by Dexter Hoyos
power at Carthage and restored the ‘war party’ (e.g. de Sanctis, 3.2.532–3) is not
persuasive; nor that the Carthaginians were thereby reinvigorated to fight (Huss
(1985) 414, ‘ein bedeutsamer Meinungsumschwung’). Oaths at armistice: note 5
above. ‘Sent out men bearing war instead of peace’: P. Rylands 491, lines 39–42,
’απ´εστειλαν φ´εροντας ’αντ`ι τ~ης ε’ιρ´ηνης τ`ον π´ολεµον; Hoyos (2001a) 75.
14 Diehards prompted Hasdrubal to attack: Pol. 15.2.4–8. Unclear if they or he
alone responsible: Livy 30.25.5. Mantel (1991) 111–16 argues that the Carthagini-
ans’ seizure of the supplies and attack on the ambassadorial ship did not amount
to a rupture of the peace-terms, but this is a very legalist argument. Seibert,
Hann. 458–9, holds that the Carthaginians wanted to hear their envoys’ report
and this did not justify Scipio’s ensuing actions in the countryside. Scipio’s anger:
Pol. 15.4.2, and stressed by Eckstein (1987) 254 as ‘probably . . . the proconsul’s
basic motivation’ even though ‘he had little to gain politically . . . while militarily
he was risking much’—but this is not persuasive.
15 Desire to bring Hannibal to battle: Lazenby (1978) 217. Date of Zama: de Sanc-
tis, 3.2.582–5, 671; Walbank, 2.446; Seibert, FzH 316–17.
16 Punic fleet’s station: Pol. 15.2.7; cf. Lazenby (1978) 217. Larger Roman war-fleets
in Africa for 202: Livy 30.24.6–7, 27.5, 36.2, 41.6–7; Thiel (1946) 176–7 thinks
Roman politics the main cause, but Lazenby stresses the military situation.
Appian supplies an implausible detailed account of campaigning before Zama
(33.141–40.167), which includes Hannibal operating in Numidia (so too Zon.
9.13.10), a siege of Carthage simultaneous with a cavalry battle at Zama, a truce
between the generals, etc. Eutropius 3.22 encapsulates the same fictitious tradi-
tion (cf. note 10). Masinissa’s arrival: Pol. 15.5.11 is preferable to Livy 30.29.4; cf.
Lazenby, 219.
17Cf. Huss (1985) 415 (Hannibal delayed battle to build and train his forces).
18 Site of Zama: Seibert, FzH 311–14, discussing the possibilities, with bibliog-
raphy. Spies and interview: Pol. 15.5.4–9.1; Livy 30.29.2–31.10. Doubted for
instance by Groag (1929) 99 note 2; Hampl (1983–4) 17–22; Seibert, FzH 315,
and Hann. 465–6 (‘Legenden’); de Sanctis, 3.2.578, rejects only the spies. Xerxes
had done the same with Greek spies (Herodotus 7.147–8) but this is scarcely
ground for disbelieving Polybius. Masinissa’s arrival (note 16) and Scipio’s
stratagem: thus Lazenby (1978) 219.
19 Hannibal intended cavalry-sacrifice at Zama: Scullard (1970) 150; Connolly
(1981) 204; Seibert, Hann. 467, 469 note 35; Lancel, Hann. 280; Santosuosso
(1997) 195; but Walbank, 2.468–9, and Lazenby (1978) 223, have doubts, and
Goldsworthy (2000) 304–5 disbelieves. Meeting with Scipio: Hampl (1983–4)
21–2 note 17 sceptically points to other anciently noted confrontations, like
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Lycurgus’ with Thales and Polycrates’ with King Amasis of Egypt. But these are
not meetings between two opposing leaders—and Alexander the Great, for
instance, does not interview his foe Darius in any tradition, while his famous
meeting with King Porus happened after Porus’ defeat (Plutarch, Alexander 60;
N. G. L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 323 BC (Cambridge 1959) 631).
20 Scipio’s demand, Pol. 15.8.14 (Loeb tr.); cf. Walbank, 2.453.
21 Zama is much discussed: e.g. de Sanctis, 3.2.536–9, 572–98; Liddell Hart (1926)
chapter XI; Walbank, 2.445–64; Scullard (1970) chapter VI; Lazenby (1978)
220–6; Seibert, FzH 308–17 (with extensive bibliography), Hann. 466–71;
Lancel, Hann. 276–83; R. J. A. Wilson, OCD 3 1,633, and J. Lazenby, OCD 3
1,633–4; Santosuosso (1997) 194–7; Goldsworthy (2000) 300–7. Single combat
between Hannibal and Scipio: Appian, Lib. 45.188–9. Hannibal gathered 6,500
foot and horse after Zama, just possibly a genuine detail (Appian, 55.241, shakily
supported by Nepos, Hann. 6.4), but urged peace (Appian, ibid. ). Silenced a
diehard senator: Pol. 15.19.2; Livy 30.37.7–8 (more dramatically placing it in the
citizen-assembly). Suicide of Hasdrubal son of Gisco: chapter XIII note 16.
22 Not so in Huss’ view: ‘Die barqidische “Partei” verlor keineswegs ihren Ein-
fluss—im Gegenteil!’ ((1985) 426). But his only argument for this is that
Hannibal later won the sufeteship; on this see chapter XV.
X V P O S T WA R E C L I P S E
1 Punic envoys: note 8 below. Peace terms of 201: Schmitt, SVA 3.296–308;
Scardigli (1991) chapter VIII; see also de Sanctis, 3.2.599–605; Walbank,
2.465–71; Lazenby (1978) 227–30; Eckstein (1987) 255–67; Seibert, Hann.
473–5; Lancel, Hann. 284–6. Polybius supplies most of the terms (15.18) but
Appian ( Lib. 54.234–8)—despite some improbable extra items, like a clause
demanding Mago’s recall from Italy (plainly a carryover from his version of the
terms in 203)—can be believed on the ban against mercenary-levying (also in
Dio, frg. 57.82). Masinissa clause not intended to undermine Carthage: Eckstein,
259–60, plausibly. Scipio’s concern: in 201 one consul, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus—
the third consul in as many years—strove to take over the command in Africa
(Broughton, MRR 1.319; cf. chapter XIV note 2).
2 Appian on Zama-aftermath: Lib. 55.239–56.244; cf. Gsell, HAAN 2.271–3.
Fleet burned: Livy 30.43.11.
3 Scipio’s demarcation of Punic boundaries, Livy 34.62.8–11. ‘Phoenician
Trenches’: Appian, Lib. 54.236 (cf. 32.135); Eumachus, FGrH 178 F2, from a
periegesis; Gsell, HAAN 2.101–3, 3.290; Scardigli (1991) 340 note 324; Lancel
(1992) 283–4; cf. map in CAH 1 8 (1930) facing p. 99, or Picard and Picard, LDC
179. Walsh (1965) 156 disbelieves them. Fossa regia: Pliny, NH 5.25; ILS 5,955 (of Vespasian’s time). Younger Scipio’s delimitation: Pliny, ibid. ; Gsell, 3.326–7, 404;
Lancel (1992) 283–4, Hann. 286.
4 Down-payment and indemnity after First Punic War: chapter I §V. Hannibal’s
reproof to the Carthaginians (abbreviated tr.), Livy 30.44.4–11; ‘first’ indemnity-
payment, 32.2.1. One might try attaching the anecdote instead to the payment of
compensation for Scipio’s seized supply-ships—the Romans calculated this at
25,000 pounds of silver, more than 300 talents—which had to be paid at once
(Livy 30.37.6, 38.1–2; de Sanctis, 3.2.600); but this would be a guess and would
not cancel the other objections.
5 Nepos, Hann. 6.4–7.4; believed by Lenschau, RE 7.2,348; Groag (1929) 114
(Hannibal continues as strategos of Libya for some years—even though Nepos 7.1
explicitly dates his recall to 200); Hallward (1930) 468; Picard (1967) 213–14;
275
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Kotula (1983–4) 89; Seibert, Hann. 497–8; Goldsworthy (2000) 326. In contrast
Lancel, Hann. 289, is sceptical. More boldly but unpersuasively, Cresci Marrone
(1978) interprets Nepos 7.4 as meaning that Hannibal became sufete in 199 and
held a lesser office in 197. Olive-trees planted over ‘Africae pleraque’: Aurelius
Victor, Caesares 37.2–3
. Roman embassy in 200 and Hamilcar the renegade: Livy
31.11.4–12, 19.1–6; on his later fate, Lenschau, RE 7.2,308–9; Briscoe (1973)
82–3, 115. Seibert ( Hann. 497) prefers Nepos (7.2) for a Punic embassy to Rome
instead. Punic hostages freed without ransom: Livy 30.43.5–8.
6 Victor a North African: Caesares 20.6, cf. 40.19. Garrison in Utica: to be inferred
from Scipio’s lengthy and unsuccessful siege (Lazenby (1978) 206–9). Note
Appian giving Hannibal 6,500 troops in the aftermath of Zama (chapter XIV
note 21); he also has a plausible garrison at Hadrumetum (47.206) and earlier
(30.128) tells of Scipio making an attempt on Hippou Acra after his victories in
203, again unsuccessfully which would imply another strong garrison—as is
likely, even though trusting Appian’s unsupported word on these African opera-
tions is unsafe (Gsell, HAAN 3.235–6; chapter XIV notes 11 and 16). Libyans
inclined to rebellion by 203: chapter XIV note 1.
7Nepos, Hann. 7.4, ‘praetor factus est, postquam rex fuerat, anno secundo et vices-
imo’. Properly ‘in the twenty-second year’ means after twenty-one years and this
would point to the year 200 (cf. Picard (1963) 276), but Nepos has just (7.2) had
Hannibal continue in army command until 199. Nepos’ notion that he moved
straight from army command to ‘praetura’ (cf. note 5) is as fuzzy—and unreli-
able—as his contradictions in applying these Latin terms to Punic offices: having
Hannibal become ‘praetor’ with the explanation that, like the consuls at Rome, so
too at Carthage two ‘reges’ (tautologically, ‘quotannis annui bini reges’) were
elected yearly; then terming Hannibal’s year of office ‘praeturam’ (7.6). Picard’s
efforts to excuse these oddities do not convince (274–8)—for instance declaring
the statement about ‘reges’ a gloss by Nepos’ late Roman editor Aemilius Probus.
8 Dio, frg. 57.86 = Zon. 9.14.13; rejected by (e.g.) Gsell, HAAN 2.273; Groag
(1929) 111. Envoys at Tunes, Livy 30.6.9; those to Rome, 30.42.11 (‘longe primi
civitatis’); Hasdrubal’s speech to Senate, 42.14–19; he blames ‘paucorum cupidi-
tatem’, 42.13; that this blaming occurs separately— not in the speech—perhaps
supports its genuineness. Appian’s speech for The Kid at Tunes, Lib.
50.215–52.228; silence too on Hannibal in Livy’s and Appian’s versions of
Scipio’s reply (30.37.1–6; Lib. 53.230–54.238).
9 Hanno the Great: an envoy to Scipio at Tunes according to Appian (49.213), but
if still alive in 202—doubted by Lenschau, RE 7.2,357; de Sanctis, 3.2.541 note
174—he would be near 80 and cannot have survived much longer (despite
Appian, Lib. 68.304: cf. chapter XVI note 19).
10 Competences of the One Hundred and Four: chapter I §III. ‘Everyone’s posses-
sions’, etc., Livy 33.46.2; on his source for Hannibal’s sufeteship see chapter XVI
note 1. Ordo iudicum = the One Hundred and Four: Groag (1929) 116–18, 127;
Hallward (1930) 468–9; M. P. Charlesworth, CAH 1 8.486; Hoffmann (1962) 112,
115; Warmington (1964) 148, 240; de Sanctis, 3.1.54; Picard (1967) 216–18; Gör-
litz (1970) 153, 155; Briscoe (1973) 336; Bacigalupo Pareo (1977) 71–7; Huss
(1985) 427, 464; Scullard (1989a) 491; Lancel (1992) 422; Seibert, Hann. 501–2.
Contrast Sznycer (1978) 580, 584 (implicitly rejects); Gsell, HAAN 2.207–8
(doubtful). Hasdrubal’s possible measures on the Hundred and Four: chapter VI
§III. ‘Barcina factio’ still in 193: Livy 34.61.11 (Hannibal’s expectations, 60.5).
Proliferation of abuses by 195: 33.46.8–47.2.
11 Critics harassed: Livy 33.46.2, ‘nec accusator apud infensos iudices deerat’. Aris-
totle on plurality of offices: Pol. 2.11.8, 1273b; above, chapter II §IV.
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12 Flawed indemnity payment (Livy 32.2.1–2) due to Punic state’s impoverishment:
Gsell, HAAN 2.323; Seibert, Hann. 497–8. Due to corrupt dealings: Hallward
(1930) 467; Warmington (1964) 240. Silver coinage debased during war:
Howgego (1995) 114. It is possible that the Carthaginians had to produce special
pure issues for the indemnity (cf. Gellius 7.5.1) and that of 199 was found defec-
tive—which would point to chicanery all the more.
13 Gifts of grain: Livy 31.19.2; 36.4.5 (in 191); 43.6.11–14 (170). On cereal output
cf. Tlatli (1978) 124–5 (estimating 1.5 million quintals in Punic times, i.e. about
20 million modii); R. M. Haywood, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, 4 (Balti-
more 1938) 43–4 (estimating 160 million modii for Tunisia and Algeria by AD 14).
Economic recovery: Lancel (1992) 423–5, Hann. 292–7. The notion that Spain
was now lost as a market (Kotula (1983–4) 89) confuses economics with politics.
14 Loss of state revenues: Livy 33.46.8–9. Hannibal’s reforms: Livy 33.47.1–2.
Raids on North Africa during war: chapter XII §I. Scipio’s armistice-promise to
stop ravaging ‘eo die’, Livy 30.37.2. It is unfoundedly optimistic to claim that the
Romans left the countryside ‘ungeschmälert’ (Lenschau, RE 10 (1919) 2233), or
with Lancel (1992) 292 to limit the destruction, for reasons unclear, to the terri-
tory around Utica and the Bagradas valley. Aristotle and Polybius on money at
Carthage: Pol. 2.11.8–12, 1273a (cf. 6.5.9, 1320b, on usefulness of bribery); Pol.
6.56.1–4; Gsell, HAAN 2.235–6; Walbank, 1.741.
15 Hannibal’s fondness for money: chapter VII note 1. Postwar supporters: Görlitz
(1970) 151 assumes that most of his war-comrades had passed away.
16 General tax levy proposed for 196: Livy 33.46.9. Hamilcar the renegade: note 5
above.
17Hannibal’s popularity in office: Livy 33.46.7
, cf. 48.9–11. ‘Democratic’ or ‘popu-
lar’ terminology: available to Appian for a report of politics at Carthage in the
150s ( Lib. 68.304–5) but not used by Livy for the 190s though he stresses Hanni-
bal’s popularity (cf. chapter XVI). Mago frater joining Hannibal in exile: Nepos,
Hann. 8.2; chapter XIV note 10. Mago the Samnite and Mago the relative: chap-
ters IV note 5, VII note 2; on the former cf. H. Volkmann, Kl P 3.889.
Interestingly among the leaders of the ‘democratic’ party 40-odd years later was
one Hamilcar ‘the Samnite’ (Appian, 68.305)—a descendant with inherited polit-
ical ties as well as nickname? (cf. Walbank, 1.110, 2.153–4). Kotula (1983–4) 92–7
denies any democratic tendency in Hannibal’s sufeteship; similarly Seibert, Hann.
501–2.
18 Accusations by enemies: Livy reports them only in 195 and as following his
actions as sufete (33.45.6–8, cf. 47.3); cf. Justin 31.1.7–9. Mommsen, HR 2.202,
Picard and Picard, LDC 274, 277, and Seibert, Hann. 499, think them plausible.
Hannibal’s journeys to Syria and then Ephesus: Livy 33.49.5–7. Antiochus’ deal-
ings with the Romans and uninterest in fighting them: Hoffmann (1957/1974)
64; R. M. Errington, CAH 2 8.270–82; Ma (1999) 94–102. Hannibal advises him
on war: Livy 34.60, 35.19.
19 Carthage’s foremost citizen: Livy 33.48.10 ‘principem civitatis’. Links with Tyre,
33.48.3, 34.61.2–3; levees, 33.48.9; dinner-parties and the like, cf. 34.61.5.
X V I H A N N I B A L S U F E T E
1 Polybius as Livy’s likely source for events at Carthage: Briscoe (1973) 335–6.
Silenus and Sosylus ‘cum eo in castris fuerunt simulque vixerunt, quamdiu fortuna
passa est’ (Nepos, Hann. 13.3; Brizzi’s fancies of a Sosylus increasingly disillu-
sioned by his hero’s unsentimental behaviour are unconvincing (1984) 7–29,
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N O T E S T O T H E T E X T
117–18). Nepos mentions them only as sources for the Second Punic War, but
one or both might have taken the story down to 195 or even to his death, even if
separated from him, despite Zecchini’s suggestion that Sosylus published his
work around 197 ((1997) 1,065–6). Failing them, other possibilities would be
Chaereas, Eumachus and Xenophon (on these, Hoyos (1998) 233–4, 281; (2001a)
77). Terentius Culleo: Livy 33.47.7; devotion to Scipio, 30.43.11, 45.5 (cf.
Plutarch, Moralia 196D); still active in 171, Livy 42.35.7; cf. Scullard, RP 114, 141, 284 . Polybius in Italy: Walbank (1972) 6–13, 166–70.
2 Date of sufeteship: M. Claudius Marcellus, one of the ensuing Roman envoys
(Livy 33.47.7), was almost certainly the consul of 196 (Broughton, MRR 3.341,
342 n.3) and so could not become an envoy until 195 at earliest. Nepos dates the
exile to ‘anno post praeturam, M. Claudio L. Furio consulibus’ ( Hann. 7.6), i.e.
196, yet terms 193 the ‘anno tertio’ after it (8.1), not ‘quarto’ as in normal inclu-
sive reckoning; on his chronology for these years cf. chapter XV note 7. Appian’s
date of 196: Syr. 4.14–1, believed by de Sanctis 4.1.112 note 3. See also Gsell,
HAAN 2. 275 note 1; Groag (1929) 114 note 4; Scullard, RP 284 (sound argu-
ments for 196); Briscoe (1973) 335; Seibert, Hann. 499 note 17; Ma (1999) 93.
3 That the clash was over the state finances is generally assumed: e.g. Groag (1929)
119; Hallward (1930) 468; Hoffmann (1962) 115; Picard (1967) 217; Seibert,
Hann. 500–1; Lancel, Hann. 291. Finance reform a separate item: Livy introduces
it with ‘adiecit et aliud’, 33.46.8. On the ‘quaestor’ in 196 see Appendix §14.
4 Hannibal overstepped powers: Groag (1929) 119 note 1; Picard (1967) 216–18;
Picard and Picard, LDC 275; Lancel (1992) 421–2; cf. Gsell, HAAN 2.276.
Against this view: Seibert, Hann. 501 note 23. Speed of events: Livy 33.46.5–7
