Citizen Hughes

by Michael Drosnin

Hughes’s response to the CIA through Holliday was quoted by Holliday in an interview.

  While it is impossible to determine how direct a role the Glomar deal played in Maheu’s ouster, Maheu himself later suggested that his refusal to make a CIA alliance for Hughes was a factor, and it is noteworthy that Hughes first mentioned the proxy that would strip Maheu of his power shortly after Holliday first contacted him about the Glomar in August 1970, and that Hughes actually signed the proxy on November 14, 1970, one day after Holliday signed the Glomar contract.

  Intertel’s Peloquin detailed his meetings with Davis and Gay in sworn depositions.

  The Mormon who retrieved Hughes’s memos from Maheu later recounted the mission in a report to Hughes: “I purposely did not call Bob to tell him I was coming until I was ready to leave (I was there in less than a minute), so he would not have time to plan any other disposition of the papers. He seemed to be in an unhappy mood, and I sensed that he did not like the implication of this action. He asked me the reason behind this, and I gave him some rather vague answer to the effect that you did not want the possibility of your messages being mislaid.”

  The final breach between Hughes and Maheu was described by Maheu in a series of interviews and in court testimony, and was also recounted by several of the Mormons. One of the aides later testified in a deposition that “during the latter portion of 1970, Gay directed myself and the other aides to hold messages from Maheu to Mr. Hughes; as a result, messages from Maheu piled up without being delivered to Mr. Hughes. At about the same time, I also observed numerous messages from the other aides criticizing Maheu and suggesting that he was disloyal to Mr. Hughes.”

  Hughes’s medical condition just before his departure was described by his physician, Dr. Harold Feikes, in a deposition, and was further detailed in an interview. “I saw Hughes within a few weeks of his leaving Las Vegas,” said Feikes. “His primary problem was pneumonia. He was only mildly ill, and not really anemic. His blood count was close to normal. But he wanted more transfusions.” Hughes’s demand for the blood was quoted by Feikes.

  Maheu sent Davis a telegram on November 6, 1970, firing him from the TWA case. The Hughes Tool Company directors revoked Maheu’s authority over the TWA case on November 12, 1970.

  One of the Mormons who was present when Hughes signed the proxy ousting Maheu later described the scene in court testimony.

  Several of the aides, in depositions, recounted Hughes’s departure from the Desert Inn, and one gave further details in an interview. The Las Vegas Sun story appeared on December 2, 1970. Two days later Hughes released the proxy, stripping Maheu of power, and on December 7, 1970, at one A.M., Hughes called Governor Laxalt from the Bahamas to confirm that Maheu had been fired.

  The White House encounter between Ehrlichman and Rebozo was recounted by Ehrlichman in an interview.

  Epilogue I Watergate

  The story of the Hughes connection to Watergate told in the epilogue is in many ways more a confirmation than a revelation. An unpublished forty-six-page report by the staff of the Senate Watergate Committee first presented significant evidence that the Hughes-Nixon-O’Brien triangle triggered the break-in, and was a primary source for my account. Several staff investigators also provided testimony, transcripts, and documentary material never made public, and provided further details in interviews. I am also deeply indebted to J. Anthony Lukas, the first journalist to fully explore the Hughes-Watergate link in his book Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Years (Viking, 1976).

  Nixon’s message to Haldeman was quoted by John Dean in Blind Ambition (Simon & Schuster, 1976, p. 66) from a copy of the memo Haldeman passed on to him, and its content was confirmed by Haldeman in an interview.

  Nixon’s fears that the $100,000 would become public in the aftermath of the Hughes-Maheu split were reflected by Rebozo in his Senate Watergate Committee testimony: “Matters went from bad to worse in the Hughes organization, and I felt that sooner or later this matter would come up and be misunderstood.… The concern was principally any disclosure that the president had received Hughes money … I didn’t want to risk even the remotest embarrassment about any Hughes connection with Nixon. I was convinced that it cost the president the 1960 election.”

  An aide who was with Nixon in San Clemente recalled seeing the president reading a Los Angeles Times story about Maheu’s lawsuit against Hughes shortly after Maheu’s ouster, and such a story did run on January 14, 1971. In a column five days earlier Anderson wrote, “Some of the confidential documents impounded by the Nevada court in the Hughes case have been slipped to us.”

  Nixon’s orders to “nail O’Brien” were quoted by Haldeman in The Ends of Power (Times Books, 1978, p. 155), and while in the book he placed the conversation aboard Air Force One, in an interview he corrected his account, placing it in the White House. Haldeman also noted that “O’Brien touched a raw nerve: Nixon’s dealings with Howard Hughes, which had cost him two elections” (The Ends of Power, p. 155).

  Hughes’s setup and condition in the Bahamas were described by one of his Mormons in an interview and by other aides in depositions. One of them, George Francom, later testified that “control of Mr. Hughes’s communications began to tighten.… I observed many messages to and from Mr. Hughes being held by all the other aides.”

  Hughes’s drug use was detailed in a 1978 report of the Drug Enforcement Administration. His activities were recorded for each day from October 1971 through July 1973 in logs kept by his aides. (Logs were also maintained all through the years Hughes spent in Las Vegas and continued until his death, but all these records were destroyed.)

  The arrest of Maheu’s men in the Bahamas was confirmed by FBI reports obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and by an Intertel agent in an interview.

  Colson’s memo about Bennett was obtained from Senate Watergate Committee files. In an interview Colson said that he was unaware of the connection to Hughes through Rebozo and also knew nothing about Bennett’s CIA ties. Colson also suggested that both Bennett and the CIA instigated the Watergate break-in: “I think Bob Bennett had a tremendous motive—he had more interest in what O’Brien was doing and saying than we did—and I’ve always felt that the CIA had some motive because of their interlocking ties with both Bennett and Hughes.”

  Dean detailed his efforts to nail O’Brien on orders from Haldeman in Blind Ambition (pp. 66–68), and the memos he sent and received were obtained from files of the Senate Watergate Committee. Haldeman gave a similar account of the Hughes-O’Brien probe in Ends of Power (pp. 19–20, 153–56) and in a series of interviews. The entire operation by the White House was also detailed in an unpublished report by the staff of the Senate Watergate Committee.

  Nixon’s renewed orders to get O’Brien were quoted by Haldeman in The Ends of Power (pp. 19–20, 154–56). “In the case of O’Brien,” noted Haldeman, “Nixon was acting very much like Captain Queeg in his search for the strawberries … here was Larry O’Brien a secret Hughes lobbyist—and no one cared.… And yet, as Nixon often said to me, how the press took after him on any possible connection to Howard Hughes!”

  Intertel’s instigation of an IRS probe of Maheu was detailed by Andy Baruffi, the IRS agent in charge of the Hughes case, and confirmed by two other IRS agents directly involved. In an interview, Maheu confirmed his belief that he was the target of a conspiracy between the Hughes organization and the federal government. “I felt the pangs of government muscle within hours after I challenged Howard Hughes,” he said.

  Danner told the Senate Watergate Committee that Rebozo called him right after Anderson’s August 1971 column appeared: “I think the subject was how did Anderson learn of this, and the answer was that he had been shown an alleged memo describing the details of the event.” Danner also testified that Anderson told him that Maheu had leaked the Hughes memo.

  Greenspun’s September 1971 warning to Klein was confirmed by both Greenspun and Klein in interviews. Both Ehrlichman and Kalmbach confirmed in intervie
ws that Ehrlichman sent Kalmbach to see Greenspun about the Hughes money, and Kalmbach and Greenspun gave similar accounts of their meeting. “I recall there being a need for someone to talk to Greenspun,” said Ehrlichman, “and I recall it being agreed—not just by me, but by a number of people, at the very least Haldeman, possibly Mitchell—that Kalmbach ought to call on him. I probably also discussed it with Rebozo.”

  The Senate Watergate Committee noted in its final report that Rebozo paid $45,621 for improvements on Nixon’s Key Biscayne compound, and concluded that the only apparent source for at least half of that expense was the cash he received from Hughes.

  Bennett informed the Senate committee that he told Colson about the Hughes memos in Greenspun’s safe late in 1971.

  Ehrlichman confirmed in a series of interviews that he received IRS “sensitive case reports” on the Hughes probe, and provided a copy of one such report he received on July 24, 1972, which summarized political aspects of the IRS investigation. The John Meier–Donald Nixon dealings were recounted in that report and further detailed by Ehrlichman, who confirmed in the interviews that he kept Nixon informed on the probe.

  Nixon’s story of the “loan” scandal was recounted by Ehrlichman. Haldeman gave a similar account of Nixon’s claims about that scandal.

  The impact of the Clifford Irving affair on Watergate was first suggested by an unpublished report of the Senate Watergate Committee. In Blind Ambition (p. 390), Dean reported Haldeman’s orders to get a copy of Irving’s manuscript and also stated that “somebody from the White House got a copy from the publisher.” Bennett told the Special Prosecutor’s Office that both Colson and Dean contacted him about Irving’s book and recounted his conversation with Dean. FBI files obtained through the Freedom of Information Act revealed that Hoover sent Haldeman reports on the Irving affair.

  The account of the Hughes-Nixon dealings in Irving’s book was quoted in an unpublished Senate Watergate Committee report and also in part by a February 4, 1972, story in the New York Times. A White House aide confirmed that Nixon himself read at least a summary of Irving’s account.

  Hughes’s activities on the day of his press conference were detailed in the logs maintained by his aides. The Hughes quotes are from a tape recording of that conference.

  The creation of the Hunt-Liddy team was described in reports of the Senate Watergate Committee and the House Impeachment Committee, by both Hunt and Liddy in their books, and by Haldeman and Dean in their books.

  Nixon’s reaction to reports that Bobby Kennedy had investigated the Hughes “loan” was quoted by a White House aide in an interview. Nixon himself made similar comments in his memoirs RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (Warner, 1978, vol. 1, p. 305), writing that Kennedy’s effort to prosecute his mother and brother was “typical of the partisan vindictiveness that pervaded the Kennedy administration.”

  The February 4, 1972, and January 27, 1972, meetings between Liddy, Mitchell, Dean, and Magruder were detailed by Liddy in his book Will (St. Martin’s Press, 1980, pp. 196–203), by Dean and Magruder in Senate Watergate Committee and court testimony, by Dean in Blind Ambition (pp. 79–86), and by Magruder in An American Life (Pocket Books, 1975, pp. 207–12). Both Dean and Magruder testified that Mitchell discussed O’Brien as a target for surveillance. Magruder also told the Senate Watergate Committee, according to an unpublished staff report, that “the attorney general not only brought up the Greenspun entry operation, but also urged Liddy to consider it as more pressing and important than the other targets discussed.”

  Hunt detailed the Greenspun plot in Senate Watergate Committee testimony and stated that Bennett first suggested that break-in a few days before the Mitchell-Liddy meeting. Bennett gave a similar account but claimed that it was Hunt who suggested a break-in after Bennett told him Greenspun had Hughes memos. Hunt in his testimony and Liddy in his book (Will, p. 205) confirmed Winte’s involvement.

  Nixon’s impatience with the lack of action from Liddy’s operation was reported by Haldeman in his book (The Ends of Power, pp. 10–11). Strachan’s call to Magruder was quoted by Magruder in Senate Watergate Committee testimony. Nixon’s anger at O’Brien over the ITT affair was noted by Haldeman in his book (The Ends of Power, pp. 153–55), by Colson in an interview, and by Nixon himself in his memoirs (RN, vol. 2, p. 54). The Hunt-Liddy-Colson meeting was confirmed by all three, and Magruder testified that Colson called to push him on getting approval of Liddy’s plan.

  The Magruder-Mitchell meeting and Mitchell’s revelation of the Hughes motive behind Watergate were described in detail by a confidential source with direct knowledge of their conversation in two hour-long taped interviews. The source agreed to give the information only upon my assurance that he would not be identified.

  In Senate Watergate Committee and court testimony, Magruder said that Mitchell approved the Watergate break-in on March 30, 1972. Magruder also testified that Mitchell ordered the second break-in. Liddy stated in Will (p. 237) that Magruder ordered him to photograph O’Brien’s “shit file” on Nixon. “The purpose of the second Watergate break-in” wrote Liddy, “was to find out what O’Brien had of a derogatory nature about us, not for us to get something on him or the Democrats.”

  Nixon’s reaction to the Watergate arrests was described by Haldeman in his book (pp. 7–13) and by Nixon himself in his memoirs (vol. 2, pp. 109–13).

  Haldeman reconstructed his June 20, 1972, conversation with Nixon in The Ends of Power (pp. 18–19) and in two interviews confirmed that Nixon himself revealed the Hughes connection to Watergate, probably in that erased conversation, and definitely in one of his talks with Haldeman in the days following the break-in.

  Epilogue II The Final Days

  Hughes’s activities at the time of the Watergate arrests were detailed in the logs maintained by his aides and confirmed by listings for July 16–17, 1972, in a Vancouver edition of TV Guide.

  The fact that Hughes was oblivious to Watergate for more than a year was established by the memos his aides and attorney sent in response to his belated inquiries and confirmed in an affidavit by one of his Mormons.

  Hughes’s escape from the Bahamas was described by an aide in an interview, and by several other aides in depositions. His dealings with Somoza were established by memos Hughes wrote and dictated, and by others received from his staff. Hughes’s preparations for his meeting with Somoza and Shelton were detailed in his logs, and the meeting itself was described both by an aide who was present and Shelton in an interview with the IRS. Hughes’s arrival in Vancouver was described by an aide who was present.

  Bennett’s role as a double agent in Watergate was detailed in Senator Howard Baker’s report of his investigation into “CIA Activity in Watergate,” published as an appendix to the final report of the Senate Watergate Committee.

  Nixon’s suspicion that Bennett was “Deep Throat” and that the Bennett-Hughes-CIA axis was somehow responsible for his downfall was reported by Haldeman in The Ends of Power (Times Books, 1978, pp. 134–39) and hinted at by Nixon in his memoirs RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (Warner, 1978, vol. 2, p. 578). “Now that few people seemed to care about the question of who had ordered the break-in,” wrote Nixon, “there was new information that the Democrats themselves had prior knowledge and that the Hughes organization might be involved. And there were stories of strange alliances.”

  Ehrlichman detailed his July 24, 1972, meeting with Nixon in an interview and provided a copy of the IRS “sensitive case report” he gave Nixon that revealed Hughes’s payments to O’Brien. “He got very, very excited about it, about as excited as I had ever seen him get,” recalled Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman also reported Nixon’s orders to have the IRS audit O’Brien and put him in jail, and the efforts to use the IRS against O’Brien were confirmed by the final reports of the House Impeachment Committee and the Senate Watergate Committee.

  Nixon’s September 15, 1972, conversation with Dean is drawn from a transcript of a White House tape.

  Hugh
es’s contribution of $150,000 to Nixon’s 1972 campaign was reported by Bennett in statements to the Senate Watergate Committee and the Special Prosecutor’s Office. Rebozo’s call to Danner seeking Hughes money was confirmed by Danner in Senate Watergate Committee testimony. Liddy’s involvement in handling the Hughes contribution was noted by Liddy in Will (St. Martin’s Press, 1980, p. 215), and by Bennett in his Senate staff interviews. Bennett reported Evans’s solicitation of another $100,000 in statements to the special prosecutor in which he also noted his arrangement of a birthday call from Nixon to Hughes.

  Hughes’s reaction to the Managua earthquake was described by an aide who was present, by other aides in depositions, and detailed in logs the aides kept.

  The IRS showdown in Fort Lauderdale was detailed in a series of interviews by Richard Jaffe, an IRS agent who played a key role, and confirmed by Andy Baruffi, who was in charge of the Hughes investigation, and by IRS reports of the incident obtained from a confidential source.

  Hughes’s plans to fly again were described by one of his Mormons, his preparations for the flight were detailed in his logs, and the flight itself was described by his English co-pilot, Tony Blackman, in a later report to lawyers for the Hughes estate. It was the first time Hughes had flown a plane since he slipped out of his seclusion for a flight in 1960, at which time his pilot’s license had already expired.

  Hughes’s belated discovery of Watergate was described by one of his Mormons, George Francom, in an affidavit. “In mid-1973, I gave him a copy of the London Express which had a picture of a plane he was interested in,” recalled Francom. “There was also a story about Watergate in the paper, and he had no idea what Watergate was about. We prepared several memos explaining Watergate, but I don’t know if he ever read them.”

  Nixon’s March 21, 1973, conversation with Dean is transcribed from a White House tape. His conversations with Haldeman and Ehrlichman about money from Rebozo’s slush fund were revealed in tapes of April 17 and April 25, 1973, meetings obtained by the special prosecutor. Both Haldeman and Ehrlichman reported Nixon’s renewed offers of money at Camp David in their books and in interviews. “In 1976 I asked Nixon where that money would have come from,” Haldeman wrote in The Ends of Power (pp. 20–22). “He said, ‘Bebe had it.’ But I reminded him that Bebe had only $100,000 of the Hughes money. Where would the rest have come from? Nixon told me this interesting news. There was much more money in Bebe’s ‘tin box’ than the Hughes $100,000 … Bebe Rebozo, in effect, maintained a private fund for Nixon to use as he wished.”