Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945

by Aleksei Isaev

  After the enemy breakthrough to the Danube, the situation for the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front became difficult for the first time. The southern flank of the breakthrough was open, and this threatened the 57th Army, 1st Bulgarian Army and 12th Yugoslav Corps, which were occupying positions southeast of Lake Balaton and along the Drava River to its mouth, with encirclement. The pontoon crossings on the Danube were swept away on one night by a storm. The Front headquarters was in the town of Paks, and enemy panzer reconnaissance units were approaching. … Frankly speaking, the situation was dangerous, and we were given the opportunity to decide the question regarding the further usefulness of holding the bridgehead west of the Danube. It was distasteful to fall back behind the Danube: Vienna would become distant, and in the near future there was no hope for a second forced crossing of the Danube, given the enemy’s organized defense of it.1

  As we see, the Soviet command initially viewed the German offensive as an attempt to eliminate the bridgehead held by the 3rd Ukrainian Front on the western bank of the Danube. In reality, the prospect of an attack around the eastern end of Lake Balaton into the rear of the 57th Army also looked threatening. The uncertainty about the enemy plans at first forced the 3rd Ukrainian Front command to allocate its reserves cautiously. The 2nd Ukrainian Front’s 30th Rifle Corps, which had been freed up as a result of the successful storming of Budapest before being transferred to Tolbukhin’s operational control, was sent to cover the area between Lake Balaton and the Danube River. However, without cooperation among Armeegruppe Balck, the 2nd Panzer Army and the main Sudöst command in the Balkans, such an operation was unrealizable. It should be said that the German command did plan an offensive by the 2nd Panzer Army on this axis. It received the code name Eisbrecher [“Icebreaker”]. A start date of 25 January 1945 had even been set for the offensive, but on 24 January an order arrived from the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, or Supreme Command of the Army) that indefinitely postponed “Icebreaker”. In a word, the German command didn’t use even the possibility of confusing the enemy regarding the real objective of the new offensive.

  Incidentally, even without a clear idea of the enemy’s plans regarding the bridgehead as a whole, the situation was threatening. The enemy’s rapid advance to the Danube led to the total expenditure of the reserves located in the depth of the 4th Guards Army’s dispositions. Despite the diversion of part of the attacking force in order to encircle the 18th Tank Corps and 133rd Rifle Corps, the Soviet troops were unable to block the enemy’s further advance in all directions. The catastrophes of 1941 and 1942 had unfolded according to just the same scenario. If the Danube River hadn’t been backstopping the collapsed front, but instead the Front’s rear services, the Germans might have made a deep penetration just as they did in Operations Blau and Barbarossa. Tolbukhin’s task was simpler than that of restoring a broken front. The Germans’ task was to break through to Budapest, the path to which lay through the gap between Lake Velence and the Danube. The width of this gap was just 17 kilometers, and it was much easier to organize a strong defense based on this narrow neck of land than to rebuild an enormous, shattered front.

  However, the commander of the 4th Guards Army no longer had the reserves even for manning a line across a 17-kilometer front. In connection with this, G.F. Zakharov was given control of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, the 1st Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, the 145th Regiment of SU-100 tank destroyers and a number of artillery units, all from the Front reserve. General Gorshkov’s cavalry corps was used to defend the corridor of ground between Lake Velence and the Danube, through which the Germans might break through to Budapest.

  In general, a Red Army cavalry division or corps was substantially weaker than its infantry counterpart. However, in the realities of 1945, given the fact that the rifle divisions on average had been reduced by casualties and the lack of replacements to 4,000 – 5,000 men, the cavalry division now looked quite different in comparison. The Red Army’s mobile formations, which were its most valuable asset, were better maintained. According to data for 20 January 1945, the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps numbered 17,801 officers and men, 86 45mm and 76mm anti-tank guns, 7 SU-76 self-propelled guns and 26 tanks, which together with its mobility made it an important trump card in the hands of the 3rd Ukrainian Front command.

  The cavalrymen received the order to move out to a new line of defense on 19 January from its current area of assembly to the west of Budapest. Now it faced a 95-kilometer march to take up a defense between Lake Velence and the Danube River. The three cavalry divisions began feverishly to construct their defensive positions only around midnight 19 January. Given only several hours of work, the defensive line could hardly have withstood an attack by the IV SS Panzer Corps’ main forces. However, the expected mortal blow against the cavalrymen’s hastily-prepared positions didn’t come at dawn the following morning. Up until 14.00 20 January, the Germans didn’t show any activity at all on this key axis for them. At that point, they limited themselves to probes of the defenses in small groups of tanks and infantry. The reason was simply a matter of supply. According to the testimony of prisoners that were seized by the Cossacks, the panzers of Gille’s corps on this sector were immobilized by the lack of fuel for the entire day.

  The prisoner testimony is confirmed by enemy documents. The German assault grouping, which had made a deep penetration, was actually experiencing supply difficulties. The fact that Soviet troops retained possession of Székesfehérvár, which was a major road hub, seriously complicated the work of the IV SS Panzer Corps’ supply units. The weather conditions complicated their work even further. At 2.00 20 January, as the Soviet cavalrymen were feverishly readying a defense, the German Sixth Army’s Oberquartiermeister [Chief quartermaster] was reporting to Armeegruppe Balck’s chief of staff: “As a result of the snowfall and strong winds, extremely deep snowdrifts have formed, which are causing lengthy delays in the movement of columns. The delivery of items of supply is being badly delayed.”2

  The 18th Tank Corps and 133rd Rifle Corps, encircled in the Aba – Sárkeresztúr area, played a prominent role in tying down Gille’s panzer corps. Even in encirclement, they created a threat to the lines of communication of the SS Wiking and 3rd Panzer Divisions that had reached the Danube. At this moment, Govorunenko’s tank corps numbered a total of 64 armored vehicles that were still operational, including 51 T-34, 8 ISU-122 and 5 SU-76. In addition, rifle units had fallen into encirclement together with the tankers. This presented a threat to the German lines of communication which the Germans could not ignore, so they could not tarry with the elimination of the pocket. In the blitzkrieg period of 1939-1941, the destruction of encircled enemy units would likely have been handed over to infantry following in the panzers’ wake. In January 1945, no longer were there columns of infantry marching behind the panzer spearheads. Thus, the IV SS Panzer Corps had to deal with the encircled Soviet units itself. A strong detachment with tanks was formed from Wiking and sent back to the west. This detachment stumbled across the 18th Tank Corps headquarters and subjected it to shelling.

  A knocked-out King Tiger of the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion. The tank was struck by a shell in the flank in the vicinity of its engine compartment.

  One more knocked-out King Tiger. Its tactical marking, the letter “G”, is visible on the tank’s front armor.

  A disabled Panther Ausf. A in Hungary, January 1945. (TsAMO)

  A close-up view of the flank of the tank in the preceding photograph. Plainly, it has been literally riddled with anti-tank rounds. Note the roller wheels that have been shot through by armorpiercing shells.

  Together with the seizure of Seregélyes by Totenkopf on 20 January, the situation around the two encircled Soviet corps became dire. Tolbukhin ordered the corps commanders to break out to the south. The choice of an axis for breakout, strictly speaking, was limited. To the east lay the Danube, which might have been crossed and would have allowed a link-up with friendly forces on its easter
n bank, but in the best case this would have come at a heavy cost in combat and auxiliary equipment. This was totally unacceptable, even setting aside the complexities of making a river crossing by the encircled units. To the north were Lake Velence and the 17-kilometer-wide corridor between it and the Danube River. Here, the presence of main enemy forces would have complicated the passage of the front lines. The columns of the encircled troops would have been simply destroyed on their approach to join back up with friendly forces. Only one path remained – to the south.

  For the breakout from encirclement, the units and formations of the two corps were split into two separate columns. The right-hand (western) column included the 181st Tank Brigade, the 21st Rifle Division, and a portion of the 122nd Rifle Division. The left-hand (eastern) column consisted of the 110th and 170th Tank Brigades, the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the 104th Rifle Division. The headquarters of the two corps were moving in this same column. A collateral effect of the 18th Tank Corps’ and 133rd Rifle Corps’ breakout from encirclement became the loss of the 4th Guards Army’s main supply base at Sárosd Station. The supplies of the troops defending on the entire front from the Danube to Lake Balaton flowed through it. The swiftly unfolding German offensive forced extreme measures to be taken to evacuate the supply stockpiles. On the night of 19/20 January, 37 train cars had been loaded with supplies and sent out. However, naturally there was no time to evacuate the stockpiles completely. For a certain time, the stockpiles remained in an area still controlled by the two encircled corps. However, this couldn’t sustain their existence for very long. On the night of 21/22 January, as the Germans approached the station, the remaining stockpiles were torched or blown up. For a long time, the breakout attempt by the encircled Soviet units was accompanied by a fireworks display in the night sky from the 60 burning train cars of ammunition.

  The breakout began at 12.00 20 January. The scenarios for both columns were approximately identical: they moved out to the south, toward evening bumped into German blocking forces, and attempted to fight their way through them. The right-hand column met stubborn enemy resistance in the area of the Heinrich Estate. Gathering the tank brigade into a fist, at 19.00 they launched a second attack and successfully broke through. Here the 181st Tank Brigade lost 9 tanks. Having broken through and with enemy pursuers snapping at their heels, the Soviet tankers and infantrymen spent all night fighting their way to the south, and came out of the encirclement on the morning of 21 January. By this time, the 181st Tank Brigade had just 4 tanks left. The losses of the 181st Tank Brigade amounted to 17 T-34 tanks and 2 M-17 halftracks. In addition, its commander Lieutenant Colonel Kublanov was wounded.

  The second column came out of the encirclement and reached the area of Herczegfalva with fewer losses – its trump card and battering ram was the regiment of ISU-122 self-propelled guns. The retained combat potential became quickly necessary, because on the following day Herczegfalva was attacked by the German 3rd Panzer Division. In the course of the day of 22 January, the 110th Tank Brigade was involved in heavy fighting for possession of that town. Its losses amounted to 16 T-34 and 2 SU-85. The 18th Tank Corps was kept afloat through replacements – it received 18 T-34 tanks and 20 SU-76 offloaded from trains.

  The situation of Govorunenko’s tank corps at that moment was of a dual nature. On the one hand, by coming out of encirclement, the units of the two corps relieved the German command of the thorns left embedded in rear of the advancing units. On the other hand, the southern flank of the German offensive was now more vulnerable. The emergence of the Soviet tank corps here created the prerequisites for an effective counterstroke. Finally, the stubborn defense of Herczegfalva, which continued for several days, tied up the German 3rd Panzer Division. In effect, the forces of the four mobile divisions of Gille’s panzer corps were now dispersed across a broad front and were attacking in various directions.

  The absence of one or two infantry corps, advancing in the wake of the tanks, substantially complicated not only the struggle with the two encircled Soviet corps, but also made the defense of the flanks more difficult. The southern flank of the German assault grouping was in essence being covered by a sparse screen of reconnaissance battalions, one panzer division, and one Hungarian infantry division. The fact that a panzer division and panzer reconnaissance battalions were being forced to screen the offensive greatly diluted the strength of the German assault grouping. Formally, these forces were subordinate to the 3rd Hungarian Army.

  The lack of infantry was telling not only on the southern flank, but also on the northern flank in the area of Székesfehérvár. At the beginning of January, the penetration in the direction of Zámoly had extended beyond this city to the north. As a result of the new German offensive, Székesfehérvár was bypassed and enveloped from the south. The 69th Guards Rifle Division of the 21st Guards Rifle Corps, which had been positioned with its front to the west, was regrouped to this axis. It had been forced to extend its front greatly in connection with the collapse of the 135th Rifle Corps’ defense and the retreat of Soviet forces to the east. As a result the defending lines around this important road hub were substantially thinned in order to meet this new German threat. Moreover, the city was now virtually semi-encircled. The reliable bulwark of the infantry in the preceding fighting – the 7th Mechanized Corps – was withdrawn from combat by 22 January. It left behind only the composite 16th Brigade, which numbered a total of 4 T-34, 1 SU-85, 3 IS-2 and 2 SU-76. This brigade was sent to defend the northern shoreline of Lake Velence and it was no longer involved in the fighting for Székesfehérvár. However, the defenders of the city were still left with tank units – the 9th Guards Tank Brigade and the 382nd Regiment of SU-100 tank destroyers, which had been transferred from the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, were operationally subordinate to the 21st Guards Rifle Corps. In these days they were continually being shuffled from place to place around Székesfehérvár’s defensive perimeter, because there was no advance knowledge of where the main German assault would be delivered.

  Attacks on Székesfehérvár with the united flanks of Breith’s and Gille’s panzer corps had started already on 20 January. The 23rd Panzer Division was attacking the city from the northwest, while the 1st Panzer Division, reinforced by a fresh Panther battalion (I/24 Panzer Regiment), attacked from the south and southeast. Kampfgruppe Phillip, known to us from Operation Konrad II, was operating on this same axis. SS Regiment Ney, composed of Hungarian volunteers (approximately 2,000 men) was providing the link between the two panzer corps. By the way, this regiment was not named after Napoleon Bonaparte’s marshal, but for the name of its Hungarian commander, Karole Nei.

  The attack’s main assault group was the 1st Panzer Division; the rest of the German and Hungarian units were pinning down the Soviet units elsewhere around the perimeter defending the city. Sooner or later, the Germans would have to detect a weakness in the Soviet defenses. An attack on the following morning, 22 January, by the 1st Panzer Division broke into the center of Székesfehérvár from the south. The appearance of enemy tanks in the city center caused a panic and the hasty retreat from the positions on the approaches to it. Already that same day, defensive positions to the east of Székesfehérvár began to be prepared at Zakharov’s order. At 18.00 22 January, the city which had been taken with fighting back in December 1944 was abandoned by its Soviet defenders.

  The situation by the end of 22 January could to a certain degree be characterized by the following words from a report of the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s deputy chief of the Political Department, Katunin: “The overall disorderly retreat by the units of the 21st Guards Rifle Corps continued until nightfall. Blocking detachments that were deployed restored order and returned those who were fleeing back to their units. Control over the troops at lower levels of command are as before absent; individual commanders, especially artillerymen, have lost their units.”

  In order to restore the front near Székesfehérvár, the 4th Guards Army commander was given the 223rd Rifle Division
from the 46th Army. In this manner, yet one more potential reserve was expended in order to avert a crisis on a previously quiet sector of the front.

  However, it mustn’t be said that the assessment of these events on the enemy’s part was unanimous. The offensive toward Székesfehérvár from the south was conducted at the order of the IV SS Panzer Corps command. Subsequently Gille’s decision was subjected to sharp criticism on Balck’s part. He argued that the storming of Székesfehérvár was a diversion and a waste of time that could have been used by the 1st Panzer Division instead for pushing forward before a solid line of defense could be built between Lake Velence and the Danube from the reserves of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. However, this disregards the vital necessity of seizing Székesfehérvár in view of its location astride the IV SS Panzer Corps’ lines of communication. Balck was clearly aware of this. He had been informed of the situation by the Oberquartiermeister of the German Sixth Army back on 20 January 1945: “In the area of combat operations southeast of Stuhlweissenburg [Székesfehérvár], the movement of supplies is often interrupted due to the heavy action of hostile fire. Because of this, delays are being created in the delivery of food and ammunition.”3

  With the capture of Székesfehérvár, this threat was eliminated. Moreover, Armeegruppe Balck was now able to reduce its front substantially and to eliminate a threat from the flank. However, General Balck was unquestionably correct regarding one point: the need to regroup the 1st Panzer Division forced the postponement of the start date for the decisive offensive toward Budapest through the corridor between Lake Velence and the Danube River. During the blitzkrieg era, the secondary task of expanding the hole torn in the enemy front by the panzers would have been taken on by the infantry. However, Balck didn’t have an adequate amount of infantry under his command.