The indistinct nature of the jungle-clad border sometimes saw shallow patrols to nearby Mayan villages and there was limited contact with the Guatemalan Armed Forces. An unusual meeting point was a volleyball court hacked out of the jungle near the Tree Top Observation Post with the net following the border. Psychological operations focused on visits to villages, organizing football matches, monitoring expatriates for evidence of subverting Mayans, resolving minor administrative disagreements and guiding wealthy, well-meaning Americans. Late one very wet night in 1980, a group from Dallas who had spent the day dispensing pills and dentistry, were roused from their Punta Gorda hotel by the two southern Field Intelligence NCOs to help treat several accidental drug overdoses administered by a local Mennonite in a village.
After years of United Nations pressure, in 1980, Guatemala surrendered its claim, thereby paving the way for Belize to achieve independence in September 1981. British Forces, Belize remained for ‘an appropriate period’ in support of the Belize Defence Force. JNCOs from Force Intelligence wrote the first course for its embryonic Intelligence Section. In January 1982, as the Army adopted NATO terminology, Force Intelligence was renamed the All Source Assessment Centre and Force Security reverted to the Counter-Intelligence Detachment. Nevertheless, Guatemalan Special Forces continued to peck at Belize. On 31 July, Warrant Officer 2 Allan Hare was on a six-month tour as the Force Security Warrant Officer and was covering for the Field Intelligence NCO (West) when the Cayo Observation Post, covering the main Customs Post on the road leading to Belmopan and Belize City, reported four Guatemalans had crossed the border in a Mini Moke. Hare collected a police officer from Benque Viejo del Carmen Police Station and intercepted the car, apparently with a flat tyre, about half a mile from the border. As the police officer challenged the occupants and searched the vehicle, Hare was taking photographs when he saw a Guatemalan walk across the road and drop something in the undergrowth. Another Guatemalan did the same thing near the Moke. Hare later checked the area and found a US grenade. A second grenade was later found in undergrowth The Guatemalans were arrested with one admitting that he was the lieutenant colonel commanding the Kaibul (Special Forces) camp at Melchor. A search of the Moke revealed documents and camouflage clothing. Meanwhile, reports were being received that Kaibuls were massing across the border intending to seize the Belizean Customs Post. When the four were released, they were met by six heavily-armed Guatemalans who had crossed the border. Belize lodged a protest at the United Nations.
The Falklands War
When Colonel John Hughes-Wilson, an Intelligence Corps officer, wrote in his Military Intelligence Blunders (1993) that ‘The Falklands War came about through a combination of complacency, government misunderstandings and failure of national policy – on both sides’, the intelligence ingredients of both sides led to two countries with historically, friendly relations going to war.
By 1982, the Argentine junta in power calculated that Britain had lost interest in the Falklands Islands and the South Atlantic dependencies and would not dispute its 1833 Argentine claim. On 2 and 3 April, Argentina seized South Georgia and the Falkland Islands and captured Naval Party 8901 and men from the HMS Endurance Ship’s Detachment, all mainly Royal Marines. Although taken by surprise, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher accepted that distance and air cover was favourable and despatched Combined Task Force 317 to remove the trespassers in Operation Corporate.
Every function from the Allied Maritime Command Headquarters at Northwood to battalions had an intelligence component. A composite Section was formed at Ashford to support HQ Land Forces Falklands Islands. HQ 5 Infantry Brigade was already being supported by 81 Intelligence Section and HQ 3 Commando Brigade, which formed the Landing Group, had an Intelligence Section of eight Royal Marines supported by the in-post Intelligence Corps staff sergeant. The defence of the South Atlantic was a Fleet task but, initially, virtually no intelligence about Argentina emerged from Defence Intelligence. Hostilities with Argentina were not expected. With collection and collation a critical resource, sufficient information was collected from public libraries and television news broadcasts were scavenged for information, appeals made for photographs and several people who had been ‘down south’ debriefed to allow a reasonable intelligence assessment to be presented at the first Landing Group Orders Group at HQ Commando Forces on 5 April. The chronic lack of Spanish linguists was partly alleviated by the arrivals of an RAF Flight Sergeant who had served at Joint Service Interrogation Wing and a Royal Marines driver of Gibraltarian extraction. At sea, the Commando Brigade Intelligence Section on board HMS Fearless faced further problems:
• The inadequate size of the Intelligence office for a Brigade Intelligence Section. In fairness, Fearless was designed to lift a battalion. The Section eventually moved into part of the Gun Room allowing, for the first time, a 1:50,000 map to be marked.
• Several thousand ungridded maps of the Falkland Islands.
• The arrival of highly classified Intelligence Summaries and Reports from Northwood preventing dissemination.
Nevertheless, the Intelligence Section briefed Brigadier Julian Thompson, the Landing Group commander, that the Argentines were likely to convert Stanley into a stronghold supported by strong garrisons at Goose Green, Port Howard and Fox Bay.
At a two-star conference at Ascension Island on 17 April chaired by Major General Jeremy Moore, Commander Land Forces, Falkand Islands, Major David Burrill, the SO 2 G2, brought a small volume entitled Argentine Army Equipment Technical Data Sheets prepared by Technical Intelligence (Army) and current intelligence, some of which came from the debriefings of the captured British Servicemen and several Falkland islanders repatriated to UK. The inability to disseminate Intelligence Summaries was partly solved when, at Ascension Island, the HMS Fearless Electronic Warfare Office intercepted credible welfare telegrams transmitted to and from Argentina by Cable and Wireless, each identifying individuals, units and giving ‘a feel’ of the state of morale. The risk of deception was regularly checked against co-lateral from other sources. Shortage of Argentine tactical doctrine and military philosophy improved when a marine infantry field manual was captured at South Georgia after the island was recaptured on 25 April. Several prisoners were interrogated. Imagery Intelligence increased when the naval and air offensive began on 1 May, as did Special Forces reports. When photographs of an Argentine ship lurking off Ascension appeared to show human torpedoes, during the day, the ships moved continuously and the Georgetown anchorage emptied at night. A short period of censoring of mail was ordered after military information was washed onto a beach. Leaving Ascension on 6 May, as the Landing Group convoy headed into the early winter of the South Atlantic, intelligence collection was again limited to classified signals and despatches dropped by a C-130 Hercules. Any chance of being lost in the ocean’s grey expanse disappeared when the convoy was overflown by Soviet Air Force Tu-95 Bears patrolling between Cuba and Angola.
On 12 May, after exercising in a heatwave in Wales, 81 Intelligence Section embarked on Queen Elizabeth 2 at Southampton. One of the NCOs remarked:
Eating QE2 gourmet meals on the way to war, practicing small arms drills among the staterooms and doing Intelligence work among the padded armchairs of the ladies hairdressing salon; they were so bizarre that the whole experience was one of make-believe.
When intelligence flowing into Northwood mentioned a reserve airfield called Calderon, the HQ Land Forces Falkland Islands Intelligence Section assessed that none referred to mainland airfields or to Stanley. Major Burrill:
Our analysis came up with three or four possibilities of which Pebble Island was one. Special Force patrols were despatched to carry out surveillance on the possible locations. Pebble Island was identified as ‘Calderon’ and the airfield was attacked by the SAS who destroyed several aircraft and ensured the airfield could not be used.
The presence of Major Burrill, described variously as the Principal Intelligence and Security Officer and the G2, was so
mething of a milestone because he was the first Intelligence Corps officer ever to be appointed as a Theatre head of intelligence and security.
Soon after Brigadier Thompson had issued his Landing Orders on 13 May, but not D-Day, an Intelligence Report arrived in the Commando Intelligence Section indicating that Combat Team Guemes (Eagle) had deployed from Goose Green to Port San Carlos and observation post, later known as the Fanning Head Mob, had been placed on the headland overlooking San Carlos Water and north Falklands Sound. Concerned that the landings might have been compromised, the prime focus of intelligence attention switched to Task Force Mercedes at Goose Green. Following the collapse of political negotiations, during the night of 20/21 May, the Landing Force Group arrived off Fanning Head. Staff Sergeant Nick van der Bijl with the Commando Brigade Intelligence Section,
From the half-deck, I saw the small blue navigation lights of the landing craft assembling at the stern and then the night was shattered by HMS Antrim opening fire on the Fanning Hill Mob, a few moments of silence and then crumps and flashes, followed by the distant machine gun chatter of the SBS attack. I was to land with Brigadier Thompson’s Tactical HQ. Next morning, I was on the upper deck admiring the scenery of San Carlos Water waiting to be called forward when all the ships opened up on Lieutenant Crippa’s incredible flight over San Carlos Water.
The unexpected Argentine air raids resulted in the landing plan changed to give priority to the infantry and artillery. Throughout D-day, in between eleven air raids, the Commando Intelligence Section watched for indications of an Argentine counter-attack. An important asset was the Special Task Detachment on HMS Intrepid providing tactical Signals Intelligence. Usually based with Communications and Security Group (United Kingdom) at Woodhouse Eaves, Loughborough, it was part of 2 (Royal Signals Special Operation Training) Squadron with a role to support rapid, airportable deployments and was a precursor to the Light Electronic Warfare Troops. The Squadron second-in-command, Captain David Thorpe, later recalled his experiences The Silent Listener (2011). With photographic interpreters on the two aircraft-carriers miles offshore and the delivery of Imagery Intelligence limited, it had been accepted that Human Intelligence of debriefing prisoners and settlers, the latter also as part of the counter-intelligence operation, and Document Exploitation would be vital. The Commando Forward Interrogation Team interrogated a sergeant who had spent six weeks at Goose Green, three Air Force manning radars guiding Argentine aircraft to San Carlos anchorage and a marine infantry lieutenant commander captured inside the beachhead perimeter. A Detailed Interrogation Centre was later established inside the Refrigeration Plant at ‘Red Beach’ (Ajax Bay). Documents captured by 3 Parachute Battalion at Port San Carlos included a net diagram and radio frequencies of 12 Infantry Regiment at Goose Green. Every night, Intelligence Summaries were prepared for collection by unit liaison officers, however not all were collected. Indeed, a large bundle for one of the Parachute Battalions remained uncollected for several days.
On the day before 2 Parachute Battalion attacked Goose Green on 28 May, four prisoners, including the 12 Infantry Regiment Reconnaissance Platoon commander, were captured but unfortunately were not transferred to the Forward Interrogation Team. It was not known until after several interrogations that 400 of the 1,200 prisoners captured had been logistic troops moved to a safer location on 27 May from the naval gunfire and Harrier attacks on at Stanley, not that they took any part in the fighting. Most of the prisoners were repatriated.
On the day of the battle, Terry Peck was debriefed by the Commando Intelligence Section. He was a former Falklands Chief of Police who had escaped from Stanley and was ‘on the run’ with a group of friends armed with weapons concealed by a Naval Party 8901 section that had briefly avoided capture in April. While Peck advised him that the military situation was under control, he also identified a Falkland Islander with military skills who could be brought out of Stanley with Special Forces assistance, but no sooner had he sent the agreed codeword ‘Rubber Duck’ confirming everything was ready, than the Argentinians imposed a strict curfew in Stanley.
HQ Land Forces Falkland Islands (LFFI) crossed-decked from Queen Elizabeth 2 to HMS Antrim to HMS Fearless and arrived in San Carlos Water on 30 May. On 2 June, 81 Intelligence Section deployed with HQ 5 Infantry Brigade to Darwin where it scavenged Argentine positions for information. The shortage of radios meant those used by the Special Task Detachment were redeployed and Captain Thorpe transferred to MV Norland and, exploiting its satellite terminal, kept HQ LFFI supplied with intelligence.
During the first fortnight of June as the British advanced toward Stanley, 5 Infantry Brigade was on the coastal right flank, while 3 Commando Brigade tackled the mountains on the left. The arrival of an Intelligence Corps Spanish linguist and a RAF Regiment officer as an interpreter doubled the size of the Commando Forward Interrogation Team. Among prisoners captured by the Commando Brigade were five 602 Commando Company at Top Malo House and an Argentine Special Forces Group sergeant knocked unconscious during a clash with the Special Air Service on Mount Kent. During this engagement, a member of the Intelligence Corps badged as Special Air Service was wounded. The lack of more prisoners during the preparatory stages before the assault on the Outer Defence Zone (Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet) meant that the intelligence product almost ceased, in particular the vital ‘over the hill’ information for the planned immediate exploitation by 5 Brigade to the Inner Defence Zone (Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge). Its advance in a complex naval operation had been hindered by the shortage of helicopters. Meanwhile, 81 Intelligence Section landed at Fitzroy in time to witness the Skyhawk attack on the two Landing Ship Logistics, Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad.
During the night of 11/12 June 3 Commando Brigade unlocked the Argentine defences. Among several prisoners that arrived at the Forward Interrogation Team were a commanding officer and a Forward Observation Officer captured by 42 Commando on Mount Harriet. The remainder of the prisoners were sent to the Divisional Cage at Fitzroy. The exploitation by 5 Infantry Brigade was delayed for twenty-four hours because it was still reorganising, a decision not well received by the Commando Brigade because Argentine shelling was causing casualties. On the eve of the 5 Infantry Brigade attack on Tumbledown on 13 June, a Special Forces report suggested that a self-propelled 155mm howitzer had been identified at Stanley. The Argentines had modern Citefa L33 towed guns but the possibility of self-propelled became a critical intelligence problem. HQ Land Forces Falklands Intelligence Section were sceptical about the report and, re-assessing their intelligence database, concluded that only towed howitzers were on the islands, Major Burrill advised Major General Moore that 5 Infantry Brigade should attack, as planned. 3 Commando Brigade experienced a similar problem when the mistranslation of information suggested tracked howitzers, as opposed to towed. Following the Argentine surrender, four towed howitzers were captured.
Later in the day, an attack by four Skyhawks on HQ 3 Commando Brigade forced a night ‘crash move’ just as both Brigades crossed their start lines to attack Wireless Ridge and Tumbledown Mount respectively. About thirty minutes later, Signals Intelligence advised Brigade HQ that it was about to be raided! As Main HQ column followed a track to the base of Mount Kent during the night of freezing winds and snow, the heavily-laden Intelligence Section BV 202 SnoCat capsized while crossing the River Murrell. At about midnight amid the crescendos of battle, the column was halted near the summit when Stanley below was suddenly illuminated by streetlights. Next morning, covered by the column, the Intelligence Section ‘pepper-potted’ to a group of soldiers seen in the rocks. It turned out to be a Scots Guard Forward Observation Party. By the time, Brigade HQ reached its location at dawn, most of the BVs had been drained of fuel to support those with radios and 81 Intelligence Section moved forward onto Mount Harriet. Another blizzard was screaming across the white valleys when ‘Argentines have surrendered’ was heard on the radio.
Later in the day of frequent blizzards, the Comm
ando Intelligence Section landed from an overloaded Sea Commando on Stanley Racecourse and, filing through a minefield, followed the coast road to Stanley. All the Intelligence Corps in the vicinity of Stanley and several others who had attached themselves to the Commando Intelligence Section crossed the ceasefire line and began searching enemy headquarters. Government House, which had been the Argentine GHQ, had a conservatory full of ripe grapes. The detachment spent the night occupying the Argentine Consulate next door to the Post Office. Next day, HQ Land Forces Intelligence issued orders for the repatriation of about 12,000 prisoners, the first batch of 4,000 boarding Canberra that night. In addition, 600 special category were to be retained for detailed interrogation by a Joint Services Interrogation Wing detachment en route from Ascension Island. Amid snow squalls and darkness illuminated by a spotlight from a captured patrol boat moored to the jetty near the British Antarctic Offices, the prisoners were searched by Royal Marines Police and relieved of everything except their uniforms, a blanket, washing kit and a spoon, and were then briefly interrogated for suitability as special category. A field hospital of 400 wounded, injured and sick prisoners was searched and a medical officer with a pistol concealed in his medical satchel transferred to a Red Cross official. Disruption by hardline officers was countered by linguists mingling with the prisoners listening to conversations, as well as unearthing several officers masquerading as other ranks. Eventually a one-sided conversation between a brigadier-general and the 5 Infantry Brigade Royal Military Police captain solved further disruption. Meanwhile, during the counter-intelligence operation, nine Polish seamen who had ‘jumped ship’ were interviewed by an Intelligence Corps linguist.
Sharing the Secret Page 41
