A week after the surrender, the Commando Intelligence Section embarked onto the Canberra and three weeks of compression of report writing, sunbathing and socialising. On 12 July, the liner was escorted to her Southampton berth by hundreds of boats and greeted by relatives and military bands.
Most of those who took part in Operation Corporate did not immediately appreciate its iconic place in British military history. Fought without atrocities, 7,000 British landed against all the odds after 8,000-miles voyage to a southern hemisphere winter and then plodded across pathless moors and freezing mountains to defeat 13,000 opponents in well-defended positions. One lesson that emerged was that the conduct of the prisoners captured by the Argentinians, which also included a Harrier pilot and a member of the SAS, proved the value of resistance to interrogation training. Just one award was made to the Intelligence Corps of Member of the British Empire to Captain Algernon Thomas. When responsibility for the defence of the Falklands and South Georgia was transferred to Land, the Intelligence and Security supported the garrison with accurate intelligence and security strategy. It moved into comfortable accommodation at Mount Pleasant in 1986. The Specialist Task Detachment reformed as the Joint Signals Unit Falkland Islands. Several who took part in the campaign were in Northern Ireland within weeks. As for the intelligence product during the campaign, Brigadier Thompson:
The response by those members of the Corps involved in the operation was positive and professional. As the brigade commander charged with carrying out the initial landings on the Falklands, what impressed me most was the quality of the intelligence assessments that were produced from quite early on and right through the campaign by the intelligence staffs in my superior headquarters and in my own headquarters. The ‘piece de resistance’ was the identification of positions occupied by the Argentine regiments before we landed, which proved to be amazingly accurate. I also felt that the way the Intelligence Staffs coped with the interrogation of prisoners, a mammoth task, when one considers the numbers taken, and the short time available in which to process them, was a model of efficiency and humanity.
For a short time in the 1950s, the Notes on the British Army had graded the Intelligence Corps as a ‘Teeth Arm’ alongside the Infantry and Cavalry. However, this view then underwent a period of Ministry of Defence indecision of whether it should be an Arm or a Service. Matters came to a head in 1979 when the Ministry stipulated that an Arm was a ‘Corps or Regiment whose role is to be in close combat with the enemy to weaken his ability to fight’. While the Corps was not often in close combat with an enemy in the conventional sense, its counter-intelligence role from its inception in 1940 in peace and war meant that close contact had disrupted hostile intelligence service operations, and had kept the Army largely unaffected by espionage, subversion and sabotage. Its contribution to Combat, Signals and Photographic Intelligence collection and threat assessments meant that enemy operations were always at risk of disruption. In many respects, while other Arms and Corps had bursts of close combat, the Intelligence Corps was on permanent active service.
The burgeoning reputation of the Intelligence Corps led to its Directorate bidding that it should be recognized as an Arm citing that it not only had a proven record in combat zones, often its soldiers on a limb or alone collecting intelligence before the Arms went into action, one good example being the Corps out during the siege of the Iranian Embassy in 1979. The tally of Queen’s Gallantry Medals and other awards emerging from Northern Ireland strengthened the case. To outwit Ministry bureaucracy, Brigadier Parritt CBE ADC, the Director, recalled:
Deciding on humour, at Christmas 1983, I toured the corridors of the MoD pitifully explaining that I was not invited to either of the main Christmas Parties. We were not recognized as an ‘Arm’ and so were not invited by the Vice Chief of the General Staff to his party, and were not regarded as a Logistic Corps and so were not invited by the Vice Quartermaster General. It worked and on 1 February 1985, I was then invited to the Commander-in-Chief’s annual Heads of Arm conference at UK Land Forces Wilton – the only Brigadier among Major Generals, quizzically asking why was he, in his distinctive beret, there.
In 1984, Brigadier Parritt attended the Commander-in-Chief’s Annual Conference along with the Directors of other Arms, all of whom were Major Generals. On 1 February, the Executive Committee of the Army Board agreed that the Intelligence Corps should be formally declared an Arm.
The Corps posting policy had been envisaged that Operational Intelligence and Protective Security NCOs would experience a series of balanced postings between their trade skills, however, Northern Ireland and increasing demands on the Corps meant that while experts had been developed in Imagery Intelligence, some aspects of Human Intelligence and counter-sabotage with 163 (Special Security) Section, there were other areas where expertise was required, such as Operational Intelligence, Protective Security and languages but it sometimes did not exist. In response, Lieutenant Colonel Snell produced a report in 1987 in which he suggested that SNCOs should be given the opportunity to specialize after Class A1 Trade Training and that personal aptitudes should suit experience, interests and ambitions.
Cyprus
After the Turkish Intervention, Cyprus continued to attract intrigue. Suspicions of East European intelligence activities manifested themselves in 1982 when a Bulgarian Intelligence Service espionage attack on 9 Signal Regiment proved the risk. US F-111s flying from Britain bombing Tripoli in 1985 and the expectation that Libya and her Middle Eastern allies would attack the Sovereign Base Areas led to British Forces, Cyprus adopting a war footing for the next three years. The attack of RAF Akrotiri by the extremist Palestinian Abu Nidal using mortars and small arms in August 1986 saw the Joint Intelligence Staff (Cyprus) assisting the RAF investigation by locating two 60mm mortars and providing a detailed assessment of the attack within three days. A Scotland Yard counter-terrorist team that arrived three weeks later took three months to reach the same conclusion. The kidnapping of Western hostages, aircraft hijackings to Cyprus and the possibility of military intervention led to two Corps attending negotiation courses and developing the notion that negotiators could also be intelligence collectors. Cyprus remains an important strategic and logistic platform for operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. When the Army and RAF components merged into the Joint Service Signal Unit (Cyprus), several Royal Signals transferring as Operators, Military Intelligence (Linguist).
Northern Ireland
After the attack on the 1984 Conservative Party conference in Brighton, the Manouevrist strategy in Northern Ireland was escalated, one result being the neutralisation of the iconic East Tyrone IRA Brigade at Loughgall police barracks. During the decade, 102 servicemen were killed, half during six bombings in Northern Ireland and three in England. In its ‘Tet Offensive’ that was launched in 1987, several soldiers, airmen and dependants, including the German wife of a soldier and a baby, were shot dead in West Germany. Once again, as had happened in Cyprus, Aden and during the 1970s, the families of Servicemen became targets of terrorism. An Army warrant officer driving his car fitted with a British Forces, Germany number plate was murdered near the Ostend ferry port. This security risk had been highlighted by 5 Security Company in 1976. In May 1988 in Bielefeld and June 1989 in Hannover respectively, the second in command of 7 Intelligence Company and a Royal Corps of Transport sergeant, whose wife worked at HQ 5 Security Company, both found bombs underneath their cars. The arrest by a German customs officer of an Active Service Unit on the Belgian border in June 1990 largely brought the IRA offensive in West Germany to an end. He admitted that a 45 Security Section presentation he had attended had convinced him that the Provisional IRA was taking advantage of unguarded crossing points to launch attacks.
Gibraltar, like Cyprus, was an enviable Mediterranean posting but when, in 1986, the recently-formed International Terrorism desk at the Defence Intelligence Staff concluded that Colonel Gaddafi, of Libya, was threatening the strategic choke points of the St
raits of Hormuz, Suez and Gibraltar, the 90 Security Section Counter-Terrorist Team was tasked to review military security in Gibraltar. Initially, HQ United Kingdom Land Forces and the RAF in Gibraltar denied there was a threat, nevertheless the Team, accompanied by naval and air force security representation, surveyed Gibraltar in 1987 and predicted several terrorist targets, notably car parking spaces outside the Governor’s residence used by the military band during the weekly Changing of the Guard In early 1988, an identified IRA threat against Gibraltar saw enhanced Protective Security counter-measures enacted and then, in controversial circumstances, three well known Irish republicans were intercepted by the SAS after they had parked a suspect car bomb in the parking spaces. In fact, it seems that they had ‘reserved’ a space for their car bomb, which was later found in Spain.
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
The Coalition Years The 1990s
Security is designing the entire system such that all measures, including cryptography, work together.
Bruce Schneir
When, in the 1980s, President Mikhail Gorbachev used ‘perestroika’ (restructuring) and ‘glasnost’ (openness) in his struggles to modernize Soviet society, reduce political corruption and expose the official disinformation of everyday life, faith in the Communist Party wavered. Internationally, Talks on Strategic Arms Limitation and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction led to mutual inspections by Allied and Soviet officers to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unable to stem surges of nationalism, the Kremlin watched as ideological vacuums appeared in countries once regarding the Soviet Union as an example to be followed, in particular the Baltic republics, Ukraine and Georgia. Attempts by the Party to shore up the collapse were undermined by social, cultural and commercial freedoms generated by increased contact with the West. Although Gorbachev released thousands of political opponents from prison camps and exile, his reforms failed and in August 1991 he was toppled by his political partner, Boris Yeltsin. His dismantling of political infrastructures quickly led to the overthrow of Central European dictatorships, disbandment of the Warsaw Pact, withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan and the unification of Germany. The Cold War had ended and the Peace Dividend emerged of global tranquillity.
In 1990, the Intelligence Corps celebrated its fiftieth anniversary by exercising the Freedom of Ashford by Regulars, TA and veterans marching through the town. Later, 100 soldiers commanded by Major John Hughes-Wilson marched past the Colonel Commandant, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Guthrie KCB LVO OBE, however the officer responsible for his microphone had switched it off by mistake. Fortunately, the General used his Welsh Guards drill square training to make his address heard. On Corps Day, a ranks lunch catered for 1,300 guests. In a speech to serving and retired Officers at the Mansion House on 22 March, the Colonel-in-Chief had pointedly said:
Considering that every successful military leader from the very beginning of human conflict is certain to have had some system for gathering information about the enemy, it may seem a bit strange that the Intelligence Corps of the British Army is serving only its 50th Anniversary … I would hardly like to hazard a guess why this should be so, although it has to be said that the Corps has existed off and on for much longer than that. The trouble may be that good intelligence consists of both the good and the bad news and no-one likes to receive unpalatable information. It is only in dire circumstances and moments of great stress that commanders really want to have the whole truth … It is obvious to everyone that the old pattern of international relations in Europe has undergone dramatic changes in recent months … but the challenge to the Corps now is to assess the implications of those changes and to evaluate the emerging situations.
The Gulf War
But on the horizon lurked trouble. For most of the 1980s the Defence Intelligence Staff and Joint Intelligence Staff (Cyprus) had monitored the bitter Iran/Iraq War swaying across defensive sand berms in the Al-Faw peninsula and watched Operation Armilla protect commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf from marauding Iranian fast patrol boats. In 1988, an Intelligence Corps warrant officer attached to the first British infantry company to exercise in Jordan since 1957 witnessed long convoys of military equipment unloaded from ships leaving the port of Aqaba en route to Iraq. Iraq emerged as victor more by default of Iranian incompetence than combat effectiveness but its economy was near bankrupt with debts owed to oil rich Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and its principal arms supplier, Russia. Demobilized soldiers flooded into unemployment. The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein attempted to shore up the economy but foundering when Kuwait drove oil prices down. Although there was sufficient diplomatic and military intelligence indicating Iraqi desperation, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, accusing the Emirate of economic warfare, was unexpected. Linking agreement to Israel returning the territories it had conquered in 1967, Iraq rejected UN Security Council Resolution 660 to withdraw and consequently further measures were imposed, including economic sanctions and a naval blockade. Concerned that the Iraqi occupation threatened the Saudi oil fields, on 7 August, the US announced that following a Saudi Arabia request, it was launching Operation Desert Storm to protect the kingdom. Next day, Iraq declared Kuwait to be its 19th province and despatched expatriate detainees, including children, to key points in Iraq, such as oil refineries, as ‘human shields’. Those hoping for the Peace Dividend hardly imagined that a Coalition army would assemble in Saudi Arabia to confront Iraq.
When the British military contribution hinged on 1st Armoured Division, which was commanded by Major General Rupert Smith, deploying from Verden in Germany to Saudi Arabia. In September in Operation Granby, 7 Armoured Brigade deployed from Soltau as the divisional advance guard. Captain Steve Baston, Divisional SO3 G2, was lecturing at the School of Service Intelligence, Ashford when his SO2 G2 phoned suggesting that he research Iraq in the Classified Library. Returning to Germany, he joined the Brigade as an additional intelligence officer, but found that the Second World War fame of the ‘Desert Rats’ was interfering with operational and intelligence planning. The Brigade’s 707 Intelligence Detachment was boosted by four reinforcements from 71 (1st Division) Intelligence Section. The remainder of the Section arrived in mid October and, while waiting for its vehicles and equipment en route by sea, acclimatized at the port of Al-Jubail. A sergeant was detached to the Force Maintenance Area, the assembly area. When Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billiere arrived as Commander HQ British Forces, Middle East at Riyadh, its G2 component was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tony Box with a staff of nine officers, five being Intelligence Corps, and of the other ranks, eight were Corps. With the Intelligence Corps still committed to Northern Ireland, the burgeoning British intelligence organisation saw an early mobilisation of ultimately 201 men and women from Intelligence and Security Group (V). Box later wrote:
Over the next five months, the Intelligence Corps was involved in the most comprehensive intelligence organisation expansion since 1945. The manpower resources came from all theatres and all disciplines. Appointments were filled in both national and allied headquarters, formed units were deployed, specialists augmented collection and analyst agencies and some separate Corps entities, such as the Gulf Intelligence Team, were formed.
When HQ 7 Armoured Brigade believed the Force Maintenance Area would benefit from an intelligence and security awareness component, Intelligence and Security Group (Germany) exploited the British knack of developing amusing acronisyms, often born of a beer in the bar, and formed the Gulf Intelligence Team (shortened to GIT). It joined the Brigade in mid-October at about the same time that 1st Armoured Division went under command of HQ 1st (US) Marine Expeditionary Force on the Coalition coastal right flank. For the first time since the Second World War, the Intelligence Corps was exposed to unfamiliar military intelligence and security processes and cultures, amid Scud attacks, chemical warfare gas alerts and managing with just one uniform. Now, 6 Intelligence Company provided detachments to 3 (US) Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company operating P
ioneer drones from Al-Jubail and the Joint US Imagery Production Centre supporting Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command in a scrap yard at Riyadh Military Base. It was also supported by a seventeen-strong Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell detachment and Commonwealth analysts. With 1st (British) Corps in Germany providing the bulk of reinforcements, 74 (4th Armoured Division) Intelligence Section formed the Gulf Intelligence Training Team (shortened to GITT) and, over the next six months, briefed about 30,000 troops. An Airport Security detachment at the Hamburg airhead and Port Security at Emden and Bremerhaven was provided by 5 Security Company. Drawing on his experiences of debriefing repatriated prisoners of war and civilians during the Falklands campaign, Lieutenant Colonel David Burrill, the Commanding Officer of the Joint Service Interrogation Wing, had formed the Defence Debriefing Team in 1987, largely from 22 Intelligence Company (V) because it offered a wider range of languages than the Regulars. By the end of Operation Granby, it consisted of 169 soldiers, including three married couples. Refugees and ‘human shields’ were interviewed at Heathrow and Gatwick and, where this was not possible, by mobile teams. Female debriefers made a significant contribution. One corporal spent 112 days on Operation Granby. A captain debriefed Iraqi detainees at Rolleston Camp. Two Volunteers formed a coalition cell at the Interrogation Wing that expanded into any space capable of accommodating a table, chair and a wall for a map.
Sharing the Secret Page 42
