Sharing the Secret

by Nick van der Bijl

  Soon after Christmas, HQ 1st Armoured Division, 4 Armoured Brigade, and its 704 Intelligence Detachment, arrived from Verden and Munster respectively. Since being formed in 1942 4 Armoured Brigade had spent just six months in the United Kingdom, its North African origins reflected by the Black Rat (Jerboa) emblem. When General de la Billiere asked that the Division join the main attack on the direct axis to the Iraqi Republican Guard, it passed under command of VII (US) Corps in the centre, but the Intelligence Sections were not immediately informed - in order to avoid Coalition intentions being compromised. Fortunately, the switch did not present serious problems because the Intelligence Cycle was being applied to the entire front. Not unnaturally, the Division had a ‘Cold War’ defensive mindset but commanders were now having to focus on attack and axis of advance and were now thirsty for intelligence, but in spite of the international context of the Coalition, partners remained protective of their information and unfamiliar with each other’s intelligence acquisition and processes. The US had Information Technology but according to an Intelligence Corps captain, in 1st Division:

  Computing was very limited and printers even more scarce. Chinagraph pencils, traces and written signals where the primary means of communication. We had been training for a mobile defensive battle in Germany and on arrival in theatre in Saudi Arabia, were faced with an entrenched quasi First World War enemy who had ‘nowhere to hide’. As there was nowhere to hide, we turned to the sky and realised that an entrenched force could be seen easily from the air using planes and satellites. Soon we were receiving detailed, too detailed, intelligence indicating where all the Iraqi units were located. Divisions, brigades, battalions and individual vehicles were carefully plotted on to maps and presented to the commanders.

  An American offer to enhance British processes by loaning a satellite image receiver and a High Frequency intelligence broadcasting system was rejected on the grounds the emissions would betray the position of Divisional Headquarters. Four NCOs sent to the US Marines Headquarters also discovered arrays of computers. One of them recalled:

  It took the USMC time to acknowledge that the two staff sergeants and two lance corporals had the ability to take all the ‘take’ and turn it into individual positions down to barrel orientation on a huge 1:50,000 map. ORBAT cards and all that good stuff just amazed them. For a week or two we were kept in another room developing our own picture and to keep out of their way. General Gray, the USMC Corps Commander, walked in, saw what had been achieved and moved us into the main G2 area and told his G2 staff that we were to be incorporated into their shifts. Myself and Staff Sergeant Smith took 12 hour leads and actually moved the major and captains into a lesser roll. I had left the Defence Intelligence Staff a few months before from the Iran & Iraq Desk which helped no end. Myself and one other travelled to 3 (US) Corps and did the unspeakable thing of taking all the overlays from each specialism and placing them on top of each other and with some knowledge of how Russian R404 radios systems are deployed, we had the audacity to indicate where the enemy divisional HQs may be located ……. and they were.

  But Need to Know principles saw the intelligence not being disseminated downwards, as had previously happened during the Falklands War, led to Major General Smith claiming that he went into battle ‘blind’ and listed intelligence failures in his top three criticisms:

  To a large degree dependent on collection systems held at levels above us. I found it difficult to gather the data I needed to make my own analysis.

  Signals Intelligence had limited value because the Iraqi use of radios was not widespread and assumptions were therefore made of unit strengths and dispositions. The BBC World Service provided the best source of political intelligence. In similar circumstances encountered with interrogation during the Falklands War, one captain recalled that officers who had hardly seen an air photograph suddenly became ‘expert’ but lacked the ability to identify equipment and solve the implications of its presence and use. Their contributions led to confusion and, to some extent, discredited the passage of intelligence. Assumptions of Iraqi combat efficiency were affected by their Pyrrhic victory in the war with Iran, whereas intelligence assessments that the bulk of the Army were demoralised conscripts and students using equipment originating from several countries and following Soviet military doctrines, were organised into units in which cohesion was limited, was largely ignored.

  When the staff sergeant took over 707 (7 Armoured Brigade) Intelligence Detachment after the 71 Intelligence Section had returned to Divisional Headquarters, he found that the Brigade SO3 G2 had returned to the United Kingdom at Christmas and had been replaced by a captain yet to attend his Brigade and Regimental Intelligence Course but who was an excellent cartoonist.

  When Iraq failed to respond to United Nation Resolution 678 to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, two days later, under Resolution 660 permitting the use of force, the Operation Desert Storm air offensive was launched to weaken Iraqi defences, Saddam Hussein declared the ‘mother of all battles’ had begun. The televising of two captured Tornado aircrew and, the story of a Special Air Service patrol hunting Scud missiles, emphasised the value of resistance to interrogation training. In Germany, a Lines of Communication Field Security Section formed to support HQ British Forces and was reinforced by Intelligence Corps already in Theatre at Logistic Base ‘Echo’, sixty miles south of the Iraqi border, but it had less than a week to embed with 71 Intelligence Section and a major at HQ VII (US) Corps. The ejection of Iraqi forces from the Saudi city of Khafji by US Marines at the end of the month and prisoner interrogations gave further evidence of an army in the very early stages of recovering from Iran-Iraq War and deteriorating combat efficiency under sustained bombing.

  The final days before G (Go) Day were spent disseminating imagery, thousands of maps and overlays. To those in the desert, the delivery of fresh food was a welcome change from ‘compo’. By 20 February, of the British intelligence contribution of 104 officers and 652 other ranks, the Intelligence Corps strength of thirty officers and 100 other ranks was the largest assembly in an operational Theatre since Intelligence Corps (Field) in 1944. The Coalition rejection of a Soviet mediation of a ceasefire on 23 February and Iraq refusing to withdraw from Kuwait within twenty-four hours led to 1st Armoured Division advancing to its forming-up place between XVII (US) Airborne Corps on the left and VII (US) Corps. On the eve of the advance into Iraq, a corporal was returning to Divisional Headquarters with a pack of maps and traces in a Lynx helicopter when it crashed in poor weather. The consequent delays in delivering the packages meant that the two Brigade HQs had little time to assimilate the latest detail fully before H-Hour, when 1st Armoured Division breached the sand berms and, with 7 Armoured Brigade leading, surged through Iraqi positions littered by wrecked equipment and headed north towards the Republican Guard. The Divisional Joint Forward Interrogation Team, which included TA interrogators, debriefed demoralized prisoners seeking shelter, food and water. A report from 71 Intelligence Section stated:

  The noise, explosions and exhilaration of moving forward: the confusion and excitement of the first contact reports and the first prisoners. We all knew how long it took, but for most of us the rapid movement forward and concentration on matters in hand, had the effect of telescoping time. Days had no meaning: just a little sleep, food, work and move, punctuated with battle reports and the sad news of our own casualties.

  When Brigade Headquarters halted in a laager was threatened by a tank column, 707 Intelligence Section dug in and readied its Light Anti-Tank Weapons. A captain recalled:

  The pace of the advance meant that there was very little time for intelligence gathering and the G2 became intelligence watch keepers. If the advance had been halted by a stronger enemy, then our intelligence collection methods may have been stretched. The reliance on air imagery had slowed down the intelligence Cycle to the point where it would no longer work in a fluid battlefield.

  The Division then swung east towards the main h
ighway to Kuwait City until, about 100 hours after H-Hour, Divisional Headquarters reached the suburbs. Occupying a farm adjacent to a coastal minefield, 71 Intelligence Section and the Gulf Intelligence Team scavenged for items of intelligence interest and also rescued a Kuwaiti fireman who had strayed into the minefield. Against the surrealistic flames and plumes of black smoke belching from oil wells sabotaged during their scorched earth policy, the Iraqis withdrew from Kuwait on the 26 February, some running into the deadly US ambush on the main Kuwait-Basrah highway. President George Bush Snr then declared that Kuwait had been liberated.

  When Divisional Rear Headquarters was tasked to collect captured equipment into a Central Main Assembly area, the Field Security Section catalogued weapons that ranged from small arms to a Free-Rocket-Over-Ground 7 (FROG-7) launcher. After being cleared of explosive, some equipment was examined by Ministry of Defence Technical Intelligence while others became barrack gate guardians, including the Chinese T-59 tank parked outside HQ Intelligence Corps in Chicksands. The Divisional withdrawal reversed the pattern of the deployment with the Al-Jubail Security Detachment, now reinforced by the disbanded Divisional Field Security Section, investigated security breaches and undertook protective security surveys in departure holding areas. It also worked with US Marine Corps counter-intelligence and the Saudi Security Authorities and undertook security surveys in Kuwait City on behalf of the British Embassy.

  When insurgents in Kurdistan rose against Saddam Hussein in March and were then denied food and medicine, thousands of Kurds fled through the snowy mountains towards sanctuary in Turkey. On 5 April, as Iraq ignored Resolution 688 to end the repression, the British contribution to the US-led Coalition force centred on Headquarters Commando Forces delivering Military Aid to the Civil Community strategy in Operation Haven by addressing the humanitarian needs of 350,000 refugees. HQ Combined Task Force formed a Security Zone in Operation Warden in which several Intelligence Corps were deployed on intelligence tasks. Detachments from the Joint Service Intelligence Wing and 7 Intelligence and 8 Security Companies deployed to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and provided intelligence and counter-intelligence detachments to the headquarters of the Joint Force and Combined Task Force in Kurdistan. The application of the Intelligence Cycle, as always, acquired current intelligence on the doctrines and organisation of the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish para-military and insurgency nationalists.

  By the end of the Cold War, the young officers nurtured by the First 100 were moving into senior positions in the Corps, having attended Staff College and, for some, Higher Command and Staff courses during the late 1970s. In 1977, no less than six were awarded ‘psc’ (passed staff college). Just as university breeds lifelong friendships, for the first time, future commanders were being exposed to Intelligence Corps officers as academic colleagues and promoters of intelligence and security as crucial to military operations. This exposure had already paid dividends in Northern Ireland. As the world hoped for the Peace Dividend, in spite of Iraq remaining a threat to Middle East regional security and fractures within the former Yugoslavia unsettling the Balkans, the Conservative Government ordered another Options for Change defence review. A separate study was examining the rationalisation of Arms and Corps structures in which no-one and nothing was sacred. When Brigadier Tony Crawford, who had been appointed Director in 1989, faced a Royal Signals bid for the whole Signals Intelligence function, he expressed delight that the Royal Signals were willing to be subsumed into the Intelligence Corps. The Royal Military Police, intent on retaining their independence and looking for opportunities to increase their core activities, argued that military security should adopt the RAF Provost and Security Services concept of combining Security Intelligence with criminal investigations. But, it was this combination that had resulted in the embarrassing investigation when the Bulgarian Intelligence Service targeted 9 Signals Regiment in Cyprus. Nevertheless, there was a cohort in the Army who believed that the prime Corps function should be confined to Operational Intelligence. In so doing they ignored that it was the combination of Security Intelligence, Protective Security and Operational Intelligence, in its widest context, that had proven a powerful weapon in providing intelligence, given the opportunity, and had protected the Army and its associated civilian organisations during the Cold War.

  Calculations by Colonel Burrill, Deputy Director and Chief of Staff, enabled Crawford to persuade the Army Board that the Corps could absorb a fifteen per cent reduction in size but not at the cost of disbanding complete units. The acceptance of this strategy enabled the Corps to increase its influence in Defence Intelligence Staff at the Ministry of Defence. When the Women’s Royal Army Corps was disbanded under Options and women were recruited directly into the Corps, it was fitting that total integration should take place during Brigadier Crawford’s tenure. While previously posted to the Ministry, he had promoted the wider employment of women throughout the Army in a paper generally known as the ‘Crawford Study’.

  When Brigadier Philip Springfield succeeded Brigadier Crawford in 1991, he adopted Colonel Burrill’s calculations and set about creating a Corps that was of sufficient strength and flexible enough to meet any commitment without impacting on existing operations, in particular Northern Ireland. Allying the Corps to the Inspector General Doctrine and Training experiment, he lost the Intelligence Development Wing in the process. Meanwhile, a Defence Costs Study saw the three autonomous Single Service headquarters merge into the Permanent Joint Headquarters. Although the survival of the Corps had been assured by 1993, particularly when the British were asked by the US to lead in the Balkans, historically it had few allies on the General Staff and Brigadier Springfield was reminded, in an era of savings that saw Directors of Arms downgraded from major generals to brigadiers, that once Northern Ireland was resolved, it could offer at least twenty-five per cent of its establishment to Options. But balanced against this suggestion was that General Smith had criticised the quality of the intelligence product during the Gulf War. Lessons learned in Northern Ireland and the Falklands were also being applied by radical and dynamic commanders, with operational experience as company and battalion commanders, acknowledging the accuracy of the Duke of Marlborough’s mantra that ‘No war can be conducted successfully without early and good intelligence’. Since the Corps excelled in the historically important asset of Human Intelligence, Springfield took a high risk strategy by switching allegiance to the Defence Central Staffs and then ensured that the Joint intelligence structure was the first to be delivered to the Permanent Joint Headquarters. General Smith’s criticisms after the Gulf War had led to several studies, one result being Colonels Wardley and Gordon Kerr developing a comprehensive intelligence structure for NATO and the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps.

  Exploiting the fast growing acceptance of intelligence and security as crucial operational assets, Headquarters Intelligence Corps set about developing its organisations and cultures to replace the autonomous national structures of the Cold War with Joint and Coalition cultures. An early step in November was that, after twenty-eight years, Intelligence and Security Group (Germany) reformed as 1 Military Intelligence Battalion with a role to support the new United Kingdom Support Command and Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. The Battalion consisted of:

  • 1 Intelligence Company formed from 6 and 7 Intelligence Companies.

  • 2 (Human Intelligence) Intelligence Company.

  • 3 Security Company.

  • The Berlin Intelligence and Security Company.

  New terminology emerged, such as Collection Co-ordination and Information Requirements Management, reflecting the introduction of IT. When the General Doctrine and Training experiment morphed to Director General Doctrine and Development, the Intelligence Development Wing posts were lost. The growing operational importance of Intelligence and Security Group (V) was celebrated by its twenty-fifth anniversary and increase in establishment by a third and the forming of an eighth company. Group Headquarters moved from Handel Str
eet to a bespoke training centre in Hampstead, which was opened by Field Marshal Lord Bramall (Lord Lieutenant of London) with Lieutenant General Guthrie, the Colonel Commandant, in attendance.

  In 1994, the reputation of the Corps was enhanced when a four-man detachment from 89 (Airborne) Section joined the 5 Airborne Brigade Logistic Battalion contribution to the United Nation Mission in Rwanda, following sectarian genocide. The status of refugee camps prepared by two JNCOs became a standard reference document at the United Nations. A staff sergeant expressed disappointment at the corruption of some humanitarian agencies. Towards the end of the year, after forty years, 13 Signal Regiment (Radio) switched off its receivers. Warrant Officer 2 Tony Cheese, a near permanent fixture at Ashford, also retired. A noted shot, he had won numerous cups, medals and awards.

  Major General Davidson had proposed in 1943 that a system should be developed to facilitate former Intelligence Corps moving into civilian intelligence and security employment but, hitherto, little had been achieved. It was during this period that Colonel Burrill formed the Intelligence Corps Association Resettlement Centre (ICAREC) to help lever discharged Corps into civilian employment but their expertise in protective security and intelligence faced formidable opposition from the police, in particular, who had largely cornered commercial and business security. Nevertheless, foresighted companies, such as British American Tobacco, realised that former Corps had skills to offer industry and commerce in security management and information exploitation. Two former Corps, Geoff Whitfield and Bill Whiley, were founder members of the Security Institute.