(With thanks to Impact)
Martin Caidin
New York, 1955
CHAPTER 1
The Sino-Japanese Incident
AT CERTAIN TIMES IN HER history, economic, political, and other implications have forced Japan into armed conflict with neighboring countries. Although such action may be justified, the nature of war demands from the belligerent nation a high cost in human lives, the drainage of natural resources, and the “judgment of God.”
Universal intimacy with the horrors of war makes it superfluous to discuss in detail the misery of the vanquished; however, recent history illustrates clearly that the victor also may lose far more than he gains from war. For large countries in an economically sound condition, damage usually is confined to relatively small areas, and the economy suffers but little. For a nation such as Japan, however, the damaging effects of only one major defeat in war may be so far-reaching and so profound that a subsequent series of victories will be unable to offset the damage incurred in the previous defeat.
We feel that we can justify the thesis taught to the Japanese masses whereby they were, subsequent to the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, led to believe that Japan would not and could not lose a war. Be that as it may, the military and political leaders in whose hands lies the future of a nation should concentrate their efforts on devising means not merely of winning a war but of preventing defeat, should armed conflict prove inevitable. Should these national leaders be misled by the outward appearance of the armed might at their disposal and throw their nation into the cataclysm of war without an exhaustive study of the implications of their actions, they cannot themselves escape the consequences of their acts. Their actions are nothing short of outrageous or, in modern parlance, subversive, regardless of theoretical justifications.
It has been the tragedy of modern Japan that those great and humane statesmen who attempted to follow the principles of “fair play” in international conduct often met death, and that several cabinets composed of such men fell by the wayside before the pressure of the military cliques.
We, the Japanese, must never forget that it was criminal to permit this situation to exist; that because of this intolerable political blindness we pushed millions of our good neighbors into misery and suffering beyond the comprehension of most Japanese civilians; and, finally, that our own foolish actions hurled Japan into the present economic abyss from which she finds it so difficult to emerge. We must provide some form of compensation for those countries on which we have visited destruction; we must maintain the utmost vigilance to prevent the repetition of past mistakes.
Despite this attitude, so necessary to peaceful international conduct, there arise occasions when armed might is indispensable to a nation’s welfare. Those persons who have been invested with their nation’s military responsibility must, without regard to politics, do their utmost to execute the duties entrusted to them.
To meet its military requirements, a nation will strive for the most effective weapons and manpower. Several decades ago Japan recognized adequate airpower as the weapon most suited to solve its national defense problems and accordingly stressed the growth of that arm, notably in the naval field.
On July 7, 1937, the Sino-Japanese Incident flared on the Asian mainland, almost a quarter of a century after we had undertaken to develop our naval air power. At this time the Navy was prepared to counter any eventuality with this striking force:
CARRIER STRIKING FORCE
FIRST CARRIER DIVISION
Under command of Rear Admiral Shiro Takasu, in Ryujo:
Ryujo, Captain Katsuo Abe
12 Type 95 carrier-based fighters
15 Type 94 carrier-based dive bombers
Hosho, Captain Ryunosuke Kusaka
9 Type 95 carrier-based fighters
6 Type 92 carrier-based attack bombers
SECOND CARRIER DIVISION
Under command of Rear Admiral Rokuro Horie, in Kaga:
Kaga, Captain Ayao Inagaki
12 Type 90 carrier-based fighters
12 Type 94 carrier-based dive bombers
12 Type 89 carrier-based attack bombers
12 Type 96 carrier-based attack bombers
LAND-BASED AIR FORCE
FIRST COMBINED AIR FLOTILLA
Under command of Captain Mitchitaro Tozuka, at Taipei (later Shanghai):
Kisarazu Air Corps, Captain Ryuzo Takenaka
6 Type 95 land-based attack bombers
24 Type 96 land-based attack bombers
Kanoya Air Corps, Captain Sizue Ishii
9 Type 95 carrier-based fighters
18 Type 96 land-based attack bombers
SECOND COMBINED AIR FLOTILLA
Under command of Rear Admiral Teizo Mitsunami, at Ohmura (later Shanghai):
12th Air Corps, Captain Osamu Imamura
12 Type 95 carrier-based fighters
12 Type 94 carrier-based dive bombers
12 Type 92 carrier-based attack bombers
13th Air Corps, Captain Sadatoshi Senda
12 Type 96 carrier-based fighters
12 Type 96 carrier-based dive bombers
12 Type 96 carrier-based attack bombers
Total strength: 66 carrier-based fighters
51 carrier-based dive bombers
54 carrier-based attack bombers
48 land-based attack bombers
219 combat-ready warplanes
There were also available the thirty scout and observation seaplanes of the costal defense ship Izumo, the flagship of the Third Fleet (stationed at Shanghai); the seaplane tender Kamoi; and various cruisers.
When the fighting spread to Shanghai on August 13, 1937, our intelligence reported that the Japanese garrison in that city was completely encircled by a strong Chinese force, supported by three hundred planes based in the Nanking area. Additional reports revealed that a concerted Chinese attack could in a few days wipe out to the last man the Japanese marines who were isolated in Shanghai. The marine garrison faced overwhelming numbers of Chinese troops; since no airfield within Shanghai was usable, our men were denied local air coverage.
On August 14, following a series of sharp land battles, the Chinese planes opened bombing attacks against our forces in and around Shanghai. Even as the raids began, a single Type 90 scout-observation seaplane of the Izumo attacked the enemy formations, downing one fighter. This first aerial battle forecast greater commitments of planes by both sides.
On the evening of August 14, the Type 96 land-based attack bombers (Nells) of the Kanoya Air Corps based at Taipei (Formosa) attacked Chinese positions. On the following day Nells of the Kisarazu Air Corps from Ohmura Base on Kyushu Island began their bombing raids, and, commencing on the sixteenth, the carrier planes joined the rising tide of raids against the enemy’s forces. These attacks of the Nells constituted the first “transoceanic” bombing raids.
For many years the Japanese Army and Navy had hidden their armament and weapons; the public saw only the obsolete models of heavy guns, warships and planes. In contrast to this policy, other countries obviously attempted to frighten their enemies into submission through constant exhibition of their military forces. Knowledge of the true performance of foreign weapons was denied the public; the propaganda mills ground out exaggerated reports of the actual strength of each nation.
By importing many foreign aircraft and weapons, we in Japan were able to gauge approximately what these weapons could and could not do. By keeping our planes and other armament within our borders and free from prying eyes, we led the world seriously to underestimate the combat strength of our naval aviation.
The so-called transoceanic bombing missions of the Sino-Japanese Incident revealed for the first time the actual capabilities of Japanese warplanes. The long-distance raids by the Nell bombers, averaging two thousand kilometers (1250 miles) for each raid, exceeded by a considerable margin the previous maximum-range attacks of any country’s planes. Further appreciation of
this startling advance in aerial warfare was possible when it was revealed that these airplanes were carrying out their attacks in extremely poor weather, flying from Formosa and Kyushu against targets in and around Shanghai, Nanking, Hanchou, and other cities.
The elation which swept the Japanese populace with the announcements of the bombing was understandable. We had a powerful, long-range, fair-and-foul-weather, day-and-night bombing force. Our planes constantly set new records; the only air battles fought across an appreciable expanse of water up to this time had been those undertaken in World War I across the Straits of Dover and its vicinity.
Despite the obvious quality of our planes and the caliber of our pilots, the Navy’s Air Force suffered heavy losses in the early days of the incident. There was much to be learned in the art of long-distance attack which could be acquired in peacetime, but the price which the Chinese exacted for those lessons was severe.
We learned—almost at once, and with devastating thoroughness—that bombers are no match for enemy fighter planes. We lost many men as this lesson was administered, including Lieutenant Commander Nitta, Air Group Commander, Lieutenant (JG) Umebayashi and Ensign Yamanouchi of the land-based attack-bomber groups, and other pilots well known in Japan.
The planes of the aircraft carrier Kaga suffered disastrously. The twelve Type 89 carrier-based attack bombers, led by Group Commander Lieutenant Commander Iwai, left the Kaga on August 17 for a raid against Hangchou. Bad weather prevented a rendezvous with an expected fighter escort and near their target the bombers were attacked by a group of Chinese fighter planes. Eleven bombers, including the commander’s, were shot down. Lieutenant (JG) Tanaka managed to bring his bullet-riddled and crippled bomber safely back to the carrier; otherwise, the fate of the attacking group would never have been known, and another bomber formation might have suffered a similar fate. Tanaka’s report astonished the officers of the fleet, and immediate warnings were issued to all bomber groups to take special precautions against the defending Chinese fighters.
We discovered that when our fighter planes provided escort to, over, and from the target such incidents did not occur. Comparing the shattered unescorted bomber groups with the relatively unharmed formations which were protected by fighters, the Navy reacted quickly. The Kaga was ordered to return immediately to Sasebo and to receive a full complement of the new Type 96 carrier-based fighters (Claudes).
Although the fighters had never flown in service operations from an aircraft carrier, the gravity of the situation warranted the risk of accidents. In early September the Second Combined Air Flotilla, equipped with the powerful Claudes, returned to Shanghai.
In the Second Combined Air Flotilla were Lieutenant Commander Okamura, Lieutenant Commander Genda, and Lieutenant Nomura, three of Japan’s outstanding veteran fighter pilots; later they were joined by another combat veteran, Lieutenant Nango. The flotilla’s first raid against Nanking on September 18 was followed by wave after wave of attacks, made chiefly with dive bombers and the powerful Claude fighters.
The Chinese air force put up a desperate air defense, hurling fighters of international repute against the Mitsubishi fighter planes. Chinese pilots attacked the Claudes with such planes as the English Gloster Gladiator, the American Curtiss 75, and the Russian N-15 and N-16 fighters. There was no doubt about the outcome of the protracted aerial engagements; from the outset the Claudes proved their superiority in a series of air victories. Within two months of the initial attacks against the Chinese targets, the enemy’s fighter planes disappeared from the arena; the last combat on December 2, when Lieutenant Nango’s Claudes blasted ten N-16’s from the sky over Nanking, was a glorious victory. All through October and November the Japanese people rejoiced at the brilliant combat successes of the Claudes, which battled numerically superior forces.
The Chinese moved their air-base facilities to rear areas beyond the flight range of the marauding Mitsubishi fighter planes, establishing new headquarters at Nanching in central China, about 335 miles southwest of Shanghai. Attacking their planes from Shanghai with Claude fighters required new tactics. Lieutenant Commander Genda, air staff officer of the 2nd Combined Air Flotilla, proposed that the Navy set up special refueling bases close to the Chinese lines to be used by the fighters on their way to the enemy.
Employing Type 95 land-based attack bombers as emergency transport planes, the Navy flew fuel and mechanics for the fighters into Kuangte Air Field. Although occupied by the Japanese Army, the airfield was partially isolated, since the enemy still controlled the supply lines. Our fighter planes landed at Kuangte for refueling, then resumed their flights for the Nancheing area. Those planes with sufficient fuel to return directly to Shanghai flew nonstop from the target area; the remainder with short fuel reserves made another stop at Kuangte.
The novelty of the new tactics proved completely successful, as repeatedly our fighters made disastrous surprise raids against the unsuspecting Chinese. Japan gained a hero in this series of attacks; Flight Petty Officer Kashimura had just downed his second enemy plane in a single engagement when the falling fighter rammed the Claude, shearing off more than one third of its left wing. Through superb piloting Kashimura managed to return his crippled fighter to Shanghai.
The demands of battle forced the naval planes into unexpected situations for which they had not been trained. Carrier-based dive bombers, attack bombers, and Type 95 carrier-based fighters repeatedly reconnoitered, bombed, and machine-gunned enemy forces in direct cooperation with our army units, which were advancing steadily westward from the Shanghai area to Nanking. Although lacking in training and experience, the naval pilots performed these missions so successfully that they received the greatest praise of the ground units, who benefited materially from their supporting attacks.
These special operations were discontinued after three months of fighting, marked by the fall of Nanking. Many lessons were gained in the way of new tactics and operations from the campaign, especially (1) that air groups and combat planes trained at sea for sea duty can serve successfully without special training in any air campaign over land, and (2) that the key to success in any land or sea operation depends upon command of the air.
The outstanding combat successes of the Claude fighter planes ended a long-standing controversy in Japan, destroying once and for all the validity of the arguments of those who insisted upon retaining biplane-type fighters. Even with due consideration for its exceptional maneuver-ability, the short range and slow speed of the Type 95 carrier-based fighter doomed it to extinction. It required the final test of combat to determine which of these two fighter types would be the most effective in war.
The China air battles vindicated completely the Navy’s insistence upon the strictest training for all pilots and air crews. Although the naval pilots were trained specifically for operations against enemy surface fleets, their quality enabled them to perform with an efficiency superior to that exhibited by our Army pilots. Conversely, it was also determined that pilots trained specifically for maneuvers over land experienced great difficulty in overwater operations, even in merely flying long distances over the ocean.
We discovered that the extended range of our Navy bombers opened new vistas of aerial warfare and that with these far-flying aircraft we could attack enemy positions far behind the front lines or while several hundred miles at sea. Most important of all, perhaps, we learned that certain types of air campaigns could not be strictly defined as either strictly “land” or “sea” battles, but required of the pilots the ability to fight under any conditions.
Despite these more obvious results of aerial warfare in China, the farsighted younger officers of the Navy Air Force encountered a solid wall of conservatism among the military hierarchy. The situation within the Army proved similar; there was little change in the basic concept of air power as an auxiliary to sea and land forces. Aware that they must first overcome the obstacles of outmoded thinking before they could hope to modernize ou
r aerial weapons, our naval air officers again bent every effort to obtain greater authority and increased funds for their Air Force.
In the succeeding years, these efforts proved their worth; modern equipment, better training, and increased numbers of planes gave the Navy the strength of modern air power. Despite radical changes within its own organization, the Army failed to keep pace with the constant and rapid advances in air power achieved by the Navy, and was especially deficient in general reliability and ground maintenance. Except for a few plane types such as the Type 100 headquarters plane, far superior to any comparable Navy aircraft, the performance of the Army’s planes fell below those of its sister service.
Despite vigorous attempts to modernize the Army’s air training policies, it remained particularly deficient in overwater and night-flying capabilities. The Army Air Force never quite emerged from its position as the “crippled air force” whose dominion was confined entirely to the land.
Even as Japan drifted toward the Pacific War, men of foresight recognized the need for a land-based air power capable of operating under any conditions. These men, outside the military organization, failed in their efforts to convince the Army’s leaders of their views.
We have often wondered about this misfortune of Japan, whose particular military, political, and social system did not permit the views of people outside the military hierarchy to affect the nation’s armament. Certainly, we could have done much to improve the effectiveness of our air strength had we at least listened.
CHAPTER 2
Peace Attempts Fail—The Fighting Continues
THE WAR IN CHINA WAS now three years old. We discontinued temporarily military operations in middle China, commencing with the occupation of Nanking in December of 1937. By the year’s end the Japanese government was making every possible effort to settle politically the regrettable conflict between Japan and China. The attempts at negotiation failed completely, due primarily to the interruption of the Japanese Army hierarchy, as well as to the desire of influential Chinese parties to see the war continued. Indeed, in January, 1938, Army officers compelled Prime Minister Konoye against his will to announce: “We will not negotiate with the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek.”
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