Under the Bloody Flag

by John C Appleby

  Hilbre Island, Cheshire. Though the island can be reached by foot at low tide today, it was occasionally frequented by pirates and rovers during the sixteenth century, who preyed on the trade of Chester and Liverpool. (Author’s collection)

  The Dee estuary, Cheshire. Pirates and rovers were attracted to the region by the trade of Chester across the Irish Sea. They ranged across the coast of north Wales, to Holyhead and beyond. (Author’s collection)

  The failure of the Armada was followed by a resurgence of English depredation, as adventurers sought to take advantage of Spanish weakness. The war of reprisals reached a new level of intensity, throwing into relief the confusion between lawful plunder, disorderly spoil and piracy. Men-of-war of varying legality crowded the coasts of Spain and Portugal. In January 1589 Venetian vessels were reportedly afraid to leave Lisbon, for fear of capture by English pirates. Later in the year rovers were swarming off the islands of the Azores, preying particularly upon vulnerable Portuguese ships returning from Brazil. In addition the Channel and western approaches continued to attract a large number of seaborne raiders of varied backgrounds, who attacked local and coastal traffic while lying in wait for the return of fishing vessels from Newfoundland.71

  Attempts by the regime to justify the seizure of foreign ships failed to convince or appease most neutral traders. Responding to the Armada as an act of open war, later in 1588 Elizabeth warned the merchants of Hamburg that she would not allow them or other members of the Hanseatic ports to carry gunpowder, provisions or ordnance and other weapons to her enemies. At the same time the regime’s efforts to clarify and regulate the sea war, by prohibiting attacks on French, Scottish and other friendly vessels, and through the issue of a revised list of prohibited goods in 1592, met with little success. Indeed, as the council continued to be inundated with overseas complaints, during the 1590s there was a real danger that the rising tide of disorder and piratical activity would overshadow, if not discredit the legitimacy of the war at sea.72

  French shipping remained the most common target for unruly English men-of-war and pirates, though the seizure of Danish vessels continued to provoke controversy and complaint. French prizes were regularly taken during 1589 and beyond. In June and July the council heard complaints concerning the seizure of a vessel bound for Spain with grain and munitions by Captain Thomas Maye, who was sailing with a commission from the King of Navarre, and of the plunder of a cargo of wines claimed by a merchant of La Rochelle. In August Sir Walter Ralegh and one of his captains, John Chidley, were ordered to restore two vessels of Cherbourg. The issue of letters of reprisal against the Catholic League in France provided a coating of legality for some of this spoil. For many French merchants and shipowners, however, English activity was essentially piratical in nature, which was aggravated by lengthy legal suits for the recovery of ships and cargoes. In an attempt to limit the damage, during 1591 the French ambassador requested that English men-of-war should be prohibited from attacking French vessels without a new commission from the Lord Admiral and himself, ‘on pain of being treated as pirates and having their ships confiscated’.73 Under prevailing conditions, it had little chance of being accepted.

  The vulnerability of French vessels remained an irresistible temptation for disorderly reprisal ships and pirates. In October 1591 the Princess of Navarre complained to the Queen and Burghley about the seizure of a vessel, carrying her passport, which was returning from North America with a cargo of fish, oil and a large quantity of rich furs. In June 1592 the port of Bayonne claimed to have suffered losses to English pirates of at least 50,000 crowns. Despite the French King’s threat to issue letters of reprisal to the victims, a few months later at least twenty warships were reported to be cruising between the Scilly Isles and Ushant, waiting to intercept fishing vessels returning from Newfoundland to Bayonne and other ports.74

  Attacks on Danish and Dutch vessels also led to angry and persistent complaints. In both cases, the response of the regime was influenced by wider political and strategic interests affecting the common cause against the enemy. Thus in August 1589 the council ordered that Danish complaints in the High Court of Admiralty were to be handled with extraordinary favour. It also ordered the restoration of a ship recently seized by Strangewich, and a search for concealed Danish plunder in London. In response to protests from Christian IV against the plunder of Danish ships in Norwegian havens, dating back to 1587, the Queen promised prompt action. By the end of 1589 commissioners in England were dealing with at least fourteen cases of disorderly spoil, in some cases stretching back over twelve years. On the defensive, the regime insisted that some of the malefactors had been executed for piracy. Further complaints to the council during the early 1590s indicated that Danish vessels remained targets for English men-of-war or pirates. While a representative for Elizabeth reassured the Danish King in 1590 that ‘his subjects should be treated with the highest favour in her realms’, he warned that pirates of different backgrounds ‘infested English waters and some Englishmen, especially in war time, attacked Englishmen and others indifferently’.75

  The seizure and spoil of Dutch shipping strained Anglo-Dutch relations, despite their shared hostility towards Spain. Although the Dutch defended their commerce with Spain on the grounds of economic necessity, doing business with the enemy was a contentious and divisive issue. Reports of 1589 indicated that Dutch traders were shipping various commodities to Spain around Scotland, contrary to Admiralty warnings, because of the profit from the trade. The scale of the English attack on Dutch trade thus aroused widespread anger in Holland and Zeeland. By 1589 the High Court of Admiralty and other agencies were hearing at least forty Dutch claims concerning disorderly or illegal depredation. According to the States-General, Dutch losses amounted to 1.6 million florins. One solution to the problem, put forward during 1589, was to allow the Dutch and other traders from northern Europe to trade with Spain in what was described as non-harmful goods, while paying for licences to sail unmolested through the Channel. It was anticipated that more than £200,000 would be raised by these means for the benefit of the Queen and the Dutch. The States-General showed some interest in the scheme, but it attracted little or no support from the Dutch merchant community.76

  Despite the Queen’s frustration and annoyance, the Dutch insisted on their right to maintain commercial relations with Spain. The English maintained that it was ‘a strange kind of war, both to traffic and make war with your enemy’, but their own position was undermined by evidence of the supply of contraband to Spain by English merchants.77 This tangled issue thus provoked mutual complaints, though on the Dutch side it was inflamed by reports that English captains, including Cumberland, tortured their victims into confessing that they were carrying goods belonging to the enemy. In 1592 Dutch traders claimed losses of more than £60,000 in three vessels taken by the English. Such ‘continual spoils and cruelties at sea threatened … ports’, such as Middelburg, ‘with ruin’.78 The Dutch demonstrated their determination to deal swiftly and severely with unruly and unlawful predators by executing about forty members of the company of the Diamond of Bristol for piracy, despite a plea for clemency from the council.

  Although the regime tried to limit the damage to neutral and friendly states, the disorderly activities of English men-of-war spread to include shipping from northern and southern Europe. The publication of a remonstrance in July 1589 against the ports of the Hanseatic League supplying Spain with provisions for war, which coincided with the return of Drake from Lisbon with more than thirty Hanseatic vessels, aroused widespread anger and resentment. The diplomatic damage, and strident demands for retaliation in Hamburg and Lübeck, subsequently led to the release of the ships and their cargoes. But the seizure of vessels from Lübeck, Emden, Danzig, Stettin, Hamburg and ports in the Baltic continued. The English used international law and custom to defend the prohibition of war supplies to Spain, but as in the case of the Dutch and the Danes, there was serious disagreement over the definition of contraband. C
omplaints from Lübeck in 1590 about the spoil of shipping carrying lawful goods were followed by the seizure of four vessels from Hamburg by Cumberland’s fleet of men-of-war. About the same time the Red Lion of Bremen was taken by John Perryman and other notorious pirates and brought into Chester, where its cargo was illegally sold.79

  During the early 1590s, Italian shipping also became a target for English rovers either sailing along the coasts of Spain and Portugal or cruising into the Mediterranean. Although the number of captures was small, they raised complicated legal issues that could take years to settle. During the latter part of 1590, for example, a Venetian argosy was brought into Plymouth by two men-of-war. Drake was instructed by the council to investigate the matter, while apprehending one of the captains and confiscating a rich cargo of pepper and jewels. The incident led the Queen to issue a proclamation warning that future attacks on the ships of friends and allies would be dealt with as cases of piracy. Nonetheless, the dispute over the ownership of the cargo turned into a fiercely contested legal case, with the captors claiming that the prize was taken ‘by way of reprisal, and that the merchants’ marks on the cargo’ had been fraudulently changed.80 As the case was referred to arbitration during 1592 it was overtaken by the plunder of another Venetian vessel by Captain Edward Glenham.

  Although unruly English depredation increased in range, the seas around the British Isles remained the scene for varied forms of opportunistic piratical enterprise which, for a time, became focused on Irish and Scottish shipping. In January 1589 a group of Dublin merchants complained of the capture of a ship by Captain Fulford, who carried his prize off to Tor Bay. In August the council issued a letter of assistance to a merchant of Waterford for the recovery of Spanish wines taken by the pirate Noe Randall and his company. By the end of the year Scottish traders were complaining of the spoil of their ships. They included a complaint of George Paddy against Sir John Wogan, dating back three years, for losses amounting to £400. The Scots merchant claimed that one of the vessels was plundered twice by pirates, who were assisted by Wogan and his three sons. Although the council provided compensation for some Scottish victims, Paddy’s long-running complaint case against Wogan lay unresolved in 1593.81

  Localized piracy and disorder continued to be a persistent problem. In April 1589 there were complaints that the inhabitants of Poole were dealing with pirates. The following year the council was informed of the spoil of a vessel at Yarmouth by a group of masked raiders, who seem to have originated from nearby Gorleston, ‘a receptacle for all disordered and masterles persones, daily committing fowle abuses’.82 In August 1590 the commissioners for piracy in Pembroke and Carmarthen were ordered to arrest the pirate, Nashe, and his confederates. Later in the year, in the face of renewed Scottish grievances, Burghley was compelled to disavow English piracies, insisting ‘I hate all pirates mortally’.83 During June and July 1591 there were complaints of English pirates haunting the coasts of the Orkney and Shetland Islands, and of two pirate ships cruising around the Scilly Isles. The merchants of Caernarvon complained in October 1592 that they were robbed by pirates as they sailed to Bristol fair. Pirates were operating in the Severn estuary during 1593, among whom Hillary Brocke of Jersey was one of the chief suspects, while later in the year a case of piracy and murder in Hull was investigated by the Council in the North.84

  Though subject to control and regulation, the early years of the sea war established a confusing pattern of legitimate reprisals, overlapping with widespread disorder and violent spoil, which was in danger of merging with overtly piratical activity. At the same time, small-scale and opportunistic piracy continued to flourish. In some regions it may have been linked with a wider problem of disorder and unrest ashore. Under these conditions, therefore, by the early 1590s the regime was in danger of losing control of the maritime conflict, to the detriment of its relations with friendly and neutral states.85

  The strain of war: plunder and piracy to 1603

  Although the coalition of interests which maintained the war at sea continued to function, the maritime conflict acquired its own momentum during the 1590s, responding and adapting to changing conditions. The failure of Drake’s last voyage of 1595, followed by the gradual withdrawal of the regime from offensive operations at sea, upset the balance of forces within what was always a temporary alliance, while further weakening its ability to control reprisal enterprise. Despite the short-lived ambitions of a younger generation of patriotic sea warriors, to reinvigorate and re-shape the maritime conflict, it continued to be characterized by small-scale actions. Consequently it remained disorderly in application and purpose, particularly as the raids of enemy men-of-war increased the competition for prizes in dangerously crowded hunting grounds. From the perspective of neutral or friendly states, English depredation appeared deliberately to confuse the distinction between lawful reprisals and piracy. By the later 1590s, the strain of organizing a private and semi-official sea war was beginning to expose deep-seated problems which lay unresolved by the time of the Queen’s death.86

  Yet the strategic and economic benefits of fighting Spain in partnership with private enterprise still seemed to outweigh the potential disadvantages. At little financial charge, it enhanced the Queen’s Navy and its maritime capability, providing her, in the words of one observer, with a ‘force by sea far exceeding any other nation’s’.87 This force undertook damaging raids along the coasts of Spain and Portugal; it disrupted and delayed the sailing of the Indies fleet; and it supported an offensive, if necessarily ill-organized, assault on the Spanish Caribbean. The seizure of one vessel returning from the West Indies, with a cargo reputedly worth 800,000 crowns, fed hopes early in 1591 that the entire fleet could be taken, precipitating the collapse of Spain in revolt, as a result of war weariness and poverty. In spite of the presence of two galleys off Havana, in 1592 it was reported that English men-of-war ‘daily braved them at their own doors’.88 The intercepted letters of enemy merchants underline the vulnerability, or brittleness, of Spain to this kind of maritime assault. With the coast infested with pirates and rovers, merchants appear to have withdrawn from trade in the face of severe disruption and mounting losses.

  The impact of the maritime conflict was strikingly demonstrated by the activities of private adventurers during 1595. In April an expedition of reprisal ships sent out by a group of London traders, including Watts, under the command of James Lancaster, raided the Brazilian port of Pernambuco. With the support of Captain Edward Fenner, and aided by a fleet of French raiders, Lancaster occupied the port for one month, during which a rich haul of booty to the value of £50,000 was acquired. Lancaster returned with profitable Brazilian commodities, including sugar and dye wood, as well as the even more valuable cargo of an East Indian carrack, which had been forced into Pernambuco, and a number of prize ships. The raid illustrated the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of the offensive reach of English sea power, especially in seeking out areas of weakness within the widely scattered and vulnerable Portuguese seaborne empire, which was ruled by Philip II. At the same time Cumberland’s fleet of predators was reported to ‘go about their ordinary purchasing’ under commissions from the Queen.89 Within a few years Cumberland was trying to follow up Lancaster’s raid on Pernambuco, in association with a group of London merchants.

  There was renewed interest in a transatlantic offensive against Spain during the mid-1590s, which brought together experienced leaders, such as Drake and Hawkins, with a younger generation of ambitious courtiers and strategists, represented by Essex and Ralegh. Though these schemes remained uncoordinated, they were marked by a mix of expansionist and predatory motives which were manifest in heady visions of looting Spanish America. Ralegh’s expedition to Guiana during 1595 appeared to encapsulate this ideological projection of empire, gold and anti-Spanish aggrandizement. These ambitions were shared by Essex, a younger and more powerful rival of Ralegh at court. In the wake of the return of the latter, Essex’s entertainment for the Queen, which made use
of an Indian youth, portrayed a glorified image of the expulsion of Spain from America in accordance with ancient prophecy. Although these ambitions were of limited appeal to the Queen, Essex played a key role in persuading her to send out Drake and Hawkins in command of an expedition to the Caribbean, in a bold attempt to seize the initiative in the war against Spain.90

  Although intended for Drake’s old hunting ground, which may have included provision not only to raid, but also to retain Panama, the aim of the expedition was subject to late modification, effectively turning it into a treasure hunt. It included a plan for an opportunistic raid on Puerto Rico, where a richly laden vessel reportedly lay exposed to capture. At the same time, the Queen’s concern for honour and profit was qualified by the security of the realm. Accordingly she expected that Drake and Hawkins ‘shall not need … to tary out longer then six monthes at the furthest’.91 Unfortunately, preparations for the voyage were disrupted by unforeseen delays which bred discontent among some of the company, enabling Spain to acquire details of its purpose. Even before the departure of the fleet from England towards the end of August, a Spanish force was preparing to sail to safeguard the treasure at Puerto Rico.

  Drake and Hawkins left at the head of a large expedition made up of twenty-seven vessels, manned with a company of about 2,500 sailors and soldiers. With ‘such a fleet and such numbers of gallant men’, Sir Thomas Baskerville, the commander of the army, protested to Essex that he would ‘rather be buried alive then any such disgrace shuld happen’.92 The fleet was made up of six large royal vessels, including the recently constructed Garland of 660 tons, and a varied force of private ships, at least four of which were owned by Watts. As in the organization of reprisal ventures, the company served for a share of one-third in any prizes and plunder. Some of the officers were investors in the voyage, including Baskerville, who received a bill of adventure for £500 instead of pay.