Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses

by Mark Curtis

  As of mid 2004, the deaths of 75 Iraqi civilians at the hands of British forces were being investigated by the British military. 'British troops, and those who command them, can kill with impunity because there is no effective mechanism for accountability within domestic or international law', commented Phil Shiner, a lawyer acting for those killed by British forces. The British military maintains a discreet unit within US-run Camp Bucca prison near the port city of Umm Qasr, in which US soldiers have been known to abuse Iraqis.30

  A Red Cross report of May 2004 noted 'a number of serious violations of international humanitarian law' by US forces, including 'brutality' in custody, 'physical or psychological coercion during interrogation', prolonged solitary confinement in cells without daylight and 'excessive and disproportionate use of force, resulting in death or injury'. Methods used included hooding, handcuffing, 'pressing the face into the ground with boots', threats, being stripped naked for several days, acts of humiliation and exposure to loud noise. These methods, which involve war crimes, have become standard US practice, employed both at Guantanamo Bay and in Afghanistan, and perhaps also at other US detention centres in Pakistan, Jordan and Diego Garcia. Indeed, they have been taught to US and British military intelligence soldiers at bases in Britain and elsewhere and are known as 'resistance to interrogation' techniques. They also perhaps best signal the Bush administration's view of international law, exemplified in Bush's own response to September nth: 'I don't care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass'.31

  The war against democracy

  It seems to be inconceivable in the mainstream that Britain could be opposed to democracy in Iraq or elsewhere. Rather, it is axiomatic that Britain is a supporter of democracy; the only apparent concession is that some 'mistakes' might be made along the way or else leaders may have too high 'ideals'. As a result, Blair's and Bush's statements about wishing to bring democracy to Iraq are rarely countered, even despite the evidence that the opposite is the case.

  In the period of occupation alone, Britain has given its backing for blatantly flawed elections in Russia, Chechnya and Nigeria. In truth, Britain and the US have a general aversion to genuine democracy, particularly in the Middle East, where the most popular political movements tend to have weird ideas about using resources for national development purposes, rather than for the benefit of Western corporations.

  In Iraq, military force has been quickly followed by economic occupation. The country is currently being subjected to the usual dose of market fundamentalism common to the Western vassal states of the Third World – a process described as 'reconstruction' in the mainstream media. The US occupation forces – in the guise of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) – have proceeded to enact a series of economic "reforms' in Iraq decreeing widespread privatisation, full foreign ownership of Iraqi banks and factories and the ability for investors to repatriate 100 per cent of profits. CPA order number 12 on 'trade liberalisation policy' decreed the abolition of all trade tariffs and Iraq's 'development of a free market economy'.

  'Reconstruction' is being managed and implemented almost solely by foreign expertise. The strategy, which involves handing out multimillion dollar contracts to firms close to the Bush administration, has provoked lobbying by the British government to make sure that 'British companies secure a large slice of the new contracts', in the words of Foreign Office minister Mike O'Brien. By the end of 2003 there were five staff from Britain's Department of Trade and Industry working in Iraq as secondees to the CPA 'to support British firms in Iraq', Trade Secretary Patricia Hewitt noted. 'We expect UK companies to play a significant role in the redevelopment of Iraq', she stated, while her department was ensuring that British businesses 'access opportunities' there. This contradicted her earlier assertion to parliament that the government 'is not in this for business opportunities'.32

  According to former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz, the US 'is pushing Iraq towards an even more radical form of shock therapy than was pursued in the former Soviet world'. Today, Stiglitz notes, there is a consensus that economic shock therapy 'failed' and countries 'saw their incomes plunge and poverty soar'. Rapid privatisation is likely to have even more serious consequences in Iraq and 'the international community should direct its money to humanitarian causes such as hospitals and schools, rather than backing American designs'.33

  The economic 'reforms' imposed on Iraq are almost certainly illegal under international law. The terms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907 require existing laws in an occupied country to be respected. Since the passing of UN Security Council resolution 1483 in May 2003, the British government has been arguing that this 'provides a sound legal basis' for the privatisation and other reforms enacted by Paul Bremer's occupation authority. Yet resolution 1483 still requires full compliance with 'obligations under international law', which include the Geneva and Hague provisions.34

  The Iraqi oil industry appeared to have escaped privatisation and is instead slated to be state-run, partly due to fears of inflaming nationalist anger. Tony Blair told the House of Commons on the eve of war that 'the oil revenues, which people falsely claim that we want to seize, should be put in a trust fund for the Iraq people, administered through the UN'. Later, Britain co-sponsored the May 2003 UN resolution which in effect gave the US and UK control over Iraq's oil revenues, with no UN-administered trust fund.35

  One key business opportunity is exporting arms. Britain has already secured a special exemption from the UN arms embargo and has been providing arms to Iraq since October 2003. This is in the form of 'sub-machine guns and pistols which are to be used by private security firms contracted to provide close protection for employees' of the CPA. In a parliamentary answer in March 2003, Mike O'Brien said that Britain would support the lifting of the UN arms embargo 'as and when circumstances warrant'.36

  A further lucrative business is that of the 'private security guards' (ie, mercenaries) operating in the country. With contracts estimated to be worth around $1 billion, British companies are believed to have the biggest share. Around 1,500 former British soldiers and police officers, including former SAS officers, marines and paratroopers are working in Iraq, much of which is being paid for by British taxpayers. The Foreign Office and Department for International Development are reported to have spent nearly £25 million on hiring bodyguards and security advisers to protect their civil servants. The US recruitment of thousands of mercenaries has included veterans from the Pinochet regime in Chile and apartheid regimes in South Africa. Private contractors were also reported to be supervising interrogations in prisons.37

  The electoral systems in Iraq have been manipulated in much the same way as its economic resources. The country's leading Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, led the campaign to insist on early elections. He was opposed by Washington and London, presumably out of fear that their own favoured candidates would not win. "The Bush administration wanted an orderly process it could control', the Washington Post commented.38

  The media generally reported faithfully what was billed as a 'transfer of power' to Iraq at the end of June 2003 – even though it had become clear several months earlier that precisely the opposite was intended by the Anglo-US occupation forces. An 'occupation order' issued in March 2004, for example, signalled the US' intention to retain control of the Iraqi military after this 'transfer of power'. It also called for the US to appoint several key officers – an army chief of staff, national security adviser and inspector-general – for terms lasting several years. In practice, any Iraqi government was unlikely to replace the appointees before national elections in 2006.

  The Associated Press also reported – under the headline 'US will retain power in Iraq after transfer of sovereignty' – that 'most power will reside within the world's largest US embassy [being built in Baghdad], backed by 110,000 troops'. The Wall Street Journal reported that 'Bremer and other officials are quietly building institutions that will give t
he US powerful levers for influencing nearly every important decision the interim government will make'. In a series of edicts issued in the spring, Bremer 'created new commissions that effectively take away virtually all of the powers once held by several ministries'. He also announced that US and international 'advisers' would remain in virtually all remaining ministries after the 'handover'. By mid-2004, Foreign Office minister Mike O'Brien stated that 'almost 200' British officials had been seconded to the occupation authority and Iraqi ministries in recent months.39

  The US under-secretary of State, Marc Grossman, admitted that what was being transferred was 'limited authority'. The former top State Department official for the Middle East, Edward Walker, noted that Iraq's budget would effectively continue to be run by the US since it would control the doling out of billions of dollars in US aid. He said that it's definitely not really a transfer of sovereignty when you don't control the security of your country and you don't really have an income'.40

  Tony Blair managed to tell the House of Commons: 'There should be full sovereignty transferred to the Iraqi people and the multinational force should remain under American command'. His official spokesperson explained the need for Iraq 'to have full indivisible sovereignty – which means the Iraq government must give its consent to the role of the multinational forces after 1 July'.41

  The 30 June 'handover' was a consolidation of US power, and in effect a constitutional coup. It even appointed into power Iyad Allawi, a CIA and MI6 asset and also the source of the British government's claim that Iraq could deploy WMD within 45 minutes. It was as openly undertaken a coup as can be imagined, further exemplifying the attitude of the occupiers towards democracy.

  Another anti-democratic Anglo-American strategy in determining Iraq's future is to ensure that the Kurds in the north are kept as far from independence as possible. During the invasion of Iraq, Britain and the US specifically assured Turkey that the 'territorial integrity' of Iraq would be preserved. US leaders have reportedly assured the Turkish government of the need for 'a federation system' for Iraq giving Kurds limited autonomy. In contrast, some Kurdish leaders claim that Washington promised them more widespread autonomy in a federal system just before invading Iraq; which has been denied by the US. In early 2004 the agreed interim Iraqi constitution provided the Kurds with powers to veto any future permanent constitution, and contained guarantees of self-rule in the Kurdish region. However, these powers were not retained in the UN Security Council resolution that was passed in June 2004. US officials rejected strong Kurdish lobbying due to concerns about offending Iraq's Shia leaders who were opposed to granting the Kurds such powers.42

  One of the British government documents revealed in the Hutton inquiry is a question-and-answer sheet on the September 2002 dossier, in one part of which is stated: 'We wish to see autonomy (not independence) for the Iraqi Kurds'. This basic position has not changed over time. The view in 1963 was that 'our interests are best served by a strong and united Iraq', according to then Foreign Office official Percy Cradock, who was later to become a chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.43

  Washington and London's perennial policy towards the Kurds is evident in the declassified documents, and is worth briefly reviewing to understand the likely course of events in contemporary Iraq.

  Consider a secret Foreign Office paper from August 1963, which notes that 'there is no prospect of an independent Kurdistan since this would mean dismembering several other states besides Iraq'. The British interest is described as 'the existence of a strong, friendly Iraqi government able to ensure order throughout the country' either by agreement with the Kurds or by 'military control'. A strong and united Iraq acted as a counter to Nasser's Egypt in the Arab world and helped 'to ensure that the various oil-producing territories remain under divided political control'. The paper also notes that it is in British interests to see a negotiated settlement to the Kurdish problem 'though preferably not such a settlement as would seriously weaken the authority of the central government by its concessions to the Kurds'.

  Britain should seek to cultivate good relations both with Iraq and the Kurds but:

  The first are much more important. . . if we favour the Kurds against the Iraqis we would alarm neighbouring countries with Kurdish minorities . . . When faced with the need to make a choice we should therefore recognise the overriding importance of good relations with the Iraqis and that it is in our interest [sic] that their authority should prevail throughout the country.44

  The Kurds are regarded as a tool for applying pressure on regimes in Baghdad when necessary. In the early 1960s, for example, the British began to encourage a new Kurdish insurrection in Iraq in order to destabilise the nationalist regime of Abdul Qasim. The files show that the British ambassador in Baghdad was quite willing to 'keep an open mind' about the possibilities of the Kurdish revolt 'bringing about his [Qasim's] downfall'. He suggested in September 1962 that Britain should not therefore encourage a settlement between Baghdad and the Kurds but rather remain on the sidelines. Britain should not give direct assistance to the Kurds, he said, 'but perhaps we need not worry too much if others do'.45

  However, once Qasim had fallen in 1963 and a favoured regime assumed power in Baghdad, British policy changed to all-out support to the government (see Chapter 5). The US pursued the same policy, providing arms to the Kurds from 1961-1963 to undermine Qasim; two days after his fall, the US began to arm the new military regime to fight the same Kurds it had previously armed.46

  The sequence was essentially repeated for Saddam Hussein. When Saddam was a favoured ally in the 1980s, his massacre of the Kurds was tacitly accepted. After he became an official enemy upon his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Kurds were once again favoured and covertly supported. Now that the US controls things in Baghdad, the Kurds are regarded largely as a threat to be kept in their box.

  The balance sheet

  These then are some of the major considerations to be taken into account. There have of couse been positive developments in Iraq: the terrible Saddam regime has fallen, making for some improvements in freedom of expression and association, and the establishment of new media and civil society organisations. But these real gains seem dwarfed by the reality of the increasingly violent occupation. There is a range of harsh consequences, not only for Iraqis but for Unpeople everywhere.

  The first is the scale of violence and killings in Iraq, which have been more brutal than in Saddam's last years, while provisions for basic needs such as health have remained static or worsened for many. Second is a rise of terrorism both in Iraq itself and elsewhere, apparently spawned by US and British strategy. Third are the long-term consequences for ordinary Iraqis of the economic occupation, from which the population is likely to benefit little.

  Fourth are the consequences for human rights elsewhere. Following the brazen violation of international law committed in invading Iraq, other states – China, Russia, Indonesia, Nepal etc. – have used the cover of a 'war against terrorism' to launch attacks on their populations. Indeed, the global human-rights conventions and international law, to which states should be held to account, are coming under unprecedented attack in favour of the law of the jungle.

  Human Rights Watch has provided a devastating critique of the US and British claim to be acting in defence of human rights in Iraq. Its Director Kenneth Roth has written:

  The invasion of Iraq failed to meet the test for a humanitarian intervention. Most important, the killing in Iraq at the time was not of the exceptional nature that would justify such intervention. In addition, intervention was not the last reasonable option to stop Iraqi atrocities. Intervention was not motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns. It was not conducted in a way that maximised compliance with international humanitarian law. It was not approved by the Security Council. And while at the time it was launched it was reasonable to believe that the Iraqi people would be better off, it was not designed or carried out with the needs of Iraqis foremost in mind.47

&
nbsp; The normality of occupation

  Occupying foreign countries is a somewhat typical British activity in the post-Second World War era – a British speciality, indeed – which may help to explain why Washington was keen to have London on board. Recent British experience of occupation has been largely ignored in the mainstream, but it provides some pointers for the future of Iraq. Let us briefly take one past and one current example, neither of which offers good omens.

  The war in Britain's then colony of Kenya in the 1950s was essentially one over land. The Mau Mau movement demanded land for millions of landless poor; the British colonial forces defended white settlers, only a few thousand of whom owned the best land in the country. The declassified files I have seen paint a frightening picture of terrible human-rights atrocities by the colonial authorities in their attempt to defeat the opposition forces.