Keep From All Thoughtful Men

by James G. Lacey

  At first, Nathan was reluctant to show the reply to Kuznets because the latter had spent most of the summer preparing the study. But Kuznets heard about it and after some prodding Nathan handed him a copy of the reply. Initially, Kuznets was angry, but then began to think Somervell’s reply amusing. After all, Kuznets was already considered the world’s foremost authority on national income statistics and accounts, and here was a man in uniform stating that his intellectual work should be kept from “the eyes of thoughtful men.”

  The entire response played all too true to the stereotype of the military mind.40

  Confident that his analysis was sound, Kuznets petitioned Nathan to prepare a draft counterresponse for delivery with Nathan’s signature. With Nelson’s consent, Nathan forwarded a reply to Somervell on 17 September 1942, not wasting any time on a shot across the bow. Rather, he opened with a broadside amidships: “In view of the gravity of the problem discussed in these documents, I hesitate to take your memorandum seriously.” Remarkably, Nathan’s rejection of Somervell’s arguments became even more pointed after this blunt opening. He pointed out, for instance, “The fact that we once urged that the sights be raised is no reason for now adopting an ostrich-like attitude when goals are established that are above probability of achievement.” After his own point-by-point refutation of Somervell’s points, Nathan concluded with a blistering attack on Somervell’s dismissal of Kuznets’ estimates:I appreciate your frankness in stating that you are not impressed by the character or basis of judgments expressed in this report. Your conclusion . . . that these judgments be carefully hidden from the eyes of thoughtful men is a non-sequitur. Also, I am obliged to be frank with you in expressing my disappointment in your reply. The problems discussed are important and their intelligent consideration is urgent. The author of the documents is recognized nationally as one of the ablest and soundest authorities on our national economy and upon its ability to produce for peace or war. I think it would be most unwise to bar these problems, which have been given careful consideration by the staff and members of the Planning Committee, from people who have responsibility for the success of the war effort and the welfare of this country.41

  Neither Somervell’s memorandum nor Nathan’s reply were couched in the language of diplomacy. In fact, they had clearly designed their letters as the opening salvos of a titanic bureaucratic struggle, which is how the media portrayed them.42 Although both sides appeared to realize they were carrying their acrimony too far, the dispute was now out in the open and needed to be formally addressed. Nelson placed it on the agenda for the 6 October WPB meeting. Press coverage alerted the White House to the growing dispute, and Roosevelt’s minions informed Nelson that the president wanted the problem resolved quickly, telling him that the meeting could not be rescheduled. Nathan was called to the White House to present a lengthy explanation of the feasibility study to Harry Hopkins and his aide Isador Lubin, who was also an assistant to the president and an expert statistician.43 Finally, before the meeting, Nathan took the precaution of presenting and explaining the entire study to Leon Henderson, who fully concurred with its findings. Henderson, with his direct access to Roosevelt and his unparalleled ability to bulldoze those who stood in his way, proved a valuable ally in the coming struggle. The fact that Henderson had the reputation of being a vocal all-outer added credibility to his stand that the military would have to cut back on its requirements.

  Somervell came armed with a letter from General Marshall to Nelson, dated 6 October.44 The letter began by stating Marshall’s belief that an effective and elaborate machinery for the guidance of the strategic effort already existed. Given that, Marshall did not believe that a joint committee consisting of an economist, a politician, and a person familiar with strategy but not with production would be an effective means of controlling the war effort. It concluded by declaring, “Lt. General Somervell is the designated representative of the War Department for the interpretation of strategy to the War Production Board.”

  In addition to securing this letter, Somervell had also prepared for the meeting by discussing the question with Under Secretary Patterson and Vice Admiral S. M. Robinson, both of whom were regular attendees of WPB meetings. He secured their approval of his position on the matter of feasibility. In the case of Robinson, his interest in the meeting’s outcome was less than that of Somervell. No matter how the question would be resolved, Robinson was satisfied that the Navy’s procurement programs would proceed on schedule.45 Nevertheless, because of his close relationship to Somervell, he supported the latter’s position. As for a “supreme production council,” Robinson could see no advantage in its establishment, and therefore actively concurred in Somervell’s desire to oppose this along with the feasibility findings of the Planning Committee.

  Nathan’s speech, given at the beginning of the meeting, contained little that was new to those present. He merely presented a summary of Kuznets’ feasibility study and concluded with a plea for the creation of a joint production strategy body. Taking up where Nathan left off, Wayne Coy, assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, inquired whether the Army and the Navy would admit that the 1942 program was too large to be feasible. Somervell replied that, whereas it was clearly necessary to utilize all means to achieve the program, it would be 90 percent complete by the end of the year, in contrast to the 81 percent that Nathan had estimated.

  Somervell declared that he was “not so despondent” as those who believed they could not meet production goals, even if more-effective controls were instituted. He further claimed that the government could avoid existing and impending shortages in critical materials through more-intense efforts on the part of the producers. Finally, he emphasized that in the interest of providing for the needs of soldiers and sailors the nation should concentrate all of its efforts on increasing supply. According to Somervell, the work involved in the millions of recomputations necessary to reduce the requirements program was not worth the doubtful benefits it might provide.

  At this point, Henderson, in answer to Somervell’s remark that the use of dollar figures in the committee’s report had not impressed him, commented that dollar and national income figures seemed to be “the best common denominators of capacity.” Somervell replied that in his opinion it would be possible to reduce dollar costs by 10 percent from existing prices. He then continued his criticism of Nathan’s report: “We already have the Combined Chiefs, Joint Chiefs, the Combined Production and Resources Board, the Munitions Assignments Board, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, and the War Production Board. What good would be a board composed of an economist, a politician, and a soldier who does not know production?”

  Nathan then made clear that in his view the production authorities could not question strategy, but inquired whether the Joint Chiefs, for their part, had considered feasibility fully in establishing military requirements. With his letter from Marshall to Nelson spread before him, Somervell replied that the supply programs submitted to WPB adequately represented the material expressions of strategy. Furthermore, he saw no need for the board to concern itself with strategic considerations. When Coy inquired what steps the government should take if production fell below strategic requirements set by the chiefs of staff, Somervell answered that this would necessitate merely making changes in the supply programs presented to WPB for the following year.

  Robinson then supported Somervell’s position by asserting that the Army and Navy would be able to keep the production effort in balance and by expressing confidence that the entire program would henceforth be more effectively scheduled. Under Secretary of War Patterson took up the argument by stating his opposition to the creation of a new production-strategy board, but suggested that it would be beneficial to have WPB officials meet from time to time with the Joint Chiefs “for an exchange of attitudes”—the only conciliatory note voiced.

  After a period when the military representatives dominated the meeting, a concerted attack on the armed services began. Lubin, acting fo
r Hopkins, pointed out that failure to meet production schedules on time meant that the JCS would not have the munitions expected and that “some means of informing them should be provided.” McNutt asserted that, despite repeated efforts, his War Manpower Commission had not been able to obtain reliable data on the manpower needs of the Army and Navy. He also denied the validity of Somervell’s contention that there was sufficient coordination in the manpower situation and stated that Somervell had not made good on his earlier promise that the War Manpower Commission would be informed of the Army’s needs. Nelson himself observed that the Army had not informed the WPB of the recently adopted proposal to increase the size of the Army and that such proposals vitally affected the general shortage of manpower.

  Despite these criticisms, Somervell, Robinson, and Patterson seemed likely to prevail by default. Without a firm WPB decision, the Joint Chiefs could hardly be expected to lower goals then projected for 1942 and 1943. Thus it appeared that the discussion might end without any effective acceptance of Nathan’s proposals. But during a brief lull in the proceedings, Henderson began to speak in a low voice, almost as though he was thinking aloud. The subject of his quasi-soliloquy was the figure set by Nathan as the maximum productive effort (munitions, construction, and nonmunitions expenditures) that the nation could achieve in 1943, and that Somervell and Patterson held to be insufficient for the conduct of the war. “The amount in question, 90 billion dollars, was interesting,” said Henderson, “because it exceeded by far the value of our entire national product both for 1933 and 1934.” Then, as if a great light were dawning, he said, in substance, “Maybe if we can’t wage a war on 90 billions, we ought to get rid of our present Joint Chiefs, and find some who can.”46

  The meeting received this statement in dead silence, which allowed Henderson to turn to Somervell and proceed to make the most violent personal attack ever heard in a meeting of the WPB. He announced that he found himself disgusted with Somervell’s repeated obstinacy, overbearing manner, and ignorance of production problems. He stated flatly his belief that Somervell had always padded his requirements, and that the general had no idea of the disastrous implications of infeasible goals. For a considerable period, Henderson gave vent to every grievance he had accumulated throughout the first year of the war.

  Somervell was silent. During his numerous struggles with WPB and his frequent disagreements at Board meetings, no one had ever spoken to him in this fashion. Nor could Henderson resist one final thrust. When W. L. Batt, a WPB vice chair, attempted to assuage Henderson by pointing out that, after all, Somervell did not make the strategy, Henderson replied, “Ain’t he got a letter?”47

  After this the meeting, which had occupied more than twice the usual time, rapidly drew to a close. Patterson again recommended that the armed services be given whatever they requested. Coy and Somervell discussed the problems raised by the size of the Army, and Coy predicted that new augmentations of the munitions program would be forthcoming. Nelson, showing obvious embarrassment, stated his belief in maximum production, but warned that plans would have to support essential civilian activities, such as railroads. Finally, Stacy May stated that the nation could meet the program if it were redesigned to produce in fifteen months what had been scheduled for twelve months. Vice President Henry Wallace and Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson pointed out that they would have to inform the president promptly if any rescheduling affected the president’s announced objectives. On this inconclusive note, the meeting ended.

  Two days later the Planning Committee considered alternative means of securing revisions to the 1943 program. Anticipating further military objections to production cuts, Kuznets suggested an alternative way to sell the idea. Rather than tell the military they had to reduce requirements, Kuznets advocated that the committee inform the military that it could have everything it wanted, but at a new date. In a memorandum to the committee, he stated, “If we could, say that the objectives in many areas are to be pushed forward—say to the middle of 1944—and that production schedules for 1943 are to be reduced, we would perhaps encounter less opposition than if we insist on the reduction of the objectives proper.”48

  Furthermore, Stacy May, present by invitation at this meeting, urged abandonment of the proposal to form a super-production-strategy committee. In his opinion, this goal was impossible to achieve, and an emphasis on the importance of effective collaboration among existing military and production bodies should replace the proposal.49

  The committee accepted both proposals and forwarded the recommendations to Nelson immediately prior to the next meeting of the WPB, set for 13 October. These two proposals had gone far toward making solutions to the feasibility program more palatable to both the military and to Somervell, in particular. First, as far as production went, the new proposals followed Somervell’s own suggestion made during the 6 October meeting: if the nation could not meet production objectives he would be in favor of just adjusting the following year’s schedules to finish the job.50 Second, they removed from consideration the one idea Somervell found most loathsome in the committee’s proposals: the creation of a new group that would bypass him and take away his position as the person who translated the Joint Chiefs’ strategic plans into production plans.

  As the Planning Committee was meeting, Somervell was having his own epiphany. The day after the 6 October meeting, Under Secretary of War Patterson, Somervell’s boss for production-related matters, sent Somervell a memorandum basically telling him to accept the Planning Committee’s stance on feasibility.51 In his letter Patterson admitted that the production program was beyond the country’s ability to fulfill, and that major cuts in the program would soon become necessary. He also said he foresaw that with so many programs (such as shipping and aircraft production) sacrosanct, most of the cuts would have to come from Army programs and possibly from the Navy’s capital ship program.52

  So by the 13 October WPB meeting both sides were ready to compromise. Nelson began the meeting by stating that the production goals for 1943 were not practicable. A long statement by Henderson stated his conviction that even the Planning Committee’s more-feasible overall goals would be impossible to meet without substantial improvements in methods of production and scheduling. After some remarks by Nelson and Lubin that indicated that any further reductions to civilian-oriented production would damage the overall economic effort, Henderson again took up his cudgel. Since the president would not consider a reduction in his “must” items, it was necessary to cut the military supply program by about 50 percent.53

  Although he had vehemently contested each of these points the preceding week, Somervell (along with Patterson and Robinson) kept silent throughout each of these presentations. After hearing that the WPB had abandoned the idea of a super-production-strategy committee and listening to proposals to roll 1943 production over into 1944, Somervell spoke up for the first time. After expressing general agreement with Mr. Henderson, Somervell stated that he was more optimistic regarding the management and control of the program. He then suggested that Nelson write a letter to the Joint Chiefs informing them the president’s “must” program when coupled with their own objectives constituted a total too great to attain within the established limits. Somervell then stated it would be the responsibility of the JCS to determine, after consulting with the president, what action should be taken to bring the overall program within the limits of production feasibility.54

  Both Patterson and Robinson then seconded Somervell’s proposal, stating, “A letter needs to be sent to the Joint Chiefs outlining the difficulties discussed at the present meeting and suggesting that the program be reviewed from this viewpoint, since an early decision on this matter was urgent.”55 After some brief discussion, the meeting adjourned. Nathan immediately drafted a letter to the Joint Chiefs for Nelson to sign and deliver.

  Upon receipt of Nelson’s letter, the Joint Chiefs immediately began considering reduction proposals that would bring total objectives down to $80 billi
on. Nelson’s letter and a proposed JCS reply were the primary topic of discussion at the Joint Chiefs meeting on 20 October.56 After some debate the Joint Chiefs directed the Joint Staff planners to prepare a study indicating where reductions could best be applied to retain a balanced program and at the same time bring total requirements within production capability. The planners were directed to have this study ready for submission to the JCS no later than 10 November 1942.57 A letter from the JCS, signed by Admiral Leahy, informing Nelson of this decision was sent the next day.58

  By the end of November, the Joint Chiefs had completed their work, which led to a reduction for 1943 in the Navy program of $3 billion and the Army program of $9 billion.59 Although the total JCS program was still $5 billion above what the Planning Committee thought feasible ($80 billion vs. $75 billion), May and Kuznets declared it was possible and Nathan agreed.60

  After more than half a year of bureaucratic warfare, Nelson and his team had won. Their victory was not without personal costs, however. Nelson’s handling of the issue, along with other squabbles with Somervell, had ruined his relations with the Joint Chiefs beyond repair, and they became increasingly antagonistic. While Roosevelt did not fire Nelson, the president gradually pushed him aside in the WPB and then made Nelson’s position redundant with the appointment of Supreme Court Justice James Byrnes to the Office of War Mobilization, which eventually assumed most of WPB’s coordination functions. Discouraged, Nelson left government service within the year.

  The feasibility dispute also brought about the demise of the Planning Committee, which was demoted to a secondary position in early 1943 when Charles E. Wilson, then vice chair of WPB, reorganized the Planning Board. According to Brigante, Wilson’s decision was greatly influenced by the antagonism Somervell and other military officials felt toward Nathan and the rest of the Planning Committee.61 As a result of this reorganization, Nathan resigned and the other members followed his lead.