Keep From All Thoughtful Men

by James G. Lacey

53 Ibid.

  54 Ibid.

  55 Ibid.

  56 Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 186.

  57 Author interview with David Ginsberg on 11 October 2007.

  58 Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 187.

  59 “The United States at War,” 80.

  60 Donald Nelson to Henry L. Stimson, Frank Knox, E. S. Land, and E. R. Stettinius, 17 September 1941, National Archives, RG 179, Box 1 (179.2.1).

  61 Based on this title, it is clear that this was a restatement of the work done by the Army’s G-4 and Colonel Aurand. It cannot have been the Wedemeyer Plan or even some revised version of it because it did not lay out any of the equipment required for his notional force and was useless as a production planning document.

  62 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 139.

  63 “Army and Navy Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements,” 11 September 1941. National Archives, Record Group 225.

  64 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 140.

  65 Ibid., 139.

  66 Comments by Robert Nathan on Stacy May report of 4 December 1941, National Archives, Record Group 179, Box 1. Note: This was based on May’s best guess of what was needed to fight a global war. After Pearl Harbor, the military would first double and then triple these requirements, pushing them far into the realm of the impossible.

  67 Author interview with Patricia Bass, daughter of Stacy May on 9 October 2007.

  68 Letter to author from Donald May, son of Stacy May (dated 12 October 2007). In the Stacy May papers (maintained at the University of Wyoming) there is one letter that May kept throughout the war years. It was the only one he kept out of hundreds he received from average citizens. May kept it close to him as a source of motivation. In part it read,What in the name of heaven do you Washington bureaucrats mean by not seeing that our boys have the needed arms, guns, machine guns, rifles, they need. I am sick at heart to think that we are asking them to fight well-equipped German devils without the equipment they need. I ask what the hell is the use of building a 3,000,000-man army if they don’t have guns and ammunition. I ask you if you are going to go out there with them to watch them be slaughtered. Oh no, you will sit here and watch them go. You will read about the war in the papers while our boys die by the millions because some lunk-heads in Washington can’t do their jobs.

  Chapter 6. The War Production Board and Two Wars

  1 Elliot Janeway, The Struggle for Survival (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), 220.

  2 Thomas Fleming, The New Dealer’s War: FDR and War Within World War II (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 410.

  3 Norman Beasley,Knudsen: A Biography (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947), 130.

  4 Ibid., 240.

  5 Janeway, The Struggle for Survival, 226.

  6 Executive Order 9024, 16 January 1942, National Archives, Record Group 179.2.1. Emphasis added.

  7 When the author began researching this work, the first book he read on the period was Nelson’s autobiography (Arsenal of Democracy) and he developed a natural sympathy for the man and a respect for his accomplishments. It took many months of further research for the author to understand that Nelson, despite many admirable qualities, was not the right man to fight the battles necessary to make sure war production was accomplished with maximum efficiency.

  8 Janeway, The Struggle for Survival, 226.

  9 “The United States at War,” 107.

  10 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 213.

  11 War Production Board, General Administrative Order 2–23, 16 March 1942, National Archives, Record Group 179.2.1. Also discussed in Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 213.

  12 The Truman Committee was established by then–Senator Harry Truman to study and spot waste, fraud, and abuse within the national preparedness administration. The Roosevelt administration initially feared the committee would hurt war morale, and, according to Fleming, in The New Dealer’s War (101), Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson wrote to the president declaring it was “in the public interest” to suspend the committee. Truman wrote a letter to FDR saying that the committee was “100 percent behind the administration” and that it had no intention of criticizing the military conduct of the war. By the end of the war, the committee was reported to have saved the taxpayers at least $15 billion, at a time when a billion dollars was still considered a significant sum of money by the United States government.

  13 77th Cong., 1st sess., Special Senate Committee investigating the National Defense Program,Hearings,pt. 12,5089,21 April 1942.

  14 Nelson clearly thought that this was an area that civilian authorities were not competent enough to delve into, despite the fact that most of this work was done by civilians within the Army and Navy organizations.

  15 Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy, 194–205.

  16 Herman Sommers, OWMR: Presidential Agency (Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 1950), 73–75.

  17 Author’s interview with David Ginsberg on 11 October 2007. Mr. Ginsberg stated that Roosevelt had called him to his office in early 1941, while he was general counsel for OPA, and told him to gather a team of lawyers to analyze what laws would be required to manage industrial production in the event of war, and to have that team prepare the proper legislation for an immediate vote in the event of war. Mr. Ginsberg claims that virtually all of this work was completed by the middle of the year.

  18 The IMP was written and updated by the Industrial War College throughout the 1930s, with the final update prepared in 1939. Their fundamental premise was that the military would assume control of U.S. production on M-Day (Mobilization Day, or the day war was declared). Due to industrial mobilization’s rolling start from 1939 on and Roosevelt’s strong desire to keep the control of the civilian economy out of the military’s control, the plan was never instituted. For more information, refer to Mobilization: The U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, DC, 1990).

  19 “The United States at War,” 111.

  20 Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 209.

  21 These reorganizations have been covered in depth in several important works. For the Army, refer to The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces by John D. Millett (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954). The Navy story is told in Robert H. Connery’s The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), while the story of the WPB organization is explained best in Koistinen’s Arsenal of World War II.These organizations are big topics in and of themselves, but this work will focus on the parts and personalities that had the most influence on the great feasibility debates of late 1942.

  22 “The United States at War,” 109.

  23 Christman, “Ferdinand Eberstadt and Economic Mobilization.”

  24 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 238.

  25 Brigante, “The Feasibility Dispute.”

  26 Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy, 204–5. See also Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 237.

  27 General Administrative Orders No. 11, 3 March 1942. A copy of this document is reproduced in the Minutes of the Planning Committee, National Archives, RG 179.1 (Box 1).

  28 War Production Board,Minutes of the Planning Committee,26 February 1942, 3, National Archives, RG 179.1 (Box 1).

  29 Time, 9 February 1942, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,777568–1,00.html (accessed 1 October 2007).

  30 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947), 240.

  31 Ibid.

  32 Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, 32. Most of those with a stake in the debate had been following developments for several months and knew that Marshall was just being polite. As the rest of this story will show,
the big fights had already been fought, and Marshall was going forward despite whatever comments might be returned at this late date. By the time Marshall asked for comments, he had already secured the approval of Secretary of War Stimson, with a draft copy of the reorganization at the White House for the president to review.

  33 Frederick S. Haydon, “War Department Reorganization, August 1941—March 1942 (Part I),” Military Affairs 16, no. 1 (Spring 1952): 12–29. This article, along with Part II, “War Department Reorganization, August 1941—March 1942 (Part II),” Military Affairs 16, no. 3 (Autumn 1952): 97–114, provides an excellent short history of the Army reorganization.

  34 Haydon, “War Department Reorganization (Part I),” 17.

  35 Ibid., 18.

  36 Ray S. Cline, The War Department: Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, (Washington, DC, 1951), 70–71. See particularly the notes on interview with General Gerow (p. 77 and p. 79).

  37 Haydon, “War Department Reorganization (Part I),” 19.

  38 Ibid., 20.

  39 The complete memorandum along with a late draft of the Harrison memorandum can be found in the National Archives, Record Group 165.8 (Records of the War Plans Division (1910–1942).

  40 Haydon, “War Department Reorganization (Part I),” 28

  41 Haydon, “War Department Reorganization (Part II),” 98.

  42 Ibid., 99.

  43 Testimony of Colonel William K. Harrison before Senate Military Affairs Committee, 6 March 1942, in Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, on S.2092, “A Bill to Establish a Department of Defense Coordination and Control,” 13.

  44 Haydon, “War Department Reorganization (Part II),” 99.

  45 General Embick’s role in determining U.S. war strategy will be seen below in Chapter 9 where we deal with Marshall’s commitment to a 1943 invasion of northern Europe.

  46 The full report of the Roberts Commission (77th Congress, 2nd Session, Document 159) can be accessed at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/roberts/roberts.html (accessed 1 November 2007).

  47 Haydon, “War Department Reorganization (Part II),” 106.

  48 For a short study of the command techniques of many of the top commanders of U.S. forces in World War II see Jim Lacey, “Soldiering and Sensitivity,” Military History Magazine ( January 2008): 58–62.

  49 Otto L. Nelson Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 356–60.

  50 Minutes of the Opening Session, Special Committee, Reorganization of the War Department, 16 February 1942, WDCSA 020, 1942 (War Department Reorganization). These minutes were not distributed or filed but are reproduced in Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy, 356–60.

  51 Haydon, “War Department Reorganization (Part II),” 112. This letter was delivered on 27 February 1942.

  52 Ibid.

  53 Ibid., 113.

  54 Cline, Washington Command Post, 92.

  55 This may be one of the few times General Arnold is referred to as genial. As one subordinate who worked closely with him said, “He pushed everyone relentlessly, he demanded, he cajoled, he was both sly and totally unreasonable. By demanding the impossible he worked miracles. His idea of administering a program was to think of something that needed doing and to tell someone to do it. No one ever stayed around to disappoint him twice” ( James Lacey, “Senistivity for Generals,” Military History Magazine, March 2008). As for Somervell being soft-spoken, this is a gross mischaracterization of the man.

  56 “Streamlining the Army,” Time, 9 March 1942.

  57 From this point forward this work will use the more common name: Army Service Forces (ASF).

  58 Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, 39. Millett’s work remains the best history of the Army Service Forces and its accomplishments during the war. See also Gropman, The Big L; and G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, vols. 1 and 2 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1953). For a version that details more of Somervell’s direct impact see John Kennedy Ohl, Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in World War II (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994).

  59 Ohl, Supplying the Troops, 4.

  60 Harry Yoshpe, “Organization for Production Control in World War II,” 1946. This monograph was commissioned by the Army Industrial College and never published. A copy is on file in the archival section of the National Defense University Library, Washington, DC. Another copy scanned into pdf format is in the possession of the author. This ninety-four– page monograph gives a detailed breakdown of the Army’s productive organization from 1939 through 1945.

  61 Ibid., 19.

  62 Cline, Washington Command Post, 93.

  63 “Memorandum to the Staff of the Under Secretary of War,” 10 March 1942, as quoted in Yoshpe, “Organization for Production Control in World War II,” 20.

  64 Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, 39. General McNarney in testimony to Congress said that although Somervell would have two bosses, each would be for a different purpose. Although it violated good management practices, it was the “best practical solution.”

  65 Koistinen’s Arsenal of World War II, 336–38, offers a more sympathetic picture of Nelson and the forces he had to contend with than is given below.

  66 John Lord O’Brian, “Oral History Project,” Columbia University, New York, 548–51. Quoted Christman, “Ferdinand Eberstadt and Economic Mobilization,” 89–91.

  67 Author interview with David Ginsberg on 11 October 2007.

  68 Ibid.

  69 Ibid.

  70 Janeway, The Struggle for Survival, 239.

  71 Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces, 7.

  72 Charles Murphy, “Somervell of the SOS,” Life, 8 March 1942, 86.

  73 New Republic, 13 April 1942, 487.

  74 Aurand, it will be remembered, was the true author of the Army’s portion of the Victory Program.

  75 Nathan, “GNP and Military Mobilization.”

  76 Author interview with David Ginsberg on 11 October 2007.

  Chapter 7. War and Feasibility

  1 Most of this report was actually written by Nathan who was working for May at the time, although in a few months that working relationship would reverse.

  2 Memorandum from Stacy May to Donald Nelson, “Feasibility of the Victory Program,” National Archives, Planning Committee Document, Records Group 179, Box 1.

  3 Ibid.

  4 As this work has shown, although translating all of the complexities of the U.S. economy into dollar terms is not a perfect representation, all parties agreed (and continue to agree) that it was the best solution available. Also, by this time the president and many others in government had become familiar with this concept of translating the economy into national income accounts. This was to become a sticking point in later feasibility discussions, especially with General Somervell, who argued that such calculations could not be trusted and did not reflect the true production outlook. This was probably just a negotiating ploy by Somervell: his personal files show him using the same financial translations in presentations to the joint staff prior to the height of the feasibility dispute in October 1942.

  5 Memorandum from May to Nelson, “Feasibility of the Victory Program.”

  6 Ibid.

  7 May and other civilian experts also failed to foresee that a new generation of materiel and munitions was about to move from the drawing board to the production line. These new weapons would require considerably more raw materials, money, and time to produce than the relatively simple items being churned out by U.S. factories in 1940–41. However, much of this extra cost would be erased as producers became more productive and reduced construction times often by orders of magnitude. Most of this increase in productivity was not captured in the early feasibility analysis, though it was being accounted for by mid-1942.

  8 Memorandum from Stacy May to Donald Nelson,4
December 1941,“Planning Committee Document,” National Archives, Record Group 179, Box 1.

  9 Ibid. This entire document is reproduced in Appendix 8, this volume.

  10 Ibid.

  11 According to the U.S Bureau of the Census (1975), “Private consumption was squeezed a bit in 1942, and then rose a bit in 1943 and 1944.” However, most of the deflated amount of consumption was caused by a reduction in private investment, which was now to a great extent being done by the government. Consumers continued to spend freely throughout the war, using the black market to purchase items that were in limited supply due to rationing. Harrison, The Economics of World War II, 85–90.

  12 Robert Higgs, “Wartime Prosperity? A Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the 1940’s” Journal of Economic History (1 March 1992): 41–60. Higgs takes aim at the “we never had it so good” hypothesis by using 1941 as his base year to judge wartime consumption levels against. His findings have ignited a debate among economic historians, but to the author appear to be another example of how modern statisticians can confuse economic models with reality. For an excellent analysis of the composition, quantity, and quality of consumer consumption, see Hugh Rockoff’s essay,“The United States: From Ploughshares to swords,” in Harrison, The Economics of World War II, 81–121.

  13 The effects that labor, raw materials, and facilities had on feasibility were explained in a later study by Simon Kuznets, which is reproduced in a condensed version in Appendix 2, this volume. For further information, see Christman, “Ferdinand Eberstadt and Economic Mobilization”; Connery, The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II; Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909–1949 (College Station, TX: TAMU Press, 1991); Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, The Army and Industrial Manpower, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959); Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Industrial Mobilization for War (1947); Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II; Novick, Wartime Production Controls; Smith, The Army and Industrial Mobilization; and “The United States at War.”