Jutland_The Unfinished Battle

by Nicholas Jellicoe

  Scheer began to adjust the order of the line. The pre-dreadnoughts of the 2nd Squadron were ordered to the rear at 21:50, although their move was delayed by the sighting of Shannon. Westfalen’s 1st Squadron was now led by the 3rd Squadron, with the 2nd Squadron eventually taking up position in the rear at 22:10. And finally, behind the pre-dreadnoughts, came the badly damaged battle-cruisers.

  Von der Tann and Derfflinger could only manage a minimal 18 knots: the former’s boilers were being cleaned, while astern the latter had been badly holed and had taken on around 3,400 tons of water.

  A stubborn struggle [on Derfflinger] was being waged against fire and water. Although as far as possible everything inflammable had been taken out of the ship, the fire continued to spread, fed principally by linoleum, the wooden decks, clothing and oil paints. At about eight o’clock we had practically mastered the flames, the fire now smouldering in only a few isolated places. Caesar and Dora turrets were still smoking and giving out clouds of thick yellow gas from time to time, but this gradually ceased after the ammunition chambers had been flooded. No one could ever have believed that a ship could endure so much heavy fire.12

  In fact, hardly any guns on her port side were working; only two 15cm guns were still intact. On her starboard she still had use of all six secondary guns.

  When Scheer had ordered Hipper to take his battle-cruisers to the rear, initially his orders did not get through to the Aufklärungsgruppe chief, who raced Moltke to the head of the line at 20 knots with Lützow and Seydlitz struggling along astern. Both were badly mauled by this stage: Seydlitz had suffered twenty-four large-calibre hits, Lützow around forty. When the order did finally get through, Hipper took Moltke and Seydlitz back to join Mauve’s slow pre-dreadnoughts. Quickly Lützow fell further and further behind. By 21:13 she was out of sight. Scheer could not jeopardise the rest of his fleet for one damaged battle-cruiser.13

  The 2nd Squadron’s move to the rear was very delayed. This is why, when Friedrich der Große arrived at the turning point at 21:45, Scheer had to amend his orders in order to maintain the Horns Reef as the target: Westfalen did not respond fast enough and a new course of 137 degrees (against the first of 142 degrees) was ordered at 21:46: ‘Battle fleet’s course south, south-east-by-¾-east’.

  The creation of a giant ‘V’ had been set in motion, with the British fleet heading down the right character stroke south and the High Seas Fleet sailing on the left, at a slightly slower speed – of about one knot, southeast – towards the Horns Reef. Over the dark hours ahead, the ‘V’ would become an ‘X’ as the High Seas Fleet crossed over the wake of the British line’s rear.

  Scheer later proposed, without much credibility, that the move to get to the Horns Reef was so that he could be in a better position to challenge the British when battle resumed in the daylight of 1 June:

  It might safely be expected that in the twilight the enemy would endeavour, by attacking with strong forces and during the night with destroyers, to force us over to the west in order to open battle with us when it was light. He was strong enough to do so. If we could succeed in warding off the enemy’s encircling movement, and could be the first to reach the Horns Reef, then the liberty of decision for next morning’s fight was assured to us.14

  Major German ships were spotted by the British, but the critical information was not passed on to Jellicoe. Most commanders thought he probably knew the situation already. Nor was the opportunity taken to attack. Many commanders thought that either they should receive direct orders to that effect or that, in attacking on their own initiative, they might compromise the fleet.

  Both Malaya and Valiant saw large ships without informing Jellicoe. Thunderer saw Moltke pass by, but her captain thought it would be ‘inadvisable’ to give his position away. The battleships Agincourt, Revenge, Marlborough and Thunderer let the dim outline of the mortally crippled Seydlitz fade from sight. Again, with no action. The cruisers Boadicea and Fearless decided not to loose torpedoes without more positive identification. Having found the van, Champion did the same. Only Faulknor tried to signal the flagship, alas, unsuccessfully. It was, all in all, a lamentable performance with absolutely no initiative taken.

  The last report that Jellicoe had received before the 02:15 deadline (the time by which he needed to have changed direction in order to be in a suitable position to catch the Germans before they reached the safety of the Horns Reef) had been from Birmingham at 23:30. However, the report was grossly misleading. It had stated that the enemy was steering south, ie parallel to the Grand Fleet.15 It was unfortunate that Jellicoe chose to put more faith in this signal than the 22:41 one from the Admiralty, which stated that Scheer was steaming for the Horns Reef.

  Jellicoe knew only the rough position of the High Seas Fleet. He had received a signal at around 21:05 that he should expect attacks from three flotilla groups in the night, then at 21:58 information that gave the position of the rear of the German fleet that he did not believe. Room 40 had not erred: the Regensburg had; the ship was ten miles out in its dead reckoning. Iron Duke got further important information about the German fleet disposition at around 23:05, namely that the Admiralty had received signals intelligence about the Germans’ course and speed: ‘German battle fleet ordered home at 21:14. Battle-cruisers in the rear. Course south-south-east-¾-east. Speed 16 knots.’

  The length of time taken for the signal to get through to Jellicoe is significant. The 21:14 (German time) signal from Scheer was sent through to Admiral Oliver in the Operations Division at 21:55. Signalled back out to Jellicoe at 20:41 GMT, it reached him on the Iron Duke only at 23:30.16 Just fifteen minutes after getting this information, Room 40 decrypted Scheers telltale signal requesting air reconnaissance of the Horns Reef early on the morning of 1 June. This second vital piece of information – sent through to Oliver at 20:10 – was never passed through to Jellicoe.

  Furthermore, Room 40 sent other vital signals to the Operations Division in the Admiralty that: (a) at 20:10 the fleet was steering south-southeast by ¾-east; (b) at 23:15 – southeast by east; (c) all torpedo boats had been ordered by Commodore Michelsen to the Horns Reef to make a 04:00 rendezvous;17 and (d) the 23:50 course signalled by Scheer was southeast by ¾-east. ‘These signals were all in the Operations Division within three-quarters of an hour of their being made. But none of them was passed on to Jellicoe.’ For Beatty’s biographer, Stephen Roskill, it showed ‘the staggeringly bad co-operation between the Admiralty War Staff and Room 40’.18

  Decryption and Intelligence

  The quality and timeliness of battlefield intelligence are fundamental for command. Jutland revealed many instances of wretched intelligence and communications failures; there was a myriad of mistakes and oversights in information management between London and the fleets. During the night of 31 May and the early morning of 1 June, Room 40 intercepted various pieces of intelligence, including a signal that the German torpedo flotillas had been ordered to meet at the Horns Reef. But after signalling that the Germans would take the Horns Reef route, Jellicoe was not given any subsequent intelligence that would have restored his faith after the earlier blunder. He was not told that Michelsen’s destroyers were to rendezvous there, nor that Scheer had ordered Zeppelin reconnaissance. He was inclined to trust his own judgement and local intelligence more and chose the Jade route.

  The confidence of both Jellicoe and Beatty was severely shaken earlier in the day, as he had heard from the Admiralty at 12:48 that Friedrich der Große still appeared to be in the Jade Basin. The illusion was shattered when Goodenough, leading Beatty’s scouting arm to the south, saw sixteen dreadnoughts of the HSF steaming up north towards the Southampton at speed. Later, there was another Admiralty signal that only increased Jellicoe’s distrust. He received a message based on Kommodore Heinrich’s 20:13 signal to the 2nd and 6th Flotillas (‘Our own battle fleet is square 165 epsilon, lower part, at 20:00, Course South’) showing Regensburg’s dead reckoning to be around about ten miles out. It certai
nly did not help that Jellicoe himself was at that exact position at the very same time stated. (This was received by Jellicoe at 20:45, giving the rearmost position of the German line as 56° 33′ N, 5° 30′ E on a southern course).19

  Scheer, by contrast, knew that the British destroyers had been placed at the Grand Fleet’s rear, and running into them confirmed that he was breaking through at the right point.

  It was only years after the war ended that Jellicoe found out the full extent of the information that had been held back. He commented:

  The lamentable part of the whole business is that had the Admiralty sent all the information which they had acquired … there would have been little or no doubt in my mind as to the route by which Scheer intended to return to base. As early as 10.10 pm, Scheers message to the airship detachment… was in the possession of the Admiralty. This was practically a certain indication of his route but it was not passed to me.20

  Between 21:55 on 31 May and 03:00 on 1 June, sixteen decodes were passed from Room 40 to the Operations Division. Of these sixteen, only three were passed on to Jellicoe. He knew from them that the British and German fleets were on a converging course, and that he was steaming slightly faster than they. ‘It is therefore puzzling that, when gunfire, searchlights and star-shells were seen at intervals astern of the main body, as was to happen during the rest of the night, it did not occur to Jellicoe or his staff that these were indications that this was just what was happening.’21

  Commodore Michelsen on Rostock commanded the destroyers attached to the High Seas Fleet. He was given the task of organising diversionary attacks on the British to prevent them blocking the main fleet getting across. Rostock joined up with Rear Admiral Bödicker’s 2nd Scouting Group, Frankfurt and Pillau (but not Elbing), which were posted out in front on the port wing.22 Michelsen co-operated with Commodore Paul Heinrich, who commanded the battle-cruisers’ torpedo-boat flotillas from Regensburg, in night-time probes on the British line. The two men organised the tasks for each group. Ahead of the armoured mass, the torpedo-boat flotillas were laid out in a fan. Korvet-tenkapitän Heinecke’s 5th Flotilla was responsible for searching ahead of the main fleet to the south-southwest and south-southeast (he found little sign of the British and returned to Westfalen). To Heinricke’s west was the 18th Half-Flotilla, while Korvettenkapitän von Koch’s 7th Flotilla was responsible for searching the south by east and southeast sectors.

  The night manoeuvring of the torpedo flotillas was dangerous work, partly because the groups had to make frequent crossings of the battleship line – there had been so many changes, of course, but it was also inevitable that they would enter the operating zone of another flotilla. Identifying friend from foe was nerve-racking and stressful for both sides.

  British destroyer deployments

  Jellicoe’s strong destroyer screen, five miles behind the Grand Fleet, stretched out an armoured wall between the Germans and their home ports.

  The fifty-eight destroyers were arranged in five parallel columns by flotilla. Positioned at the extreme west, in other words closest to the German scouting forces, was Hawksley’s 11th Destroyer Flotilla (with his flag on Castor). The other flotillas were spread between the reorganised battle squadron lines cruising in night formation. Between the two lines of battle ships, one led by King George V, the other by Iron Duke, was the 4th Flotilla. And between the two battleship lines headed by Colossus and Marlborough came the 13th, the 9th and the 10th joint flotillas positioned on Marlborough’s port side. At the extreme east was the 12th Flotilla. Between the 4th and the 13th, which were running south with parts of the 9th and 10th, was a fairly wide gap of about four and a half miles. Behind these five destroyer groups came Goodenoughs 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron which acted as a mobile rear scouting group.

  Initial Night-time Organisation of the British Destroyer Flotillas

  Once again Marlborough’s continued presence had adverse effects. Because she had been slowing her division down, the destroyer screens had also been pushed back and were more to the north of their station than they should have been, so in front of the 12th Flotilla was part of the 9th Flotilla (four destroyers headed by Lydiard). By 01:00 Marlborough had slowed to 12 knots and it was then absolutely clear that she could no longer stay in the line.23

  Scheers idea was to push through the British line, using his destroyers out in front to gauge where the Grand Fleet was, so that he could slip across its wake west to east. He knew that he had to be relentless. It was a bold plan, but succeeded more because of poor British intelligence, reporting and communications than because of its audacity.

  Jellicoe had been warned by the Admiralty of what to expect after he had received a 21:05 signal: ‘Three destroyer flotillas have been ordered to attack you during the night’. He wanted confirmation that the gunfire that had been heard was indeed from destroyer attacks and signalled Castor at 20:43: ‘Urgent. Are you engaging enemy destroyers?’ To this he received a negative, via Kempenfelt, the 11th Flotilla’s leader. That reply should have been of more significance to Jellicoe. It is surprising that there was no follow-up signal.

  Around the time that Jellicoe was questioning Castor, Scheer was coming to a clearer understanding of the British deployment. At some point in the night Scheer probably received the Neumünster signal which had picked up Jellicoe’s 21:17 destroyer-deployment orders. That he did so was denied in the German official history and later allowed to pass in Sir Julian Corbett’s account, but it seems to be the case that the signal at least got to the flagship. Now – if he indeed saw the signal – Scheer understood how he could avoid a fleet action, and realised the significance of Koch’s and Friedrich Bödicker’s engagements.24 Many of these night-time clashes were about the encounters between the probing units of the German scouting groups and the British flotillas laid out west to east; Scheer now decided that his fleet should head southeast by east, with the emphasis – ‘durchhalten’ – that this course was to be maintained without regard to consequences.

  Scheer’s Route Home

  Using a combination of Tarrant, Hines and Koever,25 the following sequence of signals seems to represent the most critical that could have significantly influenced the closing stages of the battle. In sum, they highlight failures of intelligence coordination, carelessness but, alternatively according to Hines,26 a policy of secrecy designed to protect continued British signals access:

  21:06. C-in-C to airship detachment: ‘Early air reconnaissance at Horns Riff is urgently requested’. Decrypted at 22:10 but not passed to Oliver and not sent to the Grand Fleet. Considered by historians to be one of the key signals of the battle since it clearly showed Scheer’s intended route.27

  21:14. C-in-C: ‘Our own main body is to proceed in, maintain course SSE¼E, speed 16 knots’. Decrypted/passed to Oliver/Operations at 21:55 but seen by Jellicoe after 23:30. From this point Beesly contends that ‘no fewer than sixteen decodes, all of which would have added in some degree to Jellicoe’s knowledge, were passed by Room 40 to Operations Division. Only three of them were sent to Jellicoe’.28

  21:46. C-in-C to HS Fleet: ‘Our own main body course SSE¾E’. Decrypt passed to Operations at 22:10 and signal sent to Jellicoe at 22:41, a full hour later reading ‘German battle fleet ordered home at 21:14, cruisers in the rear, Speed 16 knots. Course SSE¾E’. This signal combined the information gleaned from the 21:14, 21:29 and 21:46 signals but left out the 21:06 signal (on air reconnaissance). The 22:41 transmission was received in the cipher room on the Iron Duke around 00:05. Jellicoe saw the signal between 00:15 and 00:30. Almost four hours had elapsed. A chart plot at 22:00 would have shown Horns Reef as the destination, even if it was not named.

  23:06. C-in-C to High Seas Fleet: ‘Our own main body at 23:00 12 epsilon (56° 15′ – 5° 42′ E), Course SE¾E’. Deciphered at 23:50 but not passed to Jellicoe.

  23:14. Flag to the Nassau and the Westfalen: ‘Course SE¾S in the direction of Horns Reef’. Intercepted by the Fearless (see Hines) but only dec
rypted after the battle.

  22:32. OC 1st TD to all TBD flotillas: ‘Be assembled with our main fleet [my italics] at 04:00 at Horns Reef or course round Skaw’. Deciphered at 23:15 but not passed to Jellicoe and the vital phrase ‘with our main fleet’ was even carelessly left out of the version passed to the Operations Division.

  00:31 (1 June). AC 2nd SG: ‘Where is the head of our main fleet at 12:30? My own position is 106 alpha centre (56° 3′ – 6° 42′ E)’. Deciphered and passed to Operations at 01:05

  00:43 (1 June). C-in-C to Lützow: ‘Our main body’s position at 12:30 073 alpha’. The response was not passed to Jellicoe.

  01:03 (1 June). C-in-C to AC 2nd SG: ‘Head of our own main fleet at 01:00, bottom of alpha (55° 50′ – 6° 25′ E)’. Deciphered and passed to Operations at 01:25. Not passed to Jellicoe.

  02:30. C-in-C: ‘Main fleet in 101 alpha right middle (55° 33′ – 6° 50′) course SE by S. Speed 16 knots.’ Deciphered and passed to Operations at 03:05. This was passed to Jellicoe at 03:29.

  Jason Hines holds that while Captain Thomas Jackson – usually portrayed as having been one of the principal ‘problems’ of the Room 40 saga – was not a likeable character, what happened was by design, not error. The British simply did not want to give themselves away by sending information through to Jellicoe, which would have been picked up by the Germans, thus revealing that it had clearly been decoded. Harley says that Oliver had taken on an inexperienced officer, Captain Allan Everett (naval assistant to the First Sea Lord), and used him as a replacement for Captain Jackson while the latter slept, saying that it was this that caused the problems, not what Hines suggests. According to Lieutenant Commander William Clarke, ‘Jellicoe was the only 1st Sea Lord’ to visit Room 40 regularly.29