Guns or Butter

by Bernstein, Irving;

  There were many fewer diesel engines on trucks, buses, and utility vehicles. While they could be made to burn cleanly, operators increased power by feeding more fuel, creating characteristic black diesel smoke. The subcommittee proposed that HEW issue diesel standards.

  Growing population and ballooning consumption were producing immense quantities of solid waste, in the cities 500 million pounds daily. It was either burned, creating air pollution, or dumped into unsanitary open pits, which required a huge expanding area for landfills. Almost none of the cities had modern disposal systems. The subcommittee proposed federal financial assistance for municipalities for clean incinerators and sanitary landfills.

  Since so little was yet known about air pollution, the subcommittee urged the establishment of a research laboratory in HEW that would be devoted exclusively to that problem.

  Much of the coal and fuel oil burned in the U.S. for power generation and heating had a high sulfur content, releasing gases over the entire country that were both a danger to health and an economic burden. Methods of removing sulfur, sometimes converting it into salable sulfuric acid, were available, but the coal, oil, and power industries had shown no interest. The subcommittee urged HEW to draft model laws for states and cities to deal with this problem.

  On January 7, 1965, Muskie introduced S. 306 with 20 cosponsors incorporating these recommendations. Once again he caught the Johnson administration by surprise. In his special message on conservation and beauty on February 8, the President referred vaguely to solid waste, but stressed junk cars because of Lady Bird’s interest in beautification. He continued, “I intend to institute discussions with industry officials and other interested groups leading to an effective elimination or substantial reduction of pollution from liquid fueled motor vehicles.” This seems to have been a rekindling of his old senatorial preference for bargaining by “reasoning together.” It may also have reflected his debt to Henry Ford II, the most obstinate of the car manufacturers, for having supported the tax cut and his 1964 presidential campaign.

  Muskie held hearings April 6 to 9,1965, which exposed administration confusion. New HEW Assistant Secretary Quigley led off by saying that S. 306 was premature, that there already was adequate federal authority, and that legislation should await the completion of research. Muskie gasped in amazement and some of the nation’s leading newspapers denounced the “love affair” between Johnson and the auto industry. Quigley returned shortly with new marching orders. He now testified that both the administration and HEW agreed that new legislation was “appropriate” and that they wanted to work “hand and glove” with the subcommittee.

  Despite his promise, Johnson did not meet with the auto executives. Rather, the administration moved in on the Senate Public Works Committee, which on May 14, 1965, reported out a watered-down S. 306. Explicit crankcase and exhaust emission standards were replaced with discretionary authority for HEW to set standards. The deadline for their issuance was moved from November 1, 1966, to September 1, 1967, that is, on 1968 rather than on 1967 models. But HEW meant business. According to R. W. Markley, Jr., the Ford lobbyist, Wilbur Cohen had written to Muskie that HEW had “every intention of requiring the exhaust controls on 1968 model cars.” But grants to municipalities for construction of solid waste disposal facilities were converted into a research program. Mandatory state inspection of cars was abandoned as was the modest proposal to deal with sulfur. The Senate on May 18 passed this truncated S. 306 by voice vote.

  Now that the knives were unsheathed, the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee continued cutting away in its report on August 31, 1965. The 1967 emissions deadline was removed and the secretary was authorized to issue standards “as soon as practicable” after allowing the industry time to comply voluntarily. The research laboratory was eliminated. What little was left of S. 306 passed the House on September 24 by a 294 to 4 vote. The Senate accepted the House version by voice vote on October 1. The auto pollution provisions became Title II of the 1963 Clean Air Act and the others went into a new Solid Waste Disposal Act. The President signed this “hopeful beginning” on October 20, 1965. He said, “This act will require all 1968 model automobiles—including foreign models that are sold here—to meet Federal control standards for exhaust.”

  The original Muskie bill had been stripped of all its teeth except for one: the discretionary authority of Secretary Gardner to fix emission standards. He told the industry flatly that he would act on 1968 models. General Motors, Chrysler, and several smaller firms accepted the inevitable, but Ford balked. Markley proposed a “compromise” to Henry Hall Wilson in the White House on December 17, 1965. California already had standards and New York and New Jersey were moving “aggressively” in the same direction. Ford would supply cars with emission devices in those states alone on 1968 models. It would add them to all its cars in model year 1969, assuming HEW’s testing showed that “control devices will be effective on a national basis and will not impair vehicle performance.” The compromise was not accepted. Cohen said that “Ford was complaining because its device was more costly than [those of] the other manufacturers.”

  The HEW standards, patterned after those of California, were published in the Federal Register on March 29, 1966. They required that all 1968 model standard cars be equipped with both blowby and exhaust devices. Vehicles with very small engines, motorcycles, and commercial automobiles under half a ton were exempted. The standards applied to only two important pollutants—hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide.

  For Senator Muskie this was a significant gain for which he had paid a heavy price. By 1965 it was clear to him that the regulation of air pollution, if it came at all, would progress in stages, a gradual advance with a new law whenever the politics allowed. In one sense Muskie had time on his side because air conditions were growing worse and the public’s patience was wearing thin. But with the next law, the President and his men vowed, they would not be beaten off the starting blocks by the senator from Maine.7

  In 1966 Joe Califano established a high-level administration Task Force on the Quality of the Environment, with Gardner Ackley in charge. Califano suggested several broad environmental issues, starting with air pollution. He wrote Ackley, “We hope to develop, with your help, a vigorous and imaginative program for consideration by the first session of the 90th Congress.”

  Between 1963 and 1966 the public had become much more concerned about air pollution. An earlier impression that smog was just another nutty problem confined to Los Angeles was displaced by recognition that it was of national scope and demanded federal action. Thomas J. Watson, Jr., the head of IBM, wrote the President that he did a great deal of flying and was appalled by the contaminated air that enveloped the cities. Johnson agreed. Over the Thanksgiving holiday in 1966 New York City suffered a four-day catastrophe.

  “The atmosphere of New York,” John C. Esposito wrote, “was bombarded with more man-made contaminants than any other big city in the country—almost two pounds of soot and noxious gases for every man, woman, and child. So great is the burden of pollution that were it not for the prevailing wind, New York City might have gone the way of Sodom and Gomorrah.” Hospitals reported a dramatic increase in deaths from pulmonary emphysema and chronic bronchitis. During the episode an air inversion trapped 16 million people inside a blanket of foul air. An estimated 80 persons died and thousands of others became severely ill.

  Both the Johnson administration and Congress recognized that existing legislation was grossly inadequate and that a new policy was needed. The task force in its report on November 21, 1966, defined six major problems:

  1. The new exhaust devices, unless maintained, lost their effectiveness within a short period. The requirements for 1968 models did not apply to older models, much the larger part of the nation’s fleet. The states should be required and assisted to inspect all vehicles annually.

  2. Motor fuel additives, particularly lead, should be registered with HEW and the secretary should be authorized
to forbid any “found to be harmful to health.”

  3. In the case of an episode that presents “a clear and present danger to public health” the Attorney General should seek an injunction allowing entry and inspection of any facility emitting contaminants. HEW should have the authority to shut it down by “summary order.”

  4. HEW should establish “minimum standards of pollution control for selected classes of industries.” The states should be required to meet those standards and, if they failed to do so, the federal criteria should apply automatically.

  5. “Air pollution does not recognize nor respect political boundaries.” Big cities exported their foul air to adjoining states: New York City to Connecticut and New Jersey, Chicago to Indiana and Wisconsin, and so on. The Clean Air Act had offered a financial incentive for interstate compacts, but there had been no takers. The task force recommended that HEW establish “air sheds” with mixed federal-state commissions to impose federal standards.

  6. Finally, there were several presently intractable problems that required intensive research: exhaust devices for diesel engines, alternative propulsion systems (electric cars) that made no pollution, and a sulfur-free fuel for generating electricity and for space heating. The task force urged a sharp increase in funding for this research.

  The estimates for all six programs over five years would rise from $18.5 million in fiscal 1968 to $156 million in 1972. The total would be $500 million.

  This was pretty strong stuff. Would Lyndon Johnson and the Congress accept these heavy remedies?

  On January 17, 1967, Califano wrote the President that he had “a very constructive talk with Senator Muskie . … He will support our clean air program vigorously and would like to hold hearings in Washington on February 8. …” Muskie gave him a “feeling stone,” evidently a good-luck charm, that he wanted Califano to present to Johnson. By 1967 Lyndon Johnson needed all the luck he could get.

  On January 30, 1967, the President sent a special message to Congress, “Protecting Our National Heritage,” with air pollution leading off. He pointed to the New York disaster and noted that smaller cities, like Weirton, West Virginia, and Gary, Indiana, both steel towns, were also afflicted. “This situation does not exist because it was inevitable, nor because it cannot be controlled. Air pollution is the inevitable consequence of neglect. It can be controlled when that neglect is no longer tolerated.” He proposed a bill that followed the task force recommendations with two significant omissions. HEW would register fuel additives, but it would have no authority to ban those harmful to health; the Attorney General would have no power to seek an injunction and the secretary would not be allowed to shut down a polluting facility. Muskie introduced the administration bill, S. 780, on January 31.

  His subcommittee held hearings between February 8 and May 18 in Los Angeles, Detroit, Denver, and St. Louis. In Los Angeles he learned that exhaust controls supposed to be effective for 50,000 miles failed after 5,000. The auto industry in Detroit said that it now accepted federal regulation and Muskie sighed with relief. Surgeon General W. H. Stewart testified that Public Health studies demonstrated a direct connection between air pollution and health in general as well as with particular diseases. He painted, in his words, “a disturbing portrait of a major health menace.” It was “imperative to clean the air.” But Democratic Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virginia, whose state lived off coal, worried about the regulation of sulfur in the burning of bituminous. The coal, oil, and steel industries backed him.

  Meantime, Secretary Gardner imposed fuel tank and carburetor standards on 1969 model cars. Over strong opposition from the coal industry, he published the first report on sulfur oxides, which pointed a finger straight at coal and oil. He imposed restrictions on sulfur dioxide emissions at federal installations in New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Secretary Udall changed oil import policy to make low-sulfur crude available. Oil coming in from Venezuela was hopelessly high in sulfur content.

  Muskie’s hearings and these policy changes caused deep concern, if not fear, among the captains of American industry. The chief executives of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Standard Oil of New Jersey and California, Continental Oil, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, U.S. Steel, the Iron and Steel Institute, Union Carbide, Du Pont, American Electric Power, and Consolidation Coal banded together. They wanted to join with the government in a vast research and demonstration project on air pollution. They engaged Leon Jaworski, a prominent Texas attorney, to represent them.

  He met with Gardner, who rather favored the idea, and with Califano, who was more cautious and asked the Department of Justice for an antitrust opinion. On May 31, 1967, Edwin M. Zimmerman of the Antitrust Division sent over a negative report. “Technological breakthroughs are best achieved by having several independent sources of innovation.” When a whole industry works cooperatively, the most progressive member will be held back until the least was ready. A joint venture of this size would inhibit smaller players from entering the game. Finally, there was “no conceivable justification” for blessing a venture of this magnitude. “There can be no scale economies, no need for funds, no need for complementary technologies, etc. which warrants anything like a pooling together of the research activities of the companies here involved.”

  Nevertheless, Califano was of two minds. While there were serious obstacles, he wrote the President on May 31, “I believe there is a way to work out the problems.” But Johnson did not want to get involved. He wrote, “Keep this away from W.H. [White House]. Let Udall do this if he and [Attorney General] Clark agree it is desirable.” In effect that killed the Jaworski proposal. Gardner and Cohen did meet with the industry leaders on August 17, and, after a pep talk from the secretary, Cohen wrote the President, the executives “pledged their cooperation to work with the Government,” whatever that might mean.

  When Muskie’s subcommittee met on April 6 to draw up its report, Chairman Randolph of the parent Public Works Committee was ready with a laundry list of amendments. Muskie and Randolph argued for more than three months before they reached agreement on July 15 and put the amended S. 780 through the full committee. Randolph had significantly weakened the bill: Authority for HEW to fix national standards for industry was replaced by state control with federal intervention only if a state after 15 months had declined to set criteria. HEW was empowered to seek an injunction only in the case of an emergency which created an “imminent and substantial” danger to public health. Research on fuel combustion would be encouraged by an appropriation of $375 million over five years. California, which had higher automobile standards than the federal government, was exempted from the controls. Once again the administration had lost control over the legislation.

  The Senate adopted the amended S. 780 on July 18, 1967, by an amazing roll-call vote of 88 to 0. No senator from either party proposed an amendment. Randolph was lavish in his praise for Muskie and called the bill the most significant pollution abatement measure in the nation’s history, which, clearly, it was. Republican John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky said he had “never seen … a better demonstration of the Committee legislative process.” He commended Muskie, Randolph, and the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, J. Caleb Boggs of Delaware. Majority Leader Mansfield was pleased by the nonpartisanship.

  The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, of which Harley Staggers of West Virginia was chairman, held hearings between August 15 and 24 and listened to substantially the same testimony the Senate subcommittee had heard. The committee adopted the Senate bill with these changes: elimination of the research program on fuel combustion, reduction of the total appropriation, and removal of the California exemption. This last was proposed by John D. Dingell of Michigan on behalf of the car industry, which wanted all autos sold in the U.S. to be identically equipped. The two California members issued a stinging dissent.

  In the floor debate on November 2 the Californians reinserted the exemption for their state. Unanimity now ruled. Not to be outdone, the
House adopted S. 780 by a vote of 362 to 0.

  In the conference Muskie restored $125 million for fuel combustion research with what he described as “mathematical gyrations.” In fact, Secretary Gardner had already gained Budget Bureau approval for a $17.7 million appropriation for sulfur research on removal of the chemical prior to combustion as well as on cleaning up smokestack gases. Gardner thought this would help him with Muskie, Randolph, and Staggers. On November 14 both houses accepted the conference report without debate.

  The signing ceremony for the Air Quality Act of 1967 took place at the White House on November 21, 1967. The President gave a weather report: “ ‘Dirty water and black snow pour from the dismal air to … the putrid slush that waits for them below.’ Now that is not a description of Boston, Chicago, New York, or even Washington, D.C. It is from Dante’s Inferno.” He doffed his hat to the man from Maine. “Senator Muskie has been shoving me as no other person has, all these years, to do something in the pollution field.” Muskie had kept reminding him that until now we had taken only “baby steps.” Now “we grow up to our responsibilities.” The President also praised Secretary Gardner. He might have added Ackley’s task force for its splendid report.

  While the Air Quality Act of 1967 was certainly a large step forward compared with its predecessors, there was still an enormous distance to go. The law proved cumbersome, slow, difficult to administer, and, like the earlier statutes, required amendment within a few years. On the day before the President signed it the population of the U.S. reached 200 million. This rapid increase in the number of people was accompanied by a sharp rise in the number of factories, mines, and automobiles spewing contaminants into the atmosphere. Thus, clean air was a game of continuous elusive catchup. So long as industry, with its great political power, resisted abatement controls, the goal of clean air would never be reached.8