by Meda Ryan
The entire operation did not lead to the capture of even one IRA member or any weapons or documents though unarmed civilians in many areas were shot during the action. Some weeks later on 23/24 June, a second large-scale sweep by the British forces enclosed an area, which centred around Millstreet, and it looked as if the authorities had information as to the whereabouts of Lynch’s headquarters. Lynch and Joe O’Connor had returned from a tour of Kerry and the West Limerick brigades and arrived at Rathcoole at 4 a.m. Being exhausted they decided to sleep, even though they had been told that they were within ‘the British ring’. Paddy O’Brien, also in need of sleep decided to remain on duty. He woke Liam and Joe O’Connor after a few hours as reports indicated that the raiding parties were moving in on all sides in full strength. The IRA men moved into Kilcorney, where they remained for the day, and later in the evening, they moved again. Due to an accurate report, they were able to get outside the encirclement despite having been within a hair’s breath of being captured.
IRA activity was still hampered by fine weather and June saw very little action. By this time rumours of efforts being made to bring about an ending of the conflict were widespread. Despite these rumours Lynch was unable to foresee an end to hostilities. In fact, it appeared as if the British government forces were stepping up their activity. Though the shortage of arms for the volunteers was now a biting reality, morale was nevertheless excellent as Lynch discovered in his review of the nine brigades in his division. He anticipated, therefore, that, with the possibility of securing further arms, a resumption of the struggle on a larger scale would be feasible in the autumn.
However, though the possibilities of a truce were being considered by De Valera, Collins, Cathal Brugha and others, Liam Lynch was not consulted as to the capacity of his command to continue the struggle. The only contact headquarters made with any member of the Southern Division was between Michael Collins, De Valera and Tom Barry of Cork No. 3 brigade. Dev asked Barry how long he felt his flying column could maintain the struggle in the field against the British. ‘It depends on the British reinforcement and the amount of arms we are able to obtain,’ said Barry, adding that they could last another five years. Dev replied, ‘A bit too optimistic’.7It was some weeks before Barry was able to meet Lynch and give him information on the conversations which took place at GHQ.
One of the unanswered questions of the period is why Liam Lynch the commanding officer of the First Southern Division was not consulted by GHQ or given an opportunity of expressing his views. More than anybody else he was in a position to assess the situation particularly at this time of mid-June 1921 as he had travelled around to each of the nine brigades in his area over the past number of months on at least two occasions. The First Southern Division was the largest and most active and had played the greatest part in the war; in addition this region had by far the largest concentration of British forces, and the inhabitants had suffered a great deal because of their involvement.
Piaras Beaslaí, in his book Michael Collins and the Making of a New Ireland, stated that Liam Lynch and some of his officers went to GHQ some time before the truce and reported that owing to shortage of arms, ammunition and enemy pressure they were unable to continue the fight.8This statement was inaccurate. Florence O’Donoghue of No. 2 brigade confirmed that he had seen a letter from Liam Lynch in which he asked for ‘a few rifles’ and said, ‘We will soon be in a very bad way for .303 as we had hard luck in captures recently.’ Another letter from Cork No. 3 read that they were urgently in need of .303, adding ‘to a certain extent we are held up by the want of this and harassed to a terrible extent by the enemy.’ O’Donoghue was aware that Liam Lynch had not been directly consulted for an opinion, and believed it was untrue that they were ‘unable to continue the fight’ as Beaslaí had stated. (O’Donoghue accepted Beaslaí’s assurance that his original statement was made in good faith and under a misapprehension of the facts.)9
Tom Barry, in Guerrilla Days in Ireland, said, ‘No deputation of southern officers ever visited GHQ ... It is a fact that Lynch never left the First Southern Division area in all those months. Furthermore, no brigade or battalion officer from Kerry, Cork or Waterford brigades visited Dublin or GHQ between the end of March and the truce except myself towards the end of May and Seán Buckley in May ... Every Divisional and Brigade officer in the south rejects completely Beaslaí’s statement about Liam Lynch.’10
Shortage of arms was, of course, an acute problem. Complications had arisen with the shipment of arms which was being organised by Donal Hales in Italy. Madge Hales, Donal’s sister, went to Italy and personally returned to Collins with information of the cancellation of the shipment.11As Madge Hales’ dispatch was by word of mouth, and, because of the usual secrecy in IRA circles, she did not inform anybody else, but it does seem extraordinary that Michael Collins did not pass the information on to either Tom Barry or to Liam Deasy who were organising the intake, transport and dumps, together with the scouts along the route, and also that he did not inform Liam Lynch who was the commander of the First Southern Division and to whom the receipt of the proposed shipment of arms was of vital importance.
There is no doubt that Collins was aware of the important role played by the flying columns in the Cork brigades and other southern regions. Nevertheless, these men in the south had not been consulted about their true positions and their true intentions for the future. Were there some seeds sown here which were to spring to life at a later stage during the Civil War when men like Deasy, Barry, Lynch and other officers decided to continue the conflict?
It does appear as if Lynch, Barry, Deasy and other officers in the Southern Division, while they would have welcomed a truce, would only have welcomed a short truce. They were prepared to continue the fight, which they felt would bring success, as their intelligence service was now superior to that of the British. They had people inside the corridors of power transmitting information to the IRA. Years later, Barry, Deasy and many men who were involved in the fight for independence, were convinced that had there been a shorter truce followed by a renewal of the armed conflict, the British might have been forced to enter into a more meaningful treaty which, with hindsight, could possibly have stopped the Civil War. The IRA was, by this time, tougher, more experienced and more immune to hardship. Extra men were coming on full-time active service: combat experience was more widespread, and with the majority of the civilian population behind them the columns were able to move more freely. Food and clothing for the men on active duty was provided by Cumann na mBan and houses throughout all brigade areas became safe billeting depots.
1 Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, p. 160.
2 Ibid., p. 161.
3 Operation Order No. 2, 22/7/1922.
4 Ibid., No. 9. 19/8/1922. See Appendix II.
5 Meda Ryan, The Tom Barry Story, p. 99.
6 The Morning Post, 31/5/1921.
7 Tom Barry, Guerrilla Days in Ireland; also Meda Ryan, The Tom Barry Story.
8 Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, p. 177.
9 Piaras Beaslaí in Michael Collins and the Making of a New Ireland, stated ‘Liam Lynch and other Southern IRA Officers went on a deputation to GHQ in Dublin to state that owing to the shortage of arms and ammunition and enemy pressure that they were unable to continue the fight.’
10 Tom Barry, Guerrilla Days in Ireland, pp. 170, 171.
11 See Meda Ryan, The Tom Barry Story, p. 74.
14. Truce – hope for full settlement
In 1920 and the first half of 1921 the British establishment gave the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries free reign in Ireland when they allowed them to terrorise the Irish people. They browbeat, insulted, murdered and maimed civilians as well as the IRA in order to create a climate of despair.
In Ireland For Ever Brigadier General Crozier said, ‘Never before had the RIC been used so ruthlessly and at times surreptitiously, to destroy and create a new note of
anguish in the country.’1Not alone did terror fail but public opinion in England disliked what was happening.
Early in April 1921 Lord French gave an interview to the Daily Express in which he admitted that the volunteers were an army ‘properly organised in regiment and brigade, led by disciplined officers.’ Significant also was the fact that their voluntary army had taken the initiative and was confronting the occupation forces with many new, unexpected tactics. The British government discovered that the tactics adopted kept their forces under a perpetual strain. This type of guerrilla warfare was totally at variance with anything that they had previously experienced.
British foreign relations in America and elsewhere were beginning to incur disfavour, therefore their alternative was to use unlimited military force under a reign of martial law or to engage in some form of settlement. General Macready suggested to the British government that, if a solution was not reached by July, martial law would be imposed throughout the entire country with the exception of the Ulster counties. This would mean reinforcing the garrison with an additional nineteen battalions and a strong force of marines. British army strength in Ireland would then be brought to 80,000 men, but he felt 150,000 would be essential if a military regime were to succeed.2Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, the chief of the imperial general staff from 1918 to 1921 wrote:
18 May 1921. I said that directly England was safe, every available man should go to Ireland that even four battalions now serving on the Rhine ought also to go to Ireland. I said that the measures taken up to now had been quite inadequate, that I was terrified at the state of the country, and that in my opinion, unless we crushed out the murder gang this summer we shall lose Ireland and the Empire.3
Winston Churchill, then secretary of state for the colonies, told the cabinet:
One hundred thousand new special troops must be raised, thousands of motorcars must be armed and equipped; the three southern provinces of Ireland must be closely laced with cordons of blockades and barbed wire: a systematic rummaging and questioning of every individual must be put in force.
But towards the end of June it was obvious to the British that some form of compromise was necessary. The lord chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, speaking in the British House of Lords on 24 June 1921 said:
... if I must speak frankly, I think that the history of the last three months has been the history of the failure of our military method to keep pace with and overcome the military methods which have been taken by our opponents.
C. J. C. Street, imperial activist, intelligence officer and advisor to Lloyd George wrote later:
There were only two alternatives, to come to terms with Sinn Féin or exterminate its armed forces.4
The British forces did not seem to be able to exterminate or to beat the Irish volunteers and a truce was declared.
Liam Lynch was at division HQ at Coolea when official notification of a truce reached him on 10 July 1921. Immediately he issued the necessary order for the cessation of hostilities in his brigade to come into force at 12 noon the next day.
Were it not for this order his former brigade might have pulled off the greatest success in his region. Paddy O’Brien with eighty officers and men from five battalion columns had some days previously marched into West Limerick and, in co-operation with West Limerick units, laid an ambush near Templeglantine. For several days the column had lain in wait without finding a target. But they were prepared to wait.
Upon receipt of notification O’Brien called his section commanders together and asked for their views regarding taking up positions on the morning of 11 July 1921. All were eager to do so, and the column went into position. At 11.35 the column commander instructed the section commanders to withdraw their sections. The truce was to come into being at 12 o’clock. At 12.15 the British convoy arrived on the scene and passed some of the dispersing groups on the road; not a shot was fired. The struggle towards agreement was now in the hands of the diplomats.
During the previous years, many volunteers throughout Ireland had displayed courage and determination, had fought and died for the Republic. But the south had earned a Republic more than any other part of Ireland. In Liam Lynch’s division, 193 officers and men were killed, twice that number wounded and about 2,000 interned or sentenced to terms of imprisonment. In the face of those losses they had, under many other and varied difficulties, continued to strike at the occupation forces so vigorously and persistently that responsible British military commanders were convinced of the necessity for immense reinforcements if their defeat was to be achieved.
In the March 1921, issue of An tÓglach a tribute was paid to the men of the south. ‘The Cork brigades have proved themselves to have reached a level of military efficiency which make them a match for the most highly trained soldiers in the world. An example has been set which every brigade in Ireland should strive to emulate.’5
The first reaction to the truce was one of optimism. Officers and men in Lynch’s division had for the previous eighteen months concentrated their attention and energy upon the fight to such an extent that all other considerations, personal and national, were excluded. In their optimism, the people of the south believed that England had at last decided, in calling a truce, to evacuate her armed forces from the country, and that this would lead to the establishment of a freely functioning Republic.
Men close to Liam Lynch later expressed their opinion that in Lynch’s view the truce came a little too soon; however Lynch expected that the respite would be short and that soon the conflict would be renewed. It was his belief that England was not yet ready for a full settlement and as he continually said he would not contemplate the possibility of any settlement on terms which gave Ireland less than sovereign independence. ‘We are and must be prepared to fight to the last for that,’ he wrote in a letter to his brother, Tom. ‘In justice to the yet unborn as well as to the dead past we have no other authority but to fight on a fight thank God which never for generations seemed more hopeful than now as the Empire is heaving with trouble ...’6
1 Brigadier-General F .P. Crozier, Ireland Forever, p. 91.
2 Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of an Active Life. Vol. 2, pp. 561–2.
3 Diaries of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson.
4 Major C. J. Street, (I.O.) The Administration of Ireland, 1920.
5 An tÓglach, March 1921.
6 Letter to his brother Tom, 6/9/1921 (Lynch private family papers).
15. Collins’ offer – commander-in-chief position
An air of relaxation and a general feeling of freedom and optimism permeated the countryside during the summer of 1921. With the termination of curfew and of the prohibition of fairs and markets, movement and a form of order was restored. Normal trade and commerce created a sense of relief in the public mind. Men who had been out on active service over the past years were at last free to go about without being hampered in their activities. But as time progressed and negotiations in London between the Irish and British delegates proceeded, a dispassionate assessment of the situation was to become more difficult. As far as Liam Lynch was concerned the fight against the British government was not yet over. Quick to realise the danger of apathy, he started to combat any tendency towards relaxation in his division. Training camps were established and an expanded series of inspections were inaugurated. He discouraged men, as far as it was possible, from coming out into the open.
British tact showed itself in the establishment of liaison officers. These were appointed by both sides to supervise the observance of the terms of the truce. By doing so they recognised the IRA as an army and not as a group of rebellious civilians. During this truce period division HQ had been moved from its wartime location at Sweeneys, Coolea to O’Sullivans, Lombardstown on 2 July.
Liam had had very little contact with home over the past year and he now returned home for his brother’s ordination on 11 June and stayed for two days. He was again able to meet his
girlfriend, Bridie Keyes and the pair had much to discuss, including the prospect of marriage. His hope was that future discussions between both governments would reach a final settlement, and that his days of guerilla warfare would be finally over, so that he could at last settle down and have a future with Bridie. He was thankful to have survived the War of Independence, but sensed an anti-climax.
Richard Mulcahy, chief-of-staff, visited him at division HQ in early August and during the following week the two men inspected units of the Cork and Kerry brigades. Later that month De Valera visited division HQ and, with Liam and a few more officers, over the following three days, made a tour of the scene of the principal actions in the division. At each place the columns, which had participated were mobilised under arms and congratulated by De Valera. Liam was proud and happy. There was no sign of a break in national unity. The future seemed hopeful. Even the Irish Times acknowledged a changed Ireland!
For good or evil the old Ireland is gone. Instead of this there is a young people with new qualities and also with new defects ... none of the efforts that have been made to divide the people have succeeded. On the contrary, they have vindicated the strength of the national ideal.
On the evening of 18 August 1921, Liam was driving back from Bandon when he was held up at Ballinhassig by three cars of military personnel. The district inspector in charge demanded that he produce a British permit for use of the car (one of the restrictions enforced under martial law). Liam demanded the right, as an Irish army officer, to use his own transport without an enemy permit just as British officers ‘do without our permits’. Nevertheless, he was taken to Bandon barracks and detained there until 1.30 next day, when, following a phone message from Dublin Castle, he and his driver were released.
