by Meda Ryan
Following the Dáil vote on the treaty the senior army officers opposed to its acceptance held a series of consultations. Lynch was among this group who wished to adopt a policy where the army would revert to its original status as a volunteer force under the control of an elected Executive. In order to put this into operation a convention for the election of this Executive had to be held without delay. With the exception of Frank Aiken, O/C Fourth Northern Division, it was finally agreed that an army convention would be held within two months from that date. (18 January 1922) Richard Mulcahy, now minister for defence, gave a personal undertaking that the army would be maintained as the army of the Irish Republic. Lynch attended a conference of GHQ and divisional commandants and commanding officers of brigades which was held in Dublin on 24 February, at which the convention was fixed for 26 March. Preparation of an agenda for the convention was deferred to a meeting of the same officers to be held on 15 March. Meanwhile in anticipation of army unity being maintained officers and men were to go to Beggars Bush barracks for specialised training.
The minister for defence was to ask for permission to hold an army convention when the Dáil re-assembled on 28 February 1922. However, it was decided by the cabinet to sanction the minister’s request and not to bring it before the Dáil. This gave all the indications of army unity, despite the growing expansion of a distinct pro-treaty force with headquarters at Beggars Bush barracks, which now housed a number of officers and men from all parts of the country.
Lynch was happy that agreement had been reached at the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis on 21 February between De Valera and Austin Stack on the one side and Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins (Provisional Government) on the other. This implied unity of the political wing; it was agreed that Dáil Éireann would continue to function as it did before the signing of the treaty, its existing president and cabinet remaining in office. Further to this no election would be held during that period and when the electorate voted on the treaty, they would also vote on the constitution. This agreement was ratified on 2 March by Dáil Éireann. Happy at what appeared to be a development towards unity, Lynch returned to his divisional headquarters at Mallow. Conscious of the preservation of army unity he was determined that the force would continue its allegiance to the Republic and remain unchanged in its voluntary capacity. Lynch wanted the army of the Republic to function not alone in the posts being evacuated by the British but also in those which they still continued to occupy in the northern counties.
On 18 February Liam Forde, mid-Limerick brigade, issued a proclamation repudiating the authority of GHQ. Because he took over the evacuating barracks, GHQ ordered Michael Brennan, of the First Western Division who favoured the treaty, to move detachments from Clare into the city to take over posts being evacuated. It was an unusual move and the first time that one brigade was ordered into another area. A dangerous situation was about to develop. Captain Hurley who was brigade quartermaster of mid-Limerick decided to organise a separate force and take back from the First Western Division the area they had taken. He brought in anti-treaty men from Tipperary, Cork and elsewhere, and on 5 March a parade was held. Hurley was placed under arrest. Between 6 and 10 March a number of anti-treaty units moved into Limerick, occupied hotels and a wing of the mental hospital. Pro-treaty groups were also, at the time, occupying some of the evacuated British posts in the city whilst British forces were quartered in others. The situation was explosive. The threat of Civil War hung over Limerick. Many people, including the mayor of Limerick, tried to reconcile the conflicting elements and, because they were unsuccessful, Liam Lynch and Oscar Traynor were called to a meeting with Mulcahy, Michael Collins and O’Duffy at Beggars Bush, which resulted in Liam Lynch being asked to intervene. With Oscar Traynor, O/C Dublin brigade, Lynch went to Limerick and worked out a solution to the problem. Because of adverse publicity he felt it necessary to give the correct facts to the press in a letter dated 27 April 1922:
I have always avoided publicity but my name has been brought forward so much recently that I am reluctantly forced to deal with the matter.
Regarding the statement by Beggars Bush headquarters to the effect that they had done everything for unity in the army and that the other side had done everything possible to break it, I am sure all officers and high command in the Free State forces can verify my emphatic assertion that no officers did more than myself to maintain a united army.
My activity with O/C Dublin brigade in forcing the Limerick settlement when all others, including the Mayor of Limerick, had failed, is sufficient proof of this, and I am sure that Limerick’s first citizen will bear out what I say. The M.D. and Mr Collins were present when agreement was reached. In accordance with the terms of agreement in that most serious situation Owen O’Duffy C/S authorised me in writing:
To hand over to the charge of the Limerick corporation the four police barracks, and
To install a small maintenance party – responsible to myself – in the two military barracks, releasing the occupying troops to return to their areas.
Revolvers taken would be returned.
Mr Griffith tried hard to press the issue in a manner which would have resulted in fearful slaughter in the streets of Limerick. I was more pleased with my success in securing an amicable settlement of the Limerick situation than with any victory in connection with my activities in the war.
It was a happy consummation for me to see about 700 armed troops on each side who were about to engage in mortal combat, eventually leave Limerick as comrades. It was the junior officers of the old GHQ staff, who mutinied against the arrangements agreed to by their senior officers in doing the right thing in Limerick, really brought about the present condition of affairs, for I state definitely that it was their action on that occasion which ultimately resulted in a cancellation of the Convention.2
Lynch endeavoured to seek a solution to the problem of army allegiance so that Civil War could be averted. He looked to a future convention with hope, but believed if it was to succeed in its main objects with what he saw as a pro-treaty point of view, the army should, in future, be independent of any government. But, being realistic, he was aware of the difficulty a democratic government would have in accepting that it was not in control of the only military force within the country. He felt this situation had arisen because the Dáil had accepted the treaty by a majority vote and in doing so had abandoned its allegiance to the Republic. However, he thought that this was no more than a temporary measure as eventually the treaty would be put to the people for acceptance or rejection.
During all this period his relations with Michael Collins and Richard Mulcahy continued to be friendly. So obvious was his concern for the nation’s welfare and the future of the army that no one, however much in disagreement with his views, could treat him with anything other that respect. Being in command of a division (First Southern) which represented in numerical strength more than one-fourth of the entire army, his position was strong. The men under his control had by this time a substantial number of weapons, they had fighting experience and leadership which was even greater than that of many other regions. In addition, the men under his command were unanimous in their opposition to the treaty and they were well aware that he would use his position only in the best interests of the entire nation.
1 Paddy McCarthy having escaped from Manchester jail joined No. 2 brigade, took part in the Mallow episode, was killed in Millstreet two months later – being the first casualty in North Cork.
2 Irish Independent, 27 April 1922 (see next chapter, ‘cancellation of Convention’).
18. Army conventions – Executive chief-of-staff appointment
In early March 1922, Liam Lynch sought some method of reconciliation between those who were pro-treaty and anti-treaty. He travelled to Dublin accompanied by Florence O’Donoghue, for one of the many meetings which he had with Richard Mulcahy, defence minister and chief-of-staff, O’Duffy, and
other GHQ members. The first meeting extended over several days during which the position of the army was reviewed in detail and an effort of compromise was sought so that both opposing points of view could be reconciled. Though public statements from a number of people began to appear in the press showing a partisan view, nevertheless, these men spoke in an atmosphere of goodwill. All of them wished to maintain and foster the atmosphere of co-operation which had prevailed during the long struggle for freedom. Then events suddenly changed. While a meeting of officers was in session preparing the convention agenda, the decision of a cabinet order was conveyed to them:
It is quite evident to the unanimous Dáil Cabinet that at an Army Convention contemplated for 26 March it is proposed to endeavour to remove the army from under the control of the Government elected by the Irish people, which is Dáil Éireann. Such a purpose is illegal, and you are hereby instructed that the holding of this Convention is illegal.1
This immediately terminated efforts to find common ground for the resolutions to be submitted to the convention; Lynch was saddened as he could find no valid reason for the prohibition. The decision of two weeks earlier had been reversed when on 15 March 1922 the cabinet, believing that the majority of the army were opposed to the acceptance of the treaty, initiated the chain of events which precipitated the split.
It would be difficult to speculate what would have happened had the cabinet allowed the convention to be held as had first been agreed. The entire army would have been represented regardless of the viewpoint which each individual held. They would have met in an atmosphere of freedom in keeping with its spirit and tradition. During the previous years it had been cemented into such an organised body and a disciplined force that it should have been possible to arrive at a compromise. As it happened, forbidding the holding of the convention was looked upon by a large number of officers and men as being unjust and unreasonable. (It should be noted that the Provisional Government did not, at this time, make any order. The order was made by the Dáil cabinet.)
Lynch and other anti-treaty officers again met. They decided to hold the convention on the date originally fixed. Irrespective of what views delegates held, they summoned all the already elected delegates of the army to attend the convention. In the document which they issued to the delegates they stated that:
... On 18 January last a general Convention of the IRA was sanctioned by the Minister for Defence of the Dáil cabinet, to be held not later than the end of March:
And whereas as that agreement has been broken by the acquiescence of the Minister for Defence in the instructions issued by President Griffith prohibiting the holding of such a Convention;
Therefore be it resolved that we, the undersigned members of GHQ Staff and commandants and other officers of the IRA units, hereby call the aforesaid Convention, to be held on the date already determined, Sunday 26 March 1922; the representation to be as set forth in the general order already issued by GHQ.
Fifty-two signatures, including that of Liam Lynch, were added to the document. Lynch who had been in Dublin, hurried back to Mallow for a meeting of the First Southern Division council which was held on 20 March. Unexpectedly Mulcahy (minister for defence) and O’Duffy (chief-of-staff) attended which showed the importance they placed on this division but ‘when differences became acute, they both left for Dublin before an agreement was reached’. All present were conscious of the disaster towards which the army was being driven. From the long meeting two important points emerged:
(a) All were adamant that despite the Dáil ban the convention of the army would be held: but they would be willing to postpone the date to later than 26 March so that the entire army could be represented.
(b) The recruiting for the civic guards which was being implemented by the Provisional Government should cease. (This particularly angered a large number of army members.)
After this meeting, Lynch and Liam Deasy, the divisional adjutant, travelled on the following night to Dublin by the mail train and put the proposals which emerged from the First Southern Division council before Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins. Both main clauses were turned down.2On the same day, Rory O’Connor gave an interview to the press in which he claimed to represent 80% of the army who were against the treaty. He stated:
The holding of the Convention means that we repudiate the Dáil. If a government goes wrong we must take the consequences ... The Dáil, in deciding that the Irish Republic shall go into the British Empire, has committed an act of national dishonour that we won’t stand.
Florence O’Donoghue in summing up Lynch’s point of view said, ‘It is reasonably certain that they [Rory O’Connor’s views] did not accurately represent Liam Lynch’s position.’3
The convention assembled in the Mansion House, Dublin, on Sunday 26 March 1922. Fifty-four delegates from the First Southern Division (a quarter of the total number of 211) attended the convention. In order to maintain a neutral attitude, Frank Aiken, Fourth Northern Division, did not attend. Liam Mellows presided at the meeting during which a resolution was passed unanimously:
That the army reaffirm its allegiance to the Irish Republic.
That it shall be maintained as the army of the Irish Republic under an Executive appointed by the Convention.
That the army shall be under the supreme control of such Executive which shall draft a constitution for submission to a Convention to be held on 9 April.4
A sixteen member Executive was elected to hold office until the adjourned convention assembled two weeks later. Liam Lynch headed the poll in the voting for this Executive and five officers from his division were also elected. The Executive appointed Lynch as chief-of-staff and agreed to set up headquarters at Barry’s Hotel.
Two days later (28 March) they issued a statement declaring that the minister for defence and his chief-of-staff at Beggar’s Bush no longer exercised any control over the army. The Executive called for the cessation of recruiting for the force, which was being organised by the Provisional Government, and also for an end to civil guard recruiting.
The following day the Executive ordered the destruction of the Freeman’s Journal machinery following what it termed as ‘Misleading Reports of the Convention’.5Battalion parades of all units were ordered by the Executive to assemble on Sunday 2 April. At this assembly they reaffirmed their allegiance to the Republic, and Lynch read a statement giving the background to the holding of the convention and the decisions made there.
On Sunday 9 April the army convention reassembled at the Mansion House:
(a) to adopt the Constitution from a draft which had been prepared by the temporary Executive elected at the previous Convention.
(b) to elect an Executive to control the army.
In the constitution the wording of the original oath of allegiance, which all volunteers had taken in 1920 pledging allegiance to Dáil Éireann, was amended to pledge to ‘support and defend the Irish Republic against all enemies foreign and domestic ...’
In the election of a sixteen member Executive to control the army, Liam headed the poll, was appointed chief-of-staff and included on the newly set-up army council of seven members.6With his staff in headquarters at Barry’s Hotel his main preoccupation was the split, as conditions of near chaos existed in the army and throughout many parts of the country.
In a letter to his brother Tom which he wrote on 18 April, he said that, ‘since the Truce it has been ... a worse time on me than the whole war. Every bribe and cunning plan has been put up to us, but thank God we pulled through to take once more free action ... sad it is to risk having to clash with our old comrades, but we cannot count the cost.’7
The situation in which Liam Lynch found himself was more difficult than any he had experienced during the previous years of his life. He worked day and night, very often without rest. He had to wrestle with the anguish which his duties as chief-of-staff of the IRA demanded. ‘You need not be troubled by my lofty
position as I think nothing of it,’ he wrote to his brother. ‘I have tried to resign several times during the past few months; but same would not be accepted ... At the moment I am fed up of army and people and were it not for Ireland’s Sake Alone I would drop out of things. I know my service at the moment is sorely needed.’8
The Executive and the portion of the army which gave allegiance to this body had now cut itself off from any share of arms or equipment which had been handed over by the British to the Provisional Government. Parts of this army occupied various barracks and posts throughout the country but they had no financial resources. They had a substantial number of arms which were taken in a raid on Clonmel barracks by anti-treaty forces, otherwise, throughout the country, they were dependent on arms and ammunition which had been captured during the conflict with the British.
Through the minister for defence of Dáil Éireann and the chief-of-staff, the Provisional Government began to build a uniform fulltime nucleus of an army. Initially, recruitment was only from volunteers with previous experience: however, this was soon to extend to others. The British government transferred as much arms and equipment as was required. Churchill stated on 12 April 1922 that 4,000 rifles, 2,000 revolvers, 6 machine guns and ammunition had been handed over and that authority would be given for any further issue that may be required.9
Despite the fact that there was division there was no great bitterness between officers and men who took opposing sides. As always, the hope of a settlement existed. The possibility of reuniting the army was one of the first matters considered by the Executive. Liam Lynch basically believed a settlement was possible through negotiations. Liam Mellows, secretary to the Executive, sent a letter on 14 April to the secretary of Dáil Éireann setting out their terms. This received no response. Lynch was opposed to any idea of a dictatorship. He wrote to his brother:
