Amalric, however, was not the type of personality who was content to take an entirely reactive role, and it may be that his extraordinary attempt to ally with the dissident Shi'ite sect of the Assassins in 1173 grew out of his frustration with the circumstances in which he found himself in the early 1170s. In William's version of events, Amalric agreed to remit an annual tribute of 2,000 gold pieces paid by the Assassins to the Templars, while for his part Rashid al-Din Sinan, the Assassin leader in Syria, had promised that he and his followers would convert to Christianity. Provisional agreement was reached, but while Abdullah, the envoy of the Assassins, was travelling back through the county of Tripoli, protected by a royal safe-conduct, he was attacked and killed by a group of Templars led by a knight called Walter of Mesnil.
The king was incensed by this violation and demanded that Odo of Saint-Amand, the Templar master, hand over the culprit, but the master exacerbated the situation by refusing to do so, replying that he had given the man a penance and that he ‘was about to send him to the pope’. This was particularly galling for the king, whose evident influence in Odo's appointment must have led him to have expected greater co-operation from the master. Given his previous record, it is inconceivable that Amalric would let the matter rest there, and he went to Sidon himself, where Walter of Mesnil was being held, and had him seized and thrown into prison in Tyre. Amalric, says William, regarded this so seriously that he intended to take up the matter with other rulers, but he died before he was able to do so.148
Both William and the one other contemporary source that records the murder, the English secular canon Walter Map, present this as the loss of a striking opportunity to convert Muslims to the Christian path; indeed, Map alleged that the Templars were afraid that conversions of this kind would soon make their role redundant.149 Such an initiative was indeed unique in the twelfth century, but it may have stemmed from the belief of Hasan II, the Assassin leader at Alamut, articulated by the abrogation of the law of the Prophet and by no means unlikely in a messianic sect, that the millennium had arrived. For his part Amalric need not have had any ideological motives; purely pragmatic considerations would suggest that an alliance with a sect feared in the Sunni world, whose centre of power was in the vulnerable area to the east of Valania, and which was a committed enemy of the Zengids, was a desirable goal. In the end the king was able to clear his name with Sinan, but there is no further sign of an alliance, perhaps because three months after Amalric's death in July 1174, Raymond III, count of Tripoli, whose father had been killed by the Assassins, was appointed regent.150
By coincidence, Nur al-Din and Amalric died within nine weeks of each other, on 15 May and 11 July 1174, respectively. As might be expected from the most pro-Zengid of the chroniclers, Ibn al-Athir presents Nur al-Din as the epitome of virtue. He paid for his personal affairs entirely from his own property, considering himself to be ‘the custodian of the Muslims’ for everything else, he maintained the Shariah even when it affected him directly, his bravery was ‘of the highest order’, he was the promoter of public works, including defensive walls, madrasas, hospitals, caravanserais and seminaries, and he was the creator of charitable trusts. ‘In short, his good qualities were numerous and his virtues abundant, more than this book can contain.’151 To William of Tyre, he had been ‘a mighty persecutor of the Christian name and faith’, but this did not preclude respect for his qualities as well, for he had been ‘a just prince, valiant and wise, and, according to the traditions of his race, a religious man’.152 Michael the Syrian says that Nur al-Din's death was ‘joyous news’, not only to the Christians, but also apparently to some of his emirs as well, as they had been subject to considerable constraints under his command. ‘He did not permit the drinking of wine in the camp, nor tolerate music or dancing, and the camp was absolutely silent. He was assiduous in listening to reading from their Book; he considered himself like Muhammad, and was waiting for the Lord to speak to him as he had to Moses.’153
Naturally, Amalric had attempted to take advantage of the likely disruption in the Zengid empire caused by Nur al-Din's death by launching an attack on Banyas, but it did not succeed and he accepted a large sum of money to retreat.154 It was during this withdrawal that he fell ill with dysentery. He managed to get back to Jerusalem, but the combined efforts of Greek, Syrian and Latin doctors could not save him. Although William of Tyre sums him up as a ‘man of wisdom and discretion, fully competent to hold the reins of government in the kingdom’, his comments on his character and actions are by no means always laudatory. Like William, however, Ibn al-Athir could see the enemy's strengths: ‘He was one of the bravest of their kings, the most outstanding for policy, cunning and intrigue.’155
CHAPTER 11
The Disintegration of the Crusader States
ACCORDING to Ibn al-Athir, Nur al-Din harboured a deep and justified mistrust of Saladin. By late 1171, it had become evident that Saladin was reluctant to commit himself to joint attacks on the Franks because he feared that if they were victorious there would be nothing to prevent Nur al-Din establishing his authority in Egypt. After Saladin's withdrawal from the siege of Montréal in October 1171, Nur al-Din ‘resolved to enter Egypt and expel him’. When Saladin became aware of this he held a family conference during which his nephew, Taqi al-Din, expressed the view that any such move should be forcibly resisted. Najm al-Din Ayyub, Saladin's father, publicly rebuked him for his disloyalty, but in private assured his son that they would resist even if Nur al-Din wanted as much as ‘a piece of sugar cane’. It was, nevertheless, better not to adopt an overtly hostile demeanour, which would only be regarded as provocative. ‘It turned out as Ayyb had expected. Nr al-Dn died without having made a move against him and Saladin ruled the land. This was an example of really good and excellent advice.’ Even so, Nur al-Din would eventually have invaded Egypt. Ibn al-Athir says that he was in the midst of preparations when ‘he received God's decree which cannot be averted’.1
Nur al-Din's successor was his son, al-Malik al-Salih Isma'il, aged only eleven. Inevitably he would be under the control of Nur al-Din's emirs, led by Shams al-Din Muhammad, leaving his father's lands vulnerable to attack. Saladin was obviously interested in Damascus, but was initially restrained, since he needed a pretext, but Saif al-Din, lord of Mosul, Nur al-Din's nephew, immediately seized the Jazira. In these circumstances Amalric's attack on Banyas had to be deflected, obliging Shams al-Din to buy him off, while simultaneously threatening to call in Saladin and Saif al-Din if he refused.2
In fact, Saladin soon had problems of his own. On 28 July 1174, a large Sicilian fleet suddenly appeared at Alexandria, and at once launched an attack. Saladin himself was 120 miles away, but although the Sicilians persisted for five days, they failed to take the port because of what William of Tyre saw as incompetent leadership, but which Ibn al-Athir called gallant Muslim resistance. This had been, albeit for a short time, a serious threat; both William of Tyre and Ibn al-Athir say that the Sicilians brought 200 ships, although the latter adds another thirty-six horse transports, six large ships carrying war materials and forty other vessels with provisions.3 Moreover, they had been hoping to link up with dissident Fatimids who were plotting against Saladin. This had originally been intended as a combined land and sea attack, planned by Amalric and William II, king of Sicily, but Amalric's death was not known in Palermo before the fleet set out and therefore the Sicilians found themselves without the military support they had expected.4 At the time this alliance must have seemed a considerable success for Amalric, for it was only the second Sicilian involvement with the crusader states since the insult to Queen Adelaide in 1117.
Relieved of this threat, Saladin was now in a position to respond to an invitation from Shams al-Din, who was fearful of the developing anarchy in Nur al-Din's lands, to take over Damascus. Keeping up the pretence that he was acting as the servant of al-Salih, Saladin entered the city on 28 October 1174. He at once set about establishing himself in Syria. Between December 1174 and M
arch 1175, he acquired Hama, Homs and Baalbek, despite resistance from some of Nur al-Din's supporters, although Aleppo held out against him after a tearful appeal to the people by al-Salih.5
Less than nine months after the death of Amalric, the situation which the king had spent so much blood and resources to avoid had come about, for all of Egypt and most of Syria were now in the hands of one man, although Aleppo continued to resist. Some attempt had been made to create problems for Saladin. Raymond III, count of Tripoli, who had been a prisoner of Nur al-Din since the disaster at Artah in August 1164, had been ransomed for 80,000 dinars, probably early in 1174.6 In January 1175, he led a force to relieve the defenders of the citadel at Homs, which Saladin had not been able to take. Although nothing was achieved, Saladin realised that Raymond had been drawn by the prospect of the release of hostages held to guarantee the payment of his ransom, and he used this as a lever to persuade him to desist from interfering again in the siege of the city. William of Tyre believes that Humphrey of Toron, the royal constable, had been the key figure in these negotiations, which he describes as done ‘against our purpose’.7 Indeed, the long-term consequences of the costs of this ransom had major repercussions for Raymond and were always a consideration for him in his future actions.
However, the major reason why the Franks had been unable to take advantage of Muslim disarray in the second half of 1174 was that Amalric's death had precipitated a crisis in Jerusalem every bit as serious as that in Damascus. Amalric's successor was Baldwin, his son by Agnes of Courtenay. As the previous king's only son, he evidently had the best hereditary claim, although he was only thirteen, barely older than al-Salih. Nevertheless, his succession, claims William of Tyre, accorded with the wishes of all, laymen and ecclesiastics, and he was crowned on 15 July. Indeed, in normal circumstances, the acceptance of a minor less than two years away from his majority would not be considered unusual in the twelfth century, but in this case it was complicated by the fact that he had serious health problems. William had been his tutor and was evidently very fond of him, and around 1170, when Baldwin was nine, he had noticed a numbness in his right arm and hand, which did not prove susceptible to treatment. By the time he had reached puberty, this was diagnosed as leprosy, of the kind that modern medicine recognises as the most serious, that is, lepromatous rather than tuberculoid, and which ultimately led to his premature death at the age of twenty-four.8
Acceptance of a possible leper in a kingdom in which there had been succession problems in the past seems puzzling, but the later actions of the principals involved suggest that they did not plan for this to be a permanent arrangement, as they well knew that Baldwin's condition would deteriorate quite rapidly. In 1174, there were no alternative candidates, but given time this could be rectified, most obviously by finding a sufficiently weighty figure as a husband for Sibylla, Baldwin's unmarried older sister, who had been brought up by her aunt Iveta in the convent at Bethany. It seems unlikely that contemporaries were unaware of the nature of his disease, although admittedly it was not always easy to recognise in its early stages.9 Leprosy, however, was sufficiently common for the formation of a charitable order, that of St Lazarus, in the 1130s, which was run by lepers and which provided an honourable retreat for members of the nobility with the disease. Many families were therefore familiar with its characteristics.10 Indeed, Amalric's search for medical help in Fatimid Egypt must have been connected to his realisation that his son was ill; his use of a famous doctor and astrologer, Abu Sulayman Dawud, originally from Jerusalem but now settled in Egypt, to treat Baldwin, shows his concern.11 The members of the High Court therefore knew that Baldwin might have leprosy, but still went ahead with the coronation.12
In these circumstances, Miles of Plancy took over the running of the government. He had come to the East in the 1160s and had been seneschal since 1169. More recently he had become lord of Transjordan through marriage to Stephanie of Milly, daughter of Philip of Nablus, a highly favourable match granted by Amalric. He had been a close adviser of Amalric, especially on his Egyptian campaigns; indeed, he was a member of the Montlhéry family and therefore kin of Baldwin II and his descendants. As seneschal, he controlled finance and castles and was the chief judicial officer after the king.13 However, he did not impress William of Tyre, who describes him as being ‘of degenerate morals, one who neither feared God nor reverenced man. Milon de Plancy was a man without shame, a brawler and a slanderer, ever active in stirring up trouble.’14 During the 1170s, William became increasingly involved in the politics of the kingdom, so he is not an unbiased observer; nevertheless, there seems to be some truth in his observation that Miles provoked resentment among the baronage by blocking access to the king and excluding them from the processes of government. The most important of these barons was Humphrey of Toron, the constable, without whom Miles could not summon the host, so there was no prospect of fulfilling the obligations to the Sicilians, even had this been a practical proposition at this time. This conflict came to a head quite quickly, for Miles was stabbed to death in the streets of Acre, probably in October 1174, by unknown plotters.15
Although William of Tyre is vague about the exact sequence of events, it seems that soon afterwards Raymond of Tripoli appeared before the High Court in Jerusalem in order to obtain a judgment ‘about the petitions which he had previously presented’. After two days of discussion it was agreed to popular acclaim that ‘there should be surrendered to him, after the king, the administration and rule of the whole realm’, an office the Franks described as bailli.16 Soon afterwards he was granted the hand of Eschiva II, widow of Walter, lord of Galilee, giving him a fief owing 100 knights and making him the leading baron in the kingdom of Jerusalem, since the county of Tripoli also owed 100 knights.17
Raymond's first attempt to obtain control of the kingdom appears to have been in August, when Miles of Plancy was still alive. Although the matter had been postponed as only a few of the barons were present, on that occasion Raymond had justified himself on the grounds that he was the king's nearest blood relative, that he was the richest and most powerful of the king's subjects, and that he had granted Amalric full powers in his county while he was in prison, making him his heir should he be unfortunate enough never to obtain his release.18 Raymond was the son of Raymond II and Hodierna, Baldwin II's third daughter, and was thus one generation closer to the royal family than Bohemond III of Antioch, grandson of Alice, Baldwin's second daughter. William of Tyre says that he had widespread support, naming Humphrey of Toron, Baldwin of Ramla, Balian, his brother, and Reynald of Sidon among the barons, as well as all the bishops.
William of Tyre has a very favourable view of Raymond of Tripoli, at least partly because of what he saw as his high moral character: dynamic in action, disinclined to extremes of behaviour, modest in eating and drinking, generous to strangers. Although Eschiva had no children by him, William presents him as a faithful and loving husband, who treated her children as if they were his own. The archbishop sums him up as ‘a diligent man and esteemed by all’, whom he contrasts with others around the king who sought only their own advantage.19 However, from 1174 onwards, William's judgements on individuals – inevitably in the circumstances – are more politicised than in any other part of his chronicle. With Raymond in power, William's own fortunes began to rise; in December 1174, he succeeded Ralph of Bethlehem as chancellor and, in June 1175, Frederick of Tyre as archbishop.20
In fact, Raymond was far from disinterested.21 His actions were usually driven by his own personal ambitions and needs and, even when they were not – as on the eve of the battle of Hattin in July 1187 – his enemies believed them to have been, given his previous record. This was at once evident. Raymond had never forgiven Manuel for reneging on the marriage negotiations with his sister, Melisende, in 1160–1, an affront he had followed up by a series of attacks on Byzantine lands.22 He therefore dropped the Byzantine alliance of 1171 and attempted to obtain the help of the German emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, Manuel's w
estern rival.23 The first priority was a husband for Sibylla, and it was agreed that she should marry William Longsword, son of William V, marquis of Montferrat, one of Frederick Barbarossa's main supporters in Lombardy. This was achieved in November 1176, a month after William Longsword had arrived in the kingdom, and he received the lordship of Jaffa and Ascalon.24
This was a marriage at the level of that of Fulk of Anjou in 1129, for William was a cousin of both Louis VII of France and Frederick Barbarossa. William of Tyre says that there was some opposition to him when he actually arrived, although he claims the original decision had been unanimous. The potential was considerable. If Frederick Barbarossa had succeeded in his ambition to conquer the city-states of Lombardy, he might have been able to extend his rule into the kingdom of Sicily. Both areas contained maritime resources essential to the crusader states. In fact, Raymond's policy foundered within a year: in May 1176, Frederick Barbarossa was defeated by the forces of the Lombard League at the battle of Legnano, north-west of Milan, forcing him to come to terms after eighteen years of struggle and leaving the crusader states low on his list of priorities. Then, in June 1177, William Longsword died of an illness contracted two months before, a not unusual occurrence among those not acclimatised to the Levant. He was buried in the vestibule of the Hospitaller church in Jerusalem, where William of Tyre conducted the service, for the patriarch was unwell. Sibylla, probably no more than seventeen years of age, was left a widow, and pregnant with William Longsword's child. This was a double blow, for Longsword's death destroyed the idea that he might at some point take over from the ailing Baldwin IV, while Sibylla's pregnancy meant that a new husband would know that his own children would probably not inherit, undermining her prospects of a second marriage.
The Crusader States Page 37
