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by Malcolm Barber


  It looks as if Raymond's role as bailli ended in July 1176, when Baldwin turned fifteen and thus, according to John of Ibelin, attained his majority.25 Baldwin now reverted to his father's Byzantine alliance, despite the fact that the Byzantines too had suffered a very serious military defeat when, in September, they were overcome by the Seljuk sultan of Rum, Kilij Arslan II, at the battle of Myriocephalon, north of Lake Egirdir in western Asia Minor. William of Tyre portrays this as a very great disaster, which had a huge impact upon Manuel's health and demeanour, but it did not prevent the emperor from implementing plans for a joint invasion of Egypt.26 Perhaps he saw in this a means of restoring imperial prestige and reputation. In the winter of 1176–7, Baldwin sent Reynald of Châtillon to Constantinople to negotiate the terms of a new agreement, and in September 1177, high-level imperial ambassadors arrived in Jerusalem, including once again the Sicilian Alexander of Gravina. They brought with them a substantial fleet of seventy galleys plus support ships.27

  Reynald and Joscelin of Courtenay had been released from prison in the summer of 1176 as a result of negotiations between Bohemond III and Gumushtekin, atabeg of Aleppo, who was apprehensive following Saladin's victory over a Zengid coalition led by Saif al-Din of Mosul in April. ‘Imad al-Din, who entered Saladin's service in 1175 and provides first-hand information about his career thereafter, says that their release was the consequence of Aleppan anger at Saladin's behaviour. Even so, Gumushtekin demanded a heavy price: 50,000 dinars for Joscelin and 120,000 for Reynald.28 This in itself is enough to explain Reynald's changed attitude towards Byzantium, for Manuel was the only person capable of paying such a sum. It does not seem likely that it could have been raised by his friends alone, as William of Tyre says, although Agnes of Courtenay was probably able to provide some of Joscelin's ransom.29 Indeed, Agnes of Courtenay was now the key figure. Her position as mother of Baldwin and Sibylla gave her the kind of status and influence she had lost after the forced separation from Amalric in 1163. In c.1171, she had married Reynald of Sidon, one of the most important barons of the kingdom. Clearly, in these circumstances, husband and wife could function to mutual benefit.30

  Neither Joscelin of Courtenay nor Reynald of Châtillon had lands of their own, despite their status, so they both returned to the kingdom of Jerusalem, further complicating the politics of the court of the leper king. Joscelin was appointed seneschal, the chief administrative office of the kingdom, as well as marrying Agnes of Milly, daughter of Henry the Buffalo, brother of Philip of Nablus. The marriage brought a dowry that included Castellum Novum (Mi'iliya) and Montfort, situated in the hills to the north-east of Acre. By the autumn of 1179, he had become prosperous enough to augment these holdings with a series of purchases in the region, creating a lordship that, although scattered, was of considerable value. During this same period, in 1178, Bohemond III granted him a fief in the principality of Antioch, which included an abbey and several casalia. These were to be relinquished if Joscelin ever regained his Edessan lands.31

  Reynald was married to Stephanie of Milly, Agnes's cousin, widow of Humphrey III of Toron and, very recently, Miles of Plancy.32 As the only surviving heir of Philip of Nablus, she brought to Reynald the southern part of the great fief of Transjordan, received by her father in 1161. Reynald therefore became lord of Kerak and Montréal, and thus overlooked the routes between Cairo and Damascus, crucial links in Saladin's empire.33 The rise of Joscelin and Reynald provides a striking index of the new importance of the Courtenays and their allies. Both immediately outranked Humphrey II of Toron, the constable, previously a dominant figure under Baldwin III and Amalric, appearing above him on witness lists of charters from 1176 onwards, a position even Miles of Plancy had been unable to achieve.34

  At the beginning of August 1177, Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders, landed at Acre with a considerable army. He was no ordinary crusader. From the beginning the counts of Flanders had committed themselves heavily to the cause, something they were able to do because they had more resources than any other French baron and perhaps even than the monarchy. Philip's father, Thierry, had been to the Holy Land four times and his mother, Sibylla, had entered the convent at Bethany. Philip was closely related to the royal house of Jerusalem, for King Fulk was his grandfather, and Baldwin IV his cousin.35 William of Tyre says that his appearance had been ‘expected for a long time’, so it is probable that the Byzantines anticipated that his army would be a major element in any new assault on Egypt. They would have been encouraged in that belief by the Latin leaders in Jerusalem, for King Baldwin had become very ill, and Philip of Flanders was an obvious replacement, even if only temporarily. Accordingly, the count was offered what William of Tyre calls ‘the rule and general administration of the entire kingdom’.36

  In fact, both were disappointed, for Philip said that he had come ‘to subject himself to divine service’, not to take power, and that he wished to be free to return to Flanders when needed. He would accept any other procurator whom the king might appoint. Moreover, after what William of Tyre presents as a series of excuses and devious ploys, he refused to take part in an invasion of Egypt. He did, nevertheless, agree to fight in the north in conjunction with Raymond of Tripoli and Bohemond of Antioch, a campaign the king reinforced with 100 knights and 2,000 foot. In September, Philip and Raymond attacked Hama and then, in December, joined up with Bohemond to besiege Harim. Both the count of Tripoli and the prince of Antioch had a personal interest in its recapture. Its loss in 1164 had not only resulted in the imprisonment of both of them, but it had also left in enemy hands a strategically important fortress only 18 miles from Antioch. William of Tyre, heavily committed to the alliance with the Byzantines, was sufficiently irritated by what he saw as a diversion to comment that some said that both rulers had dissuaded Philip from the Egyptian venture so that they could enlarge their own lands.37

  This formidable force established a tight blockade, but William of Tyre believed that the target was too close to Antioch to maintain proper discipline, blaming Philip and his entourage for continually returning to the city to indulge in drinking and the pleasures of the flesh. Morale was not helped by Philip's frequent references to his desire to return home. Although, as William claims, they were close to taking the castle, in the end Raymond allowed himself to be bought off and Philip returned to Jerusalem in time to celebrate Easter on 9 April. Ibn al-Athir says that the siege had brought the Franks ‘to the end of their efforts and they had become as though exhausted’. Some confirmation of William's version of events can be found in the timing of the abandonment of the siege, for it enabled Philip to undertake the spring sailing, taking ship from Latakia for Constantinople soon after Easter.38

  The behaviour of the count of Flanders needs more explanation than that offered by William of Tyre. If they had invaded Egypt, Philip may have feared that he would have been blamed for any defeat (on past record quite a likely outcome); if they had succeeded, on the other hand, it would have been to somebody else's advantage, either that of Baldwin IV or of the Byzantines.39 Baldwin was evidently experiencing a long-term physical deterioration, but the state of his health was inconsistent and there were periods when he recovered sufficiently to lead military expeditions, even though after 1179 he had to be carried on a litter. Two years before, for example, he had led a foray into the Hauran in a now familiar attempt to undermine the Damascene economic base, and in August of that same year he and Raymond had fought a pitched battle near Baalbek with Shams al-Dula, Saladin's brother, now governor of Damascus.40 Such considerations may have been reinforced by Philip's lack of ambition in the East, to which he had come, as he said, out of piety. Moreover, the decision to take part in the northern campaign was based on a ‘sound appreciation’ of the military advice given by Raymond and Bohemond.41 Philip's attitudes demonstrate the fundamental problem faced by the crusader states in their relations with western powers: if the crusaders were powerful enough to deploy large resources, they usually had their own agenda, which was u
nlikely to be changed by the Franks of the East, while if they were minor lords, they could never make a decisive difference in any campaign against the Muslims.

  William of Tyre was clearly biased against Philip of Flanders, for he was unwilling to give due recognition to the dilemmas that faced the count. Even so, the archbishop's assessment of the overall situation may well have been correct. Saladin evidently expected to be attacked in Egypt and, indeed, left Syria in the late summer of 1176 after defeating Saif al-Din and making peace with Aleppo and the Is'mailis.42 When, however, in the autumn of 1177, he realised that the major part of Frankish forces had gone north to Harim, he seized the opportunity to invade the southern part of the kingdom. Neither Ibn al-Athir nor Ibn Shaddad explains his reasons, but to William of Tyre it was obvious that he hoped either to damage the kingdom or to force the abandonment of the siege of Harim. It may have been because of this perceived weakness that, in Ibn al-Athir's words, the Muslims ‘became over eager and relaxed, moving about the country secure and confident’. Saladin therefore left his heavy baggage at al-Arish and, accompanied by his more lightly armed troops, made a sudden appearance in front of Ascalon. Baldwin had assembled all the forces he could find, but was obliged to retreat into Ascalon on the night of 24 November, leaving the Muslim forces to raid the entire area as far as Jerusalem. William of Tyre paints a bleak picture of an abandoned Ramla and of the citizens of Jerusalem huddled in the Tower of David for protection.43

  William's account heightens the dramatic effect of the Christian victory that followed the next day. Baldwin's army was heavily outnumbered, even though William's figures of 375 knights opposed to 26,000 light cavalry, 1,000 of whom were Saladin's personal mamluks, cannot be taken seriously. The Christian army included Odo of Saint-Amand, master of the Temple, with eighty brethren, some of whom had come from the garrison at Gaza, and the leading barons, Baldwin of Ramla and his brother, Balian, Reynald of Sidon and Joscelin of Courtenay, the royal seneschal. It was commanded by Reynald of Châtillon, who had been made ‘procurator of the kingdom and the army’ following the refusal of Philip of Flanders to take responsibility for the kingdom in the autumn of 1177.44 They took with them the True Cross under the care of Albert, bishop of Bethlehem.

  The armies met on 25 November, below a hill known as Mont Gisard (Tell al-Safiya) between Ramla and Ibelin. William of Tyre says that initially the engagement was indecisive, but that soon the Christians broke Saladin's lines, chasing his army into a nearby marsh. Saladin later explained to Ibn Shaddad what had happened: his army had been charged by the Franks while it was carrying out a manoeuvre that involved the right flank moving to the left and the left into the centre.45 According to Ibn al-Athir, the Franks caught them as they were trying to cross a river, and one of them almost reached Saladin before himself being killed. Saladin later turned this incident to his own advantage, claiming that he had been spared by God ‘for a purpose that He had in mind’.46

  Ibn Shaddad calls this ‘a terrible reverse’, for many men and animals and much equipment were lost in the aftermath. The following eleven days were exceptionally wet and cold and few of the fugitives succeeded in returning to Cairo. Some suffered so much that they gave themselves up rather than spend any more time in the open. However, it had been a very bloody battle for both sides: 1,100 Christians had been killed and 750 were treated for wounds in the Hospital in Jerusalem.47 Indeed, with so many wounded, the Hospitallers would have been hard-pressed to cope, first treating survivors in their field hospital, which was a large tent they took with them whenever a major confrontation was expected, and then carrying them back to Jerusalem as soon as possible using relays of camels, horses, mules and donkeys.48 William of Tyre attributes the victory to divine help, but cannot resist adding that had the counts of Flanders and Tripoli been present, they would have claimed it for themselves.49

  The Franks knew, of course, that Saladin's rise meant that there would be further such battles in the future and that they would not be confined to the south. Saladin had established his brother, Turanshah (Shams al-Daula), in Damascus, and had shown his determination to capture Aleppo. The comprehensive agreement between the masters of the Temple and the Hospital, made in February 1179, which was intended to settle a series of disputes between the orders, reflects Frankish awareness of the need for solidarity, for it was sealed by King Baldwin, Prince Bohemond and Count Raymond, as well as leading barons, all of whom were present in person.50 It may be therefore that the victory at Mont Gisard together with the perception that Saladin would have to be fended off in the east encouraged the Franks to start building a new castle at Jacob's Ford (Bait al-Ahzan) on the Jordan, between Lake Huleh and the Sea of Galilee, in October 1178.51 The Franks had already broken the truce made after Mont Gisard by attacking Hama in August, but this was much more serious. The Templars, established on the heights of Safad by early 1168 at the latest, appear to have been the driving force, perhaps intending to create a semi-autonomous district around the two castles not dissimilar to their enclaves in the county of Tripoli. Further south, but in an equally exposed frontier position, the possession of Amman and the parts of the Belqa which the order had received in 1166 might have served as a precedent.52

  Jacob's Ford had in the past been left unfortified, but the Frankish inability to recover Banyas, north of Lake Huleh, previously regarded as of great strategic importance to the kingdom, together with Saladin's control of Damascus, persuaded the Franks that a castle there was a priority, both as an obstacle to invaders of Galilee and as a base for raiding the Hauran. William of Tyre says that it took six months to build, but it was still not finished by the following spring, for this was intended to be a formidable construction. Modern excavations and contemporary descriptions show an extensive enceinte with a tower on the western side and a very large cistern at the northern end, all built with heavy blocks, mortared with lime, but this was only the first stage. By the spring of 1179 only the inner wall had been erected, but ultimately it would have been a concentric castle built with a double line of walls (see plate 12).53

  Most of the work was done while Saladin was engaged in the siege of Baalbek, but he was well aware of the potential military threat. Moreover, he appears to have regarded the new castle as an intrusion into Muslim territory, as well as occupying the site of an important shrine, circumstances that reinforced his determination to prevent its construction.54 At first he tried to persuade the Franks to dismantle it, offering 60,000 dinars, which he gradually increased to 100,000, but with no success. He therefore spent the money instead on soldiers, who were used to raid the surrounding area and, in late May 1179, in an attempt to test the strength of its defences, in a sortie against the castle itself. Inevitably, such tactics led to confrontations with the Franks in one of which – a raid by the Franks into the region of Banyas in April – the constable, Humphrey of Toron, was fatally wounded.55 The human and material costs of this border warfare were therefore often very high. Ibn al-Athir acknowledges this: ‘How can you be made to realize just what this Humphrey was! His bravery and skill in battle were proverbial. He was a tribulation that God inflicted on the Muslims and God gave relief from his wickedness.’56 Humphrey was a well-known figure, but the destruction of villages and the burning of crops led to many more anonymous deaths every year. This was especially true of 1179, a year of severe drought and famine in the region.

  Sometimes these skirmishes developed an impetus of their own. On 10 June, the Christians suffered a serious defeat at Marj Ayun, an area that lay between the Leontes River and the Upper Jordan, to the north-west of Banyas. The king had assembled an army at Tiberias and marched north in attempt to stop Saladin from devastating the lands to the east of Sidon. On first contact, the invaders were put to flight, but Saladin rallied his forces and attacked what had now become a series of dispersed groups. Reynald of Sidon, coming from the west, was deterred from proceeding by some of the survivors and turned back. Some took refuge in the castle of Beaufort, but even so C
hristian losses were considerable and included the capture of Baldwin of Ramla, Hugh of Tiberias and Odo of Saint-Amand, master of the Temple. At this time William of Tyre was away in Rome, attending the Third Lateran Council, so he could only gather his material later from participants. These blamed Odo of Saint-Amand, although the archbishop needed little encouragement to condemn a man whom he believed to be insufferably arrogant and deeply tainted by the sin of pride. Odo, he says, died in prison within a year, ‘lamented by no one’.57

  Saladin began a massive assault on Chastellet, the new castle at Jacob's Ford, on 24 August. It took him five days to break down the defences, although he breached the outer wall on the first day. When it was all over the castle was a smouldering ruin and the cistern was crammed with the bodies of the dead. The Templar commander had killed himself by immolation in one of the many fires burning across the site. Most of the 700 prisoners were either executed or killed while being taken to Damascus. Disease spread in Saladin's army, killing, among others, more than ten of his emirs. The garrison had received no help from outside since the army, assembling at Tiberias, had taken a considerable time to muster, a situation perhaps created both by the losses at Marj Ayun and by the need to incorporate the forces of important crusaders who had arrived only in July, including Henry of Troyes, count of Champagne, Peter of Courtenay, brother of King Louis VII, and Philip, bishop-elect of Beauvais.58 They heard the news of the castle's fall while they were still at Tiberias. Saladin followed this up with another series of raids, ravaging the lands around Tiberias, Tyre and Beirut, with the specific intention of spreading terror.59

 

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