The Crusader States

by Malcolm Barber

  Neither William nor Henry lived long enough to put the plan of a joint crusade into action – if, indeed, it had ever amounted to more than a pious hope – since both died in the course of 1189. But there is no doubt that William was serious in his attempt to bring aid to the stricken crusader states, for the fleet was commanded by Margaritus of Brindisi, the most famous and capable admiral of the day, and must have been very costly to equip, since it carried an army of 200 knights and their support staff. Ernoul says that William sent another 300 knights the following August. The fleet had originally sailed for Tyre, but news of Saladin's approach diverted it north. ‘Imad al-Din asserted that the fleet was of no consequence, staying largely inactive for several months, but Ernoul believed it's presence had convinced Saladin that he could not take the city at that time.144 According to ‘Imad al-Din, Saladin was persuaded by the argument that a siege of Tripoli would take too long, for it was well fortified with numerous defenders.145

  However, little else stood in Saladin's way. On 3 July, at Tortosa, he found that the inhabitants had retreated into two towers that formed part of the fortification of the Templar compound in the north-west corner of the city, and his troops were able to plunder the town at will. The defenders of one of the towers soon capitulated and Saladin threw the smashed masonry into the sea, but he was unable to dislodge the Templars from the other tower, where they were commanded by Gerard of Ridefort, previously released by Saladin. The sultan took his frustration out on the town, demolishing its walls and burning many of the important buildings, including the cathedral.146 Nevertheless, in response to a reminder from Queen Sibylla, who was living in Tripoli, Saladin did bring the other captive Christian leaders to Tortosa, where he freed Guy of Lusignan and William of Montferrat on condition that they did not bear arms against him and that Guy went overseas. In an anecdote typically designed to appeal to the audience for his work, Ernoul describes how Guy then crossed to the island of Ruad, just off the coast at Tortosa, in the company of Saladin's representatives, to demonstrate how he had indeed kept his promise to cross the sea. In October the following year, after fierce fighting outside Acre, Saladin accused Guy of breaking his oath, but if the story of the trip to Ruad is true he cannot have had much confidence that Guy was about to disappear from the scene.147

  As in the kingdom of Jerusalem, he did not waste time on the great Tripolitan castles of the military orders; a day's survey of Crac des Chevaliers, for example, showed him that it presented too many problems. One castle, however, was unavoidable, for it blocked the coast road into the principality of Antioch, preventing access to Jabala and Latakia, which Saladin believed were ready to submit. This was Marqab, recently taken over by the Hospitallers from the Mazoir family. The Mazoirs had created a formidable castle, built largely of black basalt and set on a triangular plateau high above the sea on its western side and overlooking a narrow defile to the east. Ibn al-Athir describes it as impregnable. ‘Nobody,’ he says, ‘can have any hope of conquering it because of its height and strength.’148

  The Mazoirs were one of the most important families in the principality and had held the castle and the small associated town of Valania since 1140. However, after the damage caused by the earthquake of 1170, they had found it increasingly difficult to maintain and, in February 1187, had sold it to the Hospitallers.149 The brothers already had a considerable presence in the territory and at once set about reconstructing the castle, although they could not have done very much by the time Saladin's army appeared in mid-July 1188. Even so, Saladin had no intention of launching an attack; indeed, he was more concerned to pass it in safety than to capture it. The soldiers needed to construct palisades to defend themselves from the rain of arrows both from the castle above and from the Sicilian ships along the shore, for Margaritus had been tracking the army ever since it left Tripoli. Saladin was obliged to establish a special rearguard of archers to counter the fierce fire.150

  Once through the defile, Saladin was able to acquire Valania, Jabala and Latakia with relative ease. Valania, seat of the bishopric, had been abandoned by Bishop Anterius and his flock, who had taken refuge in Marqab. Ernoul says that Saladin chose not to leave a garrison there because of its proximity to Marqab, but instead destroyed the town.151 Anterius and his successors were obliged to use the castle as their seat, where they lived thereafter in an uneasy relationship with the Hospitallers.152 Saladin's confidence that he could take Jabala was based on a visit from Mansur ibn Nabil, qadi of Jabala, who had, according to Ibn al-Athir, been inspired by ‘zeal for the faith’ and had offered to deliver Jabala, Latakia and other towns in the region. This was not an empty promise. When Saladin arrived on 15 July, the qadi raised his banners on the walls and handed over the town, for the Frankish inhabitants had retreated into the citadel.

  The fall of Jabala offers some insight into the methods used by the princes of Antioch to rule their possessions, for the Franks were evidently a minority in a part of the principality in which the indigenous population was largely Muslim. The qadi had ‘enjoyed much respect and high status, wielding authority over all the Muslims in Jabala and its districts in whatever concerned Bohemond’. In these circumstances there was little that Bohemond could do to oppose Saladin, unless he was willing to confront him in open battle, hardly an attractive prospect after the debacle at Hattin. Bohemond had taken Muslim hostages from Jabala, but when the qadi persuaded the Franks in the citadel to surrender, he was provided with a bargaining counter, which soon led to an exchange of hostages.153

  At Latakia the pattern was very similar. The Franks abandoned the town, but held out in two forts on the higher ground. The Muslim accounts describe fierce fighting, but once more Mansur ibn Nabil was able to negotiate, warning the Franks of their fate if they held out. On 23 July, they too capitulated, much to the frustration of Margaritus, who had brought his fleet up to help in its defence. After the town had fallen, he came ashore to meet Saladin in the hope that he could persuade him to resettle the Franks as his subjects, but could achieve nothing. The Muslim chroniclers were impressed with Latakia. Ibn al-Athir says that it ‘was constructed with the most beautiful buildings, very decorated and with plentiful marble of various sorts’, while ‘Imad al-Din describes it as the most beautiful of the coastal towns with an incomparable port. It had been ‘a paradise inhabited by the damned’. ‘Imad al-Din's regret at the plunder of the marble and the destruction of the churches is palpable.154

  Saladin now began a systematic conquest of the principality of Antioch. In less than a month between 29 July, when he took the castle of Saone, and 23 August, when he forced the capitulation of Burzey, he gained control of the entire southern part of the state. Both castles were heavily fortified, yet fell by assault. Saone's formidable perimeter walls overlooking deep ravines, huge keep and rock-cut channel were undone by a weak point on the northern side, where the central ditch between the upper and lower enceintes had not been finished. After bombarding it with trebuchets, the Muslims broke into the lower enclosure and then crossed the unfinished ditch separating it from the main castle, forcing the garrison to retreat into the keep. Almost all of them were wounded, having been showered with arrows.155 Ibn Shaddad was an observer. ‘I was watching our men seize the cooking pots, in which food had just been prepared, and eat while battling against the castle. The defenders of the bailey joined those in the castle and took whatever property they could carry. The rest was plundered. Our soldiers surrounded the castle walls and the enemy, when they stared destruction in the face, sought relief by asking for terms. Hearing this, the sultan offered them terms and graciously allowed them their lives and their property, except that ten dinars should be taken from each man, five from each woman and two from every child.’156 As ‘Imad al-Din saw it, the taking of Saone ‘assured the security of Latakia and strengthened the hope that they would soon possess Antioch, as it was the key and most important of its dependencies: the gate was open and the road completely laid out’.157

  Burzey
had been captured by the Byzantines during the campaign of 974–5, when they had taken Saone. The Franks had hung on to it because it was inaccessible, high above the Orontes on the eastern slopes of the Nusairi mountains. It was unlikely to receive any help once Saladin had decided to focus on it because it was so isolated, but it nevertheless presented a formidable obstacle. Ibn al-Athir says that the only feasible approach was from the west. When he failed to break it down with his trebuchets, Saladin used his superior numbers to mount a series of assaults from this side, forcing the Franks to retreat to the citadel at the same moment that a smaller group took advantage of the situation to climb in on the undefended eastern side. The castle fell after three days, on 23 August, but the lord of Burzey was saved from imprisonment by his wife, sister of Sibylla, wife of Bohemond III. The couple were released by Saladin because, according Ibn al-Athir, she was in correspondence with the sultan and ‘used to inform him of many significant matters’. In keeping with his policy in this region, Saladin handed out both Saone and Burzey to the emir Nasir al-Din Mankubars, whose lordship of Apamea, situated on the other side of a lake and marsh from Burzey, had long been menaced by the garrison there.158

  Saladin now moved his forces north to the Iron Bridge on the Orontes, only about 9 miles north-east of Antioch, which was the place from which the crusaders had begun their approach to the city in 1097. Antioch was so close that ‘Imad al-Din says they had an ardent desire to move on the city, but that it was unanimously accepted that its approaches were protected by the Templar castles of Darbsak and Baghras and that when these were destroyed ‘the fall of Antioch would be next’.159 Both castles were situated to the south-east of the Amanus mountains. Darbsak was 25 miles to the north of Antioch, while Baghras was closer, about 16 miles away, facing the Belen Pass which led to the port of Alexandretta. The defenders of Darbsak sent for help from Bohemond III, but nothing was forthcoming and, on 16 September, they surrendered on terms that allowed them to leave for Antioch, although they could take nothing with them and were obliged to pay an indemnity of 5,000 dinars.

  This capitulation may have influenced the garrison at Baghras, evidently a far more formidable target judging by Saladin's hesitation before deciding to besiege it. When he did finally launch an assault, he took the precaution of placing a screening force between the castle and Antioch, as well as ravaging the surrounding lands upon which Baghras depended. An ineffective attack with trebuchets undermined Muslim confidence, for the castle was set too high for the machines to have any impact, but just as the besiegers were becoming weary and the work seemed never-ending, according to ‘Imad al-Din, on 26 September, the commander suddenly emerged from the gate and asked for an aman for the defenders in exchange for the castle and everything in it. In view of the isolation of Baghras, his decision is not surprising.160 The contents alone were a great prize: ‘Imad al-Din says that, among many other things, there were 12,000 sacks of corn.161

  The two castles were given to the emir ‘Alam al-Din, lord of ‘Azaz, but Baghras was not garrisoned. Instead, the emir, whom ‘Imad al-Din describes as poor, took advantage of the shortages in Antioch created by the current fighting and sold off the stocks to the Christians at very high prices, before dismantling the fortress.162 ‘Imad al-Din disapproved, believing this behaviour to be to the detriment of true believers, but he must have been influenced in his judgement by his knowledge that the abandoned remains were later occupied by Leo of Armenia, a ruler who emerged unscathed from the effects of Saladin's triumphs, for Cilicia was never attacked.163

  Antioch, however, was now virtually encircled. Earlier in the year, Aimery of Limoges, patriarch since 1140 and witness to more triumphs and disasters in the crusader states than any other contemporary leader, had written a great lament to Henry II, to whom he pleaded for help. ‘Should you delay,’ he said, ‘the Lord's Sepulchre together with the noble city of Antioch and its adjacent land will be forever disgracefully subject to foreign nations.’164 It seemed as if Aimery's prediction was about to come true. In November, Armengarde of Aspe, the new master of the Hospital, wrote to Leopold V, duke of Austria, describing the inroads made by Saladin over the previous months. ‘This summer the unspeakable Saladin totally destroyed the city of Tortosa except for the Templar citadel, burnt down the city of Valania before moving on to the region of Antioch, where he claimed the famous cities of Jabala and Latakia, the strongholds of Saone, Gorda, Cavea and Rochefort [Burzey] and the lands as far as Antioch. Beyond Antioch he besieged and captured Darbsak and Gaston [Baghras].’165

  However, the expected blow was never struck. Bohemond – described by Ibn al-Athir as ‘the greatest of the Franks and their most extensive ruler’ – asked Saladin for a truce, offering to release the large numbers of Muslim prisoners he held. He used as his negotiator his brother-in-law, which presumably enabled him to make use of continuing contacts with the Muslim camp through Sibylla's sister.166 ‘Saladin,’ says Ibn al-Athir, ‘consulted the regional rulers and others who were with him and the majority advised that he should accept this, to allow the troops to go home, rest and renew what they needed. He therefore agreed and made a truce for eight months, beginning 1 Tishrn [1 October 1188] and ending 31 Ayyr [31 May].’167 Ibn Shaddad says that the truce was for seven months and adds the significant rider that if help did not come, the city of Antioch would be handed over at the end of this period.168 For Armengarde of Aspe this was ‘a pitiful agreement’, that a city ‘acquired with the blood of valiant Christians’ would be surrendered ‘without even a stone being thrown’.

  After the dispersal of his armies, Saladin went first to Aleppo and then to Damascus. He was clearly impatient to continue his campaigns and the obvious solution was to turn his attention to those pockets of resistance in the kingdom of Jerusalem which he had not had time for in the spring. He was encouraged by news of the fall of the Transjordanian castles, including Kerak, Montréal and Li Vaux Moise, and was not deterred by the exceptionally poor weather conditions, forcing the capitulation of Safad on 6 December and Belvoir on 5 January.169 The qadi al-Fadil thought the fall of Belvoir was particularly important. It was an observation post above a junction of routes, now made safe by the removal of the Franks. The area round about was already being repopulated and the countryside was once more prosperous and calm. Only Tyre remained, which he said was not a fortress protecting its inhabitants, but a prison that enclosed them.170

  After the conquest of these castles, said Ibn al-Athir, ‘the Muslims acquired everything from as far as Ayla to the furthest districts of Beirut with only the interruption of Tyre and also all the dependencies of Antioch, apart from al-Qusayr’. Satisfying as this was, it still irked him that Saladin had freed their defenders, most of whom made their way to Tyre. ‘Every valiant, devilish champion of the Franks gathered there. Their offensive power became great and their zeal burned brightly. They sent a succession of envoys to Andalusia, Sicily and other islands of the Mediterranean, seeking aid and reinforcements, while support was coming to them little by little. All this was due to Saladin's being remiss in releasing all whom he besieged, so that he ended up biting his thumb in regret and chagrin when that was of no use.’171

  CHAPTER 13

  The Third Crusade

  AFTER Saladin had taken Latakia on 22 July 1188, Margaritus of Brindisi, commander of the Sicilian fleet which lay off the coast, requested a safe-conduct. ‘Imad al-Din must have been present when he came ashore.

  Having obtained it, he arrived, presented himself in a humble and suppliant attitude and, after a moment of reflection and meditation, expressed himself as follows. ‘You are a great sultan, a generous king, your justice is known to all, your merit is spread afar, your power is redoubtable, manifest is your goodness. If you pardon the fearful people who live along these shores, if you render this country to them, they will become for you a servant people submissive to your laws both near and far. But, if you refuse, legions will rise up from beyond the sea, as numerous as the waves. The kings of
the Christians will march against you from every country. But, since you can easily do this, let the people of this country free and grant them your pardon.’ The sultan replied: ‘It is God who has ordered the submission of the land to us: it is our obligation to obey him and to devote ourselves to the holy war; it is He who has made us master of this country. When all the nations of the world unite against us, we will invoke the power of God and we will combat them, without caring about the number of our enemies.’1

  These enemies were already gathering. Although Pope Urban III had died on 20 October 1187, soon after receiving the news of Hattin, nine days later his successor, Gregory VIII, issued the encyclical Audita tremendi, in which he blamed all Christians for what had happened, not simply those directly involved in the battle or those who lived in the crusader states. ‘Faced by such great distress concerning that land, moreover, we ought to consider not only the sins of its inhabitants but also our own and those of the whole Christian people, and we ought also to fear lest what is left of that land will be lost and the power of the infidels rage in other regions, since we hear from all parts of the world about quarrels between kings and princes, cities against cities, and about scandals.’ For those who set out in the right frame of mind there would be a full indulgence. Whether they lived or died, they should know that, through the mercy of God and the authority of the apostles Peter and Paul, ‘they will have relaxation of the reparation imposed for all their sins, of which they have made proper confession’.2