The Hunt for KSM

by Terry McDermott

  “The Qatar government had no interest in screwing up its fragile relationship with us,” said one U.S. advocate of a raid. “If we had gone in and nabbed this guy, or just cut his head off, the Qatari government would not have complained a bit…. The Qataris had no choice but to eat whatever shit we chose to feed them…. There was no U.S. agency advocating KSM’s rendition. There was an NSC proposal that was shot down by every agency that had a jurisdiction and role. Why? Everyone thought terrorism was a joke and that the NSC staff dealing with this were a bunch of idiots.”3

  But the internal politics of Qatar were probably more of an impediment than the raid’s advocates imagined. In fact, in the midst of discussions about what to do, a countercoup was mounted against al-Thani. It was foiled, but it demonstrated anew the fragile state of the Qatari government, which was slow in responding to the American inquiries on the matter.

  It would have been difficult to proceed without Qatar’s assent, said a U.S. diplomat in the region at the time. “We could not have snatched him. That would not have been either politic or possible,” the official said. “There’s always the guy who’s seen too many movies, who wants to send a commando team into a lower-middle-class neighborhood in Doha to try to snatch him.” But, he said, “I don’t think anybody ever seriously considered that a possibility.”4

  Absent the backing of the Pentagon and the cooperation of Qatar, there was little that could persuade the White House to go in after Mohammed. It wasn’t a question of desire. It was the purely pragmatic question of what could be done, especially without Qatari support. On the ground in Doha, CIA case officer Melissa Mahle concocted a plan that would make the Washington debate irrelevant. It was motivated by her fear that to involve the Qatari government in any way would result in Mohammed being tipped off. A veteran Middle East hand, she believed that any Qatari involvement would amount to giving Mohammed a free pass out of the country. It was Mohammed’s frequent travel that gave impetus to the idea. The idea was to lure KSM abroad by having a friendly Qatari official whom KSM knew ask him to fly somewhere to do a favor for him. They had a man who was willing to make the request. The plan was for the FBI to put an agent, Pellegrino, on the same flight and arrest Mohammed as soon as the plane landed on foreign soil.5

  With no snatch and grab approved at the deputies’ meeting, the CIA plan was set aside and the administration was left to try persuading the Qataris to hand KSM over to the FBI, exactly what Mahle had warned against in letters and protests to officials in Doha and Washington. The Qatari foreign minister flew to Washington for meetings with FBI director Louis Freeh and others, and he seemed reasonable, even eager to help. But once he returned to Qatar, no action was forthcoming. Freeh sent the foreign minister a letter reminding him of the dangers KSM presented. “A failure to apprehend KSM would allow him and other associates to continue to conduct terrorist operations,” Freeh wrote.6 He mentioned that Mohammed was suspected of terrorist involvement by several countries and that the Qataris themselves agreed. They had reported that KSM was involved in some unspecified plot to construct a bomb. Freeh’s letter seemed to have no effect whatsoever.

  While the diplomats debated with the Qataris on how they could or could not help one another, a rendition aircraft and FBI were moved into nearby Oman. Pellegrino was there, waiting; he was called to Doha to help explain again to the Qataris why the American government wanted Mohammed. The idea was that Pellegrino, the man with the nitty-gritty details on how bad an actor KSM was, would be able to persuade the Qataris to help.

  Pellegrino flew to Doha. He never met a single Qatari official.

  For two weeks, he cooled his heels at the embassy and the local Sheraton while the American ambassador, Patrick Theros, negotiated with the Qataris, at times with a CIA official also in attendance. Pellegrino got so exasperated that one afternoon he called Garcia, even though it was 3:30 a.m. New York time, and said, “Clear your head,” and then asked the assistant U.S. attorney to please impress upon Theros how much the Justice Department wanted Mohammed, and to tell him why a U.S. plane and a team of agents was waiting to go wheels up next door in Oman. Garcia could be a very forceful person, and even half asleep he made his case. Nothing seemed to matter. There was even an attempt by former president George Bush to persuade the Qataris, with whom Bush had had good relations, but there was no progress in the meetings, which went on for days.

  Melissa Mahle would later blame the FBI for the stalemate, saying it never should have risked involving the Qataris. The FBI blamed Theros and the Qataris. It is not difficult to imagine the Qatari government’s reluctance to assist the Americans. Radical Islam as a global force didn’t appear to threaten America. At the time, even bin Laden was mostly regarded as more of a nuisance than a danger. Outside the FBI, there were very few people anywhere in the world who thought Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was a significant player in anything. Pakistani intelligence, for example, did not seem to be concerned about him. The Qataris apparently didn’t care, and seemed to be supportive of KSM’s jihad.

  Then one day Theros came back to the embassy from yet another meeting with the Qataris. Pellegrino had been waiting anxiously for an update. Theros had one: the Qataris, who were supposed to be watching KSM, had “lost” him.

  How, an American official asked, do you lose somebody in Qatar? Theros said that by “lost,” he meant that KSM had slipped out of the country. Pellegrino was less tactful. Looking at the ambassador, he said: “You motherfucker…” Almost as an afterthought, he threw in, “Sir.”

  Theories abounded as to who could have tipped Mohammed, some more plausible than others, but the mystery was never solved. Those involved said they had come within an hour, maybe two, of taking KSM into custody. After he was gone, the Qataris denied the Americans access to his apartment or office. At the White House, an angry Richard Clarke demanded a postmortem from the CIA about how it could have happened, whether intelligence indicating that sympathetic Qatari officials had undermined the U.S. effort and aided his escape with travel documents were true, and where KSM might have gone. “How many flights are there out of Qatar?!” he wanted to know. Clarke said he never got anything from the agency. White, the U.S. attorney, called Freeh and Reno in Washington to say, “Let’s keep this pedal to the metal because we are really concerned about him.” But Doha was the last easy chance to catch KSM. It really would not have been a great deal more complicated than any of a thousand arrests that are made every day around the world. From that point on, Mohammed was aware he was being sought, and behaved like it. But he didn’t curtail his far-flung activities. In fact, having lost his home base in Doha, he might have traveled more. His itinerary—if it’s Tuesday, it must be Brazil—read like some mad tourist jaunt. He juggled identities and appearances to suit his objective of the moment.

  Foley Square, New York City, Summer 1996

  Basit had been indicted for two separate sets of crimes—the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 “Manila Air” plot, which was what prosecutors called the attempt to destroy a dozen airliners. He had different accomplices in each case, so two trials would be needed. Mary Jo White, the U.S. attorney, decided to bring the Manila case to court first, mainly because most of its witnesses were in the Philippines. Given the logistics of getting them to New York, delaying that trial until after the Trade Center trial would only increase the difficulty of persuading the witnesses to testify. Trial preparation had the unavoidable consequence of taking Pellegrino and Besheer away from the hunt for the remaining plot members, including KSM.

  Besheer was given the thankless task of securing and wrangling the witnesses, a logistically demanding endeavor even for a domestic prosecution in the United States. Civic culture in the Philippines is not similar to that in the United States. Going to a courthouse in Manila to testify in a criminal proceeding simply because you’ve been asked to do so would seem an odd choice to many Filipinos. Going to New York to testify because some Americans asked you to would not be a question of choic
e, but perhaps of sanity. Why would you?

  The answer, as it happened, was as varied as the potential witness. Some wanted nothing. Others wanted a plane ticket. Some asked for money, for relocation, for citizenship, a job.

  It became a full-time occupation for Besheer for many months in the run-up to the trial. He had a hard time even locating many of the potential witnesses. He was heavily reliant on the Filipino police and intelligence agencies, both as witnesses and as sources of contacts and introductions. Getting them was never a sure thing.

  Many of the police officers who were potential witnesses worked under General Hermogenes Ebdane of the Philippine National Police. Besheer called and made an appointment to see him. Besheer and Pellegrino arrived at the general’s office as requested at eight o’clock sharp the next morning. The police-office compound also contained housing for officers, many of whom lived on the premises. There were chickens scratching through the dirt outside the building. Besheer and Pellegrino waited in an outer office, drinking the ritual Nescafé instant coffee, which seemed to be the universal drink served to government visitors throughout Southeast Asia. Finally, the door to a back office opened and the general strode through, dressed in a camouflage-pattern wifebeater and boxer shorts. He welcomed the Americans into his office.

  They explained what they needed, and it was as if Ebdane had suddenly realized the importance of the meeting. Please wait a moment, he said. He left the room for a minute or two, leaving the two JTTF reps to stare at an elaborate oil painting of the general sitting at the same desk, in full military regalia. When he returned, he had put on his uniform shirt, full of medals and epaulets. The boxer shorts remained. Besheer and Pellegrino could barely contain themselves, especially when they looked at the portrait on the wall above Ebdane. Besheer kept his gaze directed at the general, Pellegrino at the floor, while Ebdane issued the order agreeing to the request.

  Many of the witnesses had to obtain passports, and there was always the fear that some of them would skip out when they arrived at the Hawaii refueling stop or once they got to New York. Besheer pinned a number on the lapel of each witness, and assigned Bureau officials to keep track of them and make sure they were all accounted for while in transit. He also had officials watch them in New York, and arranged tours and trips to baseball games at Yankee Stadium.

  The prosecution’s case against Basit, Murad, and Khan had some holes in it—not because of the physical evidence, which was voluminous, but mostly due to the way the evidence had been obtained. Exactly when the Filipinos had entered room 603 at the Josefa was unclear. Had the defendants been tortured during interrogation? How capable were the accused of acknowledging their rights when so informed on their rendition flights to the United States? Could they understand English well enough to give informed consent? The language question pertained mainly to Murad and Khan. Basit’s English was excellent—so good, in fact, that the judge, Kevin Duffy, allowed him to represent himself. Basit was a lively figure in the courtroom, often referring to himself as his client or the accused.

  The trial was extraordinary in other ways. Media coverage was extensive. Retaliation for Basit’s arrest had been threatened in both Pakistan and the Philippines, and some of the local authorities who had been helping the Americans were targeted. Police snipers were posted on rooftops around Foley Square in lower Manhattan, where the trial was held.

  For reasons never explained, Basit was charged and prosecuted under his alias, Ramzi Yousef, and even he referred to himself by that name. Duffy sent out five thousand summonses for potential jurors, thinking that press coverage of the bombing had been so extensive that it would be difficult to find jurors not affected by it. The selected jurors were promised anonymity.

  During the trial, Duffy ordered the warden of the jail where Basit was housed to appear in court, where the judge lacerated him for the conditions in his facility. It was also revealed during the trial that Duffy’s life had been threatened by the defendants and that he was under guard twenty-four hours a day, which gave Basit cause to ask for Duffy’s recusal from the case. Duffy did not recuse himself, nor did he suspend proceedings when on July 17, 1996, in the midst of the trial, TWA flight 800, a Boeing 747 en route from JFK to Rome, exploded just off the coast of Long Island.

  One thing not revealed at the trial was a top-secret effort by the FBI to monitor Basit’s jailhouse conversations with an informant, convicted mobster Gregory Scarpa. Basit took a shine to Scarpa, especially to his claim that he could provide him with the ability to make telephone calls from inside the jail. Unbeknownst to Basit, and with Scarpa’s help, the calls were monitored by the FBI. Some of the calls were made to a man Basit referred to as Bojenga, who seemed to be a coconspirator in Basit’s plots. Some authorities believed Bojenga was KSM. In one internal memo that the New York squad sent to FBI headquarters, investigators detailed how Basit told Scarpa of an unidentified person who had provided information on coconspirator Wali Khan, leading to his arrest.7

  “In sum, it appears that there is a threat to or by some unknown subject in or formerly in Qatar, possibly Khalid Shaik Mohammad,” the memo said. “The person to be kidnapped, tortured, and killed is believed by Yousef [Basit] to be an informer. Yousef is passing a ‘coded’ message [to] Bojenga to torture the informer first to find out his ‘recruiters’ and kill them as well….”

  In addition, Yousef suggested that Bojenga attack the U.S. embassy in Qatar, or a less secure embassy elsewhere, as retaliation for participation in the arrest of Wali Khan.

  Through the monitored calls, the FBI also knew Basit was communicating with KSM through their relatives. They also knew Bojenga was involved in more terrorist plotting. The clues that came out of the relationship between Basit and the government informant, and from Basit’s phone calls to the outside, were not pursued aggressively, if at all. Many of the telephone conversations were in Baluch and Urdu and weren’t translated for weeks or months. Pakistan, where many of the calls were directed, wasn’t much help. And the Bureau couldn’t contact officials in Iran, where other calls were made to Basit’s relatives, because the U.S. government had declared it a state sponsor of terrorism.

  During the course of the trial, Basit flirted with court reporters, asking one out to dinner; he told outrageous lies, suggesting, for example, that he wasn’t even in the Philippines when the alleged crime occurred; and kidded back and forth with Pellegrino and Besheer, who were in court every day to back up the prosecution team. Pellegrino and Besheer both also testified, Pellegrino at length. He was prickly on the stand, often giving monosyllabic answers to complicated questions from defense lawyers. Given that Basit was acting as his own attorney, the trial also featured the cross-examination of a law enforcement officer, Pellegrino, by the man he had been chasing for two years, Basit.

  KSM’s name wasn’t mentioned once during the trial—on purpose, because prosecutors believed that if he didn’t know they were looking for him, he might not hide, despite the fact that he was well aware of the effort to catch him in Qatar.

  The three defendants were found guilty on all counts. At the close of the trial, Basit made a remarkable statement:

  You keep talking also about collective punishment and killing innocent people to force governments to change their policies; you call this terrorism when someone would kill innocent people or civilians in order to force the government to change its policies. Well, when you were the first one who invented this terrorism.

  You were the first one who killed innocent people, and you are the first one who introduced this type of terrorism to the history of mankind when you dropped an atomic bomb which killed tens of thousands of women and children in Japan and when you killed over a hundred thousand people, most of them civilians, in Tokyo with fire bombings. You killed them by burning them to death. And you killed civilians in Vietnam with chemicals as with the so-called Orange agent. You killed civilians and innocent people, not soldiers, innocent people every single war you went. You went to wars more t
han any other country in this century, and then you have the nerve to talk about killing innocent people.

  And now you have invented new ways to kill innocent people. You have so-called economic embargo which kills nobody other than children and elderly people, and which other than Iraq you have been placing the economic embargo on Cuba and other countries for over 35 years….

  The Government in its summations and opening statement said that I was a terrorist. Yes, I am a terrorist and I am proud of it. And I support terrorism so long as it was against the United States Government and against Israel, because you are more than terrorists; you are the one who invented terrorism and using it every day. You are butchers, liars, and hypocrites.

  Duffy responded with eloquence:

  Ramzi Yousef, you claim to be an Islamic militant. Of all the persons killed or harmed in some way by the World Trade Center bomb, you cannot name one who was against you or your cause. You did not care, just so long as you left dead bodies and people hurt.

  Ramzi Yousef, you are not fit to uphold Islam. Your God is death. Your God is not Allah…. You weren’t seeking conversions. The only thing you wanted to do was to cause death. Your God is not Allah. You worship death and destruction. What you do, you do not for Allah; you do it only to satisfy your own twisted sense of ego.

  You would have others believe that you are a soldier, but the attacks on civilization for which you stand convicted here were sneak attacks which sought to kill and maim totally innocent people….

  You, [Abdul Basit], came to this country pretending to be an Islamic fundamentalist, but you cared little or nothing for Islam or the faith of the Muslims. Rather, you adored not Allah, but the evil that you yourself have become. And I must say that as an apostle of evil, you have been most effective.

  Duffy sentenced the three men to prison for 240 years each.