Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler

by Robert Gellately

  PEACE FEELERS

  Stalin’s despair in the first weeks was hinted at in several ways, most controversially by his efforts to come to an agreement with Hitler. After the war, there was no admission that such an offer had been contemplated, and to some extent the story is still shrouded in mystery. There is evidence from several sources, however, that on or around the end of July 1941 Stalin and Molotov decided to make an approach to Hitler by way of the Bulgarian ambassador, Ivan Stamenov. Although Bulgaria was a German ally, it had not declared war on the USSR, and in keeping with diplomatic practice, it represented what remained of German interests. Beria delegated Pavel Sudoplatov, a trusted spy, to find out what it would take for Hitler to end the war.2

  According to other testimony, namely of Marshal Kirill S. Moskalenko in July 1957 at secret hearings, Stalin, Molotov, and Beria not only discussed surrendering but agreed “to hand over to Hitler the Soviet Baltic Republics, Moldavia, a large part of the Ukraine and Belorussia. They tried to make contact with Hitler through the Bulgarian ambassador. No Russian Tsar had ever done such a thing. It is interesting that the Bulgarian ambassador was of higher caliber than these leaders and told them that Hitler would never beat the Russians and that Stalin shouldn’t worry about it.”3

  The message delivered by Sudoplatov to Ambassador Stamenov (who happened also to be an agent of the NKVD) was that the Soviet Union might be prepared to accept a peace treaty. It would undoubtedly be like the one at Brest Litovsk in 1918, when Lenin had given away most of European Russia. As he had predicted, the USSR eventually clawed back everything they had been forced to give imperial Germany. The Leninist precedent, always important to Stalin, for concluding even an unfavorable peace had its attractions.4

  After the war and Stalin’s death, when Beria fell out of favor and was put on trial, he was charged with numerous crimes, including trying to make peace with Hitler. Beria said in his defense that he “received from Stalin an order to create through Stamenov conditions that could allow the Soviet government to maneuver and win time for collecting forces.”5The alleged motive seems improbable, as does the aim to impede the German offensive by spreading “disinformation.” Beria’s story sounds more like an attempt to cover up efforts that could be held against him after the fact.

  Stalin’s shattered morale in the early weeks of the war might well have been enough for him to test the waters. When Khrushchev returned from the front at the end of July, he visited Stalin at his underground headquarters in Moscow’s Kirov subway station: “The man sat there devastated and couldn’t say anything, not even any words of encouragement which I needed…. What I saw before me was a leader who was morally crushed. He was sitting on a couch. His face was empty…he was at a complete loss and didn’t know what to do.”6

  Hitler seemed to sense the very moment Stalin wanted to make a deal. He suggested to those at his headquarters at the time that the Communists’ hope for a negotiated surrender was the reason their propaganda had not really attacked him. He thought Stalin—that “devious man from the Caucasus”—was prepared to give up European Russia out of fear that he might lose the entire Soviet Union. Whatever Stalin might have calculated, Hitler thought it would be impossible for the Red Army to carry on the war from the other side of the Urals.7

  Most Soviet leaders said nothing about this business in their memoirs. Zhukov notes only that he was summoned to Moscow on October 7, and because Stalin was recovering from the flu, he was taken to the leader’s home. Zhukov was then sent to the western front and told to pull out all the stops to save Moscow.8

  Later Zhukov told a different story for the edition of his autobiography published after his death.9 There, as in conversation with the historian Viktor Anfilov, Zhukov said he overheard Stalin and Beria when he entered the room: “Ignoring me, or perhaps unaware of my arrival, he was telling Beria to use his agencies to sound out the possibilities for making a separate peace with Germany, given the critical situation. That gives you an idea of just how disoriented our head of state was at the time! Finally he noticed me and, after greeting me, said with irritation that he had no idea what was happening on the Western and Reserve fronts.”10 Beria again tried to use the Bulgarian ambassador, and with no more success. Hitler would hardly have settled for even a very large part of the cake when at that moment he thought he could have it all.

  Stalin almost certainly made other attempts to find peace with Hitler besides those in July and October 1941. Churchill warned FDR in September that the British officials negotiating with the Soviets thought it possible they “might be thinking of separate terms” with Hitler and advised against giving the Communists any assistance. Indeed, there were persistent rumors in Allied circles of similar efforts in November.11

  Nikita Khrushchev heard whispers from Beria and Malenkov that Stalin was hoping for a deal with Hitler, but was unsure of the date. He recalled that it was “probably 1942.” He had a sharp memory, and except for the date his account, including the involvement of the Bulgarians as intermediaries and all the rest, supports the others. He may not have been wrong about the date, and if so, Stalin’s doubts persisted into 1942.

  It was only in 1943, Khrushchev recalled, that Stalin began to show more confidence, and only after the first big victories did he begin to strut about “like a rooster, his chest puffed out and his nose sticking up to the sky.” Before 1943 Stalin “walked around like a wet hen.”12

  FDR AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

  For the Soviets the only glimmer of hope anywhere in the world was with the capitalist United States. The American lend-lease agreement signed with Britain on March 11, 1941, was drawn up to avoid the criticism of isolationists in Congress and in the country generally. It was designed to help Britain but with all possible steps taken to ensure America would not get dragged into the war. Congress insisted the navy not escort goods to Europe lest its ships get in harm’s way. The United States became the “arsenal of democracy,” but it was still far from entering the war. Americans were divided about whether to aid the Soviet Union after it was attacked, because of the long conflict between Soviet Communism and Western-style democracy.

  When Churchill warned in September that Stalin might be leaning toward peace negotiations, his was not the only skeptical voice raised about offering aid. The Chicago Tribune, for example, said it was ridiculous for “sane men” to have the slightest faith in the “supreme monster…Bloody Joe”—that is, Stalin—“who brought on the war by selling out the democracies” and might well “sell them out again and make a deal with Hitler.”13

  Roosevelt had his own qualms and had made no bones earlier in saying the Soviet Union was run “by a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world.” But he was willing to engage with the Soviets to ensure Germany’s defeat and eager to have the United States play a role in that event and thus emerge as a major player in the postwar world. He did not want to pay in American lives, but was willing to spend treasure. His cabinet and chief advisers were not so sure. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall despised the Soviet system and loathed the Soviet ambassador, Constantine Oumansky, of whom Marshall said “that he will take everything we own,” with Stimson adding that the man was “nothing but a crook” and “a slick and clever little beast.”14

  Roosevelt was right to feel the Soviets had to stay in the war. If the unthinkable happened and Hitler and Stalin reached an agreement, as they had in August 1939, the world would have been faced by unpredictable and growing disaster. Hitler aimed at global conquest, and his scientists were working on an atomic bomb, while others developed long-range missile systems. Does anyone doubt he would have used these weapons?

  Here was one of the great turning points in history, easy to overlook when so much else was happening. FDR’s thought was that with the Soviets doing the fighting and the dying, it might be possible to keep the United States out, or to come in at a later date, as happened in the First World War.

&n
bsp; On July 9, 1941, FDR issued instructions that a plan be drawn up covering various contingencies, including American entry into the war. What emerged was the Victory Program, which gave precise details of future strategic goals and how they would be attained. The priority was to defeat Germany, but it acknowledged that the United States could not possibly mobilize, train, and equip the armed forces until July 1, 1943. The Program forecast fielding 215 divisions (or 8.7 million men) at a cost of $150 billion. The assumption was that the Soviet Union would not be in the war at that time.

  FDR preferred to pay for victory in money, not lives, a policy that Stalin fully recognized and resented. But the Soviet ruler needed American aid. Perhaps more important to victory were the resolve and sacrifice of the Soviet peoples who contributed so much. For all that, knowledge that the United States now was backing the USSR was a comforting thought to the embattled men in the Kremlin. By late 1942 the United States had revised plans for the troops it would need: instead of 215 divisions as originally thought in the Victory Program, perhaps 90 would suffice. FDR’s “arsenal of democracy” not only saved American lives but helped the United States, of all the combatants, emerge with a booming economy.

  It was a wise Roosevelt, therefore, who rejected the advice of those around him. The otherwise sagacious Stimson was proven wrong when he said to Marshall that “this Russian munitions business thus far has shown the President at his worst.”15 Time revealed it might have been one of the president’s finest hours, a fact that cannot be underlined enough. Roosevelt had the lend-lease agreement extended to the Soviet Union on October 1, 1941, granting it credits to pay for American goods. Averell Harriman of the United States went with Lord Beaverbrook in late September to negotiate the terms, and found Moscow under siege. At the very least, the agreement was a badly needed morale booster.16

  On October 3, Stalin wrote the president to express his “heartfelt gratitude” for the interest-free loan and promise of essential war materials. He was sure that the deal he had just made with Harriman would be acceptable to FDR. It most certainly was, and aid in the amount of $1 billion was extended to the USSR on November 2 under the lend-lease program. Stalin underlined his determination: “Like you, I am confident of final victory over Hitler for the countries now joining their efforts to accelerate the elimination of bloody Hitlerism, a goal for which the Soviet Union is now making such big and heavy sacrifices.”17

  PANIC IN MOSCOW

  When Moscow was on the verge of being overrun, Stalin recalled Zhukov from Leningrad and sent him to assess the situation to the west. Zhukov concluded that the Germans were moving forward “on all important routes leading to Moscow.” He asked for immediate reserve troops to prevent the worst. Not only Stalin but others concluded that Zhukov had to be put in charge in the hope that he could stop the advance. On October 10 he was appointed commander of the combined western and reserve fronts, but German air raids intensified and warnings sounded almost every night.18

  Zhukov set up a new line of defense that ran southward from Kalinin, to Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk to Kaluga. If we look at that line today, we can see the Wehrmacht was closing in for the kill. Kaluga was captured in the south almost immediately, and the Germans broke into Kalinin in the north, shrinking the line and threatening to go around it. The Red Army was in danger of being encircled yet again, with Moscow less than fifty miles away. Making matters worse, the Germans had complete air supremacy and could operate at will.19

  On October 13, Zhukov issued order No. 0345, which appealed to the Red Army to stand and fight while threatening all “cowards and panic-mongers,” namely those leaving their positions without authorization, with being shot on the spot. In his memoirs Zhukov serenely called these “strict measures to prevent breach of discipline,” and he had used similar methods earlier in Leningrad.20

  Stalin was against any retreats or even tactical withdrawals and wanted battles to continue to the last man. The Germans would be made to pay for every inch, so as one line of defense crumbled, the Soviets threw together another.

  Hitler was adamant that Moscow was not to be taken, but, like Leningrad, surrounded and destroyed from the outside. He wanted to trap thousands of troops, perhaps with their Communist leaders, inside the city and level it.21

  Stalin ordered evacuation of the entire state and Communist Party apparatus on October 12 and 13. Moscow’s armaments industries were disassembled and shipped out. Those that could not be moved were wired with heavy explosives and readied for demolition, as were the bridges in and near Moscow. The major commissariats (such as those of defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs) were sent to Kuibyshev on the Volga—just over a thousand kilometers away—but others went to a dozen different cities, some in Siberia. Scientific and cultural institutions, like Moscow University, the Academy of Sciences, and major theaters (like the Bolshoi Ballet), were also dispatched, making it seem that Stalin thought the city was lost and not likely to be liberated anytime soon. People streamed out any way they could.

  Preparations were drawn up for a line of defense hundreds of miles to the east along the distant Volga River. The official U.S. military history of the war states: “If Stavka contemplated having to defend that line, the future must have appeared dark indeed.” If Germany had ever invaded up to that line, the Soviet Union would have lost 75 percent of its industrial capacity and would have been reduced to a third-rate power.22

  The GKO, which was now in effect the government, as well as Stavka, remained in Moscow for the time being. Should Stalin do so as well and risk being taken hostage? A train was readied and a mansion in Kuibyshev prepared for his arrival.

  The Germans were on the verge of surrounding Moscow and grew so near that the roar of the battle could be heard and wild rumors circulated. An alarming message was published in the press: “During the night of October 14–15 the position on the Western Front became worse. The German-Fascist troops hurled against our troops large quantities of tanks and motorized infantry, and in one sector broke through our defenses.”23

  Panic spread and looting grew on October 16. Stalin must have been shocked to witness what was happening as he drove to the Kremlin early in the morning. The city was under siege, and word was the government was leaving. Some citizens showed their loyalty to Stalin and Communism, but as many and more vented their hatred and resentment. A widely expressed view—impossible to quantify in an exact way—was that many thought they had little to fear, as the Nazis only wanted to eliminate the Communist system and the Jews.

  According to an eyewitness, the scene on one of the roads out of town unfolded like this:

  People here and there stop cars, drag out their occupants, beat them up, and throw things into the street. You hear cries such as “Beat the Jews.” People are starting to remember the insults, the oppression, the injustice, the bureaucratic humiliation by officials, the boasting and smugness of the Party people, the draconian ukases (decrees), the systematic deceit of the masses, the nonsense spread by the newspapers, the sweet talkers…. I never would have believed such a story if I had not seen it myself. We had Jews at school, and I don’t remember any open, clear example of anti-Semitism. There were some quips, not malicious, more jokes than anything, nothing more. That’s why these wild reprisals against the Jews, and not only against them, on October 16, 1941, at the Il’ych Gates shook me up so much.24

  A report by the NKVD gave details of similar outbreaks of anti-Semitic and anti-Communist behavior in Moscow. For example, some workers at a motorcycle factory got drunk and the next day carried out “counterrevolutionary agitation of a pogrom character, calling on the workers to destroy the Jews.” Elsewhere workers milling about in a crowd called on comrades to “beat the Communists and others.” Some people put out white flags. One NKVD report mentioned the panic, hoarding, and belief that the Germans had superior forces and could not be stopped.

  The report continued: “Although patriotic feelings flourished among the majority of the population of the capit
al at the same time many citizens had an openly anti-Soviet attitude… a hatred of Communism, including the families of Communists, and anti-Semitism.” One man remembered his neighbor saying: “Come on, Hitler; come on, pal!”25

  Peasants in the provinces were said to be sanguine about the German advance on Moscow: “What’s it to us? It’ll be bad for the Jews and Communists. There might even be a bit more order.”26 Knowledge of these attitudes was reflected in Soviet propaganda, which shifted away from an emphasis on Communism and the Stalin cult in favor of themes like traditional patriotism and the need to protect kith and kin against the invader.27

  A refugee who ultimately made it out of the Soviet Union had been in Moscow during October 1941 and vividly remembered what happened:

  Such a panic was never seen. Everyone was going in all directions. Nobody was punished for any crime. They broke open store windows in broad daylight. Jewish pogroms started. The arrival of the Germans was expected from hour to hour. German planes were flying overhead from street to street and no one even shot at them; the Germans weren’t afraid but they waved their hats and greeted the public from the planes. They could have taken Moscow easily. There was no one in command of anything. 28

  The broad sentiment at the time was that Moscow was within reach. That opinion was echoed by numerous other witnesses.29 Discontent existed not just in Moscow and Leningrad but in other parts of the country.30

  TRAGEDY OF LENINGRAD

  Hitler’s idea was to destroy Leningrad, and the encirclement was all but complete by September 1941. The siege of three million began, and unrest grew when it looked as though the city was going to fall. Even the NKVD fled, commandeering planes and every means available to make a break. Officers burned their files, Party lists, and documents lest these got into the hands of the Nazis, and they all be executed.