Eleven Days in August

by Matthew Cobb

  In the past few days in various places, and notably in Montrouge, the Huns have shot young Frenchmen. In such cases we must go onto the street in large numbers; everyone should be involved in the action. Everyone – from the whole military committee to the local patriotic militia – needs to join in. Each FTP fighter must be motivated by a sacred hatred of the Hun, the members of the Milice, the assassins of Oradour and of a thousand other towns. We must respond to each blow from the enemy. As in 1941–1942, we will fight terror with terror. Two eyes for an eye . . . It is easy to grab two, three, four or five Huns, take them to the place where they shot our people and then kill them like dogs. Any members of the military committees who do not organise such a response to any assassinations of our people will be considered to be cowards. (Ouzoulias, 1972, pp. 419–420.)

  The three dead men were Marcel Laurent, Robert Degert and Claude Guy. There is a plaque to their memory at 107 rue Maurice Arnoux, Montrouge, at the edge of what is now a sports ground.

  37 Debû-Bridel (1978), pp. 269–71.

  38 Cazaux (1975), p. 65; Denis (1963), p. 214; Ouzoulias (1972), pp. 398–400.

  39 At the CPL meeting of 18 July, the Front National representative stated that 100,000 people were involved (Denis, 1963, p. 214). The main historian of the liberation of Paris, Adrien Dansette, who was generally not sympathetic to communist claims, puts the figure at 100–150,000 (Dansette, 1946, p. 154). These figures are impossible to verify; we can only conclude that there were many demonstrations, each with dozens or hundreds of participants. On the other hand, not everyone saw the demonstrations; Edith Thomas was on the place du Panthéon and was disappointed to find herself alone, apart from three urchins who sold her some tricolour bouquets of wilting flowers (Thomas, 1995, p. 202).

  40 Grunberg (2001), p. 323. This is in fact his entry for 15 July. On 14 July (presumably earlier in the day) he wrote: ‘Once more, a sad 14 July this year. No, we won’t be dancing in the streets of Paris this 14 July.’

  41 At the CPL meeting of 18 July, the President, communist trade unionist André Tollet, reported that ‘in general, the police behaved well’. Denis (1963), p. 214.

  42 Ouzoulias (1972), p. 398; Debû-Bridel (1978), p. 143.

  43 See Kitson (1995).

  44 Ouzoulias (1972), p. 399. The street in the 10th arrondissement where Yves Toudic was killed now bears his name.

  45 The varying figures for the number of arrested railway workers are discussed in Chevandier (2002), p. 208, n. 113. An undated (end-July 1944?) report from the Union des Syndicats ouvriers de la région parisienne gives the figure of seven arrests (Cogniot et al. 1974, p. 73), while a letter from the Laval government to the Germans, written on 13 August 1944, requested the liberation of fifty-two railway workers in the Paris region (Bachelier, 1996, section 7-3-8).

  46 Michel Germa, who was a teenager at the time, recalled: ‘When the Germans opened fire, Michel Dermont threw me to the ground and we escaped by running through the nearby gardens, before eventually finding our comrades at the normal meeting place.’ See www.lalande2.com/articles.php?lng=fr&pg=571#twenty-five [accessed January 2011].

  47 The following material is based on the account of local union and resistance activity written in an undated (end-July 1944?) report from the Union des Syndicats ouvriers de la région parisienne (Cogniot et al., 1974).

  48 Letter from the Laval government to the Germans (13 August 1944) (Bachelier, 1996, section 7-3-8).

  49 Bourget (1984) devotes a whole chapter to the incident and possible explanations (pp. 145–72). He includes a list of the twenty-eight victims, most of them petty criminals, several of whom were still on remand awaiting trial.

  50 Picasso’s amazing wartime production ranged from classic images of Paris, through portraits of his lovers, to the famous Bull’s Head composed of a bicycle saddle and handlebars (Nash, 1998).

  51 Barr (1946), p. 223.

  52 Warlimont (1964), p. 440. In August 1945 Warlimont recalled the events as follows: ‘About 1250, there suddenly occurred a terrific explosion which seemed to cover the whole room in dust, smoke and fire, and throw everything in all directions. When I got up, after a short period of unconscious ness, I saw that Hitler was being led backwards through the door, supported by several attendants. He did not seem to have been seriously hurt.’ ETHINT 5, p. 2.

  53 The plotters were not against the extermination of the Jews, they did not want to change the fascist policies that had governed their country for the last eleven years; they wanted to kill Hitler, they wanted to stop the war in the West and they wanted Germany to join forces with the Allies and turn all its strength against the USSR. As early as May 1944, the conspiracy had outlined these views to the USA, although the Allies played no part in the plot (Hoffmann, 1970, pp. 746–9). The Parisian plotters had also talked to the ALLIANCE British intelligence circuit in the French capital, asking to be put in contact with the Free French (Fourcade, 1973, pp. 326–7).

  54 For a dramatic first-hand account of events in Berlin, see the 15 August 1945 interview with Major-General Otto Remer, who was involved in putting down the putsch. ETHINT 63.

  55 Bargatzky (1969), p. 157. All of the key figures in the German Army command structures in France were directly or indirectly involved: General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, the military commander of occupied France; Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Boineburg, military commander of Paris; and the commander of Army Group B in France, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who was severely wounded on 17 July and played no part in events. On 15 July, Rommel sent Hitler a message that described the situation on the Western Front in the most graphic terms and concluded: ‘The troops are fighting heroically everywhere, but the unequal contest is drawing to an end. I must beg you to draw the conclusions without delay.’ (Speidel, 1971, p. 116.) In the original draft, Rommel spoke of ‘political conclusions’. Rommel never fully recovered from his wounds, and finally committed suicide in October 1944.

  56 Von Boineburg, guided by a recently updated map of the location of SS and SD (Nazi Intelligence Service) forces, ordered raids on the SS and SD headquarters on avenue Foch and on the various SS barracks around Paris. The operation did not begin until later in the evening in order to ensure that as many of the SS troops as possible were back in their barracks. An execution range was prepared at the Ecole Militaire.

  57 Bargatzky (1969), p. 157.

  58 Bood (1974), p. 306.

  59 Bourget (1984), p. 195. Stragglers who were out on the streets or in bars were attracted by alarm sirens and then rounded up. The troops were carted off to prison at Fresnes or at Saint-Denis, while the top brass were locked up in cells in the basement of the Hotel Raphael. Hoffmann (1970), p. 475; Bargatzky (1969), p. 159.

  60 Oberg’s crony, SS Colonel Helmut Knochen, was hauled out of a Parisian nightclub into the warm evening air and the welcoming arms of his comrades-turned-captors (Hoffmann, 1970, p. 475).

  61 Matters were further complicated because von Kluge had just taken on the additional post of Commander of Army Group B after Rommel had been wounded. During his meeting with Hitler when he had been given his new assignment, von Kluge had been convinced by the Nazi leader’s infectious mania that the situation on the Western Front was in fact far better than those on the ground imagined. It took no more than a few hours at the front for von Kluge to accept that Rommel had been right: the Allies would break through in a matter of weeks if not days. This striking proof – if further proof had been needed – of Hitler’s crazed incompetence should have emboldened the man who was in charge of the whole Western Front. Instead it seemed to encourage his indecisiveness.

  62 Hoffmann (1970), pp. 470–8.

  63 Gaertringen (1995); Jacobsen (1969), ‘Synchronoptical Table’ in supplementary pocket. According to Hoffmann (1970), these words were uttered over the telephone by another conspirator, General Ludwig Beck, who was in Berlin (Hoffman, 1970, p. 472). See the photographs of the Army Group B headquarters and of the room where von Kluge, von Stülpn
agel and Hofacker met, in Mühlen and Bauer (1995), opposite p. 81.

  64 Watts (2009), n. 14.

  65 Already the Luftwaffe and the Navy leaders in the French capital were putting pressure on von Boineburg’s men to free their SS comrades. Neither of these men had any substantial troop forces to hand (Bourget, 1984, pp. 187 and 189).

  66 Speidel (1971), p. 122.

  67 Bourget (1984), p. 186. After the war, von Boineburg said bitterly: ‘The failure of the enterprise was due to the indecision of Field Marshal v. Kluge.’ (A-967 pp. 2–3.) It is not clear what von Boineburg thought would have happened had von Kluge been more decisive and had the Paris ‘enterprise’ succeeded.

  68 Bargatzky (1969), p. 159.

  69 After the war, a British major questioned Abetz as to why the Parisian SS did not immediately arrest the conspirators and did not carry out a thorough investigation into the Parisian events. Abetz’s explanation was that the different services in the Parisian garrison had grown used to working together against the unreasonable demands of Berlin (Abetz, 1953, p. 323). For Lieutenant Karl Wand, who was directly involved in arresting the SS and SD (Nazi Intelligence Service) troops, the SS and SD leaders did not wish to attract the attention of the SS Commander in Berlin, Himmler, who would no doubt have wished to know why his crack troops in Paris meekly allowed themselves to be arrested without a fight (Bourget, 1984, p. 193). This was also the view of von Boineburg (Bourget, 1984, p. 201).

  70 Bourget (1984), p. 196.

  71 AN 72AJ/234/IX/22.

  72 That day, Rondenay and de Beaufort had a series of meetings with military leaders. First, Rondenay met with the regional Military Delegate for Paris, Pierre Sonneville (‘Equilateral’), to discuss a hare-brained plan to cut off all supplies of water, electricity and gas to the capital (this was dismissed as threatening the civilian population rather than the Germans) (Sonneville, 1968, pp. 338–9). Then Rondenay had two meetings in the west of Paris. It was between these two rendezvous that the arrests occurred: first Rondenay met his equivalent in the southern zone, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury (‘Polygone’), while the meeting that never happened was to be with Chaban himself (AN 72AJ/237/II/2a/36). Sonneville suggests that Chaban was present when he and Rondenay discussed the crazy sabotage plan. This would raise the question of why Chaban and Rondenay were also to meet later on the same day. It is possible that Sonneville was mistaken and that the discussion with Chaban took place at another time.

  73 Albertelli (2010a) and www.ordredelaliberation.fr/fr_compagnon/855.html [Accessed May 2011]. Rondenay was replaced by Lorrain Cruse.

  74 Felstiner (1987).

  75 Felstiner (1987), p. 35.

  76 These figures are taken from a letter written in July 1944 by Georges Edinger, Président Générale of the UGIF, reproduced in Rajsfus (1996), p. 350. Dreyfus & Gensburger (2003), p. 245, write of 350 children being arrested.

  77 Klarsfeld (1996).

  CHAPTER 2

  1 Bourdan (1945), p. 9.

  2 Massu (1969), p. 125. After the war, Torrès married Jacques Massu of the 2e DB.

  3 Cobb (2009a). The 2e DB was composed of nine regiments split across three tactical groups, each group named after their commanding colonel.

  4 Moore (2011).

  5 For the role of colonial troops in the Free French army see Echenberg (1985) and Scheck (2010).

  6 This was known as le serment de Koufra – ‘the Kufra Oath’.

  7 On 30 December 1943, de Gaulle met with Eisenhower and discussed the future invasion of France and the apparent opposition of the British to the presence of Free French ‘indigenous troops’ in Free French infantry divisions were they to be in Britain prior to the invasion; on the other hand, said de Gaulle, ‘our armoured divisions are made up principally of French elements’ (de Gaulle, 1956, p. 675). Shortly afterwards Bedell Smith wrote a memo marked ‘Confidential’ in which he discussed which Free French division should be involved in the liberation of Paris: ‘It is more desirable that the division mentioned above consist of white personnel. This would indicate the Second Armoured Division, which with only one fourth native personnel, is the only French division operationally available that could be made one hundred per cent white.’ Bedell Smith went on to argue that if it was not possible to use a racially cleansed version of the 2e DB, then it would be necessary to ‘create a force, from scratch, composed of white troops’. Two weeks earlier, Bedell Smith’s predecessor, General Frederick Morgan, had written a note summarising a discussion with Churchill’s Chief of Staff, General Hastings Ismay, showing they were on the same wavelength when it came to deciding which Free French troops should be allowed to liberate Paris: ‘General Ismay and I have emphasised to Colonel de Chevigné [the Free French Chief of Staff] that we would accept only with great reluctance anything but troops from France proper. He quite understood . . . I have told Colonel de Chevigné that his chances of getting what he wants will be vastly improved if he can produce a white infantry division.’ All quotes from Wieviorka (2007), pp. 364–5. The first clear description of a process of racial cleansing in the 2e DB was made during a conference held in February 1994 in Paris. General Jean Compagnon, who had been a member of the Leclerc Division, made what he called an ‘anecdotal clarification’: ‘the British wanted as few “indigenous” troops as possible. I don’t know why – furthermore there were only white soldiers! This was clearly set out in a note dated 28 January 1944, written by General Bedell Smith on Eisenhower’s orders.’ (Levisse-Toussé, 1994a, p. 96.) The first serious examination of the question was carried out by Wieviorka (2007), who unearthed the archival sources quoted here. This discovery was immediately picked up by the Independent (31 January 2007). Over two years later, in 2009, the BBC website announced that: ‘Papers unearthed by the BBC reveal that British and American commanders ensured that the liberation of Paris on 25 August 1944 was seen as a “whites only” victory.’ (news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7984436.stm [accessed July 2012].) These were the same papers that had been published in Wieviorka’s book in French in 2007, and in an English translation in June 2008, and to which General Compagnon had referred in 1994.

  8 Levisse-Touzé (2007); Mesquida (2011).

  9 Free French units participating in the 15 August 1944 landings on the Mediterranean coast included both black and Arab soldiers. Either the question of race was not considered by the Allies, or if it was, it was thought that it was less of an issue in the south.

  10 Beevor (2009), p. 376.

  11 Boegner (1992), p. 276.

  12 Beevor (2009), p. 433.

  13 Lankford (1991), pp. 145–6 and 154. These people were all members of a SUSSEX group (see chapter 3).

  14 Blumenson (2000), p. 11. Oddly enough, in some photographs von Choltitz bears a striking resemblance to the British comic Les Dawson.

  15 NA GRGG 183, pp. 6 and 13.

  16 Neitzel (2007) p. 94. After his capture on 25 August 1944, von Choltitz was held at the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre at Trent Park, north of London (the building is now the site of Middlesex University), together with over sixty German generals and other high-ranking POWs. Unbeknownst to the inmates, a wing of British intelligence, MI19, secretly recorded their discussions. Verbatim transcriptions were made in German, and English summaries, together with translations of some of the conversations (which accounts for their sometimes odd English), were circulated to various British intelligence organisations. These documents are now held at the National Archives in Kew. Translations of some of the German transcripts have been published (Neitzel, 2007); however, many of the documents have hitherto been unexploited, and are reproduced here for the first time.

  17 NA GRGG 183, p. 4.

  18 Hitler said: ‘It is your business to see that all people unfit for combat and all those not prepared to fight are evacuated from the town immediately. That all those who are fit for combat are armed.’ NA GRGG 183, p. 5. Von Choltitz’s appointment was just one example of the bewildering series of changes that th
e German High Command made to its front-line commanders, generally at the instigation of Hitler, who insisted on micro-managing military matters, as a result of both his deluded self-confidence in his strategic and man-management abilities and his increasing paranoia and distrust of the military high-ups, which was not entirely unjustified. As Goering later put it: ‘When serious reverses hit us, the Führer often changed commanders.’ ETHINT 30, p. 6.

  19 Von Choltitz (1969), pp. 206–208.

  20 Neitzel (2007), p. 192. Original emphasis.

  21 Neitzel (2007), pp. 255–8.

  22 NA GRGG 184, p. 6.

  23 NA GRGG 183, p. 2, recorded on 29 August 1944, shortly before von Choltitz’s arrival at the POW camp.

  24 NA GRGG 182, p. 5. This comment was made by General von Broich, who was also responsible for the unflattering schoolboy memories cited above.

  25 NA GRGG 181(C), p. 1.

  26 Mitcham (2007), p. 121.

  27 NA GRGG 180, p. 3.

  28 Warlimont (1964), p. 449.

  29 Kriegel-Valrimont (1964), p. 166. Rol went on to complain that Allied weapons were nonetheless getting through to forces that were backed by Free French intelligence and MI6.

  30 The communications delays meant that it would have been days if not weeks before a call from the Delegation led to containers falling into a field in the Paris region. Earlier that day, Chaban’s deputy, Colonel Ely (‘Algebre’), sent a desperate plea from Paris to General Koenig, complaining that they had received no messages for a week. In fact, things were even worse than Ely thought: the file copy of the message is marked ‘received 16.8.44’ – a week after it was transmitted (AN 72AJ/235/II/245).

  31 Footitt & Simmonds (1988), p. 116. The footnotes for this chapter of Footitt & Simmonds are mixed up; the correct source for this quote is in note 12.

  32 Amazingly, the Civilian Delegation also suffered from Chaban’s stinginess with weapons. At the end of July, Parodi’s second-in-command, Roland Pré, sent a cable to Free French intelligence reminding them that the members of the Civilian Delegation needed weapons to defend themselves: ‘Despite repeated requests, for four months we have found it impossible to obtain a single weapon from the Military Delegate.’ AN 72AJ/235/II/165.