Eleven Days in August

by Matthew Cobb

  86 Berlière & Liaigre (2012), p. 230.

  87 Bourget (1984), p. 443.

  88 All details about Petiot from Césaire (2006) and King (2012). Petiot was eventually flushed out following the publication of an article about the case in a Resistance newspaper, which named him and cast a large number of aspersions on his name (as if being a mass killer was not bad enough). This provoked Petiot to write a letter to the press, inadvertently revealing a series of clues as to his new identity and whereabouts. Long after his death, Petiot was defended in a book by the colourful former SOE agent Ronald Seth (in 1942 Seth was arrested by the Gestapo on a mission to Estonia and subsequently worked for the Germans; after the war he became a sexologist and, under the pseudonym Robert Chartham, founded the magazine Forum – see his obituary in The Times 5 February 1985). Seth accepted Petiot’s claim that he was in fact working for the Resistance, and that he had been threatened by the Communist Party (Seth, 1963).

  89 Bourget (1984), p. 462. British Intelligence officer Malcolm Muggeridge interviewed ‘Laffont’ after he claimed that the French police were compromised and unable to deal with his case fairly. Nearly thirty years afterwards, Lafont still left a striking impression on Muggeridge, whose closing recollections are typically unpleasant: recalling that Lafont was guillotined rather than shot, Muggeridge imagined that ‘neat, sallow head with the blunt Mediterranean back to it, sliced off like a thistle’s’ (Muggeridge, 1973, p. 220). Bonny and Lafont were arrested at the end of August, having been betrayed by one of their colleagues, the shadowy Joseph Joanovici, a millionaire scrap metal merchant who worked for the Germans and also claimed to have links with sections of the Resistance in the Paris police. Joanovici was eventually arrested in 1947 and tried for economic collaboration in 1949; the head of French counter-intelligence, Roget Wybot, claimed that Joanovici had not been arrested previously because he was protected by the Préfecture de Police. Whatever the case, the Prefect of Police, Charles Luizet, was forced to resign because of suspicions about the role of the Préfecture in the Joanovici case (Bernert, 1975). Joanovici’s double-dealing existence is the subject of a recent multi-volume French comic book series, Il Etait Une Fois en France, by Fabien Nury and Sylvain Vallée.

  90 Galtier-Boissiere (1944), p. 294.

  91 Vergez-Chaignon (2010), pp. 202–74.

  92 Berthonnet (2003).

  93 Denis (1963), p. 148.

  94 The first managing director of the régie Renault, as it was known, was Pierre Lefaucheux.

  95 Denis (1963), pp. 147-50; Zvenigorosky (1994).

  96 See Minguet (1997) for the view of a Trotskyist working in one of these factories, Caudron. For an overview of this period, written by a participant, see Craipeau (1978); Craipeau was a leader of the Trotskyists, but stepped down during the insurrection, frustrated because most of his comrades were unable or unwilling to seize the moment. On 17 September, the few hundred Trotskyists in the Parti Communiste Internationaliste (PCI) did their best to talk up the factory occupations, in a leaflet entitled ‘Vivent les Comités d’usines!’, but it contains few concrete examples of factories actually under the control of factory committees (the exceptions were the Caudron and Jumo factories, where Trotskyist militants had some influence) (www.association-radar.org/spip.php?article1023 [accessed July 2012]). Although the PCI’s call for the creation of inter-factory committees and of ‘soviets’ at this stage may have been programmatically pure, the moment that such demands could catch fire in the popular imagination of workers in the Paris region had passed, if it had ever existed. Indeed, according to the Trotskyists themselves, this orientation may have contributed to their isolation. A year later, one of the leaders of the PCI (Marc Spoulber) publicly stated that their group was ‘inexperienced and lacked audacity’, and that by concentrating on the question of factory committees (‘elected by a very small proportion of the working class’) they had been unable to challenge the domination of the Communist Party in the working-class neighbourhoods where the insurrection took place, arms in hand (Marc, 1945, p. 6). Another militant of the time, Claude Bernard (‘Raoul’), had a similar analysis: ‘Our “soviet” orientation led us to counterpose soviets to everything else.’ In Suresnes, when the PCF-led militia decided to take the town hall during the insurrection, recalled Raoul, ‘Instead of going with them, we stayed outside, mocking their democratic legalism. All we had to do was to go inside and sit down. But we deliberately remained apart, bewitched by our perspective of creating “pure” soviets.’ (Broué, 1995, p. 27.)

  97 Marc (1945), p. 6.

  98 Hostache (1958), p. 454.

  99 The ‘Gardes patriotiques’ were initially, and confusingly, known as the ‘Milices patriotiques’. For fairly obvious reasons, the name was soon changed. There was a struggle with the CPL over who would appoint the mayors in the twenty arrondissements of the city. According to the laws adopted by the Provisional Government earlier in the year, the CPL had the right to appoint the arrondissement mayors. On 30 October the government decided that it would appoint the mayors and that the CPL would merely be consulted on various issues, despite opposition from the whole of the CPL, including Léo Hamon. This was effectively the death-knell of the CPL; in July 1945 it organised a rally (‘les États Généraux de la Renaissance Française’) calling for the full application of the CNR programme before transforming itself into a society for commemorating its previous role, in which form it still exists today. Denis (1963), pp. 151–9.

  100 Bourget (1984), p. 421.

  101 Cazaux (1975) pp. 321 and 326. In the second half of November, British intelligence officer Malcolm Muggeridge hung out with one of the last armed groups (he claimed to have met them when Churchill and de Gaulle marched down the Champs-Elysées (Muggeridge, 1973, p. 216); this was on 11 November – Boegner, 1992, p. 319). Muggeridge’s recollections were those of a perfect snob: ‘They were mostly very young, with that curious hunted animal look that street life gives . . . I was never able to decide whether they were just a marauding gang, or whether patriotism and ideological fervour played some part in their activities and antics . . . Considering their youth, they behaved with a horrifying callousness, arrogance and brutality.’ (Muggeridge, 1973, p. 217.)

  102 The Communist Party’s support for the government was assured – at least temporarily – and this was confirmed when exiled PCF leader Maurice Thorez returned from Moscow and, in January 1945, made a barnstorming speech in front of his comrades, in which he pledged the Party’s support for ‘One army, one police, one administration’ (Buton, 1993, p. 195).

  103 Galtier-Boissière (1944), pp. 292–3.

  104 ANACR (n.d.), p. 38.

  105 Courtin (1994), pp. 72 and 75.

  106 Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux wrote down this amazing story – she called it ‘a series of miracles’ – in August 1945. The section dealing with her successful rescue of Pierre can be found in AN 72AJ/67/IV/18, pp. 16–24. In the text, the names of the key protagonists are indicated by initials; there is a key on p. 9. Although there was no question of a bribe, Madame Lefaucheux gave von Else 10,000 marks as they parted; she regretted this when she returned safely to Paris. For Claire Girard, a farm manager who was not a member of any Resistance group but helped downed Allied pilots, see Girard (1954) and Andrieu (1997) (neither make mention of her link with Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux). The small square in front of the boulangerie in Courdimanche is now called place Claire Girard.

  EPILOGUE

  1 Rice (1945), pp. 328 and 332.

  2 Cazaux (1975), pp. 263 and 273.

  3 Tuffrau (2002), p. 129; Matot (2010), p. 261. ‘Decour’ was the Resistance pseudonym of Jacques Decourdemanche. For a short time after the liberation the school was known as Lycée Decourdemanche.

  4 Philippe Castetbon’s immensely moving book Ici Est Tombé consists of interviews he made in the early 2000s with the surviving relatives of the victims, along with some stunning photographs of the interviewees (Castetbon, 2004). Various websites have sought to l
ist these plaques, providing information about the locations and about the people they commemorate – e.g. www.plaques-commemoratives.org [accessed July 2012].

  5 The poster for the exhibition, which took place at the Musée Carnavalet, is reproduced in Darrobers (1989), p. 69. It featured a montage of images, centred on one of Robert Doisneau’s photographs of the barricade on the rue de Huchette, opposite the Préfecture.

  6 ADM 72A, p. 2. The introduction to the brochure was written by Parodi, and is reproduced in Studer (2003).

  7 Merlat (1947).

  8 This bold decision to digitise soon fell victim to a failure to ‘future-proof’: the software that is required to view the images under the best circumstances (Adobe VSG) was discontinued by its maker in 2009 (the most recent versions date to 2005 or even 2001, depending on your operating system, so may no longer work). The images can be viewed, but with difficulty. Good luck. www.archivesdefrance.culture.gouv.fr [accessed July 2012].

  9 Among the recently emerged material is some film of the 11th arrondissement, taken in August: www.dailymotion.com/video/x8867e_paris-xie-aout-1944_webcam [accessed July 2012].

  10 Debono (2004).

  11 There are several accounts of this process. Langlois (1998) is particularly detailed, contrasting the various versions of the film, and the difference between French, US and Soviet newsreel accounts of the liberation of Paris.

  12 See chapter 16; Albert Mahuzier, who was not one of the core team of the Comité de Libération du Cinéma Français, recalled that he filmed a member of the Garde républicaine sounding ‘Ceasefire’ on his trumpet, but that ‘this scene, no doubt compromising for some, did not appear in the official film of the Liberation’ (Mahuzier, 1961, p. 224).

  13 Lindeperg (1993); Debono (2004); Langlois (1997 and 1998).

  14 This explains why it has been called a ‘Gaullist’ film, despite the relative downplaying of the role of the Free French – Debono (2004).

  15 See the excellent analysis in Tombs (1995). For a survey of Parisian insurrections, including 1944, see Burton (2001).

  16 See Eric Hazan’s exploration of the city and its meaning (Hazan, 2010).

  17 In a discussion with Marc Boegner, de Gaulle claimed that the communists hoped to seize power after 24 August, but they were hampered by the fact that the masses did not follow them; by mid-September de Gaulle considered that the communists were not a ‘present danger’ (Boegner, 1992, p. 309). For an overview of the position of the Communist Party in this period, see Buton (1993); for the classic anti-communist view, see Aron (1959). For an account of the overall context in Europe, see Lowe (2012).

  18 Cazaux (1975), pp. 227–8.

  19 Bourget (1984), p. 477.

  20 Bourget (1984), pp. 476–9. See for example the discussions with the participants in Breton (1964) or Crémieux (1971), or the polemical broadside by Rajsfus (2004).

  21 NA GRGG 181(C), p. 4.

  22 Studer (2003).

  23 AN 72AJ/62/VII/3.

  24 von Choltitz (1949).

  25 Is Paris Burning? is based on hundreds of interviews with participants, but it is impossible to verify or cross-reference them, rendering it hard to use as a historical source. In reviews published at the time, British and US historians appear to have taken Collins & Lapierre’s statements about the threat to Paris at face value. M. R. D. Foot concluded: ‘The General was faced, in the end, with the choice of obeying orders or saving Paris; he saved Paris, and earned his niche in history’ (Foot, 1965), while William Chamberlin stated that ‘what impelled von Choltitz to act as he did remains something of a mystery’ because the Germans had ‘mines and explosives set for massive destruction’ (Chamberlin, 1965). There was no mystery, because there were no mines and explosives, and he did not ‘save’ the city (see chapter 16 and below). The film was directed by René Clément and starred a host of major French and US actors in a style that mixed location reconstructions with documentary footage of the actual events. The actors included Jean-Paul Belmondo, Yves Montand, Alain Delon, Leslie Caron, Orson Welles, Anthony Perkins, Kirk Douglas and Robert Stack, while the screenplay was by Gore Vidal and Francis Ford Coppola. According to Langlois (1998), German viewers were shocked by the presentation of von Choltitz, because it was not favourable enough. The film was nominated for two Academy Awards (Best Art Direction and Best Cinematography), but did not receive an overwhelmingly positive critical reception (one reviewer complained of ‘such a mishmash of melodrama and such a dumbfounding lack of suspense’ – New York Times 11 November 1966). It was also accorded a major accolade – a spoof in Mad magazine, under the title ‘Is Paris Boring?’ (Silverstone & Drucker, 1967). The two-page feature includes the usual Mad jokes (e.g. von Choltitz says, ‘I luf Paris in ze Springtime! Und I luf Paris in ze Fall! Und I luf Paris in ze Summer . . . But mein Fuehrer only lufs Paris ven it sizzles!’) The spoof also contains a sharp piece of satire, when Nordling asks von Choltitz: ‘You blasted Rotterdam off the face of the Earth without a second thought. Why this sudden change of heart with Paris?’ to which von Choltitz replies: ‘First, ve vere not at var vit ze Dutch! Ve only did it for kicks! Und second, ve vere vinning ze var zen! Hitler was a genius! Now zat ve are losing, Hitler is mad, und ve gotta save our necks!’

  26 von Choltitz (1949); Le Figaro 12 October 1949. In his final memoir, published in 1951, von Choltitz merely says that he learnt of the telegram ‘by accident’ from ‘better informed superior officers’ (von Choltitz, 1969, pp. 241–2); he does not say when this supposed message was received.

  27 Collins & Lapierre state that General Warlimont heard Jodl’s aide uttering this phrase on the telephone to Model’s headquarters at Margival on 25 August (Collins & Lapierre, 1965, p. 284). Warlimont makes no reference to this in his memoirs written at the same time as Collins & Lapierre’s blockbuster, or in interviews he gave closer to the event (ETHINT 1; ETHINT 5; Warlimont, 1964; Crémieux, 1971, pp. 181–4). Because there is no evidence that Hitler ever sent such a message, I have not referred to it here. For an excellent summary of this question, see Dansette (1966). For Hitler’s message of 23 August, which did order that if Paris was to fall to the enemy, it should be as ‘a heap of rubble’, see chapter 12.

  28 Alexandre Parodi particularly objected to this interpretation. On 12 August 1965 he wrote to the authors of the film, outlining a series of corrections and criticisms, but beginning with a critique of the book: ‘The book is highly contestable in terms of its political interpretation of the major decisions we took: it presents the insurrection as essentially a communist attempt to seize power, or at least to get close to it, while the cease-fire was a manoeuvre of the “Gaullists”.’ (Studer, 2003, pp. 733–4). Colonel Jay had little time for Collins & Lapierre: ‘The descriptions in this book are for the most part superficial and false. It is a bestseller for the masses, written by two sensationalist journalists with all the imagination and guile that such gentlemen normally possess.’ (Jay, n.d., p. 75.)

  29 For a pithy summary of von Choltitz’s motivations during and after the war, see Dansette (1966). All this had been clearly set out in Le Franc Tireur 24 October 1949, under the headline ‘Von Choltitz did not have the means to defend or to destroy Paris’ (AN 72AJ/62/VII/3, p. 18). In 1954, von Choltitz appears to have admitted as much in the pages of the East Berlin daily Täglische Rundschau; under pressure from critics within the army, he stated he had not destroyed Paris solely because he did not have the necessary means (Adler-Bresse, 1955). Alexandre Parodi, writing in Le Figaro in 1966, concluded with this explanation of the German commander’s behaviour: ‘Paris was saved because of von Choltitz’s feelings of doubt mixed with fear’ (Studer, 2003, p. 738). The apparent enigma of von Choltitz continues to intrigue; at the beginning of 2011 a play called Diplomatie was put on in Paris at the Madeline theatre, portraying an imaginary night-time meeting between Nordling and von Choltitz in which the pair discuss whether von Choltitz will destroy Paris. However, the true enigma is that there is still an enigma.

>   30 Figures given by historians vary substantially, and can rarely be traced back to any original source. Dansette (1946), p. 434 states that 2000 Parisians were killed, alongside 800 résistants and over 100 soldiers (2e DB and US). According to de Boissieu (1981), p. 261, 1400 Resistance fighters were killed, and over 2000 wounded, while German casualties were 2,700 dead and nearly 5,000 wounded. Jackson (2001) suggests nearly 1500 FFI and Parisians were killed. Wieviorka (1994) states that there were 1000 FFI fighters killed, 600 civilians and 71 men from 2e DB. According to Burton (2001) p. 243, there were 2887 Germans killed and 1482 Frenchmen (482 were civilians). Burton’s figures are taken from Michel (1980), p. 99 who in turn cites the newspaper La Voix de Paris (19–20 August 1945). However, there no sources for the figures given in La Voix de Paris (AN 72AJ/61/I/22); the numbers do not even add up, and the newspaper also claims that a total of ninety-two German tanks were captured or destroyed, which is a gross overestimate. These figures would appear to be at the origin of the numbers of dead given in Le Figaro 25 August 2004) on the sixtieth anniversary: 1483 Parisians, 130 2e DB and 2788 Germans. A contemporary figure was 989 killed and 3859 wounded (AN 72AJ/61/I/14, p. 9).

  31 Campaux (1945), p. 229. For the history of Cadran see Holman (2005).

  List of Illustrations

  1. Marshal Pétain addresses the crowd at the Hôtel de Ville, April 1944.

  2. The Champs-Elysées, June 1944.

  3. Micheline Bood, 1944.

  4. Odette Lainville.

  5. Private Walter Dreizner, 1944.

  6. Jean-Claude Touche, 1944.

  7. ‘Chaban’ – General Jacques Delmas, 1945.

  8. Colonel ‘Rol’, 1944.

  9. Raoul Nordling, consul of Sweden, 1944.