Impossible Victories

by Bryan Perrett

  The Americans had carried out these manoeuvres as neatly and as calmly as if they had been on the parade ground instead of under fire on a battlefield. Riall, having been forced to change his earlier opinion, is said to have remarked in some surprise, ‘Why, these are regulars!’4 In his view, however, it mattered very little, since experience had taught him that American regulars would stand only a little longer than American militia. He had every confidence that his own infantry would follow its normal practice of closing to within short range of the enemy, firing one or two sharp volleys and then driving them off the field with a bayonet charge before they could recover.

  He therefore had no hesitation in ordering the Royal Scots and the 100th to advance, forgetting that in so doing they would soon reach a point at which they would mask the supporting fire of their own guns. Scott made no such mistake. Seeing the long scarlet line bearing slowly down in disciplined silence on his brigade, he galloped over to Towson, ordering him to abandon the artillery duel and concentrate his fire on the British infantry. He then rode along the front of the brigade, reminding them that they had just celebrated the national holiday and should now give their fellow Americans another date to remember.

  When the range had closed to within 100 yards Scott gave the order to fire. The two British regiments seemed to stagger as their first casualties went down but closed up and continued their advance until they were within 50 yards before returning fire. Both sides now became involved in a murderous firefight at suicidal range, absorbing heavy casualties. In addition, the British suffered severely at the hands of Towson’s gunners, who were firing canister obliquely into their ranks. In vain did Gordon and Tweeddale, before they were themselves hit, urge their men to close with the bayonet and finish the matter; losses were mounting, especially among the officers, and there was something about the steady manner in which the Americans continued to load and fire while their own casualties were pulled out of the line that told those in the ranks that these men would not break when attacked with cold steel.

  On the western flank of the battle Jesup had used his initiative, as Scott intended. Within the space of ten minutes he lost some 40 men from the fire of Sheppard’s 6-pounders and the British light companies; then, deciding that he was doing no good where he was, he charged the latter, driving them deep into the trees. Detaching one company to pursue them, he began moving north with the rest of the regiment until he was level with the Kingsmen, forcing them to change front to meet the threat.

  Simultaneously, Brown was urging Ripley’s brigade into action. Major Joseph Grafton’s 21st Infantry was ordered to make a wide flank march through the forest towards the British rear, but found the going more difficult than expected and in due course emerged from the trees too late to be of use. Likewise, Major Daniel McFarland’s 23rd Infantry was slow moving off and only reached the Plain after the serious fighting was over.

  The issue was decided by Major Jacob Hindman, Brown’s divisional artillery commander, who sent forward Captain John Ritchie’s company with two 6-pounder guns and one 5½-inch howitzer, and one 12-pounder gun under Lieutenant James Hall. The new arrivals slotted neatly into the gap between the 9th/22nd and the 11th, and quickly began lacing the ranks of the Royal Scots with canister. Scott was convinced that ‘the enemy could not long withstand this accumulation of fire/ and he was right. Slowly, and without breaking ranks, the Royal Scots and the 100th began to give ground by stages and Riall, recognising that the action was lost, ordered a withdrawal across the Chippewa. This was covered by the Kingsmen, Pearson’s light infantry, and the light dragoons, who saw the artillery safely off the field. The Americans followed up but were halted by heavy artillery fire from across the river and at length withdrew to their camp.

  From start to finish, the battle had lasted about an hour and a half, but its most intense phase, the firefight between the two British battalions and Scott’s brigade, probably lasted no longer than 20 to 30 minutes. Riall’s casualty return, excluding Indians, recorded 148 killed, 321 wounded and 46 missing; Brown reported 41 killed, 219 wounded and 50 missing. Donald Graves’ meticulous research into all aspects of the battle, however, indicates that many of those reported killed, especially among the British, were in fact prisoners and that the total number killed on both sides, including Indians, was in the region of 200. The Battle of Chippewa had been fought between equal numbers of regular troops with neither side possessing a terrain advantage and the outcome had proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the United States’ Army had become a force to be reckoned with. Riall’s defeat stemmed from his own understandable underestimation of his enemy and, given that the musketry of both sides was equally efficient, from the close-quarter intervention of the American artillery in the infantry battle, resulting in far higher British casualties. If those British officers now captive in the American camp were chagrined by their defeat, they at least had the cold comfort of knowing that it had been inflicted by troops who maintained professional standards similar to their own, and they were honest enough to say so.

  A period of three weeks’ indecisive manoeuvring following the battle. Riall, his confidence shaken, abandoned the Chippewa line and, having left a strong garrison in Fort George, withdrew to Twenty Mile Creek on the road to Burlington Bay, where he received the first reinforcements sent forward by Drummond. Brown followed up with the Left Division, halting at Queenston Heights. There, day by day, he waited in vain for the sight of Chauncey’s sails on the lake to the north. During this period Porter’s militiamen, guided by Willcocks’ renegades, carried out a series of patrols that, contrary to Brown’s repeated orders on the subject, degenerated into looting and burning expeditions. The Americans’ every move was reported by the angry population with the result that they were regularly ambushed by the 1st and 2nd Lincoln and 2nd York Militia, which Riall had sent to screen their camp. At length, tired of waiting for Chauncey, Brown moved forward to Fort George on 22 July. After two days spent exchanging gunfire with the garrison he reached the conclusion that he was wasting his time and withdrew first to Queenston and then to Chippewa, where his troops could be more easily supplied.

  Meanwhile, Drummond had decided to assume operational command himself and, as well as following up Brown’s withdrawal, he despatched a force to scour the American side of the Niagara. Simultaneously, his advance guard, commanded by Pearson and consisting of the 2nd or Light Brigade (the light dragoons, the Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles, a composite militia battalion, two 6-pounder guns and one 5½-inch howitzer) and the weak 1st Militia Brigade (detachments from the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Lincolns and 2nd York, plus an estimated 50 Mohawk warriors), a total of between 1,100 and 1,200 men, pushed rapidly southwards and by 09:00 on 25 July were in contact with the American outposts. Sending back word to Riall and Drummond, Pearson took up position along Lundy’s Lane, a country road running from west to east to meet the river road and continue on to the Niagara. To the west of the crossroads Lundy’s Lane crossed a small hill on the summit of which was a church and graveyard. This feature dominated the wide expanse of open farmland to the south and on it he placed his guns. Most of the area has now been covered by the city of Niagara, the Falls themselves being located about a mile to the south-east of what became the battlefield.

  Having visited the position, Riall rode back to Queenston to confer with Drummond and the two decided to concentrate their strength along the line of Lundy’s Lane. The troops with Drummond, the 89th Regiment (later the 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers), three companies of Royal Scots, the light companies of the King’s and the 41st (later The Welch) Regiment, two 24-pounder guns, a Royal Marine detachment with Congreve rockets, and some 400 Indians, a total of approximately 1,100 men under the overall command of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Morrison of the 89th) were ordered forward during the afternoon. A messenger had already been despatched to Colonel Hercules Scott, encamped near Ten Mile Creek, with instructions for him to hurry forward with all the troops at his disposal. These started
at about the same time and included five companies of the King’s, seven companies of the 103rd, two of the 104th,5 and three 6-pounder guns with, in reserve, seven companies of Royal Scots and the 2nd Militia Brigade, consisting of detachments from five militia units, giving a total of 1,720 men.

  The Americans, encamped on both sides of the Chippewa, had been aware of the British presence to the north throughout the day. Brown, however, was more concerned by reports from one of his own militia officers regarding the British activity on the American side of the Niagara and he was convinced that Drummond’s objective was the Left Division’s major supply base at Schlosser. Lacking the means to cross the river in strength, he decided to divert British attention with a renewed thrust at Fort George. At about 15:00 he sent for Scott and told him to take his brigade, Harris’s dragoons and Towson’s guns north to Queenston. As Brown’s instructions seemed lacking in urgency, Scott took his time so that it was not until over two hours later that his regiments began tramping over Chippewa bridge. A mile and a half beyond some British light dragoons were spotted at a roadside inn known as Willson’s Tavern, but after observing the Americans for a moment or two they rode off. Having reached the tavern and obtained accurate information regarding Pearson’s strength and position from Mrs Willson, an American by birth, Scott sent back a courier to inform Brown that he was in contact with a strong detachment of the enemy which he intended engaging. He then resumed his advance towards some chestnut woods a mile to the north of the tavern. The Americans’ approach was greeted by war whoops and shots, but evidently the Indians withdrew almost immediately, for Harris’s dragoons, having incurred the loss of a man wounded, were able to gallop up the road and into the area of open farmland, beyond which they could see the British line drawn up some 750 yards distant. It was, in Harris’s view, a great deal longer than that which had been encountered at Chippewa, and he sent back a man to inform Scott accordingly.

  The irony was that if he had arrived just a few minutes earlier he would have found the entire position deserted. When the light dragoon vedette had galloped in from Willson’s Tavern its commander had informed Riall that Brown’s entire division was advancing. Riall, still nervous after his rebuff at Chippewa, estimated Brown’s strength to be in the region of 5,000 men (it was actually closer to 3,000) and, doubting the ability of Pearson’s small command to withstand an assault in such force, he gave orders for a withdrawal to Queenston. Hardly had the position been vacated than the retreating troops encountered Morrison’s column, with which Drummond had been riding. Drummond, less than pleased, countermanded the order. After some frank speaking with Riall, he gave instructions for the combined force to reoccupy the position and sent back a galloper with instructions for Colonel Hercules Scott’s column to hurry forward. As now formed, the British line followed Lundy’s Lane with the weak 1st Militia Brigade on the extreme right, followed in succession by the Glengarry Light Infantry, wearing a green uniform similar to that of British rifle regiments, the Royal Scots, the 89th, the light company of the 41st and the light company of the King’s holding the crossroads with the composite militia battalion on their left and the light dragoons to their rear. As before, the artillery, now consisting of two 24-pounder guns, two 6-pounder guns, one 5½-inch howitzer and the rocket detachment, under the overall command of Captain James Maclachlane RA, was positioned on the low hill beside the church. The time was now approximately 19:00.

  If Brigadier-General Winfield Scott’s handling of his brigade at Chippewa had been a model of sound tactical judgement, the reverse was true at Lundy’s Lane. Thanks to his unsparing efforts he had undoubtedly made it the finest formation in the US Army; now, thanks to a series of mistaken decisions, it was to be uselessly squandered.6 Despite the ominous implications inherent in Harris’s contact report, Scott persisted in his intention of giving battle when prudence suggested awaiting the arrival of Brown with the rest of the Left Division. After Jesup’s 25th Infantry had been ordered to cover the right flank by advancing north between the river road and the Niagara itself, he deployed the rest of the brigade on the left of the road with the 9th Infantry on the right, the 22nd Infantry in the centre and the 11th Infantry on the left, Towson’s guns coming up to conform on the right of the 9th while Harris moved his dragoons into position just behind them.

  The Americans had emerged from the chestnut woods at about 19:15. Maclachlane’s guns and the rocket detachment opened fire from the hill immediately. The gunfire was accurate and effective, blowing gaps in the ranks of the halted regiments. The 12-pounder Congreve rockets, fitted with solid ball, shell or airburst shrapnel warheads, were less so since they were unstable in flight and rarely hit the target they were intended for. A large proportion simply climbed skywards, but those that managed to maintain level flight had a very damaging effect on the recipients’ morale. Unlike cannon shot or howitzer shells, the course of which could to some extent be predicted, the rockets changed direction frequently and without warning; furthermore, their noise, fiery tails and the thunderclap detonations of explosive warheads at head height was extremely alarming.

  This was the moment when Scott, realising that he was outnumbered and outgunned, could have withdrawn. He subsequently gave two reasons for not doing so: firstly, he hoped that by standing fast he would overawe his opponents; and secondly, so highly did the rest of the Left Division think of his brigade, its morale could be fatally damaged if it was seen to be withdrawing. Neither reason bears close examination. The truth was that at Lundy’s Lane Scott was as over-confident as Riall had been at Chippewa; and, pig-headed as he was, he was determined to repeat his success as soon as Brown appeared with the rest of the division. That, unfortunately for his men, would take far longer than he anticipated.

  In the meantime, the 9th, 11th and 22nd were being systematically blown apart. Scott ordered them to open fire, but as this was delivered at extreme range little damage was done and the principal result was to empty the men’s cartridge boxes. Towson had tried in vain to respond with counter-battery fire but his guns, being on the flat, lacked the necessary elevation to reach those on the hill and at length fell silent. Harris’s dragoons, having lost several men and horses to no purpose, withdrew behind the chestnut wood.

  At about 20:00 Scott ordered the three regiments to advance in order to shorten the range, then changed his mind and halted them after they had covered 100 yards. This actually worsened the brigade’s situation, for the Glengarry Light Infantry, moving out of the British line in skirmish order, began to engage its left. Drummond, noting the move with approval, despatched the three companies of Royal Scots to support them. Scott could only respond by instructing the 11th to refuse its own left and offer a front. Shortly after this the Americans ran out of ammunition.

  It was this and the concurrent transition from fading light to total darkness that saved Scott’s brigade from destruction, for the British gunners, deprived of the line of muzzle flashes at which to aim, could only fire at random and by 20:45 their guns had fallen silent save for the occasional shot. The three American regiments had incurred casualties amounting to 60 per cent of their strength and the fact that they were still standing was a tribute to the excellence of their discipline. Even so, Major Henry Leavenworth, commanding the 9th, told Scott that the moment had come to withdraw. Scott had just replied to the effect that they must hang on until Brown arrived when his horse was killed under him. If, at that moment, Drummond had ordered a general advance with the bayonet there is no doubt that Scott’s remnants would have been swept off the field. Nevertheless, there were excellent reasons why he did not do so. Because of the darkness, he was unaware of the whereabouts or intentions of the rest of the Left Division, which he still believed outnumbered his own force, and in these circumstances he was understandably reluctant to move out of a good defensive position – especially as a sudden and quite unexpected crisis had developed on his own left flank.

  Those responsible for this were Jesup’s 25th Infantry who, it
will be recalled, had been ordered to cover the right of Scott’s brigade by advancing north between the river road and the river itself. No opposition had been encountered and as the light faded Jesup came across an unguarded track which he believed would emerge close to the British left wing. Deploying one of his companies in skirmish order to cover his own left, he led the regiment along the track and found this to be the case. While the attention of the Canadian militia holding the British flank was distracted by his skirmishers, with whom they were exchanging shots, Jesup formed the 25th in line unnoticed, fired a volley and charged home with the bayonet. The two nearest Canadian companies were quickly overrun, the survivors surrendering or scattering into the darkness while the rest of their regiment fell back in some disorder west of the river road, while the light companies of King’s and the 41st, together with the left wing of the 89th, conformed to the movement in order to offer a refused flank. Jesup promptly pushed forward a company under Captain Daniel Ketchum to take possession of the now-abandoned Lundy’s Lane/river road crossroads. Here it reaped a rich harvest in prisoners as British officers and men, unaware of the American presence in the darkness, simply walked into the trap. Among them was Major-General Phineas Riall who, hit in the arm by a stray round, was looking for a surgeon to dress his wound. Riall is said to have asked Ketchum his name and when told responded with wry humour, ‘Well, you’ve certainly caught us!’ At length, having collected more prisoners than he could safely handle, Ketchum fell back on the main body of his regiment where Jesup told him told him to escort the captives to the rear. Shortly after, the party was fired on, almost certainly by a party of rallied Canadian militiamen, and in the ensuing confusion most of the prisoners, save Riall and the officers, who were closely guarded, managed to escape back to their own lines. Soon after this incident Jesup was told what had happened to the rest of Scott’s brigade and that no reinforcements had arrived. Believing that the battle was now irretrievably lost, he therefore began marching his regiment to the rear but had only covered a few hundred yards when he encountered Brown, bringing up the rest of the Left Division, led by Ripley’s brigade. He therefore halted and awaited further orders.