A Naval History of World War I

by Paul G. Halpern

  Things became worse in November. Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee’s German Asiatic Squadron defeated a British force off the Chilean coast on 1 November, and Fisher quickly dispatched the battle cruisers Inflexible and Invincible to the South Atlantic and the Princess Royal to the West Indies. Turkey entered the war on the side of Germany, and the battle cruisers Indefatigable and Indomitable remained off the Dardanelles. Beatty had only four battle cruisers (the Lion, Queen Mary, New Zealand, and Tiger) to meet Hipper’s four German battle cruisers plus the hybrid Blücher. Moreover, the Tiger had only just joined and was not fully efficient, and the dreadnought King George V, just back from refitting, was disabled by condenser defects.

  December brought no real relief. The new dreadnoughts Benbow and Emperor of India joined the fleet in December, but it took time for them to work up to real efficiency. The annihilation of Spee’s squadron at the Falkland Islands on 8 December meant that the battle cruiser shortage was soon to be alleviated, and the two battle cruisers were ordered back from the Mediterranean (but needed refits). On the other hand, the Conqueror and Monarch collided entering Scapa Flow in bad weather on the 26th, and the Conqueror in particular was badly damaged. The problem with destroyers had not improved either. On 4 December Jellicoe wrote the Admiralty that his present weakness in destroyers would handicap him in obtaining the crushing victory over the High Sea Fleet that was expected of him. I have related these incidents to show how the apparent British superiority could be dissipated. Jellicoe’s correspondence for the period is full of very real concern. It was only after February 1915 that the ratio of strength slowly but steadily improved for the British as the superdreadnoughts (armed with 15-inch guns) of the Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign classes began to enter service.38

  As a result of these circumstances the High Sea Fleet probably had at this time the best chance of victory in a major naval encounter that it would ever have. The Germans soon learned of the loss of the Audacious, but they probably did not know of the other British problems. The Germans also added new ships. By the end of January 1915, they had completed the dreadnoughts Grosser Kurfürst, König, and Markgraf, as well as the battle cruiser Derfflinger, but the latter three had been only recently commissioned and were still working up to full efficiency.

  Tirpitz remained a persistent voice for offensive use of the German fleet. He wrote the chief of the Admiralstab on 16 September that they could not achieve an equalization of forces by guerrilla war, that the aim of all their work for more than twenty years had been battle, but that given their numerical inferiority they must strive to give battle not more than 100 nautical miles from Helgoland. Their best chance for victory had been in the first two or three weeks of the war, for the British became stronger through new building while the spirit of the German crews declined. Moreover, Tirpitz declared, there were domestic political considerations: “If we come to the end of a war so terrible as that of 1914, without the fleet having bled and worked, we shall get nothing more for the fleet, and all the scanty money that there may be will be spent on the army.”39

  Despite Tirpitz’s arguments, a meeting aboard the commander in chief’s flagship on 3 October between Ingenohl, von Pohl, and the three commanders of the battle squadrons reaffirmed the decision to continue the defensive Kleinkrieg strategy and to avoid an offensive with the fleet. This strategy did not, however, preclude offensive minelaying off the British coast or the bombardment of coastal towns by battle cruisers. Ingenohl was anxious for such an operation for reasons of morale and, consequently, Hipper’s battle cruisers bombarded Yarmouth on 3 November, while a cruiser slipped close inshore to lay mines. Two of the German battle squadrons came out to the edge of the Bight but did not enter the North Sea. Although British forces in the Yarmouth area were weak—an ancient minesweeper and some old destroyers—they were not sunk, and the bombardment did little damage. A British submarine, D.5, was sunk coming out of Yarmouth by a floating mine, but the Germans suffered a much severer loss when the armored cruiser Yorck blundered into a German minefield returning to port and was sunk.40 The raid did result in the transfer of the Third Battle Squadron—the latest predreadnoughts of the King Edward VII class—from Scapa Flow to Rosyth, where it would be better placed to counter raids or a possible invasion. The War Office in November was apprehensive about a German invasion, although there was little basis in reality for these fears. Unfortunately for Jellicoe, the detachment of the Third Battle Squadron and the cruisers and destroyers necessary to support it came at time when, as we have seen, the British margin of superiority was dangerously low.41

  Hipper believed he had a better use for battle cruisers than raiding coastal towns or vainly trying to entice the British fleet into a trap. In November he developed a plan, originally submitted by one of his captains, that would have sent the four newest battle cruisers to the West Indies or South Atlantic to conduct commerce warfare and over whelm any enemy cruisers assigned to protect trade. Hipper maintained this was the one way the big German ships could damage the enemy and thereby justify their existence. His plan was vague on the inevitable question of coaling. The battle cruisers would be blistered to increase their bunkerage, and it was believed that “it would not be difficult to surprise them and coal by force of arms in English bases at least once.” Hipper’s plan was not approved. Ingenohl preferred giving U-boat warfare a chance to succeed before detaching surface forces for commerce war and depriving the High Sea Fleet of its battle cruisers. He did see the advantages of isolating Great Britain and even considered the possibility of the battle cruisers linking up with Spee’s newly victorious squadron. Von Pohl, however, preferred the U-boat strategy and maintaining the fleet intact, whereas Tirpitz still favored a fleet action, but not cruiser warfare.42

  Ingenohl was anxious to make another raid on the east coast of England, this time choosing Scarborough and Hartlepool. The raid once again included both bombardments and minelaying. The strategic purpose was to lure the Grand Fleet or a portion of it over a freshly laid minefield or within range of U-boats. The kaiser, encouraged by the news of Spee’s victory at Coronel, gave his consent, but the necessity of using every available battle cruiser delayed the operation until December because of problems with the Von der Tann’s machinery. The British, it seems, were not the only ones with technical problems. Then came news of the destruction of Spee’s squadron at the Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December. For psychological reasons Ingenohl was anxious for a quick success to counteract the morale effects of the British victory, and he now knew with certainty that at least two British battle cruisers were away in the South Atlantic. He would therefore strike before they could return. The High Sea Fleet came out in support as far as the Dogger Bank—the sand banks approximately halfway across the North Sea. Ingenohl did not inform the kaiser of this deployment because it would have risked a major fleet action.

  Ingenohl was ignorant of one factor that nearly brought about disaster for Hipper’s battle cruisers. Room 40, which had not been able to give warning of the Yarmouth raid, was now able to intercept and decode enough information to predict a raid. The Admiralty ordered Jellicoe to send Beatty’s battle cruisers and Goodenough’s light cruiser squadron, supported by a dreadnought squadron, to a position where they could intercept the Germans on their return. Jellicoe wanted to go with the whole Grand Fleet, but the Admiralty insisted only one battle squadron was necessary. Jellicoe sent Vice Admiral Sir George Warrender’s Second Battle Squadron, six of the best dreadnoughts (the King George V [flag], Ajax, Centurion, Orion, Monarch, and Conqueror) accompanied by eight destroyers. He chose an almost perfect rendezvous for Warrender (proceeding from Cromarty) to meet with Beatty’s battle cruisers, screened by Goodenough’s light cruisers, roughly off the southeast corner of the Dogger Bank. Tyrwhitt’s Harwich Force completed the trap from the south, and Keyes with his two destroyers and eight submarines was ordered to the vicinity of Terschelling. Unfortunately there was a gap in British intelligence. Room 40 had
not established the fact that the High Sea Fleet itself would be at sea, and Ingenohl actually planned to be in a position about 30 miles from the British rendezvous at dawn. This put fourteen German dreadnoughts and eight predreadnoughts in dangerous proximity to Warrender’s six dreadnoughts. The Germans, as a result of the Admiralty’s decision to refuse Jellicoe permission to take the whole fleet to sea, might have been able to do what they had always hoped to do—destroy or severely maul an isolated portion of the Grand Fleet, thereby whittling down British strength. Both sides came very close to disaster on the 16th of December.

  Poor visibility and squally weather had much to do with saving both the British and Germans that day. Before dawn on the morning of the 16th, Warrender’s destroyers clashed with the destroyers and light cruisers of the High Sea Fleet. However, it was Ingenohl who turned away, when he was only some 10 miles from Warrender and Beatty, perhaps ending once and for all his chance for fame in naval history. He was convinced the destroyers he had engaged were the advanced screen of the Grand Fleet and that a general engagement for which he did not have the kaiser’s permission might be at hand. Ingenohl also left Hipper in the lurch, for the High Sea Fleet was supposed to hold its position until Hipper’s bombardment was finished.

  The bombardments of Scarborough, Whitby, and Hartlepool were accomplished without undue difficulty. The Germans brushed aside the weak opposition of local forces and inflicted heavy civilian casualties and considerable damage, while the light cruiser Kolberg laid one hundred mines. Would the British be able to intercept the Germans on their return? The answer was no, for a number of reasons. Jellicoe was finally ordered to sea with the Grand Fleet to block any German strike at the north, but the Germans did not come anywhere near him. Bad weather forced Tyrwhitt’s destroyers coming from the south to turn back and drastically reduced the speed of his light cruisers, which continued. Goodenough in the Southampton, screening the advance of Beatty, made contact with and engaged the light cruiser Stralsund and accompanying destroyers. He was soon joined by the light cruiser Birmingham, but he unfortunately failed to inform Beatty that there were other German cruisers in the distance. This would have indicated that Hipper’s group was probably advancing behind them. Beatty, in turn, anxious to spread the search for Hipper and believing the Southampton and Birmingham were sufficient to handle a single German cruiser, ordered Goodenough’s other cruisers, the Falmouth and Nottingham, now on the scene, to resume their position for lookout duties and to take station 5 miles ahead. The signal made by Beatty’s flag lieutenant, Ralph Seymour, was badly worded—the first of a series of similar mistakes Seymour would make at critical moments—and could be interpreted as addressed to the light cruiser squadron as a whole rather than the two individual ships. Goodenough, not realizing that Beatty had a mistaken view of the situation because he had only reported one German cruiser, turned away and lost contact with the Germans in the deteriorating visibility.

  The Stralsund group next passed Warrender’s squadron. Rear Admiral Arbuthnot of the Second Division reported that the enemy was in sight but chose to await orders rather than open fire himself. Warrender did not fire but contented himself with ordering three armored cruisers in pursuit and reporting the sighting. The signal, in turn, diverted Beatty from a course that might well have brought him in contact with Hipper. The result was that the Germans got away, and when Room 40 did intercept a signal from Ingenohl’s flagship indicating the High Sea Fleet was at sea, the Admiralty ordered Warrender not to go too far to the east.

  The Admiralty’s last chance was Keyes and his submarines on the Terschelling line. Keyes had been cruising about in the destroyer Lurcher, trying to gather the submarines after he had received word the Germans were off Scarborough. He had collected four when the signal arrived advising him the High Sea Fleet might return at dawn the next day and ordering him to proceed to Helgoland to intercept it. Keyes sent the four submarines on and continued to try to find the others. The Admiralty, though, had misjudged the movements of the High Sea Fleet, which was home before midnight. Keyes might have been able to catch Hipper’s forces with his two destroyers—it seems like a suicide mission—but the message failed to reach him in time, due to a mistaken attempt (that wasted hours) at trying to reach him on the short-range “D,” or destroyer, wavelength instead of the long-range “S,” or ship, wavelength. A British submarine did get a shot at the dreadnought Posen proceeding from the Elbe to the Jade the next day, but the torpedo ran deep and missed, perhaps symbolic of the whole frustrating affair.43

  Shortly afterward Beatty summed up his feelings to Jellicoe: “There never was a more disappointing day . . . We were within an ace of bringing about the complete destruction of the enemy cruiser force—and failed.”44 Beatty also remarked on the initial destroyer action and that there was no doubt they had run into a screen in front of the whole High Sea Fleet. The British must have realized very quickly that Hipper was not the only one who had a close shave. The 16th of December 1914 deserves to be better known. It demonstrates that even a great advantage such as Room 40 and well-chosen initial deployments could not offset the combination of human errors and the uncontrollable nature of the weather. To make matters even worse, the British had come close to disaster. Surely no event illustrates more clearly the old adage that nothing is certain in war.

  Could the Royal Navy retaliate in any manner for this affront to the English coast? Certainly in the fall and winter of 1914–15 there were a number of schemes directed either at the islands off the German North Sea coast or at some operation in the Baltic. They were not very practical and ultimately came to nothing (see chapter 5). There was one ingenious way to get at the German ships if the Germans would not come out, and that was by air. In fact the first air raids were primarily directed against German airships rather than warships. The large zeppelins of the German Naval Air Service were a potentially valuable tool for reconnaissance. In the autumn of 1914, the zeppelins had not yet played an effective role in the naval encounters, but they had the range and disturbing potential to bomb the British Isles. Although the first zeppelin raid on England did not take place until the night of 19–20 January 1915, the zeppelin hangars at Cuxhaven were already an attractive target for the British.

  The Royal Naval Air Service carried out the Cuxhaven raids with seaplanes carried in the converted cross-Channel steamers Engadine and Riviera. Those who regard the naval and military leaders of the First World War as hidebound, unimaginative, and unwilling to adopt new technology may be surprised to learn how comparatively early in the war aircraft were employed on imaginative endeavors such as this. One might say that imagination outran the technical ability to achieve results. Because of the limited range of the aircraft, the raids required an offensive sortie into the Bight by Tyrwhitt’s flotillas and Keyes’s submarines. The first attempt on 25 October was a failure, largely due to heavy rain, and four aircraft did not even get off the water. On 21 November the Royal Naval Air Service attacked the zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen with land-based aircraft. Three planes took off from Belfort in eastern France, one was shot down, and, contrary to what the British thought, the zeppelin under construction at the target was not damaged. The attacks with seaplanes were the most promising, but remained frustrating. The next attempt, on 23 November, was recalled after Room 40 intercepted signals indicating German cruisers might be out in the Bight in the area where the attack would be launched.

  The Admiralty made a major attempt on Christmas Day 1914. This time three seaplane carriers were involved, the Engadine, Riviera, and Empress. The Germans were expecting an attack that day; they believed an attempt would be made to block the German ports with merchant ships. They also feared a repetition of 28 August, when the battle cruisers had overwhelmed their scouting forces, and therefore kept only submarines and their two available zeppelins out in the Bight. The result was the first significant encounters between aircraft and warships, a preview of the great air-sea battles of future wars. The zeppelin L.6 at
tacked the Empress, which had fallen behind because of condenser trouble. A pair of seaplanes from Borkum also made a second attack. The British launched their nine seaplanes a half hour before dawn, but two failed to get off the water. None of the remaining aircraft did any damage to the zeppelin sheds; in fact, only one plane even reached them, and then it failed to recognize the target because the pilots had been given the wrong location. The other aircraft dropped their bombs on different targets with little effect. One plane did fly over the German fleet in Schillig Roads, obtaining intelligence and creating considerable excitement, but accomplishing little else. This should not detract from the courage of these early pilots, who pressed on in their primitive aircraft in the face of quite often heavy fire.

  The British ships were attacked by the zeppelin L.5 and seaplanes as they searched for their aircraft that had failed to reach the designated recovery positions. Only three of the crews were rescued by surface craft. Keyes’s submarines rescued another three and were attacked by the zeppelin Z.5 in the process. The seventh crew was picked up by a Dutch trawler, treated as “shipwrecked mariners,” and subsequently returned without being interned. None of the ships suffered serious damage from zeppelins or aircraft—a German submarine on the scene also failed to get into a firing position. The British, in fact, seem to have come to the conclusion that ships had little to fear from the air as long as they had sufficient room to maneuver. The Christmas Day air raid of 1914 should probably be treated as a learning experience that pointed the way to the future when technology and experience would make aircraft much more effective.45