A Naval History of World War I

by Paul G. Halpern

  The usual wireless interceptions had provided prior warning the submarine was on her way and shipping had been alerted, but Sims warned the American authorities in the strongest possible manner that nothing was to be done to give away the secret that they had advance notice of the submarines coming. The Navy Department drafted a circular letter, dated 4 May, which stipulated the steps to be taken to defend shipping (including convoys) should U-boats commence operations in coastal waters. Consequently, the American reaction was swift once survivors had been rescued and confirmation received a U-boat was actually operating off the U.S. coast. Coastal shipping was placed under the protection of the naval districts, and a series of special routings together with air and sea patrols was started. On 3 June the chief of naval operations ordered the four naval districts controlling the coast from Rhode Island and the eastern tip of Long Island to Cape Hatteras to institute coastal convoys, and a general wireless message was broadcast to all Allied merchant vessels to make port until further notice if they were not properly convoyed. The convoys were basically confined to the mid-Atlantic region, and traffic elsewhere had to hug the coast. The extent of the U.S. coast was naturally much greater than that of Britain, and the Americans were hampered in instituting patrols owing to an insufficient number of seaworthy patrol craft or aircraft and trained pilots. The American patrols also included substantial numbers of the 110-foot submarine chasers, which were not proving terribly effective in European waters. Nevertheless, Secretary of the Navy Daniels assured the chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee that there was no necessity to recall any ships from European waters and that the navy’s defense plans were “adequate.”

  The Americans also anticipated that the Germans might attack shipping from the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf route was particularly important because oil supplies moved through these waters on their way to the east coast or transshipment to Europe. The navy established a force designated “American Patrol Force,” with headquarters near Key West, and prepared to adopt convoys as soon as the Germans threatened those waters. They did not prove necessary.

  The U-boats’ activities created a sensation that is hardly surprising considering, for example, that one of the Carolina’s lifeboats drifted ashore at Atlantic City while a Shriners’ parade was taking place on the boardwalk. There were even articles by eminent authorities in the press warning that seaplanes might be launched from submarines to bomb targets inland. This led the New York City Police to erect air-raid sirens every thirty blocks and prohibit the use of display lights at night. On 4 June a thirteen-night blackout began, lasting until the authorities decided the blacked-out area was even more conspicuous because it was surrounded by areas lighted as usual.87

  It took several days for the system of convoys to go into effect, and U.151, which had moved south to the waters off Virginia, found numerous victims. When U.151 returned to Germany in July after a 94-day cruise, she had sunk 23 vessels, most of them small, representing by German figures 51,336 tons, and had also cut the undersea cables between New York and Nova Scotia and New York and Colón. Her commander, Korvettenkapitän von Nostitz und Jänkendorf, reported brisk traffic by vessels sailing alone and unescorted and favorable opportunities for submarines. The British organized a strong hunting patrol to try and intercept the boat on her way home. They had no success, although the submarine commander reported torpedoes had been fired at his boat north of the Hebrides on 13 July and in the Skaggerak on the 17th. The long voyage must have been a considerable strain, for U.151 was not ready to sail again until 17 October, only to be recalled by wireless within three days.88

  The coastal convoys ran between New York and Norfolk with submarine chasers and other small antisubmarine craft serving as escorts. Vessels from the Third Naval District escorted ships from New York to Barnegat, where they were relieved by craft of the Fourth District, which brought the convoy to Winter Quarter light off Maryland where the Fifth District craft brought them to Norfolk. Ships were retained in port until there were sufficient numbers to make a convoy worthwhile, and every effort was made to have the escorts on their return journey pick up a convoy going in the opposite direction. If no reliefs were on hand, the escorts would have to take the convoy through to its port of destination. Apparently the submarine chasers had difficulty keeping up with the faster convoys. The Americans also formed a “naval hunt squadron,” which worked out of Norfolk. It consisted of the destroyer Jouett (833 tons) and six submarine chasers. The chasers eventually received hydrophones, but, not surprisingly as the experience of war in European waters had shown, these methods achieved little success. The number of aircraft and dirigible patrols along the coast also increased. Secretary of the Navy Daniels soon sought to reassure America’s allies and offset any German propaganda over the raids. He issued a statement for publication in London on 9 June that the German submarine raid would not in any way change the policy of the American government. The road to France would be kept open for the shipment of troops and supplies, and there would be no weakening of American naval forces in European waters.89

  The second submarine destined for American waters, U.156, under the command of Kapitänleutnant Feldt, sailed on 16 June with orders to lay mines off New York and operate off New England, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland. U.156’s greatest success was undoubtedly on 19 July when the large American armored cruiser San Diego was sunk by a mine approximately 10 miles southeast of Fire Island off the Long Island shore. Fortunately the loss of life was small, only six, but the San Diego was the largest American warship lost during the war, ironically in American waters and close to the entrance to New York harbor. Sims had again provided advance warning of the departure of the submarine but not, of course, its operational area.

  U.156’s most brazen feat was to sink a tug (later salved) and her tow of four barges off Orleans on Cape Cod, and then survive an ineffective attack by four seaplanes—all in full view of bathers ashore. The tonnage involved was small, and the American government promptly took over the Cape Cod Canal for the duration of the war and placed it under the U.S. Railroad Administration. The move was partially to end the high toll charges that had forced the tug and its coal barges to take the longer and more dangerous open sea route. Furthermore, on 1 August the Allegheny region of the U.S. Railroad Administration diverted coal traffic from Port Richmond, Philadelphia, to Port Reading, New Jersey. This permitted coal traffic to New England to proceed by the East River, Long Island Sound, and Cape Cod Canal, a much more sheltered route.

  On 20 August U.156 captured the Canadian steam trawler Triumph (239 tons) about 60 miles south by west of Canso, Nova Scotia. The Germans manned and armed the vessel and, working in conjunction with the submarine, used it to capture and sink seven other fishing craft in the Grand Banks fishing area before scuttling their prize. U.156 never returned to Germany. The submarine was probably mined and sunk on 25 September in the Northern barrage while attempting to return home. U.156 sank approximately 9 steamers and 20 sailing craft, representing 29,150 or 33,582 tons.90

  The third submarine to raid American waters was U.140, which sailed on 2 July under the command of Korvettenkapitän Kophamel, former leader of the Mediterranean U-boat flotilla. On 6 August the submarine destroyed the Diamond Shoal light vessel off the coast of North Carolina but narrowly escaped a depth-charge attack by the American destroyer Stringham on 10 August. The submarine had been chasing the Brazilian steamer Uberaba (6,062 tons), which had sent out a distress call. This was the sole encounter between a destroyer and submarine in American waters during the war; the depth-charge attacks opened leaks that left a trail of oil and made operations in coastal waters too dangerous. Kophamel was forced to curtail his cruise. U.140 returned to Kiel after an 81-day cruise, having sunk a total of 30,004 tons.91

  The fourth submarine to operate off the North American coast in August was the large new minelayer U.117, which sailed on 11 July. The submarine’s first victims on 10 August were nine small craft of the swordfishing
fleet on St. George’s Bank, about 60 miles east of Nantucket. U.117 laid four minefields between Barnegat and Wimble Shoal, North Carolina, but had to begin her return trip prematurely because of a leaking oil bunker. On a 74-day cruise U.117 sank 23,724 tons of shipping. The mines took their toll long after the submarine had departed. On 29 September the predreadnought Minnesota struck a mine off the mouth of the Delaware but was able to reach the dockyard under her own power. Smaller merchant vessels were less fortunate. The San Saba (2,458 tons) was mined and sunk off Barnegat on 4 October, and the Cuban steamer Chaparro (2,873 tons) was sunk not far away on the 27th. The last victim of U.117’s mines was the Naval Overseas Transportation Service’s freighter Saetia (2,458 tons), which was lost approaching the Delaware on 9 November.

  The American hunting squadrons had little luck and, in fact, suffered casualties from their own side. On 27 August the subchaser S.C.209 was sunk by gunfire from the armed steamer Felix Taussig 27 miles south of Fire Island lighthouse after being mistaken for a submarine. The U.S. Navy also used submarines on antisubmarine patrols, often accompanied by submarine chasers or other small patrol craft. They never encountered U-boats, and there were, perhaps inevitably, incidents when they were mistaken for the enemy. Fortunately, there were no losses. The U.S. Navy also experimented with its own form of decoy vessel. In September and October, a four-masted schooner, the Robert H. McCurdy, was at sea off the mid-Atlantic coast accompanied by submarines. A similar decoy, the 693-ton Charles Whittemore, worked out of Newport, Rhode Island.92 Aircraft also flew many hours of patrols, and on 14 August east of Cape May they and submarine chasers forced U.117 to submerge. The bombs were ineffective, but the attack probably saved a passing tanker. Once again aircraft may not have been able to destroy a submarine, but they were able to force it to stay submerged, preventing it from obtaining a favorable firing position.

  The last two submarines to raid the American coast, U.155 and U.152, sailed on 11 August and 5 September, respectively. U.155 after sinking relatively few ships and having been beaten off by the British Newby Hall (4,391 tons) was ordered by the Admiralstab on 11 October to leave the American coast and operate off the Azores. The next day the homeward-bound American transport Amphion (7,490 tons), the former North German Lloyd Köln, repelled the submarine after an artillery duel. U.155 managed to torpedo and sink the American steamer Lucia (6,744 tons) in an eastbound convoy on the 17th, but was ordered home by the Admiralstab three days later. The score after a 96-day cruise was a disappointing 15,812 tons.

  U.152, another converted merchant submarine, had even less success. The submarine proved too slow and unmaneuverable to approach or maintain contact with a convoy west of Ireland, the British steamer Alban (5,223 tons) was able to escape north of the Azores on 24 September, and the American tanker George G. Henry of the Naval Overseas Transportation Service eventually forced the submarine to break off the action after a long artillery duel on the 29th. The next day U.152 attacked the Naval Overseas Transportation Service freighter Ticonderoga (5,130 tons), which had straggled from an eastbound convoy because of engine trouble. The Ticonderoga tried unsuccessfully to ram the submarine, whose shells repeatedly hit the freighter. The convoy’s ocean escort, the cruiser Galveston, appeared in the distance, forcing the submarine to submerge, but the cruiser’s commander did not want to distance himself from his convoy and did not close. The submarine was able to surface and completed the destruction of the crippled Ticonderoga, whose crew was compelled to raise a white sheet and abandon ship. The loss of life had been heavy, 213 out of 237 aboard. Proceeding westward, U.152 met no opportunities to attack until ordered by the Admiralstab to leave American waters for the Azores on 11 October. On the 22d she received a wireless message for all U-boats to return to Germany. In the course of a 71-day patrol she had sunk only three ships, representing 7,975 tons.93

  The German submarine offensive failed in its larger purpose. The six submarines working off the North American coast in 1918 sank from May to November (excluding those ships later salvaged) a total of 93 ships representing 166,907 gross tons. More than half (45) were American, but only 33 were actually steamers, the remainder mostly sailing vessels or small fishing craft.94 The important convoys across the Atlantic were hardly disturbed, and losses in convoys remained small, generally stragglers.

  It is also to the credit of the American leaders that despite the shock of having the war brought to the very doorstep of the United States, and despite the inevitable rumblings in Congress or vocal public opinion, they never lost sight of the big strategic picture. The war would be won or lost on the European continent, and American warships were not pulled back from European waters and the convoys continued to sail without interruption. Secretary of the Navy Daniels in his annual report termed German submarine operations against the American coast “one of the minor incidents of the war.”95

  The transport of American troops to Europe was the responsibility of Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, who had been designated the American commander of convoy operations in the Atlantic and subsequently commander of the Cruiser and Transport Force. The liners in the American merchant marine suitable to carry troops across the Atlantic were relatively limited in number. Few of the larger passenger liners before the war had flown the American flag. However, there were 18 large German ships that had been interned in American ports and were promptly seized by the American government. In some ships the Germans had attempted to sabotage machinery, whereas others suffered from the long years of lay-up. It took considerable work to bring the ships back into service by the end of the year, but the effort was certainly justified. The 18 ships represented 304,270 tons and were estimated to have a carrying capacity of 68,600 troops.96 The former German ships received new American names, when appropriate, and included the largest liner in the world, the Hamburg-Amerika line’s Vaterland (54,282 tons), which became the Leviathan. The Leviathan was really in a class by herself. She carried 7,250 troops on her first voyage in December and more than 10,000 in subsequent voyages. The huge liner is estimated to have carried one-tenth of all American troops transported to Europe. She required special handling; for example, she could only dock at Liverpool on a full moon tide, and Brest therefore became her usual destination. The Leviathan usually sailed alone because of her speed, although she was sometimes accompanied by the Great Northern Steamship Company’s (8,255 ton) Great Northern and Northern Pacific. These two new (1915) liners were the fastest in the American merchant marine and had been built for the west-coast route from San Francisco to Portland, Oregon. Despite their smaller size, some considered them to be the best of the transports in U.S. service, and from 1921 to 1922 the Great Northern, renamed Columbia, served as flagship of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.97

  The Americans ran their own troop convoys directly from New York to the Bay of Biscay. These were in addition to the HX and HC mercantile convoys and were controlled and escorted by the U.S. Navy, but coordinated with the routing charts at the Admiralty. Nevertheless American resources even with the addition of the former German ships were nowhere near sufficient for the job, and the majority of American troops were carried in British or British-controlled vessels. As of 24 August 1918, 1,454,941 American troops had arrived in Europe, 770,928 of them (52.9 percent) carried in British or British-controlled ships, 663,764 (45.6 percent) in American ships, 18,596 (1.3 percent) in French ships, and 1,653 (.1 percent) in Italian ships.98 By the end of the war 2,079,880 American troops had been carried to Europe, 51.25 percent in British or British-leased ships, 46.25 percent in American ships, and 2.5 percent in other vessels, notably French and Italian. The Americans furnished the escorts for most of their troops; 82.75 percent were carried under American escort, 14.125 percent under British escort, and 3.125 percent under French escort. The number of American troops transported each month began to rise sharply in March 1918, passed 120,000 in April, exceeded 247,000 in May, and did not drop below this figure until October. The largest number of Americans, more than 311,000, c
rossed in July.99

  The Royal Navy manned and operated the former White Star liner Olympic (45,324 tons) and Cunard liners Mauretania (31,938 tons) and Aquitania (45,647 tons) as troopships. In 1918 they were exclusively employed in the transport of American troops. The Admiralty considered that their great speed and ability to maintain it in almost all weather conditions made it safer for them to proceed on their own, and a regular ocean escort would not have been able to keep up with them. They were usually met at the 15th meridian by an escort of four destroyers and escorted to their destination. The British liners had a smaller troop capacity than the Leviathan. Their record for the number of troops carried in a single voyage was: the Olympic, 6,148; the Aquitania, 6,090; and the Mauretania, 5,162. The Leviathan carried a record 10,860. These great ocean liners were, like the Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth in the Second World War, valuable assets. The Admiralty calculated that of the 1,037,116 American and Canadian troops carried to Britain in 1918, no fewer than 135,467 (13 percent) had been carried in the four so-called monster transports.100

  The huge logistical needs of the American forces in France were handled by the Naval Overseas Transportation Service, which was established on 9 January 1918 to operate the growing number of cargo ships and transports that had been acquired since the United States entered the war. There were already at this date 73 vessels. The maximum number of ships operated at any one time was 378.101

  The really large movements of American troops began in April, but it was not until August that the Navy Department became sufficiently worried about the possibility of some action by German surface raiders to take measures to add to their security. The older cruisers that furnished the ocean escorts would not have lasted long against a powerful raider such as a battle cruiser. The U.S. Navy therefore stationed Battleship Division Six at Berehaven, Ireland, where it would be well situated to furnish protection to a convoy. Battleship Division Six consisted of the battleships Utah (flag), Nevada, and Oklahoma under the command of Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers. The Nevada and Oklahoma were oil burners, armed with 14-inch guns, and the Americans also sent an oiler and tug to service them. The full division was on station by 10 September but was never needed. There were no German raiders.102