Destiny Betrayed: JFK, Cuba, & the Garrison Case
Page 59
Like other things, Jim Garrison predicted this in January of 1968. At the public request of Mort Sahl, Johnny Carson invited Garrison on his show. Sahl had been working for Garrison as a volunteer. And with his show biz connections, he had previously gotten him an interview in Playboy. He now got him on The Tonight Show. The problem was that Carson was employed by the Sarnoff owned NBC network. The previous year, the Sarnoffs had approved the Walter Sheridan-CIA hatchet job documentary on Garrison. They were not going to reverse field and give the DA a free and fair platform to educate millions of Americans on the JFK case. Therefore they had rehearsed Carson to play the Hugh Aynesworth-James Phelan antagonistic role. Further, NBC had asked Garrison to arrive early at the studio. They then sent lawyers to interview him for hours when he arrived.77 They recorded his answers. When Garrison walked onstage, he noted that Carson had cards typed up in front of him with his recorded answers plus their rejoinders attached. Consequently, instead of being a free and open forum done to educate the public about the Kennedy case, it turned into a preview of the adversarial, and thankfully cancelled, CNN program Crossfire. And it began with Carson’s very long first question. In which he accused, not the Warren Commission, but Garrison of confusing the American public. Carson did not come off well. Realizing this, he angrily confronted Sahl afterwards and said that it would be a long time before he ever appeared on his show again.78 Sahl’s career went into serious decline after this.
At the end of the program, Garrison managed to invoke a Cassandra-like warning about the future. In the face of Carson’s nonchalance about the cover up of Kennedy’s murder, Garrison said that he was there to tell the people that the honor of this country was at stake. And if they do not demand to know what happened to President Kennedy, the country as they knew it would not survive. Everyone, including Al Gore, Ross Perot, George W. Bush, and Bill Clinton understands that today.
Jim Garrison understood it in 1968.
Notes
In the notes that follow, references to the Report of the Warren Commission appear as WR. References to the Commission volumes are cited by the volume and page number. References to the Final Report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations appear as HSCR. Citations to the 12 volumes of appendices and hearings appear as HSCA and the volume and page number.
Books cited in these endnotes are listed by author(s) only, unless an author has written more than one work, in which case titles are added. If a book is used for only one or two footnotes, the full citation is given in the footnotes. If a book is referred to only in the footnotes, the author and title are given. The full citations to all other books appear in the Bibliography. Full citations for regularly used periodicals are also in the Bibliography.
One of the great contributions of the Assassination Records Review Board is the recovery of part of the records of the Garrison investigation. These references are cited with the acronym of NODA, meaning New Orleans District Attorney’s office.
When an article from Probe Magazine is sourced, the author and title appear only the first time the essay is referenced.
Chapter 1
1 Britain’s request for an American takeover of its imperial role allowed the Truman administration to implement a Cold War policy of American leadership which was long in the planning. The British step-down was a necessary component of American leadership. See Jezer, p. 43.
2 Cabell B. Phillips, pp. 167–168. Acheson became a leading architect of American Cold War policy, a proponent of the view that unlike America, the Soviet Union was not entitled to a postwar sphere of influence over other nations. See Jezer, p. 41.
3 In congressional testimony, Acheson described the domino theory in terms of “rotten apples”: “Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost.... We and we alone were in a position to break up the plan.” Acheson, p. 219.
4 Bernstein and Matusow, pp. 182–184.
5 The Marshall Plan was tailored to American export needs and well-based fears of a return to prewar depression conditions. The plan, known as the European Recovery Act, made the U.S. dollar the standard of international trade, provided U.S. companies with significant foreign markets, and integrated European recovery into America’s industrial and banking system. Jezer, pp. 45–8.
6 The Plan did not pass easily. Its major corporate and political supporters had to overcome determined opposition from then powerful isolationist, nationalist Congressmen. The communist takeover in Czechoslovakia (Stalin’s response to America’s rebuilding West Germany) created the crisis atmosphere necessary for its passage. Jezer, pp. 47–48.
7 Ranelagh, pp. 748–749; and Ellis, p. 37.
8 Ellis, p. 36. Indeed, there was fierce bureaucratic infighting, “probably orchestrated by J. Edgar Hoover.” Ranelagh, p. 114.
9 The act denied the CIA any “internal police and security functions,” although the term was not defined. National Security Act, Sec. 102(d)(3). In fact, the CIA conducted many domestic operations, some, such as Operation CHAOS against opponents of the Vietnam War, quite extensive.
10 Ellis, p. 37.
11 Prados, p. 21.
12 In one early, major covert operation, the CIA intervened decisively in Italy’s 1948 elections to prevent a likely Communist victory. Men like Allen Dulles, James Jesus Angleton, Frank Wisner, and William Colby combined in “a crash program of propaganda, sabotage and secret funding” which was “run out of the [Wall Street law] offices of Allen and John Foster Dulles at Sullivan and Cromwell.” Simpson, p. 90.
13 Prados, pp. 15, 40–43.
14 After Chiang Kai-shek’s defeat by Mao Tse-tung in 1949, several thousand of his troops remained in Burma perched on China’s southern border. There they were regrouped and supported by the CIA as contras for some seven or eight military incursions into Mao’s mainland China. While the CIA armed and maintained these forces, they also developed into an opium army that would control the so-called Golden Triangle, the poppy-rich area spanning the borders of Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma, which became the world’s (and America’s) chief supplier of raw opium from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. See McCoy, pp. 162–192. This may have been the organization that Gary Underhill referred to and that JFK had gotten wind of and would use in his upcoming shake-up of the Agency (see Chapter 5).
15 Ellis, p. 38.
16 For general details regarding Gehlen, see Simpson, and Reese. For many of the specifics discussed here, see Scott, “Allen Dulles”; and Oglesby, “Gehlen”
17 During the time of Soviet-American wartime alliance, Dulles was harboring, then implementing, virtually treasonous plans for a postwar anti-Soviet alliance. Dulles conducted his own private negotiations with Nazi General Kurt Wolff for a separate German surrender to Americans in northern Italy, to head off Germany’s full-scale surrender to the joint allied command–obviously including Americans and Russians. Dulles’s dogged efforts– Operation Sunrise–which he secretly continued despite direct orders to stop them, sowed enormous distrust between the Americans and the British on the one hand, and the Russians who feared a separate surrender deal behind their backs, on the other. See Scott, “Allen Dulles,” p. 6.
18 According to Scott, “There seems no question that by April 1945, the OSS was recruiting Nazis and fascists to help mobilize against postwar Communism.” Scott, “Allen Dulles,” p. 14.
19 Oglesby, “Gehlen,” pp. 14–15.
20 Bird, p. 353.
21 Ibid., p. 354.
22 For a recounting of the deal, see Oglesby, pp. 13–15. For the escapes of Mengele and Barbie, see Scott, “Allen Dulles,” p. 10. A future member of the Warren Commission, John J. McCloy, was U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, and played a role in Klaus Barbie’s
escape. Brussell, p. 105.
23 As chief of Eastern Front intelligence, Gehlen played a signficant role in what Christopher Simpson calls “one of the most terrible atrocities of the war”: namely, “the torture, interrogation and murder by starvation of some 4 million Soviet prisoners of war.” Simpson, p. 44.
24 Simpson, p. 53. In light of Allen Dulles’s anti-Soviet efforts during wartime, his links, and those of his brother, John Foster Dulles, with German financial interests, before, during, and after the war, bear scrutiny. For considerable details, see James Stewart Martin, pp. 67–68; Higham, pp. 22, 112–113.
25 Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 548; Bernstein and Matusow, pp. 293–295.
26 Lisagor and Lipsius, p. 129.
27 Kahin and Kahin, p. 8.
28 Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, see Chapters 5 and 8, also pp. 210, 214–215; Prados, pp. 133–138 for Sukarno operation.
29 Blum, pp. 174–181.
30 Morley, p. 32.
31 Ibid, ps. 34–35.
32 Ibid, pp. 35.
33 Ibid, pps. 35–36.
34 Ibid p. 36.
35 Ibid, p. 39, p. 55.
36 Ibid p. 49.
37 Ibid, p. 50.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, p. 51.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid, p. 53
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, p. 56.
44 Pease, Lisa. “David Atlee Phillips, Clay Shaw and Freeport Sulphur.” Probe Magazine, Vol. 3 No. 3, p. 18.
45 Ibid, p. 19.
46 Fonzi, pps. 133, 265.
47 HSCA interview of November 3, 1978.
48 Morley, p. 57.
49 Ibid, p. 58.
50 Ibid, p. 61.
51 Ibid, pps. 63–64.
52 Szulc, p. 81.
53 Morley, p. 75.
54 Hinckle and Turner, pps. 56–57.
55 Ibid, pps. 56–61.
56 Morley, pps. 76–78.
57 Ibid, p. 79.
58 Ibid, p. 80.
59 Ibid, p. 81.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid, p. 82.
62 Ibid, p. 84.
63 Ibid.
64 NODA memorandum of October 9, 1968.
65 Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, pp. 556–557.
66 Morley, p. 85.
67 Ibid, p. 94.
68 NODA memorandum of 2/13/67 from Sgt. F. Sedgeber to Jim Garrison.
69 HSCA interview with Jack Martin, 12/5/77.
70 Summers, p. 440.
71 Inspector General Report, p. 15. Hereafter designated as IG Report.
72 Ibid, p. 19.
73 Ibid, p. 32.
74 Morley, p. 80.
75 Ibid, p. 95.
76 Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, p. 557.
77 Dulles was right. Nixon was so wedded to toppling Castro that after failure of the Bay of Pigs, he reportedly answered Kennedy’s request for advice by saying “I would find a proper legal cover and go in.” Hinckle and Turner, p. 97.
Chapter 2
1 Parmet, Presidency of JFK, p. 31.
2 Markmann, p. 26.
3 Parmet, Struggles of JFK, pp. 175–180.
4 Ibid., pp. 310, 368.
5 E. O’Ballance, The Red Army, (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 199; Michio Kaku and Daniel
Axelrod, To Win A Nuclear War (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 11.
6 Parmet, Presidency of JFK, pp. 45–46.
7 Ibid. , p. 46.
8 Ibid ., pp. 46–47.
9 Morley, p. 95.
10 Parmet, Presidency of JFK, pp. 47–48.
11 As Eisenhower said of the Vietnam of 1954–5: You have “what you would call the “falling domino principle.” You have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have the beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.” Quoted in Jezer, p. 64.
12 More than any other country in World War II, the Soviet Union suffered unprecedented destruction of its people and economy from the German invasion: over 20 million Soviets, and one-third of its total wealth and infrastructure destroyed.
13 Not only “by itself,” but against Stalin’s express policy. Stalin had long tried to control, curb, even destroy any independent Chinese communism. Indeed, when WWII ended, Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 with Mao’s sworn enemy Chiang Kai-shek promising to aid Chiang’s troops exclusively and to recognize Chiang’s authority even in an area like Manchuria where neither he nor the U.S. then had any forces. Stalin’s position was for Mao to at most accept a junior role in a government under Chiang Kai-shek–definitely not to pursue victory in a civil war. Snow, pp. 227–228.
14 Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, p. 183.
15 Ibid., p. 197.
16 Ibid., p. 236. In 1955, the Communist Chinese began to shell two offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, which were still run and occupied by Nationalist Chinese troops under Chiang Kai-shek. This caused a brief crisis which not only did the Russians refuse to fuel, but which Communist minister Chou En–lai finally resolved by giving up the islands to the Nationalists.
17 Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, p. 180.
18 In the early 1950s, the Democrats were pilloried for having “lost China” since it happened on Harry Truman’s watch.
19 Some of the more courageous include scholars such as William Appleman Williams, Bertrand Russell, and Peter Dale Scott; politicians like Senators Wayne Morse, Ernest Gruening, Mike Gravel, and William Fulbright; and independent journalists like I.F Stone and George Seldes.
20 Parmet, Struggles of JFK, p. 226.
21 DiEugenio, James. “Dodd and Dulles vs. Kennedy in Africa.” Probe Magazine, Vol. 6 No. 2, p. 18.
22 Mahoney, pps. 14–15.
23 Ibid, p. 12.
24 DiEugenio, James. “Dodd and Dulles vs. Kennedy in Africa.” Probe Magazine, Vol. 6 No. 2, p. 18.
25 Ibid.
26 Mahoney, p. 15.
27 Ibid.
28 Blum, p. 135.
29 Mahoney, p. 16.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid, p. 15.
32 Ibid, p. 16.
33 Ibid.
34 Blum, p. 137.
35 Ibid, p. 138.
36 Ibid, p. 139.
37 Ibid.
38 DiEugenio, James. “Dodd and Dulles vs. Kennedy in Africa.” Probe Magazine, Vol. 6 No. 2, p. 19.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Mahoney, p. 19.
43 Nevins, p. 67.
44 Ibid, p. 72.
45 Ibid, p. 77.
46 Ibid, p. 80.
47 Probe Magazine, op. cit. p. 20.
48 Mahoney, p. 20.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid, p. 23.
52 Toldeo Blade, 7/15/57.
53 Hurt, p. 415.
54 Ibid, p. 416.
55 DiEugenio, James. “Dodd and Dulles vs. Kennedy in Africa.” Probe Magazine, Vol. 6 No. 2, p. 20.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid, p. 21.
59 Ibid.
60 Kaiser, p. 31.
61 Ibid.
62 Schlesinger, p. 163.
63 Hilsman, p. 130.
64 Schlesinger, p. 329
65 Ibid, p. 332.
66 Ibid, p. 337.
67 Ibid, p. 516.
68 Newman, JFK and Vietnam, pps. 3–4.
69 Goldstein, pps. 53–66.
70 Blight, pps. 282–83.
71 Goldstein, p. 101.
72 Ibid, p. 162.
73 Pease, Lisa. “Indonesia, President Kennedy and Freeport Sulphur.” Probe Magazine, Vol. 3 No. 4, p. 19.
74 Ibid, p. 20.
75 Ibid.
76 Kahin and Kahin, p. 179.
77 Ibid, p. 181.
78 Probe Magazine, op. cit. p. 21.
79 Ibid.
80 Probe Magazine, op. cit.
81 S
chlesinger, p. 535.
Chapter 3
1 Hancock, Nexus, p. 52.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid, p. 53.
5 Ibid.
6 Kornbluh, p. 81.
7 Ibid, p. 48.
8 Ibid, p. 58.
9 Ibid, p. 99.
10 Ibid., pps. 283–84.
11 Ibid, p. 94.
12 Davy, pps. 30–31.
13 Kornbluh, pps. 97, 122.
14 Ibid., p. 303.
15 Ibid., pps. 120–123.
16 Ibid, p. 291.
17 Schlesinger, p. 249.
18 Higgins, p. 102.
19 Ibid., p. 103.
20 Kornbluh, pps. 294–95.
21 Ibid.
22 Schlesinger., p. 250.
23 Ibid., p. 257.
24 Kornbluh, p. 125.
25 Ibid., p. 288.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid, p. 126.
28 Ibid, p. 296.
29 Ibid, p. 126.
30 Prados, pp. 183, 188–189, 191.
31 Kornbluh, p. 295.
32 Ibid, pps. 227–28.
33 Ibid, p. 307.
34 Ibid., p. 321.
35 Hunt, pps. 22–23.
36 Ibid.
37 Szulc, p. 72.
38 Hunt, p. 38.
39 Ibid., p. 16.
40 Hancock, op. cit., pps. 22–23.
41 Ibid., p. 25.
42 Ibid., p. 26.
43 Kornbluh, p. 72.
44 Ibid., p. 73.
45 Schlesinger, p. 260.
46 Ibid., p. 264.
47 Kornbluh, p. 70.
48 Ibid., p. 73.
49 Ibid.
50 Hunt, p. 41.
51 Ibid., p. 97.
52 Ibid., pps. 172–176.
53 Ibid., p. 185.
54 Kornbluh, p. 321.
55 Ibid, p. 310.
56 Ibid., pps. 311–12.