The Savior Generals: How Five Great Commanders Saved Wars That Were Lost—From Ancient Greece to Iraq

by Victor Davis Hanson

  64. For the innovative stratagems of Belisarius, see Rosen, Justinian’s Flea, 153–54. Cf. 82–84.

  65. Justinian’s propensity both to commemorate himself and the general impermanence of his own megalomania is noted by Stanhope, Life of Belisarius, 59–60.

  66. For the quotes from Procopius and Gibbon, see Procopius, History of the War, 7.1.12–16; Gibbon, Decline and Fall, 4.41. On the idea that Justinian’s dream was not improbable, cf. the assessment of Jacobsen, “The recovery of the empire was not to happen, but with Belisarius’ military ability, it was—in 540—a distinct possibility. The chance would never come again.” (Jacobsen, Gothic War, 260.)

  Chapter Three: “Atlanta Is Ours and Fairly Won”

  1. For a synopsis of Sherman’s pre–Civil War life, see variously Hirshson, White Tecumseh, 18–70; Kennett, Sherman, 23–108. Almost all biographers note both Sherman’s failure and his own recognition of such failure—and the importance of it in forming his character and views later on during the war.

  2. Hirshson, White Tecumseh, 388–89, notes the high incidence of instability in the Sherman family; for Shiloh and Sherman, cf. Hanson, Ripples of Battle, 71–94.

  3. Hanson, Soul of Battle, 214–31, on the Sherman “catharsis” between his leaving the army and Bull Run. Just four years before Shiloh, an unemployed Sherman sighed, “I am doomed to be a vagabond, and shall no longer struggle against my fate.” After the March to the Sea, a surprised Sherman said of himself in a letter to his wife, “I look back and wonder if I really did it.”

  4. For the connection between Sherman’s prewar failures and the uncanny knowledge and insight he drew on in Georgia, see again Hanson, Soul of Battle, 224–29.

  5. Flood, 1864, 117. Apparently, northerners assumed that Grant could defeat Lee in the manner he had taken Forts Henry and Donaldson, and Vicksburg—without the sort of casualties they had suffered in September 1862 under McClellan, who, it should be remembered, at one point had reached within four miles of Richmond.

  6. There is a discrepancy between what McClellan believed and what the Democratic plank on which he eventually was nominated on demanded. As Lincoln put it, a war Democrat was riding into the campaign on a peace horse: The Copperheads had inserted into the Democratic platform a plank calling for an immediate armistice—even as McClellan assured veterans and their families that he would simply not give up the war, but use the carrot and the stick to restore the Union by ignoring slavery. Democratic unity obtained at the convention in late August was doomed to come apart by November, given the seemingly mutually exclusive views of McClellan and the Copperheads—and Sherman’s sudden and unexpected military successes. There is a fascinating account of the Democratic convention at Chicago in Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 276–94. For his speech, Sears, McClellan, 595–96.

  7. McDonough and Jones, War So Terrible, 12–13, review the perfect storm that had hit Lincoln by 1864, from draft riots and higher war taxes to charges that he was either an abolitionist zealot and race mixer, or an appeaser of the Confederacy.

  8. See Flood, 1864, 28–31, on Mary Todd’s friends who sought patronage in exchange for enabling her to charge her personal debts as government expenditure. The degree to which Lincoln himself knew of all this is uncertain.

  9. For a survey of Lincoln’s various personal crises during 1864, see, again, Flood, 1864, 14, 43–44. The popular anti-Lincoln hysteria that began in earnest before his nomination and then peaked before the November election hinged on Lincoln himself—but not in comparison to any alternative to his policies. For all the furor, no critic had yet explained to the Northern public how in mid-1864 the Union could either sue for peace with an independent Confederacy, bring the South back with slavery, or find a way to crush the rebellion without losing tens of thousands more dead.

  10. Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 132–47. Like any unpopular war, from Korea and Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq, unconditional cessation is seen by many as an admission that the previous butcher’s bill was all in vain.

  11. On the scheming of this talented but ill-assorted bunch, see Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 32–45. If in 1860, the outsider Lincoln had seemed to be the ideal compromise to bridge the various agendas of eastern politicos, by 1864 he was written off as too unsophisticated and inexperienced to navigate through Washington politics and being devoured by his far more savvy cabinet.

  12. Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 110–20, 273–74. Oddly, the more McClellan posed as Lincoln’s replacement, the less he seemed able to explain what he would do instead as commander in chief. The Peninsula campaign had in retrospect looked like a colossal blunder in July 1862; now, by July 1864, McClellan claimed that it did not seem so horrific in comparison with Cold Harbor.

  13. For the machinations of Frémont and others, and the general vice-presidency intrigue, see Flood, 1864, 107–11, 141–43. In general, the fortunes of both Frémont and McClellan were in direct proportion to the news from the front; Union defeat had created their candidacies, and only Union victories would end them.

  14. So, too, the midterm elections of 1862 had not gone Lincoln’s way, given the so-so performance of Union armies from Bull Run to Antietam. Even amid victories such as Shiloh, there followed disappointment with the Northern inability to translate Southern tactical setback into strategic defeat. Cf. Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 203; and Castel, Decision in the West, 2–5, on the status of the Union army and the Northern cause as 1864 began.

  15. Quoted in Waugh, 267; see McClure, Abraham Lincoln, 113. Reports, however, of a saddened Lincoln were frequent from nearly the day he entered office to his assassination.

  16. Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 151, 164. There was just as much division in the South as well, among those who wished to rejoin the Union if slavery were kept intact; those who insisted on an independent Confederacy at any cost; and a few who, in exchange for an immediate armistice, were willing to accept a gradual end to slavery and acceptance without penalty back into the Union.

  17. Cf. McMurry, Atlanta 1864, 12–25. The war would end in Virginia, where the major land battles had started; but Lee’s army would more likely surrender before it was destroyed—largely because operations elsewhere to his rear had deprived him of both men and supplies.

  18. Grant’s ongoing bloodbath in Virginia convinced Sherman that he had to achieve a result that was both spectacular and at seemingly tolerable cost. Cf. Flood, 1864, 91–116.

  19. For the politics of the respective campaigns, see Lewis, Sherman, 394–96. Some of the 100-day call-ups of new troops in spring 1864 were apparently predicated on the notion that Grant might win the war within three months of taking over direct command of the Army of the Potomac in Virginia. The distance from Georgia, and the difficult rural terrain in which Sherman operated, made it difficult to fathom the pulse of battle out west between June and September.

  20. See Caudill and Ashdown, Sherman’s March, 5; cf. “Sherman made defeat for the South akin to being beaten by a corporate magnate good at reading balance sheets but indifferent to glory and legacy.” For an analysis of the generals on both sides of the Atlanta campaign, see Castel, Decision in the West, 28–57. In contrast to General Joe Johnston, who was loathed by Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederacy, William Tecumseh Sherman enjoyed the confidence of both Lincoln and Grant. Such support gave the latter as much confidence as the former was often unsure of his tenure.

  21. There is some controversy over the exact orders given Sherman, and Sherman’s own interpretation of what precisely his chief aim was when he left Tennessee—whether to weaken Johnston’s army, capture Atlanta, stop reinforcements from joining Lee, occupy Southern territory, or embarrass the Confederacy. Of course, these aims were not mutually exclusive, and in the end Sherman essentially accomplished nearly all of them. See Castel, Decision in the West, 90–93, for an excellent discussion of how Sherman opportunistically seemed to emphasize a particular goal at a particular time as he saw fit.

  22. Sherman, Memoirs, 589; for th
e Union strategy, see McMurry, Atlanta 1864, 12–16, and especially Castel, Decision in the West, 563, who makes the salient point that “the most important task was to forestall Johnston from reinforcing Lee.” There was an apparent assumption that Lee and the Southern cause were not contingent wholly on their losses in the west; in dire contrast, the viability of the Confederacy in the west hinged in large part how well Lee in saving Virginia and the Confederate capital.

  23. Liddell Hart, Sherman, 331. Sherman encouraged this notion that a western general, and a largely western army, were superior to easterners, hardier than Southern cavaliers, and would eventually have to save the Union.

  24. Bull, Soldiering, 99.

  25. Sherman, Memoirs, 518; Lewis, Sherman, 359–60. Cf. a quote from a captured Confederate soldier (360), “Sherman’ll never go to hell; he will flank the devil and make heaven in spite of guards.” Lewis makes an astute observation (398) that “In practically every section where there was bold Federal action in the summer of 1864, there was a Westerner in command . . . The West was in the saddle.” If one argued that three men eventually won the Civil War for the North—Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman—then the idea of western credit for the victory seems logical.

  26. Sherman, Memoirs, 492; Davis, Sherman’s March, 4. Residents of Atlanta apparently assumed from the beginning of Sherman’s campaign in early May that their own city would be the eventual Northern objective. Cf. Carter, Siege of Atlanta, 128–30. On the strategic value of Atlanta, see Liddell Hart, Sherman, 233–34.

  27. On the relative advantages of each army as the campaign began, see Marszalek, Sherman, 260–61. It was true that the majority of Confederate generals were probably more skilled and talented than their Union counterparts, yet the four best (and highest-ranking) Union generals—Grant, Sheridan, Sherman, and Thomas—were perhaps the most talented commanders on either side of the Civil War.

  28. For a description of Johnston’s army—and the quality of Union forces arrayed against him—see Castel, Decision in the West, 110–19. For the quote and discussion, cf., again, Marszalek, Sherman, 269. Johnston’s aims are discussed at Symonds, Johnston, 328–31.

  29. There is a good review of how the Confederates had plenty of chances to cut Sherman’s rail lines—and why they largely failed—in McMurry, Atlanta 1864, 198–203; Sherman as logistician: 26–41, 116–18.

  30. For Johnston’s inability to fathom the political aspects of his military strategy in Georgia, cf. Symonds, Johnston, 384–86.

  31. Sherman, Memoirs, 500. On the problem of keeping up with Sherman’s rapidly changing “thoughts and wishes,” see Hirshson, White Tecumseh, 220.

  32. For the tactical shortcomings of both Sherman and Johnston at Resaca, see Castel, Decision in the West, 182–86. Historians critical of generalship during the Atlanta campaign should remember that the landscape was dense, and the weather often bad, resulting in little accurate intelligence on either side.

  33. After the war, Johnston claimed that his primary, though misunderstood, aim all along had been to help the Northern peace party “to carry the presidential election.” Cf. Lewis, Sherman, 366 and 373–74. For accounts of popular admiration for Uncle Billy and rising morale among Union troops, see Hanson, Soul of Battle, 230–31.

  34. See Castel, Decision in the West, 200–209, for an analysis of the less than stellar generalship of both Sherman and Johnston between May 17 and 20. The problem with criticism of both Sherman’s and Johnston’s command is clear in hindsight: Hood’s later antithetical tactics would soon ruin the Southern effort. And the more Sherman worried about advancing without losses rather than about destroying the enemy army, the more he neared Atlanta with sky-high Union morale. That nothing either Johnston or Hood did stopped Sherman is testament to his tactical and strategic insight.

  35. Johnston’s strategy is assessed well in Symonds, Johnston, 316–18, and especially 358–71.

  36. For the campaigning between Cassville and Pickett’s Mill and the general ensuing depression in the North, see Castel, Decision in the West, 202–54. For a defense of McClellan, cf. Sherman’s letter to his wife (Simpson and Berlin, Sherman’s Civil War, 743).

  37. Castel, Decision in the West, 293–96. Hood’s rashness at Kolb’s Farm was a precursor to more to come when he took over from Johnston in July—and explains why Sherman welcomed the enemy change of command.

  38. For Sherman’s own attitude after Kennesaw Mountain, cf. Marszalek, Sherman, 274–75. In short, Sherman defended his frontal charges against dug-in troops—and then never repeated them again.

  39. Liddell Hart, Sherman, 252; for different analyses of the late June and early July tactics of Sherman, see, again, Castel, Decision in the West, 342–47. The more Johnston retreated, the more the Union public was buoyed by Sherman’s progress—and the more Sherman was reluctant to risk incurring high casualties.

  40. For Hood’s life and earlier career, see Miller, Hood, 106.

  41. Castel, Decision in the West, 367; cf, 32, 58. For Union officers rejoicing at the news of Hood’s replacement of Johnston, see Carter, Siege of Atlanta, 193–94.

  42. See Lewis, Sherman, 382–83, for the comparative statistics on losses between Lee’s and Johnston’s records of resistance.

  43. Kennett, Sherman, 243: “That spring and summer Sherman the commander could be seen at his best in the conventional warfare of his day. He was now free to direct as he wished the efforts of a hundred thousand men . . . That spring he had just turned forty-four. His keen mind had been further honed by three years of war and he was still possessed of his remarkable stamina. In Georgia he would reach the zenith of his career.” For Hood’s quotes, Miller, Hood, 2007, and see Simpson and Berlin, Sherman’s Civil War, 694, for the Sherman quote about taking up the dare of war.

  44. Castel believes that Union estimates of Confederate casualties at Peachtree Creek and elsewhere were exaggerated and might be reduced by half; cf. Decision in the West, 381. Ezra Church: Secrist, Sherman’s Trail, 53.

  45. Sherman, Memoirs, 578–79. There was an air of unreality in the South as newspapers and officials clung to the analogy to Napoleon’s disaster in Russia a half century earlier—as if Georgia experienced subzero weather, Sherman’s lines were thousands of miles long, and Hood’s dwindling forces were Cossacks.

  46. On the controversial decision to let Hood flee from Atlanta, see Marszalek, Sherman, 282–83. On Sherman’s fairness about McClellan: Simpson and Berlin, Sherman’s Civil War, 57.742–43.

  47. Sherman, Memoirs, 583. For the change of heart and the stunned Southern reaction, see Caudill and Ashdown, Sherman’s March, 42–44. For all Sherman’s hatred of the press—understandable, given its sensational headlines during his depression of early 1862—no Union general was now more worshipped.

  48. Castel, Decision in the West, 540–47, offers examples from contemporary newspapers and diaries, attesting to the general consensus that Atlanta’s fall had ruined the morale of the South, saved the Lincoln candidacy, and doomed McClellan’s hopes. Cf. also Bailey, Chessboard of War, 8–12; Trudeau, Southern Storm, 34–35; Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 297–99; Hirshson, White Tecumseh, 241.

  49. Davis, Lincoln’s Men, 202–7; Lewis, Sherman, 409–11.

  50. Sherman, Memoirs, 583. For most of August, Lincoln despaired that Sherman could not take Atlanta before Grant ground up his army outside Richmond. It was to Grant’s credit that he congratulated Sherman even though in some sense his subordinate’s success only highlighted his own failure.

  51. Simpson and Berlin, Sherman’s Civil War, 733. Sherman deplored the politics of September 1864 in a letter to his brother, Senator John Sherman. Rumors were rampant that the Midwestern and centrist Sherman might in fact favor McClellan, a fantasy dispelled by Sherman in another letter to his wife, Ellen Ewing Sherman (cf. Simpson and Berlin, Sherman’s Civil War, 743).

  52. Sears, McClellan, 604.

  53. For the various arguments downplaying the importance of Sherman’s capture of Atlanta, se
e McMurry, Atlanta 1864, 204–8, who examines in depth the argument of Castel that the capture of Atlanta did in fact ensure Lincoln’s election. Cf. McDonough and Jones, War So Terrible, 319–21; and for some statistics on the vote breakdown, compare Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 354–55.

  54. For a harsh appraisal of Grant’s tactics and accompanying losses, see the spirited attack by Liddell Hart, Sherman, 274–75 (e.g., “If the commander had not lost hope, his men fought without it.”). For Sherman not going after Hood from Atlanta, see Woodworth, Sherman, 138–39. On the politics, cf. Liddell Hart, Sherman, 275. Grant felt that taking Richmond at any cost might end the war; Sherman believed that nearly destroying his army to capture Atlanta would still lose Lincoln the election. For McClellan’s discomfort, see Waugh, Reelecting Lincoln, 291–94. Even the Confederacy was confused, as the Augusta Constitutionalist wondered, “Are we to take [McClellan] for a peace candidate or a reconstruction war Democrat?” A much quoted declaration from a Union soldier, “It knocks McClellan into pie,” summed up the general reaction to McClellan’s dilemma; cf. Wortman, Bonfire, 322.

  55. On Sherman’s decision to outsource Hood to Thomas and ignore his movements, cf. Carter, Siege of Atlanta, 352–54. In September and October, Sherman variously considered several marching routes before settling on Savannah as his destination; cf. Trudeau, Southern Storm, 40–43. On breaking and smashing things, see Sword, Southern Invincibility, 308–9.

  56. Sherman, Memoirs, 589. On “irretrievable ruin,” see Bailey, Chessboard of War, 9. If Grant had continually promoted Sherman as his own career ascended, Sherman had also saved Grant: talking him out of resigning after accusations of drunkenness at Shiloh, and now taking Atlanta when Grant was stalled outside Richmond.

  57. Atlanta was shortly reoccupied by southerners after Sherman left, but the city was in such dire condition that the returnees could hardly turn it into a Confederate asset; cf. Wortman, Bonfire, 326–28; Carter, Siege of Atlanta, 22–30. On the importance of the reliable Thomas for Sherman’s gamble, see Einolf, George Thomas, 255–57. For Sherman’s letter to Hood, cf. Simpson and Berlin, Sherman’s Civil War, 711.