by Gant, Jim
Since we could not maintain a twenty-four-hour presence in the village (which they had asked for on two separate occasions), I decided to give them as many weapons and as much ammo as I could get my hands on. I felt like not only was it the best thing to do, but the moral thing to do as well. I had asked them to risk so much—what else was I supposed to do?
I am comfortable with the decision for two reasons. First, the tribe needed more weapons to help defend themselves and, more importantly, Malik Noor Afzhal and his people viewed these weapons as great gifts. These were gifts not only of honor but trust as well. These gifts bound us together even more than we already were. Power in this area was about the ability to put armed men on the ground to attack an adversary or defend their tribe. Guns were the ultimate currency.
A principal tenet of the One Tribe at a Time concept is that US Trial Engagement Teams “advise, assist, train and lead” the tribal forces they are paired with. Under “assist,” we need to add “arm and supply.” I will have more to say about this in Chapter 8: How to Engage the Tribes.
The last time we visited Mangwel, Sitting Bull and Dr. Akhbar’s wives gave me beautiful, hand-made jewelry to specifically give to my wife and daughter. As they handed me these gifts, they told me, “Thank you for what you have done for us. Thank your wife for sending our children gifts.” The jewelry is beautiful, but what it represents means the most.
Bottom Line
We were safer in Mangwel than on our own firebase. The relationships we built there are still reaping dividends in the Konar region, more than six years after we left.
See “Gifts of Honor” on Steven Pressfield’s website at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com.
5
PASHTUNWALI AND ITS TACTICAL APPLICATIONS
Pashtunwali is the code of honor the Pashtun tribes live by. Understanding it is crucial if one is going to learn about or become part of a Pashtun tribe.
The law, as we understand it in the West, is not the basis for the tribal societies. That function is performed by a code of honor. It has been my experience that many Western soldiers—officers and NCOs alike—do not perceive or understand “honor” as an Afghan does. Most Americans view honor as a mixture of honesty, integrity, respect, fairness and loyalty to one’s country. In many ways the tribesmen I have dealt with think of honor in similar terms—as loyalty, courage, the ability to defend themselves, their families and their tribal communities.
But the tribesman is less concerned about “country”—which for him is almost irrelevant—and more concerned about protecting the domain of his family, his customs, his tribal leadership, his warrior pride. He lives in a regional world where day-to-day military strength means the difference between survival and being overrun by other tribal elements whoever they might be (the Taliban, other aggressive tribes, or the Russian army).
There is no larger government force available to intervene and protect him when his tribe is in danger.
“Thus, warlords and warriors fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq and other tribal zones today are renowned for the value they place on upholding codes of honor and avoiding shameful humiliation. All want to gain honor for themselves and their lineage, clan and tribe. No one can afford to lose face, for that would reflect badly not only on them as individuals but also their kin. If the word were in the dictionary, it might be said that tribes and clans are deeply honoritarian.” (Ronfeldt 2006, 35)
A “warrior code” is the centerpiece of the majority of tribal men, young and old, that I have known on a personal level. This code and their conception of honor is the tribe’s collective center of gravity, as well as each individual’s.
Sitting Bull and I often spoke of warriors. ODA 316 and I had proved ourselves in combat to them. It was this ability and opportunity to prove our physical courage to the tribesman that made them truly respect us.
The only other aspects of Pashtunwali I will mention are revenge (badal) and the hospitality (melmastia). The revenge aspect of the tribe in Mangwel was a real and tangible issue. It was interesting to me that this revenge aspect could be put into motion by the mere perception of challenging the tribe’s honor or name. When, at one point, members of the Hezb-e Islami (HIG) accused Malik Noor Afzhal of letting Christianity be spread in his village, we both knew and understood this was a lie. However, it was the issue of his tribe’s honor that caused our combined reaction of violence towards HIG.
“Principles of mutual respect, dignity, pride, and honor are so important in tribal societies that humiliating insults may upset peace and order more than anything else. An insult to an individual is normally regarded as an insult to all who belong to that lineage. Then there are only two ways to alleviate the sense of injury: compensation or revenge. And a call for compensation or revenge may apply not just to the offering individual but to his or her lineage. Responsibility is collective, and justice is less about inflicting punishment for a crime than about gaining adequate compensation or revenge to restore honor. It is not unusual to find clans and tribes engaged in prolonged cycles of reconciliation and revenge; i.e., fusion and fission deriving from insults that happened long ago.” (Ronfeldt 2006, 39)
I would also be remiss if I did not mention the simply remarkable hospitality that we were shown every single time we visited Mangwel. The people always gave the very best of everything they had. They treated us with respect, dignity, and honor in every way, every single time we were together.
“The tribal form, at its best, embodies high ideals about how a society should be organized and how people should treat each other. Today, as in ancient times, social ideals about egalitarianism, mutual caring, sharing, reciprocity, collective responsibility, group solidarity, family, community, civility, and democracy all hark back to tribal principles.” (Ronfeldt 2006, 59)
The honor of an Afghan woman can never be compromised. It sounds contrary to how they treat their women, but that is the point. Their world is one of contradictions (to outsiders) and is very hard to understand.
A personal point on this. I was invited inside the inner rooms of compounds in Mangwel on two occasions. Both times I was presented with gifts from the wives of two separate village elders. Neither time was even my interpreter allowed to go inside. Both times the wife was uncovered and personally handed me the gifts to give to my own wife and daughter.
Hearts and Minds vs. Shame and Honor
Pashtunwali has a definite effect on the tactics, techniques and procedures used, not only to fight the insurgency but to get the local population on our side. The Pashtun tribes will fight any and all outsiders, and refuse to accept being ruled by a central government.
An important tribal concept that the Tribal Engagement Teams must internalize is: “Hearts and Minds vs. Shame and Honor.”
A “warrior code” is the centerpiece of the majority of tribal men, young and old, that I have known on a personal level. This code and their conception of honor is the tribe’s collective center of gravity, as well as each individual’s.
The Pashtun can go from brother to mortal enemy—in sixty seconds. It is one of the things I respect and enjoy most about the Pashtun culture.
It is also important to remember that most of the insurgents are Pashtuns. In many cases the Taliban rule of law (Sharia law) is in direct conflict with Pashtunwali. We currently are not using this to our advantage.
Ask a Pashtun what comes first, Islam or Pashtunwali, and he will invariably answer: “Pashtunwali.” (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009)
“The Pashtun people are unusual in the sense that they will willingly do things if asked respectfully, but will refuse pointblank if ordered to do so or threatened by force. Bombings and missile strikes won’t force them to beg for mercy or cooperate with their attackers. They are made of sterner stuff. Their patience is endless and is borne out by their suffering during the past three decades.” (Yusufzai)
Bottom Line:
A thorough and deep understanding and respect for Pashtunwali is critical for the succ
ess of US Tribal Engagement Teams and the overall US strategy in Afghanistan.
6
SIX PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT COIN STRATEGY AND ITS APPLICATION IN AFGHANISTAN
RAND recently published a detailed and informative book, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, by Seth Jones. It includes an analysis of ninety insurgencies since 1945. The study identifies three major variables correlated with the success and failure of the counterinsurgency efforts.
Capability of indigenous security forces, especially police
Local governance
External support for insurgents, including sanctuary
David Kilcullen has echoed this in a White House briefing in 2008. The Taliban, he declared, has outfought and outthought us on all three critical fronts: “We have failed to secure the Afghan people. We have failed to deal with the sanctuary in Pakistan. The Afghan government does not deliver legitimate, good governance to Afghans at the local level.” (Kilcullen 2008)
What We’re Doing Now
Counterinsurgency strategy is rightly predicated on this primary objective: to “secure the population where they sleep.” But how?
Right now, this effort has come entirely from the Kabul government, either through US forces or through the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).
“The development of Afghan Security Forces has been a badly managed, grossly understaffed and poorly funded mess,” says Anthony Cordesman, analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Moreau and Yousafzai 2009, 33)
Current policy is to pour more time, money and resources into the ANA and ANP. We have been doing this for eight years now and what do we have? The ANA and ANP are symbols of the central government, which at present is not trusted by the tribes.
Yet we continue to stake the success of our mission on their development. We should continue to develop the will and capacity of the ANA and ANP, while simultaneously preparing the tribes to defend themselves.
As Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently said, “My worry is that the Afghans come to see us as part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. And then we are lost.” (Moreau and Yousafzai 2009, 32)
The current program to train Afghan police is understaffed, under-resourced and full of corruption. Most importantly, the tribes’ reluctance to accept any outside influence automatically qualifies them as one of the few viable options available to protect the population. Why continue to work against the tribal structures and traditions already in place? Not only let the tribes protect themselves, but encourage it.
How a Tribal Engagement Strategy (TES) Provides Security
Following the “Clear – Hold – Build” model, a small number of US TETs (Tribal Engagement Teams) —given enough time to train a Tribal Security Force (TSF) and the ability to call for US air support and aerial re-supply and a US Quick Reaction Force in an emergency—could conduct the “hold and build” portion of this strategy with a very limited footprint.
“A man with a gun rules a hundred without one.”
– Vladimir Lenin
We are talking about the tribes providing security for themselves, with the assistance of the US Tribal Engagement Teams.
Security at the local (tribal) level is the key to security and support at the national level. No political change will ever take place without true security at the tribal level. A Tribal Engagement Strategy can help do that.
“We should consider how our counterinsurgency strategies and policies might include non-state groups in a civilian policing role. Scholars and analysts have observed that “third forces”—militias, private military companies, and even criminal organizations—can sometimes be opted to play useful counterinsurgency roles. These irregular forces might be induced to provide police-like protection to the civilian population.” (Rosenau 2008, 22)
“If it is accepted that a major problem of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is the ability to control the villages, a logical conclusion would be that the formation of village militias is necessary.” (Giustozzi 2008, 173)
Tribal militias also would inhibit the Taliban’s ability to attack tribal members (the TSFs/Arbakai). With our Tribal Engagement Team (TET) support, the tribes could retaliate in strength against the Taliban.
Training and building relationships with the leaders of the tribe will be permanent fixes in large areas of rural Afghanistan. We will be able to stay there for the long haul with very little support once the systems are in place and the Tribal Security Forces (Arbakai) are well-trained and we have gained their trust. Trust in the tribe I worked with in Mangwel was worth everything.
The natural governance of Afghanistan is tribal. Through its councils, jirgas and shuras, tribal members have been dispensing justice and providing the means of conflict resolution for centuries.
How a tribal Engagement Strategy Promotes Good Governance
The natural governance of Afghanistan is tribal. Through its councils, jirgas and shuras, tribal members have been dispensing justice and providing the means of conflict resolution for centuries. However, such traditional tribal mechanisms have been weakened by brutal and deliberate campaigns of assassination, intimidation, and co-optation—first by the Soviets, then the warlords, now by the Taliban.
“No one is currently doing the job of actual policing and enforcing the rule of law, keeping the population safe from all corners—including friendly fire and coalition operations, providing justice and dispute resolution, and civil and criminal law enforcement.” (Kilcullen 2008)
Tribal Security Forces could do this through the tribal jirga system, beneath the authority of a tribal council and backed up by a Tribal Engagement Team to bring US resources, leadership and training to bear. Together with the tribal elders, they can act as peacemakers and brokers, bringing the important actors to negotiate.
These traditional institutions can facilitate justice and legitimacy through a local approach to resolving conflicts.
The Taliban…have been working in the villages for years to establish “shadow governments” of Sharia law courts and other indigenous institutions, providing the justice and fair play that the villagers cannot get from a remote and corrupt national government.
The Taliban know this, even if we don’t. They have been working in the villages for years to establish “shadow governments” of Sharia law courts and other indigenous institutions, providing the justice and fair play that the villagers cannot get from a remote and corrupt national government.
“On a national scale, we are not going to win hearts or change minds. This must be done on the ground, person-to-person, by gaining respect and trust with each tribe. In other words, we need to employ a Tactical Engagement Strategy, one tribe at a time. Study and gain a detailed appreciation of Pashtunwali, the honor code of the Pashtuns, in order to communicate effectively, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, within the target audience’s cultural frame of reference.” (McCallister 2008)
Speaking of Iraq, Carter Malkasian and Jerry Meyerle state, “Another way to reduce government misrule could be… to empower traditional tribal structures that may be more representative and have greater authority on the ground.”
“In Afghanistan, tribes are even more important. Most Pashtuns identify themselves first and forever with their tribe, sub-tribe, or clan. Competing political institutions and figures are much weaker and most of the population lives in rural areas, far from government institutions.” (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009)
Another major COIN tenet is to separate the insurgent from the population. The presence of the Tribal Engagement Teams would facilitate this very quickly. Once the TETs were on the ground with the tribal leadership, insurgent elements would either be killed or have to leave the area. The presence of the TETs would also make it difficult for the local Taliban supporters to be mobilized when the Taliban wanted to surge in certain areas.
Local Taliban fighters would be much more inclined to re-integrate into the tribe once the TSFs (Arbakai) start to be i
mplemented. Which low-level Taliban members could re-integrate would, of course, be up to the tribal leadership.
Good governance is the follow-on to reliable security. Tribal Security Forces can facilitate both. “Unless you are confident in the ability of your government to enforce its peace, then the man with a gun at your door at midnight is your master.” (Kelly 2009, 5)
How a Tribal Engagement Strategy Interdicts External Support for Insurgents
The safe-haven issue in the eastern and southern portion of Afghanistan is a huge factor that could potentially cause the failure of the entire campaign. From my own experience, the location and demographics of the village of Mangwel and members of the tribe located there make this a situation where we could and did acquire much more intelligence to make more informed decisions in that region.
Given enough time, effort and resources, a Tribal Engagement Strategy could be expanded to the entire border region, not only policing the infiltration routes from Pakistan (which the tribesmen know as intimately as we know the streets of our own hometown), but providing actionable intelligence about who has crossed over, where they are, and what potential danger they represent.
“Unless you are confident in the ability of your government to enforce its peace, then the man with a gun at your door at midnight is your master.”
– Justin Kelly,
How to win in Afghanistan
Putting US soldiers (TETs) on the ground with the tribes will say more about our commitment than anything else we can do.
“US military operations most succeeded when leaders at the small-unit level had enough leeway, specialized assets, and firepower to engage the population and develop their own intelligence. Indeed, US military doctrine needs to establish far looser and more broadly distributed networks that have a high degree of independence and survivability. (Jones 2008, 98)
