by Gant, Jim
The RAND study also points out four more reasons to depend on indigenous actors to fight the war:
Most insurgencies have taken between eleven and fourteen years to win. Therefore, the indigenous forces eventually will have to win the war on their own, and they must develop the capacity to do so.
For some of our missions we dressed in Afghan garb, especially when we didn’t want the Taliban to know our teams were operating in certain areas. Here I’m in the local garb with AK-47 ready to go. This is my favorite personal photo from Afghanistan.
Indigenous forces usually know the population and terrain better than external actors and are better able to gain intelligence.
A lead US role can be interpreted by the population as occupation (especially in Afghanistan).
A lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they control their own destiny.
Integrating Tribal Security Forces into the National Security Apparatus
These Tribal Security Forces should be used to assist—not replace—the national and local police.
The bond here between the tribal leaders and councils and their US counterparts on the Tribal Engagement Teams is crucial. Remember, tribal honor codes mandate adherence to treaties and contracts, particularly between warriors who have fought side-by-side and risked their lives together.
A vast majority of the tribes just want to be left alone. Years and years of broken promises have severely damaged our ability to deal with the tribes. The Tribal Engagement Teams would show a commitment to the tribes and the tribal leadership that we will be unable to replicate in any other way. Putting US soldiers (TETs) on the ground with the tribes will say more about our commitment than anything else we can do. It will be a great “honor” and show them trust and respect by truly joining forces with them.
Bottom Line:
The GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) must find a way to incorporate the historical tribal structures into the national political system. It will not look like anything we can envision at this point, and may vary from province to province or even from tribe to tribe. But it can be done. Tribal Engagement Teams can help facilitate this.
7
TRIBES AND THE “ENEMY”
While most of the Taliban are from Pashtun tribes, the tribes themselves are not the enemy. The Taliban, al-Qaeda, HIG (Hezb-e Islami), Haqqani and other insurgent networks are the tribes’ enemy—our enemy.
How Tribesmen Become Taliban
The Taliban find many willing recruits among disaffected tribesmen. The Taliban offer fame, glory and the chance to live exciting, meaningful lives. Many recruits see the Taliban as their only way to survive: Kill as a Taliban or be killed by the Taliban.
“By 2006, village jihadists accounted for fifteen to twenty-five percent of the Taliban’s active fighting strength at any given time.” (Giustozzi 2008, 43)
Our Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs) can get inside this disaffection/recruitment cycle and show the tribes that our teams (and by extension, the Coalition Forces and the Afghan central government) are there to help them. If we give them a better alternative—show them that we are their friends and are committed for the long haul—they will not only not attack us, but will be more willing to share intelligence and even come back home and fight for their tribe.
The Taliban Have Been Targeting the Tribes for Years
Taliban assassination teams have killed more than 120 tribal leaders in the past two years alone, and through intimidation driven many more away from their home districts. The practice of delivering “night letters”—written death threats—on tribal leaders’ doorsteps is extremely effective. It’s gangland, Afghan style. But the tribes are not all taking this passively; many are arming and organizing on their own, without US help.
The use of lashkars (Arbakai) is spreading, and we need to be there in the right way to join them as allies, not as intruders. “There is going to be a civil war. These lashkars are spreading,” says Asfandyar Wali Khan, leader of the Awami National Party, which controls the provincial government in the NWFP.
“It will be the people versus the Taliban.” (Wilkinson 2008)
The tribes are forming their own anti-Taliban fighting units, the Arbakai. Their main mission is to protect tribal homelands from any perceived threat (be that US forces, Afghan Army units, Afghan Police units, predatory warlords, al-Qaeda and the Taliban). With our assistance they will grow stronger and be far more effective—and be our allies. Don’t we want to understand their motivations and influence them?
Engaging the tribes and understanding tribalism at its core is the surest and “lightest-footprint” opportunity we have to protect the tribes—the cultural and political foundation of Afghanistan—where they live, one tribe at a time. Doesn’t it make sense to join forces with as many of them as we can, while at the same time gaining valuable intelligence on our enemies? This is a fundamental step in establishing the basis for order and security in this region.
“Pakistan has already armed some of the tribes in areas where the Taliban is attempting to move in. Some of these lashkars have as many as 14,000 members in the FATA (Federally Administrated Tribal Areas) of Pakistan.” (DeYoung 2008)
Many recruits see the Taliban as their only way to survive: Kill as a Taliban or be killed by the Taliban.
One tribal leader was recently quoted as saying, “I don’t need tanks. I don’t need planes. I don’t even need a single bullet. I will use sticks and I will use the guns my people have to defend themselves.” (Sappenfield 2008) Is that clear enough?
The enemy thinks he can wait us out. However, we can turn time into an ally if we engage and partner with the tribes and, most importantly, demonstrate our commitment to them.
Tribalism versus Talibanism
My team and I clearly proved it can be done. Malik Noor Afzhal and his people loved us. They enjoyed our stories and our culture. We were able to disprove many of their preconceived notions about “us” (outsiders, Americans, infidels or whatever).
When we left there, I promise you that the tribe in Mangwel thought very highly of Americans and what we represented, how we acted, and how we treated them. This is not just of tactical importance to understand, but strategic importance as well.
The enemy thinks he can wait us out. However, we can turn time into an ally if we engage and partner with the tribes and, most importantly, demonstrate our commitment to them. Once they believe that we share the same objectives and are not leaving, they will support us and fight alongside us.
“The Taliban is exploiting our major strategic…and tactical weakness: an inability to connect with the population (the tribes). Officials working in Pakistan and Afghanistan support this view, claiming that the youth ‘oppose the current tribal system because they know it is not harnessing its potential.’” (Giustozzi 2008, 39)
My Tribal Engagement Strategy can beat the Taliban at its own game. “In its simplicity and effectiveness, the insurgents’ reliance on small teams to infiltrate villages and weed out pro-Kabul elements was to prove one of the strongest aspects of the Taliban strategy. It pitted Taliban strength (abundance of commitment, ideologically indoctrinated young fighters able to achieve basic tasks even without supervision from field commanders) against government/ Coalition Forces weaknesses (shortage of manpower, little or no presence in the villages, inability to patrol extensively away from the main roads, and a lack of effective intelligence networks in most areas).” (Giustozzi 2008, 102)
We must help the tribes protect themselves by fighting alongside them. Will we make mistakes? Yes. But the risk is well worth the gain.
Bottom Line:
For the Afghan people, the real war is one of Tribalism vs. Talibanism. If we do not move now to support the tribes in this fight for their lives, it will produce a number of consequences, all of them bad: Taliban operations will expand over larger areas, killing more tribesmen and sweeping in more recruits as they go.
The one system in Afghanistan that has been reliable for centuries will continue to crumble, resulting in more disaffected tribal members drifting into terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. Thus we will give up on the most critical element of Afghan society that can ultimately defeat the Taliban—the tribes. We simply cannot let this happen.
My Tribal Engagement Strategy can beat the Taliban at its own game.
8
HOW TO ENGAGE THE TRIBES
Rapport building and cross-cultural competency is the key.
If an important part of our strategy is to build working ground-level alliances with the tribes, how do we make this happen? My ODA 316 and I created a model for successful tribal engagement and all that it requires. The relationships I developed in Iraq and Afghanistan not only worked while we were there, they have stood the test of time and continue to this day. This chapter is all about how our model can be adapted successfully to similar situations anywhere.
First, let’s look at an earlier example of successful tribal engagement. One of the main areas under contention today is in Southeast Afghanistan near Khas Khonar and the Pesch Valley areas. This is exactly where Sitting Bull’s village of Mangwel is located. This same area was one of the British Empire’s most challenging territories. How did they deal with it?
“From the 1890s to 1947, British control relied heavily on a small number of highly trained British officers. These frontier officers were highly educated, committed, conscientious, and hard working. Many had studied law and the history of the area and spoke some of the local languages. They had a deep sense of duty and a strong national identity. All required a depth of administrative competence and judgment to successfully wield the extensive powers at their disposal. They contributed significantly to the province’s security and stability. These men were particularly valuable in navigating the intricacies of tribal politics.” (Roe 2005, 20)
The key to a successful tribal engagement strategy is the ability to identify men (Tribal Engagement Team members) who have a special gift for cross-cultural competency and building rapport—that is, they must become educated in the ways of the tribes and build strong relationships with them based on mutual trust and objectives.
These men must like to fight and spend countless months, even years living in harsh circumstances. They will have to fully comprehend tribal concepts of honor, loyalty and revenge—the Pashtunwali code. Initially, they will have very little physical security other than the AK-47 they carry, their planning skills and the tribal fighters they live with.
Tribal Engagement Team (TET) Challenges
The situation at each tribe will be complex and will vary. Each will present its unique spider web of loyalties and subtle agendas that a Tribal Engagement Team must deal with smartly—and brutally when necessary. At the same time these men must be alert to detect and mediate local rivalries, sometimes within the tribe they are advising. They will have to be subjective on one issue and objective with another.
Five main problems we face in Afghanistan are:
The IED threat, the civilian casualties caused by air strikes, the inability of US forces to protect locals in rural areas, the immediate need for more Afghan and US troops, and the fact that we are losing the tactical and strategic information campaign there.
This tribal engagement plan addresses all five problems head on.
First, the IED threat will decrease to near zero because there will be little need to move troops around. The TETs will live in the village with the tribe. There will be no need to travel the dangerous roads between the firebases and the population.
Second, the TETs will be living with the tribe in its village, so calling in air strikes on your own village is not an option, unless the decision is made by the tribal leader in extreme circumstances. The tribal leader will be the final authority to make the call for air support, thus avoiding civilian casualties in his tribal domain.
Third, TETs living inside the village, not in some distant firebase, will increase the security of the village. The enemy will have to be much more aggressive to penetrate the tribal area, and that will dramatically increase the chances that we (the TET and Arbakai) will be able to kill them.
Fourth, the TETs will decrease the need for both US and Afghan government forces by training and advising a Tribal Security Force (TSF) or Arbakai. The Arbakai could be trained, equipped and organized as a modular, loose-knit unit. Eventually each TSF could be integrated into a kind of confederation—with district, regional and national units—to fight against any greater threat. Attack one tribe and you attack us all. This will take years to accomplish, but it will have tremendous enduring benefits for all concerned.
Fifth, the TETs must develop their own Information Operations and provide ground reports to all news media—the story has to be told. International media coverage of Muslim countries is extremely important. Seventy to eighty percent of the Afghan population cannot read, so videos and the spoken word in Pashto will be essential. This strategy will not work without a major Information Operations (IO) campaign.
Tactical Tribal Engagement
Tactical Tribal Engagement (TTE) is one possible solution in certain areas for the current problems facing the United States military in Afghanistan. This tactical strategy has far-reaching effects that will impact the operational and strategic nature of the war not only in Afghanistan, but across the border region of eastern Afghanistan and the ungoverned areas of the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in Pakistan, specifically the northern FATA areas.
Essential TTE Tasks:
Establish and maintain rapport with the chosen tribe in the area. Advise and assist its leaders in all matters.
Provide real security for the village. Not presence patrols, but 24/7 on-site security. A permanent presence that the tribes can rely on. “Advise, assist, train, equip and lead” a TSF, an Arbakai.
Facilitate tactical civic action programs. Integration with the local Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is crucial, along with the ability to use funds that units have at their disposal for “quick” money to help tribes who are facilitating the success of CF and the Afghan government. The TETs would also address basic healthcare and infrastructure services (water, electricity and irrigation), construction and repair of schools and clinics, both to improve the life of the tribe and employ its individual members for pay. These programs should be worked through the local/district/provincial/national governments when possible and be integrated into the US battle space owner’s overall plan.
Employ an aggressive tactical PSYOP plan that ties into the overall strategic IO campaign in the area. Tribes also can heavily counter the Taliban propaganda. This is a critical aspect of the success of the TTE strategy. The world has to see the Afghan tribes and US soldiers working, living, laughing, fighting and dying together.
Report “Ground Truth” continuously. This activity would tie the tribe in with all levels of the government system. It would also be the process by which the tribe’s concerns are relayed directly to the CF military apparatus. Such ongoing accounting would serve as a check and balance, reporting what is actually happening on the ground as opposed to what the GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) may say is happening. “Ground Truth” provides feedback to headquarters level units (battle space owners) in charge of the area ANA and ANP.
“I want the entire plan to be so effective that the Taliban feel threatened by our very presence, without us even firing a shot.”
TET solutions should always be answers to local problems, yet always with an eye to integration with regional and national government representatives. It will also be imperative for TETs to watch for scenarios where local/district/provincial/national government forces can be successful. In other words, cooperate and help set the government up for success.
In return, the TSFs and tribal members would provide security, intelligence and early warning of insurgent attacks to the TETs, who would then pass this on to hig
her commands.
Mission Statement of a TET Leader:
I will train myself, my Tribal Engagement Team and my tribal counterpart for the tactical fight every single day.
I will establish strong, meaningful relationships with the tribal leaders.
My goal is to establish a relationship with my tribal counterpart, for my team to establish a strong relationship with the tribe; to establish focused security for the tribe and the locals in the area; to plan, develop and then implement a well-conceived IO, PSYOP and CA plan.
I want to make it so the Taliban and al-Qaeda have no choice but to come and meet us on our terms.
I want the entire plan to be so effective that the Taliban feel threatened by our very presence, without us even firing a shot.
A Key Requirement is to Tie the Tribe and the TET into the Following Areas:
The local ANA and ANP.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
National level Information Operations facilitators to include all major news agencies and publications.
The local US forces (battle space owners).
The ODA in the area.
Higher echelon PSYOP units.
Higher echelon CA units.
Access to air assets for re-supply and CAS.
NGOs
Report “Ground Truth” to higher commands. Be the conduit of information and requests from the GIRoA and higher to and from the tribes. Report “Ground Truth” as well as the tribes’ perceptions and expectations to the GIRoA and higher.
