Decoding the IRA

by Tom Mahon

  The raids were a disaster. Aside from the killings, which elicited a swift response from the gardaí – and met with disapproval from the public and even from within the IRA’s own ranks – little information or weapons were acquired, while many IRA units were either unable or unwilling to participate.219

  Cooney confided to a colleague: ‘From reports to hand many areas refused to carry out the raids.’220 Even the diehard republican, Tom Maguire of Mayo, disobeyed orders: ‘Tom McGuire [sic] conveyed [the] order to [his] adj. [adjutant] but cancelled it at the last moment.’221 The Offaly brigade’s excuse for its inactivity was that a supervising staff officer hadn’t arrived from GHQ as promised: ‘[The chief of staff] was to send down a staff officer to this area, to make final arrangements for the executions [sic] of the operations, which were to be brought off in this area on Sunday last. I and [the] staff here, very closely scrutinised the details necessary for the bringing off of the well planned raids on the Tullamore and Birr barracks, but were badly disappointed by no staff officer turning up. What a pity it was, that this area was not included in the lists of last Sunday’s activities. I presume the arrest of Moss would account for the mix-up.’222 Cooney (rather magnanimously) replied to this lack of initiative: ‘I regret very much that final instructions were not sent [to] you. Everyone at GHQ were convinced that your area was already informed of the date. Arrest of [the] C.S. [chief of staff] was responsible for the hitch.’223

  There was also dissent in Tipperary, and GHQ wrote to the brigade OC: ‘Re. refusal of units to carry out raids, it is advisable that no undue haste be shown in dealing with those units. Our main efforts should be devoted to keeping the organisation intact against the present enemy offensive. That areas were not prepared for immediate operations is evident, but for future work I am convinced that these areas will not be caught napping. The moral to be impressed on all officers, is that they should be prepared and ready for all eventualities in a military organisation such as ours.’224

  Within days the government proclaimed a state of emergency and the police rounded up over 110 republicans across the country.225 ‘Flying squads of armed detectives carried out numerous raids.’226 In Dublin Special Branch officers searched well-known IRA haunts such as the Clarence and Exchange hotels looking for Cooney and other GHQ officers.227 An Phoblacht’s offices were raided and the printing press was smashed, preventing the production of the 3 December issue.228 Cooney reported: ‘Men and women are being arrested daily. Raiding is as intensive as in the old days.’229 He even managed to strike a note of defiance: ‘Most leaders arrested and will be interned. [There is a] big offensive by the enemy to crush the army. They will not succeed, but our task will be tremendous.’230

  In pre-dawn raids Frank Kerlin and George Plunkett were among twelve leading IRA members arrested in Dublin. They were remanded in custody for a week and though discharged on 24 November, the court had them immediately re-arrested under the Public Safety Act.231 Others arrested included John Joe Sheehy, OC of the Kerry 1 brigade, and Michael Kilroy and Dr J. A. Madden, both of the North Mayo brigade.232

  However, it was the arrests in Cork city that proved the most problematic for the IRA’s leadership. Initially forty republicans were arrested there, but the majority were released and just ten were remanded in custody for a week. This latter group comprised some of the city’s leading IRA gunmen from the time of the Anglo-Irish War, many of whom were either in the process of resigning or had already left the IRA and were supporters of Fianna Fáil. They included P. A. Murray, who was on the Army Executive and had recently been adjutant general, Mick Murphy, who was also a member of the Army Executive, and Tom Crofts, who had been OC of the 1st Southern division during the Civil War. Disappointed with the pointless killing of Garda Sergeant Fitzsimons and wishing to distance themselves from the organisation, they recognised the court, obtained legal representation and were granted bail. All of this was against the IRA’s General Order 24, which barred recognition of Free State courts. The lawyer for Tom Crofts and one of the other defendants stated that ‘he wished to say that his clients had not hand, act or part in the occurrences of that Sunday night, which they all so deplored and regretted’,233 while Mick Murphy referred to the raids as ‘regrettable happenings’ and that he had ‘severed my connection with all political military organisations over twelve months ago’.234

  Figure 16. In the aftermath of the barrack raids Andy Cooney wrote to a colleague, warning him not to return to Ireland for the time being. He addressed his comrade as ‘A Chara dhil’ or ‘dear friend’ and may have been writing to Seán Russell.

  [John Joe] Sheehy, [Michael] Kilroy and [Dr J. A.] Madden are among latest arrests. Clarence, and Exchange [Hotels] searched for you, and me. All the Dublin men [have been] interned under new Act. George [Gilmore] and Moss [Twomey] will be tried this week. I fear the former has been identified for rescue.

  From reports to hand, many areas refused to carry out the raids. Mick Murphy, Moss Donegan, and four or five others, arrested in Cork have written [to] the press, denying all connection with [a] military organisation. They deplored the murders [of the two gardaí] and have done much harm amongst the rank and file. Cork No. 1 is working normally, nothwithstanding arrest of all its late officers.

  Tom McGuire [sic] conveyed [the] order to [his] adj. [adjutant] but cancelled it at last moment. Ned Rielly [sic] is being eagerly looked for.

  We are going to have a difficult time to pull through. The Army, as a whole, was not prepared for the operation, and there will be much local dissension.

  Could you get a covering address? Your own name on letters is bad.

  A young daughter [was born] to Sean and Kid [MacBride] and we can’t celebrate the event.

  ‘James’ has refused the cash he promised Moss. [He] will now only give us [£]100 per month. [I] am going to see him tomorrow.

  So public a break with the IRA – by men who had fought a hard battle against the British – provoked an angry response from within the organisation. In particular Mick Murphy’s comments were singled out for criticism. Cooney reported: ‘Mick Murphy, Moss Donegan, and four or five others, arrested in Cork have written [to] the press, denying all connection with [a] military organisation. They deplored the murders and have done much harm amongst the rank and file. Cork No. 1 [brigade] is working normally, notwithstanding [the] arrest of all its late officers.’235 He accused them of having ‘done much harm by surrendering completely to enemy aggression’.236 Interestingly, Cooney himself was likely disturbed by the killing of the two gardaí and used the term ‘murder’.

  As Murphy planned to emigrate to America, Cooney sent word across to the IRA’s agent there, ‘Mr Jones’: ‘Mick Murphy’s attitude is [by] far the most serious, as his statements are untrue and every[body] knows so. He is a member of the Executive and of Cork 1 Bde [brigade]. He never resigned from either. As he is reported to be going to America, I consider it essential that ye have these facts.’237 ‘Jones’ who was a fellow Corkonian, replied: ‘[I] am aware of [the] action of [the] Cork people. If any one of them come to this country they will be treated as they deserve.’238 Connie Neenan, who was also from Cork and based in New York, wrote: ‘The action of [the] Cork officers who surrendered was condemned by all. It was a deplorable step by men who should at least remain loyal [even] if [they’re] otherwise inactive.’239 He added that, embarrassed by their ex-comrades’ betrayal, the Liam Lynch IRA Club in New York, which was composed of veterans from Cork, contributed to a special IRA emergency appeal: ‘[The] Liam Lynch Club [of] New York contributed [the] largest sum, as proof of their repudiation of [the] Cork officers.’ 240

  The arrest of Twomey and other senior officers thrust Cooney into the centre of the action. To add to his worries, a financial crisis occurred on 17 November when the Soviets abruptly announced that they would drastically decrease their funding of the IRA (see Chapter 8). This forced Cooney to travel to London the following week to meet ‘James’, the Soviet intell
igence officer there – but to no avail.241 The only other potential source of significant revenue was Clan na Gael in America and he wrote asking for an urgent fund drive. Cooney was so desperate that he even threatened to disband the IRA unless adequate support was forthcoming from the Clan (see Chapter 7).242 And to save money GHQ sent a letter to the OC in Britain telling him to close up his operation there.243

  The Free State government, having made its point, soon relaxed the pressure. On 17 December An Phoblacht reported that the charges against Moss Twomey were dropped by the Circuit Criminal Court in Dublin, though the paper was indignant that the president of the government, William Cosgrave, had attempted ‘to prejudice his case, while he was on remand, by describing him as Chief of Staff of the IRA’. On his discharge Twomey was immediately rearrested and interned again in Mountjoy, only to be finally released very soon afterwards, along with the other internees.244

  On 17 December Frank Kerlin wrote to one of the IRA’s convicted prisoners, Mick Price, in Mountjoy: ‘[The] internees are all released.’245 Moss Twomey also wrote to Price on the same day: ‘You must have been as surprised as ourselves to hear that we had been released. We were sure when called out that we were to be sent to some other prison. We were only hoping that all political prisoners in the place would be cleared out as well. It would not in the least surprise me if yourself and Donal [O’Donoghue] were released before Xmas. I am not saying this in any way to cheer you up … [I] got [a] note in prison from yourself and Donal. [I] had [a] reply written and smokes ready when [I was] released … [I] cannot yet form [a] judgement on [the] situation [following the raids]. Things are not so upset as I expected.’246

  Within the IRA the verdict on the raids was decidedly mixed. The 4th battalion of the Dublin brigade wrote that the battalion council ‘was unanimous in their demand that an explanation is due from H.Q. re. the above [barrack raids]. Isolated Raids as in our opinion shuch [sic] activities have been instrumental in creating an atmosphere that facilitated the Free State Government in declaring a State of War, resulting in the Safety of the Army [IRA] in general been [sic] seriously jeopardised … [the raids have] proven detrimental to the [republican] movement in general.’247 At the other end of the spectrum, Connie Neenan reported: ‘The recent attacks at home by the army gave rise to great enthusiasm and admiration here amongst all our fellows. We should gain considerably in membership and finance’, though he did admit that ‘the army has an enormous task [ahead of it]’.248 Also in New York, the Irish World led with a triumphant front-page headline: ‘Spy lists seized by Irish Republicans’.249

  Moss Twomey alluded to these differences of opinion when he wrote: ‘There appears to be a very emphatic demand that the army decide what the policy is to be, as regards the question of armed activity.’250 Andy Cooney expressed a somewhat similar concern: ‘We are going to have a difficult time to pull through. The army, as a whole, was not prepared for the operation, and there will be much local dissension.’251 The failure of officers and men to carry out orders and the inability of the leadership to discipline them are ominous signs in any military organisation. Without discipline and cohesion the IRA was incapable of carrying on any sustained or determined campaign. The organisation was now split into at least two major camps: one supporting Twomey and GHQ and the other supporting de Valera and Fianna Fáil. One solution that Twomey suggested, and if it had been implemented would have greatly strengthened the IRA, was of forming a smaller, more clandestine and better-trained army: ‘[The] feeling is growing in favour of a smaller and more secret active organisation and for organising other volunteers and ex-volunteers in an open organisation.’252

  In contrast to Twomey and Cooney, Seán Russell felt that the raids presented an opportunity for republican unity. He wrote to Twomey in May 1927: ‘You will remember, following the barrack raids last November, how Dev, believing that a National crisis had arisen, requested a meeting of SF, FF and army representatives (as nominated by the army). The Free Staters by their action in arresting army Officers of both sides made such a meeting possible. The army at that time, I believe, failed to take advantage of a favourable opportunity to bring about the unity we work so hard to make today. The Staters, realising that the arrests had the opposite effect to that which they desired, ordered the release of all the internees.’ This spurred on Russell to propose a joint anti-imperialist platform with Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin – with the IRA blowing up statues and symbols of British imperialism.253

  While GHQ had learned its lesson and the raids weren’t repeated, it was important to propagate the notion that they had achieved some degree of success. Twomey wrote in early February 1927 to Connie Neenan: ‘Explain barrack attacks were for intelligence purposes. [I] heard there was disappointment [over] there, when [they were] not followed up.’254

  As for the Cork officers, in April 1927 the Army Executive urged that the Army Council take steps to see that both Mick Murphy and P. A. Murray were brought before a court martial ‘without further delay’.255

  Overall the raids had a detrimental effect on the organisation and likely precipitated the resignation of many members. In 1970 Bowyer Bell wrote about ‘practically everyone’s desire for a second round’ of raids.256 From the information now available, this statement is clearly inaccurate. Bowyer Bell doesn’t reference this statement but it’s likely that he got it from Andy Cooney whom he interviewed in the 1960s. This and the other comments by Bowyer Bell on the raids appear to be Cooney’s later explanation and justification for the raids, rather than an accurate representation of the events.

  It’s also noteworthy that despite the killing of two unarmed gardaí the IRA internees were all soon released. This was part of a pattern of largely lenient treatment by the authorities at the time. Though the Special Branch could still badly mistreat prisoners and regularly harassed known IRA operatives, under the circumstances the Free State was rather benign in its treatment of the IRA. This policy was probably as successful at undermining the organisation as repression would have been. The gardaí and courts were often successful in persuading defendants to recognise the courts, apply for bail, etc. – all of which was against IRA rules (and specifcally General Order 24). And a frustrated Twomey reported: ‘The enemy do not want to have political prisoners, if he can get them to leave the Organisation or trick them into doing something for which he knows he will be dismissed.’257 Even senior officers laid themselves open to the accusation of cooperating with the enemy, and in December 1926 the director of intelligence, Frank Kerlin, had to send a letter to Donal O’Donoghue in Mountjoy: ‘Re. [your] attitude towards [the] appeal tribunal. It is to be considered as [a] Free State court and no appeal [is to be made]. [I] am sending [you a] copy of GO [General Order] 24 for reference.’258

  The republican election pact

  By 1927 many in the Free State looked forward to the possibility of a change of government in the upcoming summer’s general election. The ruling Cumann na nGaedheal party was unpopular among many sections of the public and in particular the Intoxicating Liquor Bill was badly received. In addition, those republicans who had reluctantly supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Free State were very dissatisfied with the outcome of the Boundary Commission and the resultant accommodation the government reached with Britain and the Northern Ireland state.259 Far from emasculating Northern Ireland (as many in southern Ireland had hoped it would), the commission had the opposite effect of helping to bolster the new state. This disquiet began to express itself in calls for the IRA to broker an alliance of Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin to contest the election. In the words of Moss Twomey: ‘Efforts [for an alliance] are chiefly by Treatyite opponents of [the] present government.’260

  Many felt a unified republican platform could win a majority at the election, enabling the republican deputies to form a government, renege on the Treaty and establish a republic. Such a plan was doubly attractive to the IRA in that it would both help to maintain the unity of the organisation and allow it
to seize power.261 After the dismal performance of the IRA during the barrack raids it should have been clear to GHQ that it was incapable of a conventional fight against the Free State army and needed the assistance of some such stratagem. Twomey wrote: ‘We felt justified in making the effort for several reasons; chiefly because of hope we entertained of getting [a] majority [in the Dáil] and if we did not, to prevent an acute division in the Army over [the] elections.’262

  Peadar O’Donnell, Moss Twomey and Seán MacBride worked together to draw up a detailed proposal to be put before representatives of the three key republican groups: the IRA, Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil.263 The plan called for events to unfold in the following sequence: representatives of Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin and the Army Council would meet and constitute themselves as a National Board. The board would approve a panel of republican candidates for the election and would also approve the campaign and election literature of the candidates. Before the election it would select the members of the future republican cabinet. On winning the election, the republican TDs were to refuse to attend the (Free State) Dáil, and to instead form an Assembly, which included representatives from the six counties of Northern Ireland. The Assembly would declare itself the ‘sovereign Assembly of the country’ and annul the Free State Constitution and the Anglo-Irish Treaty or ‘all Imperial commitments’. This Assembly and its cabinet now became the ‘lawful’ legislature and government of the Irish Republic, with the ‘ Second Dáil’ and its ‘Republican Government’ transferring over its ‘powers and functions’. So as not to alarm Britain, the actual declaration of an Irish Republic could be delayed! Then, moving carefully, the new government would disband the Free State army and replace it with the IRA.