Decoding the IRA

by Tom Mahon

  During the barrack raids of November 1926 the brigade again managed to avoid action but the unit’s first staff officer came up with an alternative proposal to GHQ. Writing in an awkward style, he suggested: ‘In this area’s case, however, I have certain incumbent action otherwise, to be executed here [sic]. Action, which if carried out, universally will strike terror into the hearts of our opponents. There are ten men in this area – who come under the category of spies, baillifs [sic], sheriff, and judiciary – to be shot here. Will you acquiesce in making a General Order in this direction, for Friday night the 3rd [of December] [ap]prox. between the hours of 7 and 10 o’clock? Signed, 1st Staff Officer, Offaly Area.’35

  Two weeks later the staff officer sent details to the chief of staff of some of these ‘notorious spies’. A national school teacher from Daingean, by the name of McInerney, showed his British sympathies by wearing a poppy on Remembrance Day and selling poppies at the school. He was reported to carry a revolver and to regularly drop into the local garda barracks. At the time of the barrack raids he was quoted as saying that if the IRA attacked the barracks, they should be let in and then murdered by the gardaí, though the IRA staff officer didn’t elaborate as to how the unarmed gardaí would accomplish this.

  John Lennon from Tullamore was an IRA officer arrested by the gardaí for selling poteen. To be treated leniently, he and his brother allegedly offered to inform for the gardaí and to give information on the whereabouts of IRA weapons. The staff officer said that Lennon’s brother then asked to meet him. Knowing it was a trap, the officer didn’t attend the proposed rendezvous and Special Branch officers were later seen at the meeting place searching for him.

  John Campbell of Rahan had been dismissed from the IRA during the Civil War for signing a written undertaking not to engage in future armed activities against the state. He went on to work as a paid informer for the Special Branch and tried to recruit other IRA members. On one occasion the gardaí raided an IRA house looking for a secret room which was used to store weapons. Campbell was suspected of having given the information to the gardaí, as he was said to be the only one outside of the household who knew of the existence of the room. The gardaí also uncovered some weapons in the area and for this Campbell received £30. In this case the IRA’s informant was reported to have been a brother in a religious order who was related to a garda chief superintendent.

  John Rigney was a ‘scoundrel’ and an officer in the Free State army whose family betrayed two IRA men who sought refuge at their home during the Civil War. The men were soon arrested and later executed. It was said that ‘Rigney and a party of military feasted the evening of the arrest at his house in apparent jubilation for the capture.’

  The final ‘spy’ listed was Major General Prout, who had been a senior divisional commander of the Free State’s national army during the Civil War. He fought in the Tipperary/Waterford region where his troops were regarded as undisciplined and frequently drunk and he himself was accused of being weak and incompetent. Towards the end of the war in April 1923 his soldiers killed Liam Lynch and arrested several leading IRA officers.

  Figure 18. The chief of staff wrote to the Offaly brigade seeking to thwart the unit’s plan to shoot several suspected ‘spies’. Moss Twomey was in prison at the time and therefore Andy Cooney may have been the author. It was written in 1926, and not 1923.

  List of spies [you sent] noted. Am forwarding it to DI [Director of Intelligence] for his information. Your last paragraph is not clear. Are you able to carry out the annihilation of all known spies? If so, is your Brigade in a position to look after the men, who may have to go on the run? GHQ cannot give any assistance whatever, not having any money

  The best action to be taken against those agents is publicity. [Placing] prominent notices in conspicuous places, and tying them to chapel gates will render their usefulness as spies worthless.

  [Regarding] Major [General] Prout, I understand, certain action was to be taken. Has this been done?

  The IRA staff officer sought to justify these intended killings by disingenuously comparing them to Michael Collins’ execution of (actual) British intelligence agents during the Anglo-Irish War: ‘I am sure you will agree with me when I state that it was the annihilation of the spies which brought about the consolidation of our position in the old days. Similar action to my mind is again incumbent on our part.’36

  Fortunately GHQ didn’t share the Offaly officer’s enthusiasm and a despatch was sent from headquarters (likely written by Andy Cooney): ‘The operation you suggest requires more consideration, before sanction for its execution could be granted. Permission cannot at present be given.’37 Headquarters followed this up with a letter asking: ‘Are you able to carry out the annihilation of all known spies? If so, is your brigade in a position to look after the men, who may have to go on the run? GHQ cannot give any assistance whatever, not having any money.’ GHQ offered a much more practical solution: ‘The best action to be taken against those agents is publicity. [Placing] prominent notices in conspicuous places and tying them to chapel gates will render their usefulness as spies worthless.’38 This despatch appears to have finally put the matter to rest.

  Connaught

  Overall the IRA in Connaught was weak and largely inactive. Nominally Mayo had a large IRA contingent, though it went into rapid decline and from 1926 to 1930 the membership of the Claremorris brigade declined from 227 to 40.39

  In September 1926 the OC of the Connemara battalion spent three days inspecting the South Galway brigade and reported: ‘[I] found the area so badly disorganised that I could not find a single officer who could exactly tell me what rank he held.’ He was unable to find any member of the brigade staff. But eventually ‘after much trouble and searching’ came across one of the ‘old veterans’, ‘Packie Ruane’ of Menlough who agreed to summon a meeting of the officers (if required) and to reply to despatches from GHQ. Letters for Ruane were to be sent via a covering address — ‘Michael Crehan, Menlough, Ballinasloe’ — from where they’d be forwarded to Ruane.40 When Moss Twomey later visited the area he arranged to meet the brigade’s officers at Turley’s pub in Newbridge, where ‘everybody in it [is] alright’.41 Unfortunately for the IRA Packie Ruane eventually went the way of many other IRA veterans and was appointed chairman of the local Fianna Fáil cumann.42

  There were two IRA brigades in Mayo, the North Mayo brigade with a reported 520 members and in the south the Claremorris brigade with 227.43 As with all IRA units these numbers were largely imaginary. Both brigades were badly demoralised by the exodus of volunteers, many of whom either emigrated or joined Fianna Fáil. In June 1927 a grand total of seven members defied GHQ by standing as candidates in the general election, and four were elected – three for Fianna Fáil and one for Sinn Féin. Michael Kilroy, who was the most prominent IRA commander from the county and was a member of the Army Executive, was among those elected for Fianna Fáil.44 Kilroy was later ‘dismissed’ from the brigade.45 Needless to say it was unlikely that those who remained were the cream of the crop.

  The plight of Michael Kitterick illustrates the situation many volunteers, particularly those from the poorer counties of the west, now found themselves in. The North Mayo brigade headquarters recommended to GHQ that the IRA should employ him as a weapons instructor. This offer seemed primarily motivated by a desire to help out an unemployed comrade. Kitterick was an ‘unattached’ officer, meaning that he was no longer active. He was ‘very intelligent and extremely enthusiastic about Army affairs’. Following his release from prison in 1924 (and due to his association with the IRA) he was unable to find ‘casual employment’ locally and emigrated to Liverpool, but not finding a job there either he soon returned to Mayo. Kitterick had fought for the IRA in both the Anglo-Irish War and the Civil War and had no civilian vocational skills, though he was able to instruct in ‘general organisation and advanced infantry training’ and was a ‘qualified trainer … [for the] Vickers [and] Lewis [machine guns] and [the] Stokes
trench mortar’.46 While the IRA was known to possess a number of these machine guns, they had few if any Stokes mortars. However, being a relatively portable weapon, capable of firing an eleven-pound shell 800 yards every two seconds, it had the potential to be devastatingly effective if used by a properly trained and equipped IRA.47 This was the sort of weapon that Twomey, as chief of staff, should have tried to acquire!

  Northern Ireland

  In 1926 the IRA had 517 members in the six counties of Northern Ireland, with 242 volunteers attached to the Belfast battalion alone. Remarkably this number remained stable in 1930, though the total membership of the IRA declined significantly.48 This was likely a testament to the de facto dis-enfranchisement and marginalisation of the Catholic nationalist minority in the north rather than any organisational skills of the IRA.

  The predicament of the nationalists in the north however remained of peripheral concern to the IRA’s leadership in Dublin. Moss Twomey and his colleagues were more focused on dealing with the Free State and minimising the threat posed by Fianna Fáil.

  The despatches show that the IRA was relatively powerless, isolated and weak in the north. The twenty-three volunteers in Antrim (outside of Belfast) were so cut off that the chief of staff wondered how he could remain in contact with them.49 The IRA didn’t appear to have any significant intelligence sources in the state. The only exception was some low-level information obtained on the police in Armagh, which suggested that the IRA had an informant either in the barracks or one who had access to the post sent to the barracks.50

  GHQ sent an organiser, Staff Captain Wilson, to work in the north.51 There he set up a joint IRA–Sinn Féin committee to organise commemorations for the anniversary of the eighteenth-century United Irishman, Wolfe Tone. Wilson, however, found the committee ‘very slow’ and had ‘to quicken them up’.52

  Wilson also appointed ‘Dan Turley’ as OC of the Belfast battalion. He regarded Turley as ‘the only member of the [battalion’s] staff one could consider’ for the position.53 The chief of staff, however, wrote: ‘I am not quite sure that the appointment you have will work out satisfactorily as I think he is an officer who is rather hard to get on with, though I have no doubt he is one of the best otherwise.’54 Unfortunately for Turley’s sake he was to find a place in the history of the IRA. He was a longstanding Belfast republican, having acted as an election agent for Sinn Féin in the city in 1918 and since then had served numerous terms of imprisonment. In the 1930s he was the battalion’s intelligence officer; however, following a number of successful police raids and arrests, he came under suspicion of being an informer. The IRA brought him across the border to a house, where he was beaten and tortured with a pliers and a poker. A subsequent court martial in Dublin found him guilty of spying and sentenced him to death, though this was commuted to banishment from Ireland. He agreed to the sentence and went to live in Britain. However, lonely and unable to support his family, he returned to Belfast after six months. There he spent most of his time in a secret room in his house, only venturing out at night. Friends warned him that the IRA would kill him, but he stayed and continued to protest his innocence. Finally in December 1937 he was shot dead on his way to mass. Twomey later refused to comment directly on the killing, merely saying: ‘He would not have been shot had he followed my advice which was to remain in Scotland.’ Turley’s family remained staunch republicans (with both of his sons members of the IRA) and they put considerable effort into trying to prove his innocence.55

  Aside from sending despatches by courier, GHQ had difficulty communicating with its northern units. Wilson noted that: ‘The post is not safe for any length of time as the censorship is still pretty active here.’56 At least two addresses were used for sending letters – ‘John Rafferty, The Stores, Katesbridge, Belfast’ (the cover name for Rafferty was ‘Mr Johnson’)57 and ‘Miss May Watters, 117 Butler Street, Belfast’.58 Miss Watters was presumably related to Tommy Watters who later became general secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland in 1941.59 The officers of the Belfast battalion could be contacted by calling on ‘Mrs Cooley, 74 Cavendish Street, Clonard, Belfast’.60

  Attempts were also made to smuggle in copies of An Phoblacht and the chief of staff wrote to Wilson: ‘You never reported how you would suggest An Phoblacht can be got over the border. Would you get it in at a few places? Hegarty’s of Derry have a place just outside the border and run a car across every day – without much searching.’61 In 1930 a man from Tyrone was reported to have received a month in prison for possessing a single copy of the paper.62

  Two volunteers from the village of Leitrim, in County Down, ‘Eddie Toman and Barney Cunningham’, were reported as anxious to become involved again with the IRA following their release from prison in 1924.63

  The IRA’s representative in New York reported to Twomey that a number of veterans there were critical of GHQ’s efforts in the north: ‘There is a group of Six County men, very active here, [and] they think you are neglecting their area. They say there is no [IRA] organization in the north, and it is only [a] waste of time to send a man from the FS [Free State] area to reorganize them. He will not be listened to. One of them have [sic] volunteered to go over and reorganize that area, if you give him the necessary authorization. His name is Frank Donnelly, of County Tyrone. He is an exceptionally good man, and is willing to report at once. In doing this, he is making a great sacrifice, as he has a good business [here].’64 Andy Cooney sent a rather indignant reply denying that the IRA were ‘neglecting the place’ and defended Captain Wilson. ‘I have only to say that a GHQ Officer has been permanently stationed in the Six Counties, since December last, on organisation work. They also have a representative on the [Army] Executive and on the Army Council.’65 Jones further pressed his case and finally Twomey sent a more diplomatic reply than Cooney’s rebuttal. ‘Personally I consider it unnecessary at this stage for [the] Six Counties man [Frank Donnelly] to come over. He will not be able to do much and may only become a financial responsibility. Of course if he is anxious it would be wrong to prevent him. It is really the spirit, as you state, that we should encourage and we should not do anything which might give the impression that this is not the spirit we wish to prevail.’ This exchange highlights the difference in personality between Moss Twomey and Andy Cooney, and is a reminder of the skills that made Twomey such a popular leader.

  While these reports and despatches don’t constitute a comprehensive overview of all the IRA’s units, they all support the same conclusion. The IRA was disorganised, unprepared, split and disintegrating.

  CHAPTER 5

  Intelligence

  Seán Hogan has offered his services to [Chief Superintendent] Neligan for money.

  IRA chief of staff

  Warder Bailey … is always prepared to work for money.

  IRA Department of Intelligence

  Frank Kerlin, the IRA’s director of intelligence, oversaw a clandestine network that extended throughout the country. He received reports and tips from sympathisers and IRA men, along with a small number of key informants. This chapter provides a rare glimpse into that network.

  Historical background

  The Anglo-Irish War has been called ‘overwhelmingly an intelligence war’ and on the intelligence front the IRA was the clear victor.1 It was Michael Collins, the IRA’s director of intelligence at the time, who established a highly effective intelligence system throughout the country. Intelligence officers were appointed to local IRA units and oversaw the gathering of information on the British police and army, as well as suspected sympathisers. Countless men and women were prepared to pass information to the IRA. Especially valuable were those employed in transport and communications, such as railway porters and post office clerks, along with hotel staff. This information was supplemented by frequent raiding of the mail by the IRA. A number of members of the police also communicated with the organisation, either out of a sense of nationalist sympathy or fear of the IRA. In Dublin, Collins controlled a group
of high-value agents within the police and the British administration at Dublin Castle. One of the most important of his sources was David Neligan, a Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) detective.2

  With the aid of a small group of gunmen, known as the ‘Squad’, Collins used targeted assassination to eliminate British intelligence capability in Dublin. These efforts culminated in November 1920 in the ‘Bloody Sunday’ killing of fourteen British officers and ended British covert intelligence for the remainder of the struggle.3

  Soon after the Treaty of 1922 Collins set up an armed ‘police’ force based in Oriel House, Dublin, which became know as the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) or simply ‘Oriel House’. It was staffed largely by ex-IRA men, including intelligence officers and members of the ‘Squad’. The CID protected the government in Dublin and assisted the army in the Civil War fight against the IRA.4 Members lacked discipline and organisation and the force became notorious for the brutal treatment and killing of prisoners.5 In November 1923, with the ending of the Civil War, the CID was disbanded.6

  Meanwhile, in February 1922, an unarmed Civic Guard was formed, which was soon renamed the Garda Síochána (Guardians of the Peace). In 1925 the Garda Special Branch, under the command of David Neligan, took over responsibility from the army for combating the IRA. The Special Branch was the only armed section of the Garda Síochána. While the gardaí became well accepted by the community, the Special Branch, though considerably less brutal than the CID, was unpopular and known for its rough treatment of republicans.7 As a mark of its disdain the IRA continued to refer to the Special Branch as the ‘CID’.

  In July 1925 the Special Branch raided a house in Adelaide Road, Dublin and captured the IRA’s director of intelligence, Michael Carolan, along with a considerable file of intelligence papers. Carolan was sentenced to a year in jail and his assistant, Frank Kerlin, succeeded him.8