110. McDonough, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 52.
111. Ibid., 62.
112. Ibid.
113. Hehn, Low Dishonest Decade, 175.
114. Ferguson, War of the World, 332–33.
115. Hehn, Low Dishonest Decade, 220.
116. Ferguson, War of the World, 368.
117. Quigley, Tragedy & Hope, 635.
118. Ferguson, War of the World, 347.
119. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 118.
120. “Wallis Simpson, the Nazi Minister, the Telltale Monk and an FBI Plot,” UK Guardian, June 29, 2002.
121. Charles Higham, The Duchess of Windsor: The Secret Life (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 362–63.
122. Jonah Goldberg, Liberal Fascism: The Secret History of the American Left from Mussolini to the Politics of Meaning (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 147.
123. Ibid., 147.
124. Ibid., 148.
125. Stanley L. Ganskins, “Bernard Baruch, Exponent of Preparedness,” Master’s Thesis, University of Cincinnati, 1950, 86.
126. David Clay Large, Between Two Fires: Europe’s Path in the 1930s (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 176–77.
127. Hehn, Low Dishonest Decade, 63.
128. McDonough, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 74.
129. Ibid.
130. Johnson, Modern Times (1991), 356.
131. Ibid., 360.
132. Paul Kengor, Dupes: How America’s Adversaries Have Manipulated Progressives for a Century (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2010), 151–59, and on the American Peace Mobilization, 139–59.
133. Johnson, Modern Times, 361.
134. Ferguson, War of the World, 470.
135. Ibid., 473.
136. Ibid., 471.
137. Ibid.
138. James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 6–7; Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control Between the Wars (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 64; Sadao Asada, “The Japanese Navy and the United States,” in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973); and Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921–1931 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1963).
139. Ibid., 25–26.
140. W. T. DeBary et al., eds., Sources of Japanese Tradition, Second edition, Volume 2, abridged, part 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 297–98.
141. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, xiv–xvii.
142. Lewis, Nothing Less Than Victory, 238–39.
143. Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 29.
144. Ibid., 42.
145. Johnson, Modern Times, rev. ed., 190.
146. Ibid.; David Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy (New York: Pocket Books, 1971); James Weland, “Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931,” Journal of Military History, 58, 445–60; Philip Jowett and John Berger, Rays of the Rising Sun, Volume 1: Japan’s Asian Allies, 1931–1945, China and Manchukuo (Solihull, England: Helion, 2005); Robert Ferrell, “The Mukden Incident: September 18–19, 1931,” Journal of Modern History, 27, March 1955, 66–72. In 2006, a Japanese newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, published the results of a research project that concluded that the militarists alone were responsible but that politicians were “impotent” to stop them.
147. Byas, Government by Assassination, 87; Brij Tankha, Kita Ikki and the Making of Modern Japan: A Vision of Empire (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2006).
148. James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).
149. Johnson, Modern Times, rev. ed., 312; Byas, Government by Assassination, 265–67.
150. Byas, Government by Assassination, 272.
151. Johnson, Modern Times, rev. ed., 313.
152. Ben-Ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936 Incident (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).
153. Byas, Government by Assassination, 43.
154. Ibid., 101.
155. Ibid., 155.
156. Ibid., 245; David James, The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951), 134.
157. Johnson, Modern Times, 188.
158. James, Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 136.
159. Kurt Singer, Mirror, Sword and Jewel: A Study of Japanese Characteristics (London: Routledge, 1973), 39–40.
160. Marshall, To Have and Have Not, 25.
161. Ibid., 23.
162. Eliot Janeway, “The Americans and the New Pacific,” Asia, 39, February 1939, 109–13.
163. Marshall, To Have and Have Not, xi.
164. Ibid., 41.
165. Ibid., 124.
166. Byas, Government by Assassination, 153.
167. Lewis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), 34–50.
168. Marshall, To Have and Have Not, 150.
169. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Nazi foreign minister, and Nomura both provided a template for “negotiations” that was copied in the 1960s by Yippie leader Jerry Rubin in his confrontations with authorities. Rubin, who drafted many of these early tactics modeled on the results of Germany and Japan, explained: “Satisfy our demands and we go twelve more…. All we want from these meetings are demands that the Establishment can never satisfy…. Demonstrators are never ‘reasonable’ [emphasis ours].” Jerry Rubin, Do It: Scenarios of the Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 125, 169.
170. Marshall, To Have and Have Not, 156.
171. Rear Admiral Kemp Trolley, “The Strange Assignment of USS Lanikai,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 83, September 1962, 71–84. Trolley, the commander of the Lanikai, which was the only vessel actually dispatched by this order, concluded his mission was as bait to provoke an attack.
Chapter 5: The Hounds Unleashed
1. Paul N. Hehn, A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe, and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930–1941 (New York: Continuum, 2002), ix.
2. Ibid., 15.
3. Ibid., 36.
4. John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: German Army in Politics, 1918–1945 (New York: Macmillan, 2005).
5. Ibid., 133–38.
6. Hehn, Low Dishonest Decade, 66.
7. Ibid.
8. John Terraine, The U-Boat Wars (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1989), 220–21.
9. Herbert M. Mason, Jr., The Rise of the Luftwaffe 1918–1940 (New York: The Dial Press, 1973), 211.
10. Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the German Economy (New York: Penguin, 2006), 339–41.
11. Ibid., 405.
12. Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf, Gerhard L. Weinberg, ed. (New York: Enigma Books, 2006), 113.
13. Ibid., 113.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 99.
16. Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Hitler’s Image of the United States,” American Historical Review, 69, July 1964, 1006–21.
17. Ibid., 1010.
18. Ibid., 1011.
19. Ibid., 1018.
20. Geirr H. Haarr, The German Invasion of Norway April 1940 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 32.
21. Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945 (Washington, DC: Department of Army Pamphlet 20-271, 1959), 51–52.
22. Haarr, German Invasion of Norway, 397.
23. Ziemke, German Northern Theater of Operations, 110.
24. H. O. Lunde, Plan Catherine, Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War, The Battle for Norway, 1940 (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2009); J. L. Moulton, The Norwegian Campaign of 1940: A Study of Warfare in Three Dimensions (Lon
don: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966).
25. Thomas Powers, Heisenberg’s War: The Secret History of the German Bomb (New York: Da Capo Press, 2000).
26. Diana M. Henderson, “The Scottish Soldier: Reality and the Armchair Experience,” in Paul Addison and Angus Calder, eds., Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, 1939–1945 (Random House, AUS: Pimlico, 1997), 21–28.
27. John Williams, The Ides of May: The Defeat of France May–June 1940 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 74; Martin S. Alexander, “ ‘No Taste for the Fight?’ French Combat Performance in 1940 and the Politics of the Fall of France,” in Addison and Calder, Time to Kill, 161–76.
28. Brian Bond, Britain, France and Belgium, 1939–1940 (London: Brassey’s, 1990); Joel Blatt, ed., The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments (Oxford, UK: Breghahn Books, 1998); Robert Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899–1940 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press), and his The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); and Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 2005).
29. Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through 20th-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005), 215.
30. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 373.
31. Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (New York: Penguin, 2006), 388.
32. John Strawson, Hitler as Military Commander (South Yorkshire, England: Pen and Sword Military Classics, 2003), 108.
33. This is often called Auftragstaktik, completely incorrectly, but German commanders were given a mission and then allowed to handle their commands as they saw fit to accomplish that mission.
34. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 720.
35. Quoted in Martin S. Alexander, “ ‘No Taste for the Fight?’ French Combat Performance in 1940 and the Politics of the Fall of France,” in Addison and Calder, Time to Kill, 161–76 (quotation on 161).
36. Ibid., 163.
37. L’Aurore, November 21, 1949, quoted Gamelin as saying, “There is no longer any.”
38. Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 46–49.
39. Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography (New York: Plume, 2001), 615–16.
40. Ibid., 616.
41. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 181.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 62; http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/122-their-finest-hour.
44. Maxime Weygand, Recalled to Service, trans. E. W. Dickes (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1952), 147.
45. Horst Boog, Juergen Foerster, et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, v. 4, Der Angriff auf der Sowjetunion (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1983), 262.
46. Ibid., 281.
47. Ibid., 633.
48. Terry Brighton, The Last Charge: the 21st Lancers and the Battle of Omdurman (Marlborough, England: Crowood, 1998).
49. Winston Churchill, Great Contemporaries (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1937), 225.
50. There is some indication that Churchill may have painted the alleged Jack the Ripper—Walter R. Sickert—unaware, and allowed Sickert to paint him! See Patricia Cornwall, Portrait of a Killer: Jack the Ripper—Case Closed (New York: Putnam, 2002).
51. Jenkins, Churchill, 484.
52. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume 1: The Gathering Storm (Boston: Mariner Books, 1986).
53. Jenkins, Churchill, 528.
54. Ibid.
55. Richard Clarke, Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942–1949 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1982); Alan P. Dobson, U.S. Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940–1946 (London: Croom Helm, 1986); and Albert L. Weeks, Russia’s Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004).
56. Thomas Mahl, Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States (London: Brassey’s, 1999).
57. Peter R. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 5.
58. Ibid., 16.
59. Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Volume 3, Der Mittelmeerraum und Sùdosteuropa (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984), 368.
60. David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean (London: Routledge, 2002).
61. Christopher Buckley, Greece and Crete 1941 (Athens: Efstathadis Group, 1984), 12; Christian Hartmann, Halder Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938–1942 (Munich: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 1991), 263.
62. Edward E. Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941 (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999); Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); Aleksandr Moiseevich Nekrich, Adam B. Ulam, and Gregory L. Freeze, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German Soviet Relations, 1922–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
63. Erickson, Feeding the German Eagle, 127.
64. Ibid.
65. Barton Whaley, Codeword BARBAROSSA (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1973), 1–10; John Waller, The Unseen War in Europe: Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War (London: Tauris & Co., 1996), 192.
66. Boog, Der Angriff, 270.
67. David M. Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941–1943 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 247.
68. Donald Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen (London: Penguin, 2004), 315. Out of 57 corps commanders, only 7 survived, and 30,000 officers total were killed or imprisoned.
69. Christer Bergstrom, Barbarossa: The Air Battle: July–December 1941 (London: Chevron/Ian Allen, 2007), 20.
70. Alexander Hill, “Did Russia Really Go It Alone?” World War II Magazine, June/July 2008, 62–67.
71. Ibid., 64.
72. M. Harrison, Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment and the Defense Burden, 1940–1945 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 134; G. F. Krivosheev, ed., Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), 252. Alexander Hill provides different math for the tanks around Moscow, arguing that the British contribution approached 40 percent.
73. Hill, “British Lend-Lease,” 775.
74. David M. Glanz and Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 37; Glantz, Colossus Reborn; Alexander Hill, “Did Russia Really Go It Alone? How Lend-Lease Helped the Soviets Defeat the Germans,” World War II Magazine, July 12, 2008, http://www.historynet.com/did-russia-really-go-it-alone-how-lend-lease-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm.
75. Larry Schweikart, America’s Victories: Why the U.S. Wins Wars (New York: Sentinel, 2006), 157; S. J. Zaloga and J. Grandsen, Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War II (London: Arms and Armor Press, 1984), 128, 206; Glanz and House, Battle of Kursk, 37–38.
76. Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 479.
77. Ferguson, War of the World, 443.
78. It is useful to review the distinctions within various divisions and subdivisions of the German High Command in World War II.
(1) The German General Staff or General Staff Corps (or in German simply Generalstab) was not a staff at all in the American or British sense: it was a group of specially selected and carefully trained officers from the rank of major upward who filled almost all important command as well as staff positions throughout the Army. To separate them from the normal line officers, they had a red stripe running down the outside of each trouser leg. Regular line, non-Generalstab officers could rise to high commands (Rommel and Model come immediately to mind), but they were always paired with a Generalstab officer to ensure good liaison (Rommel had Bayerlein, von Mellenthin, and Hans Speidel in turn). The Truppenam
t’s leadership was made up of General Staff officers, and that was why the Army could be expanded so rapidly. In World War I, von Moltke was a General Staff officer, as was Hentsch, and this is critical to understanding how and why Hentsch would have had the extraordinary power he did during the Battle of the Marne in 1914. Von Moltke was also chief of the Army General Staff. It is important to realize that the chief of the General Staff made all the appointments and assignments for officers in the German Army, even those at higher ranks than himself.
(2) The Army General Staff and the German General Staff were both headed by the Chief of the Army General Staff (Chef des Generalstabs des Heeres or simply Chef des Generalstabs). That position was occupied by Colonel-General Franz Halder from 1939 to 1942 after the resignation of Colonel-General Ludwig Beck, who had been in that post from 1935 to 1939. After Halder came Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler from 1942 to 1944, Colonel-General Heinz Guderian from 1944 to 1945 (March 21), then the last, General der Infantrie Hans Krebs, who committed suicide after Hitler in Berlin. On March 16, 1935, the Truppenamt, which had existed until then to serve as the nucleus of the German Army, formally and simply became the General Staff of the Army.
(3) OKH or Oberkommando Heers was the Army High Command, and run by the commander in chief of the Army (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres). In 1935 this was Colonel-General Werner von Fritsch; in 1938, Colonel-General von Brauchitsch, who was dismissed and replaced by Hitler himself in December of 1941. After December 1941, the Army’s representative and senior officer in the Fuehrerhauptquartier (Hitler’s Headquarters) was the chief of the Army General Staff.
(4) OKW or Oberkommando der Wehrmacht was the Armed Services High Command. Formerly de facto the war minister’s office, a position held by Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg until 1938, it was created into a separate command by Hitler upon Blomberg’s dismissal (he married a former prostitute). Hitler himself became Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht at that time (February 1938), and his chief of staff, the only one ever to occupy that post, was Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (Chef der OKW). This position turned into being Hitler’s personal staff, and a new staff organization, the Wehrmachtfuührungsstab (Wehrmacht Leader Staff—actually the Wehrmacht Operations Staff) was created to handle the work formerly accomplished by the staff in the Department of National Defense. This staff was initially headed by Generalmajor Max von Viebaln from March 1938 to August 1939, afterward by Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, until the end of the war.
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