by Todd Gordon
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
In the 1980s, democracy promotion became a key strategic axis in American foreign policy strategy in Latin America, as the U.S. began to slowly shift its support away from murderous military dictatorships, towards forces seen as better able to secure stability for international capital. Funding for democracy promotion, emanating from the National Endowment for Democracy, and channeled through organizations such as the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, offered financial support and training to political parties, business organizations, human rights groups, and journalists that were sympathetic to neoliberalism. Market liberalization, together with an extremely narrow conception of democracy—what the sociologist William I. Robinson refers to as polyarchy—were pursued to support the consolidation of the new world order.1077
It was not until the 2000s that Canada began to actively engage in this form of democracy promotion, following the expansion of Canadian capital throughout Latin America from the 1990s onwards, and the growing influence of left-wing forces there, especially in the Andes.1078 Between 2009 and 2012, Foreign Affairs spent nearly C$5 million on democracy promotion initiatives in South America in general, most of it for the Andean region, on top of spending on specific countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela (not including money spent on Rights and Democracy, which increasingly focused its attention on Latin America before the government shut it down).1079 Projects financed by Foreign Affairs include a report on supposed threats to democracy in the region by the conservative World Movement for Democracy, political party assistance seminars, training in the use of new technologies, projects working against efforts to limit foreign financing of Andean NGOs (a concern in Venezuela and Ecuador given the extensive funding of opposition NGOs by the U.S.), and the building of a network for political monitoring in the Andes. Many of these projects involve direct, coordinated support for oppositional groups in the region, such as the network la Red Latinoamericana y del Caribe para la Democracia (Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy), which was created through a 2008 meeting organized by the Canadian embassy in Panama together with the American National Endowment for Democracy (NED), for leaders of the opposition from Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Cuba.1080
Most of these Canadian-funded projects are based on the idea that democracy is under threat in parts of the Andes, by which Foreign Affairs officials and democracy promotion NGOs really mean that social movements and/or governments are challenging the sanctity of the narrowly defined parameters of liberal institutional politics: democracy is reduced to an election once every several years, and the spectrum of debate never should transcend policy prescriptions for enhancing market liberalization. As one Canadian project proposal remarks, “popular support for democracy has dropped across the region, largely in response to unrealistic expectations of what democracy can deliver.” But support for democracy has not dropped in the Andes; demands for greater popular participation have in fact increased. What has declined is faith in traditional liberal institutions such as legislatures that discourage more active political participation, which the project proposal acknowledges when it refers to the “increasingly divisive” debate “between proponents of direct democracy and representative democracy.” In the face of this reality, this project calls for “practical programming activities to enhance the involvement of citizens in the law-making and oversight functions of legislatures”—that is, in those institutions that growing numbers of people increasingly see as having limited capacity to reflect their interests.1081 For Canadian democracy promotion policy, democracy is defined in the narrowest of terms, and anything more inclusive or participatory is cited as a threat.
In a 2009 speech, Peter Kent captured his government’s priorities in the region and how democracy and human rights fit into these. High rates of inequality in Latin America, he observes, “may fuel opposition to the free market and democracy,” so Canada’s response is a “commitment to promoting freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”—with no mention of economic issues.1082 The problem, then, is not in fact inequality for Canada’s foreign policy makers. Nor, therefore, is it possible to imagine that alternatives to neoliberal economics, and narrowly conceived liberal democracy, might provide solutions to the region’s longstanding problem of inequality. It is not even conceivable in the minds of Canada’s political leaders, serving the interests of capital, that any such alternatives could be democratic.
The problem, instead, is the potential threat to the free market in a narrowly circumscribed liberal democracy posed by forces challenging inequality. As political scientist Neil Burron argues, “Canadian democracy promotion is increasingly being used as a political device to promote free markets and to criticize governments that have strayed from the Washington Consensus.”1083 While he was head of the now defunct government-funded Rights and Democracy, Gérard Latulippe offered a similar, and somewhat confused, attempt to justify Canada’s focus on Latin America for democracy promotion: “you can see the emergence of a new model of democracy, where in fact it’s trying to make an alternative to democracy by saying people can have a better life even if there’s no democracy.”1084
It is noteworthy that while Canada likes to pontificate about its support for democracy and human rights in the Americas, it has not even signed the American Convention on Human Rights, and is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission or Court (the Inter American Commission and Court are the monitoring bodies of the Convention) beyond their advisory functions. Yet Canada has been, in recent years, the second largest individual funder of the Commission, spending US$2.4 million—11 percent of the Commission’s budget financed by states and international organizations—between 2008 and 2012. The U.S. and Canada have the most financial influence over one of the Convention’s monitoring bodies, although neither of them are signatories of the Convention.1085
Venezuela
The biggest target of Canada’s democracy and human rights promotion activities in the region is Venezuela. It became a common assertion by Foreign Affairs and International Trade (FAIT) and the Conservative and Liberal parties, though never backed up by serious argument, that the Chávez government was an authoritarian regime. Venezuela has also been identified as a country with a poor democratic and human rights record by Conservative members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.1086
The mandate letter issued to the Ambassador to Venezuela, Perry Calwood, on his appointment in 2007 by the Deputy Ministers of FAIT was clear on what the embassy’s attention should be focused on: “human rights, democracy and the rule of law.”1087 This directive is in turn reflected in the Country Strategy reports, which are written by embassies for Ottawa. The embassy reports from Venezuela to Ottawa note, for example, that “Venezuelan human rights organizations such as [redacted] are in a critical financial situation,”1088 and that its objective is to “nurture all civil society,” though, quite clearly, civil society for the embassy is synonymous with the opposition to Chávez.1089
During a rare trip to Venezuela by a cabinet minister in January 2010, Peter Kent met with “representatives of civil society,” business leaders, and politicians.1090 The names of those with whom he met, however, are not disclosed by the Canadian government on the grounds that their security would be threatened should their names be made public. In a speech to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States in November 2010—several months after his trip to Venezuela—Kent spent much of his time highlighting the importance of democracy promotion to Canadian foreign policy in the Americas; in thinly veiled criticisms of Venezuela, Kent proclaimed Canada’s commitment to “vigorously defend” human rights and democratic institutions “in the face of efforts to weaken and discredit” them.1091 Direct contact by Canadian political leaders in Venezuela did not extend beyond Kent’s visit, given the chilly relationship Canada’s meddling created. As noted above
, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird did plan to visit Venezuela in early 2013 while Chávez was fighting cancer in Cuba—in a proactive attempt to test the waters of a soon-to-be post-Chávez Venezuela—but had to abruptly cancel when the president returned home unexpectedly.
In December 2010, the Venezuelan National Assembly passed a law that prohibits foreign funding of NGOs and political parties. The law was a response to the role of these foreign-funded NGOs in efforts to build the anti-Chávez right-wing and support for the failed 2002 coup against the President. In response to this, Ottawa directed several Latin American-based Canadian embassies in early 2011 to meet with “like-minded” governments in the region in an effort to mobilize opposition and publicly censure the Venezuelan government. At this time, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs travelled to Venezuela and, along with embassy officials, held several meetings with Venezuelan NGOs, academics, and “grassroots” organizations to discuss opposition to the law and its potential impact on foreign support for these organizations.1092 While the opposition presented this to international observers as a crackdown on dissent, for the Chávez government it was a defense of Venezuelan sovereignty, given the role that foreign funding has played in efforts to destabilize the country.1093 The embassy read this move by the Chávez government as targeted first and foremost at the Americans, and therefore as an important reason for Canada to step up its own democracy promotion support—to pick up the American slack.1094
The stepped up attacks on Chávez’s “authoritarian” proclivities translated into a growing budget for democracy promotion and human rights in Venezuela. This started under the Liberals, in fact, but intensified after the Harper Conservatives took power in 2006. CIDA’s Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), which is actually distributed through embassies, has been an important conduit for Canadian financing of democracy promotion and human rights support in Venezuela. Until 2003–2004, little CFLI money went to democracy and human rights. After that, democracy promotion and human rights becomes a CFLI focus, and by 2007–2008 CFLI in Venezuela was dedicated to these strategic areas alone. Between 2005 and 2006, CFLI spending included support for well-known supporters of the 2002 coup and active anti-government organizations. The best known of these organizations was Súmate. In 2005, the Liberal government brought the head of Súmate, Maria Corina Machado, to Ottawa to speak to members of parliament.
As Anthony Fenton notes, Machado supported the attempted 2002 coup and was later “charged with conspiracy to commit treason for allegedly using NED funds to campaign against Chávez in the recall referendum organized by the opposition.” The chair of the FAIT-funded (now defunct) right-wing Latin American policy organization, FOCAL, John Graham, participated in high-level meetings in Washington with Machado and key U.S. political figures such as Condoleeza Rice and Roger Noriega in 2005 to discuss “strengthening democracy in the region.”1095 FOCAL itself subsequently received funding from NED for democracy promotion work in Venezuela and the Andes. Canada also funded coup-supporting Fundacion Justicia de Pas Monagas.1096 Starting in 2007–2008, CIDA and the embassy refused to disclose publicly the organizations they were supporting on the grounds of the alleged security risk involved in releasing such information. While the security risk is surely extremely overblown, the rationale implies they are funding opposition organizations.
In 2007–2008, CFLI money for democracy and human rights projects in Venezuela shot up to over C$227,000, declining the following year to less than C$100,000 and rising above C$100,000 in 2009–2010 to nearly C$200,000 in 2010–2011 and over C$175,000 in 2011–2012. Over the same periods, non-democracy promotion and human rights bilateral aid was a significantly smaller component to Canadian spending, and in fact non-existent in 2011–2012.1097 Of the FAIT spending that has been publicly disclosed, between 2008 and 2012, over C$715,000 was earmarked for democracy promotion specifically targeting Venezuela. This figure would be higher still if it included funding for regional initiatives that also targeted Venezuela.
In 2010, as part of Canada’s expanding democracy promotion agenda against Venezuela, the now defunct, federally-funded Rights and Democracy—then headed by former employee of the National Democratic Institute (the international democracy promotion wing of the U.S. Democracy Party) Gérard Latulippe—awarded its John Humphrey prize to Chávez critic PROVEA (El Programa Venezolano de Educacion-Accion en Derechos Humanos). The award included a C$30,000 grant.1098 A 2010 report, Assessing Democracy Support in Venezuela, by Spanish think-tank the FRIDE Institute, which was funded in part by the World Movement for Democracy—which itself has received hundreds of thousands of dollars from Canada, and whose steering committee chair at the time was former Canadian Conservative Prime Minister Kim Campbell—identified Canada as the third largest supporter of democracy promotion programs in Venezuela after the U.S. and Spain. The report describes Venezuela as “semi-authoritarian,” and, in the face of the electoral successes of Chávez, it states that, in fact, “elections are the main link between democracy and dictatorship,” and calls for more financing for the opposition.1099 Without irony, in its Country Strategy reports the Caracas embassy stresses that Venezuela is wracked by political polarization and instability, which it uses as part of the justification for democracy promotion spending. But given that Canada has become a significant spender in this area, trying to systematically bolster the opposition, such claims about political polarization and instability become self-fulfilling prophecies: Canada intervenes to embolden the opposition, which creates polarization, and on that basis Canada justifies intervention to support democracy or human rights. Canadian spending is not a response to polarization or instability, but part of the cause.
Canada’s democracy promotion human rights position on Venezuela was reiterated by the government in its response in the fall of 2012 to the Conservative-dominated Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development’s report on human rights in Venezuela. The committee called on the government to continue its democracy promotion and human rights work, including the funding of Venezuelan “human rights defenders.” The government responded by assuring the committee of its ongoing commitment.1100
Ecuador
As an important destination for Canadian investment in the late 1990s and 2000s, the site of a significant number of powerful social movements, and the locale for the election of a left-of-centre president, Ecuador has also drawn the attention of Canada’s democracy and human rights promotion efforts. Allan Culham, Canada’s representative to the OAS, has flagged Canada’s concern for an ostensible closing of “democratic space” in Ecuador. Culham was speaking about Ecuador following what has been referred to by the Correa government as a failed coup attempt on September 30, 2010.1101 On that day, police officers mounted road blockades in Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca and, together with a small sector of the armed forces, seized several barracks and briefly shut down the national airport by occupying the airstrip. The National Assembly was also occupied. The actions were an expression of opposition to cuts to public sector funding, including new austerity measures that hit the police and armed forces alike. After Correa addressed a hostile crowd of police at one of the seized barracks that morning he was shot at with a tear gas canister as he attempted to leave the scene with his security guards—he was walking with a cane at the time due to a recent knee operation.
Although the canister did not hit him, he did suffer from gas inhalation and was immediately taken to the hospital. Police then surrounded the hospital and Correa was unable to leave the premises for several hours, ultimately being freed by loyal soldiers who engaged in a firefight with the protesting police, leading to several deaths outside the hospital. In hindsight, the loyalty of the bulk of the armed forces to the constitutionally elected government seems never to have been seriously in doubt.1102 However, in the immediate context of the events this was hardly self-evident, and the presidents of numerous Latin American countries, as well as the Secretary Gener
al of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza, deemed it necessary to immediately denounce the actions of the insurrectionary police and a sector of the armed forces, and to publicly declare their support for the continuity of Correa’s constitutional government.1103
Canada played down the significance of the police threat. As in Honduras, Canada refused to single out the police and right-wing opposition as responsible for the violence and instead suggested that the government and its supporters were equally responsible. Kent, as Minister of State for the Americas, called “on all parties to refrain from violence and any other actions that could imperil the rule of law and the country’s democratic institutions.”1104 This position is repeated by Allan Culham during a special meeting about the attempted coup at the OAS Permanent Council. While Canada supported a resolution criticizing the threat to the rule of law, and Culham expressed support for the “elected government,” he added “I would…like to take this opportunity to remind us all of what I think is an important element of government that we should not forget, and that is the need to create democratic spaces which are respectful of dialogue and respectful of all sectors of society to be sure they have the opportunities to express views.”1105 The implication Culham was making is that the police rebellion and insubordination of a sector of the armed forces were a response to the narrowing of democratic space in Correa’s Ecuador.
