by Todd Gordon
In follow-up reports to Ottawa the embassy puts the blame for the conflagration on Correa, but opportunistically sees an opening to put more pressure on Correa to perhaps bring him more securely into the imperial fold. For example, Ambassador Shisko refers in a Situation Report to Ottawa on the attempted coup to the “vulnerability of Ecuadorian institutions” that “has further been exacerbated,” not by rebellious police and the Right, but “by a steady concentration of power at the hands of the president,” and notes the possibility that Correa might exploit the opportunity of the events of September 30, “to follow Chávez’s example and radicalize his position with no negotiations, no dialogue and further concentration of power.”1106 In a follow-up communication Shisko assures Ottawa that “we are very much looking forward to exploring creative ideas and entry points for Canada in support of democratic governance in the country.”1107 Shisko’s expression of imperial opportunism came while discussing the potential danger of Correa’s centralizing power, and the deepening of his putative leftist political agenda. Shisko’s “evidence” was the fact that Correa’s party, Alianza Patria Altiva y Soberana, or simply Alianza País (Proud and Sovereign Homeland Alliance, AP), enjoys a majority in congress, and can therefore pass laws without consulting the opposition.
Several months later, Canada provided C$120,000 to Corporacion Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation Corporation), which, according to Foreign Affairs, is meant to “empower citizens to more effectively engage in the political process through civil society capacity-building and strengthening the civil society network in Ecuador.”1108 Citizen Participation Corporation, identified by Shisko as “an active critic of certain government practices,”1109 and thus deemed suitable for Canadian funding, highlights in its proposal the “obvious weakening of civil society…due to a lack of action by civil society organizations.” The project’s aim will be to “create space…for the public discussion of issues of prime importance to the country,” as well as “capacity building in leadership, political watchdogs, and communication strategies.”1110 Again, the implicit premise for Canadian support here is a distrust of Correa and the idea that the Ecuadorian Right, and those sympathetic to Canadian investors, should have a stronger voice, greater opportunity to be heard, and, ultimately, be more politically effective and have greater decision-making influence—all themes that are raised in discussions surrounding the project proposal. It is also worth noting that the Andean Unit for Democratic Governance, the centrepiece of Canadian democracy promotion in the Andes, which is headquartered in Peru, has had staff based in Quito since November 2010.
When Canada expresses concern about threats to democracy in Ecuador, what it fears is not some form of dictatorship or slide toward authoritarianism, for which there is no evidence, but rather the independent actions of Correa and his government when it seeks to set—rather modest—limits on the power of Canadian capital. Also seen as an obstacle to democracy in Ecuador are the country’s social movements, particularly those pushing for more participatory and collective forms of decision making—often unsupported by Correa himself—on issues of land and environment, which are in form and substance far more extensive examples of democracy than the neoliberalism preached by Canada. The desire for alternatives to the neoliberal free market model promoted by Canada—whether in the form of Correa’s Left populism, or the more radical push for participatory and inclusive democracy by some of the more powerful social movements in the country—could not be ignored by Canadian policymakers. The embassy, writing to Ottawa, recognized after Correa’s victory that “Ecuadorians support him and…they wish to see institutional change.”1111 While much of the social movement Left are less supportive of Correa than when he was first elected, there certainly is a desire for “institutional change.”
Neither of these alternatives is acceptable to Canada. They represent a push beyond the bounds of so-called “good governance,” and thus pose ostensible challenges to democracy; Canadian intervention is therefore required. The free market and the rights of foreign capital are, in this view, inviolable, and so Ecuador, like Venezuela, becomes a target of democracy and human rights promotion. Between 2008—a short period into Correa’s first term in power—and 2011, Canada spent roughly C$1 million on democracy and human rights promotion in Ecuador. Foreign Affairs provided C$400,000 for a U.S. NED-coordinated project starting in 2008 for Latin America, including Ecuador. The premise of the project was to offer organizational, financial, and educational support to civil society organizations operating in “in countries where civil society faces immediate threats to their freedom of association, such as in Venezuela or Ecuador.”1112 The sheer absurdity of this assessment should give the reader pause.
In 2009, FAIT committed C$336,500 to the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), even though Ecuador has a multiparty democracy, to “encourage dialogue on Ecuador’s constitution” (dialogue which already existed), and another C$302,000 in 2011 to encourage greater political participation from youth, “with the objective of strengthening the country’s democratic culture and institutions.”1113 The 2009 proposal from the NIMD justifies support for the project noting that, “the Latin American political landscape has proven to be a turbulent, rapidly changing environment in which constant evaluation and reassessment is necessary,” including of “the emergence of new political parties, leaders and social movements, especially in the Andean region.”1114
What the Canadian-funded project is stating, in reality, is that the Left has been ascendant in Ecuador in both the mode of social movements and the form of political parties, challenging foreign capital directly and gaining institutional political power, and in some cases rethinking those institutions and norms—a process that clearly does not benefit Canadian investors, or Canada’s longer-term geopolitical strategy in the region. In the process, political organizations and parties of the Right that held power in the recent past in countries like Ecuador (or Venezuela), have been weakened or marginalized due to their association with the legacy of neoliberalism, and have consequently been incapable of shaping contemporary political debate. Canadian policymakers, in response, criticize this outcome as an example of a lack of political dialogue, and a decline in democratic practices. Canada rarely broached such criticism before the re-emergence of the Ecuadorian or Andean Left in the late 1990s.
Clearly the Canadian strategists supporting these democracy and human rights promotion projects are not motivated by the concerns of indigenous communities and environmental activists opposed to Correa’s mining policy, given that Canada pushed heavily for a more favourable mining regime against the demands of such groups. The NIMD proposal itself identifies explicitly with the experiences of the “opposition parties,” which were not represented in the elected Constituent Assembly, and the interests of which were “not being taken into account by the governmental majority.” Even though the constitution was “approved by the population with an overwhelming majority,” according to the NIMD’s proposal it reflects a democratic shortcoming, as the “opposition”—that is the right-wing parties—did not exercise sufficient influence.1115 Ultimately, the meagre support for right-wing forces in Ecuador is not raised by Canadian supporters of these projects, who focus on an alleged absence of “open and broad debate”; the power of the Left—ranging from Correa to the social movements with whom he has clashed—and weakness of the Right is simply depicted by Canadian officials as a failure of Ecuadorian democracy.
In addition to the internal inconsistencies in Canada’s logic of democracy promotion in Ecuador, there is also considerable hypocrisy surrounding Ottawa’s agenda in this area. Before Correa’s election, the Canadian state was hardly concerned with promoting dialogue or “open and honest debate” between all sides in Ecuador. There were no demands for more meaningful inclusivity, despite violence being meted out against opponents of mining by state and private security forces. It is only when Correa gains control of the country’s e
lectoral institutions that Canada discerns the need for such a focus. In Correa’s Ecuador, Canadian funds are targeted to “strengthen the role of citizens as part of the current constitutional process”—this after the elected Constituent Assembly completed its work with a considerable degree of popular input, and certainly a great deal more than Canada could ever claim for its own constitutional process in the 1980s. Canadian money was also used to issue bulletins explaining the content of the new constitution to the right-wing national newspaper El Comercio, and the organization of workshops to create “better informed citizens about their rights and obligations.”1116
The purpose of the youth democracy project led by the NIMD was to study youth electoral participation with the aim to “expand the inclusiveness and representativeness of the political system,” even though voter turnout in the election held previous to this Canadian-supported project was over 75 percent—higher than the last six Ecuadorian presidential elections, and considerably higher than the turnout in any recent federal Canadian election.1117 In expressing his support for the project in an email to Foreign Affairs in Ottawa, Ambassador Shisko notes that the new constitution permits sixteen-year-olds to vote, even though they are not “prepared to participate in a responsible way.” He adds that “Ecuador does currently lack of [sic] political leaders and political parties are not strong in training new generations.” But democracy programs such as those funded by Canada “could help address, in the longer term, the weaknesses of a [sic] party practices in the current political system overall.”1118
Canada’s hypocrisy can be seen more clearly if we look at its democracy and human rights promotion agenda from a regional perspective. Canada has not sought to promote “honest debate” in allied countries, such as Colombia, despite that country’s terrible human rights record, and the regular targeting of dissidents and opponents of natural resource development by state and non-state security forces. Governed by right-wing administrations, Peru has also not received the same attention from Canada’s democracy and human rights promotion initiatives under the Harper government, despite ongoing violence against indigenous communities. Peru, according to Foreign Affairs, is a “like-minded partner on issues of democracy, human rights and prosperity.”1119 Foreign Affairs did spend C$167,400 to help political parties’ “platform-development capacities,” with particular focus on getting parties to engage Peruvians outside of Lima—where the resistance to mining is strongest—more effectively.1120 Lima is, however, the headquarters for Canada’s Andean Unit for Democratic Governance (AUDG), which was established in 2009 to develop and coordinate democracy promotion work in the region. A FAIT report on the opening of the Centre, in discussing its chosen location, remarked that “Canada considers Peru to be an important partner in the hemisphere to build strong, effective and accountable democracies.”1121 The same year Canada opened the Unit in Lima, President Alan García’s security forces killed over thirty indigenous protesters in its ongoing assault on the opposition to natural resource development. But because the Peruvian government is an ally, it is democratic.
SECURITY POLICY
The diplomatic and political interference described above is accompanied by a more sinister approach to shaping political and economic outcomes in the region. The opposition to Canadian interests in the Andes is viewed by Canadian political leaders as a security threat. We need to understand that security concerns for imperialist countries are not simply reducible to physical threats against them; and, indeed, in this case no credible claim could be made that any country in Latin America, including in the Andes, poses such a threat to Canada. The threat is to the security of Canadian capital and its ability to make profit in the region. The interests of Canadian capital are, after all, what drives Canada’s engagement with the region in the first place. Whereas in Central America this challenge has for the most part remained at the level of social movement organizing, in the Andes it includes governments, which raises the security stakes for Canada. What we are witnessing is the securitization of Canadian foreign policy in the Americas, involving alliance with particular countries as a front against popular movements and governments that are not sufficiently compliant with imperialism.
Venezuela
Certainly the U.S. has taken the lead on the practical and ideological sides of the security question in the Andes. The U.S., Eva Golinger has demonstrated, was working behind the scenes in support of the failed 2002 coup against Chávez. It maintains a series of military bases throughout the region. Meanwhile, the American Right has tried to link Venezuela to Islamic terrorism, of course without any demonstrable proof. The U.S. Congressional Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence actually held hearings on support for Hezbollah in Latin America. Witnesses, such as neocon Roger Noriega, sought to make links between Venezuela and terrorism, based in part on Chávez’s expedient alliance with Iran. The point is that, for the American political establishment, Venezuela, and left-wing populism more generally, are security threats.1122
The Canadian government, as we have noted, claimed Chávez was an authoritarian ruler, contrary to the facts. From the claims that Chávez is a dangerous authoritarian—based on the active imagination of Canadian policymakers—and the fear of his growing regional influence, it was only a short step to the conclusion that Venezuela was a security threat that needed to be contained. In the internal FAIT discussions on Venezuela, the potential dangers of the Venezuelan military are a regular thematic focus. Canada, one report notes, “is [redacted] observing Venezuela’s rearmament and growing weapon’s purchases.”1123 An increase in military spending by Venezuela is identified as part of the dangerous regional anti-neoliberal agenda of Chávez, rather than an-under-the-circumstances reasonable response to real external threats. Venezuela has faced foreign meddling by imperialist powers, including an attempted coup, and the violation of its sovereignty by the Colombian military, while in 2009 the U.S. reached a deal with Colombia for use of seven military bases. It is actually acknowledged by observers in FAIT that Venezuelan military spending as a percentage of GDP is lower than most countries in South America, including Canadian ally and chronic human rights offender, Colombia.1124 It is worth considering, too, that Venezuelan defense spending is not projected to match the significant increases in Canadian defense spending in the next decade, nor is Venezuelan military spending used to project power in North America. But Canada’s military spending (consistently in the top fifteen nations in the world), increased security cooperation with Colombia, support for security forces in Honduras and Guatemala, and establishment of a new military base in Jamaica are of course no threat to stability or security in the region.
Colombia
As the government most aggressively sympathetic to the interests of foreign capital in the region, and with a war-hardened security apparatus well positioned to play a frontline role in the defense of imperialism, Colombia has become the anchor of Canada’s Andean security posture. Since the late 2000s, Colombia has been receiving Canadian training and funding through Foreign Affairs’ Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program, and since 2011 that support has been provided through DND’s Military Training and Cooperation Program.
The geopolitical side of Canada’s Colombian posture is summed up well in the Bogotá embassy’s 2006–2007 Country Strategy report, which acknowledges the terrible human rights situation in the country but reflects that nevertheless “it is, in important ways for Canada, a bastion of stability in its region despite the internal conflict.”1125 It is not that the Canadian embassy values stability for Colombian workers, indigenous peoples, Afro-Colombians, peasants, or anyone else who falls on the wrong side of state and paramilitary terror; rather Canadian diplomacy values the stability of the Colombian state only insofar as it helps to secure the geopolitical and economic interests of Canada, in a region where other governments are not as readily compliant to Canadian interests. The condition of workers, Afro-Colombians, indigeno
us peoples, peasants and so on is beside the point from the Canadian state’s perspective. In a political context like the Andes, there is a premium on having an ally such as the Colombian state.
Speaking to the Wall Street Journal in 2009, Harper was unambiguous in stressing the geopolitical importance of Colombia to Canada. Colombia, he reflected, is an important “ally” in a region “with serious enemies and opponents.”1126 This view is held by key Liberals in Ottawa as well—it is worth remembering that the Chretien Liberals laid the groundwork for the deepening of political ties with the Colombian regime in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Harper government subsequently built upon and extended the existing diplomatic infrastructure. Scott Brison, a former Tory who led the Liberals’ support for the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA), put his defence of the ostensibly economic treaty in realist geopolitical terms (with the usual dose of hyperbole): “If we isolate Colombia in the Andean region and leave Colombia exposed and vulnerable to the ideological attacks of Chávez’s Venezuela, we will be allowing evil to flourish.”1127
The two countries’ militaries discussed closer cooperation at least as early as 2009 during a visit to Colombia by several Canadian military leaders. That meeting followed a visit by Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff that same year, and a meeting between Stephen Harper’s National Security Advisor, Marie-Lucie Morin, and President Uribe (all government documents for Morin’s trip are completely redacted).1128 A background report written within National Defence observes that Colombia has “a professional, joint, military that is looking to expand its role outside its borders” and that, in line with the geopolitical thinking of Canadian policymakers discussed above, there is a “strategic importance of Colombia to Canada.”1129 In fact, Colombia had already expanded its role outside its borders in 2008, a year before the 2009 discussions of greater military cooperation with Canada noted above, when it caused a diplomatic crisis in the region after violating Ecuadorian sovereignty in an attack on a FARC encampment. While Colombia’s action was condemned by most countries in the region, a U.S. embassy communiqué refers to comments made by FAIT’s Director General for the Caribbean, James Lambert, to the U.S. embassy in Ottawa expressing Canada’s support for Colombia, though wanting to be cautious in how that support is publicly expressed so as not to unnecessarily alienate the region.1130 The Uribe regime was also notable for its constant military sabre rattling with neighbouring Venezuela.1131
