by Todd Gordon
Relations were deepened with the March 2014 signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for defense cooperation between Canada and Colombia. The memorandum indicates that this is to be part of “a strategic framework for increasing [military] relations” between the two countries. Defence Minister Peter MacKay remarked that he was “very satisfied by the signing of this memorandum of understanding with Minister Pinzón. With the growing emphasis of Canada in Latin America, and given the importance of Colombia in the continent, there are increasing opportunities for Canada and Colombia to learn from one another.”1132
Not only is the increase in security cooperation connected to the role Colombia plays in the region, but it also obviously comes at a time when Canadian investment is increasing in the country following the FTA. The Canadian government and capital are cognizant that while great strides have been made in improving investment conditions in mining and oil and gas, that process is not complete: guerrilla forces are still active—a reminder of which came in 2013 when a Canadian mining executive was held hostage by the ELN for seven months—and communities of resistance are still standing in the way of resource development on their land. During Harper’s visit to Colombia in August 2011, he announced increased security support for Colombia, ultimately laying the foundations for the MOU. Harper and President Santos discussed security for Canadian companies investing in Colombia. The Canadian Prime Minister noted that while improvements have been made there are still concerns that need to be addressed.1133
Canada has also sought to bolster the Colombian security apparatus by expanding arms sales. In fact, the Liberal government permitted the sale of dozens of helicopters that can be used as gunships to the Colombian military in the 1990s.1134 In 2012, the Harper government added Colombia to the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (it also added Peru). This means that Colombia is now one of a few dozen countries to which Canada can export automatic assault weapons—guns that are banned in Canada. The Canadian government rather coldly notes that the addition of Colombia to the list “opens new market opportunities” for Canadian weapons exporters, but the flipside of this business opportunity is arming a military whose role in Colombia and the region is important to the pursuit of Canadian interests beyond the profits of the arms industry.1135 Just weeks after Colombia was added to the Firearms Control List, General Dynamics Land Systems Canada, supported by the Canadian Commercial Corporation, won a C$65.3 million contract to sell twenty-four light armoured vehicles to the Colombian Ministry of National Defence.1136 In 2013, Canada also provided C$550,000 in equipment to the Colombian national police for detection of and protection against chemical, biological, and nuclear explosives.1137
Exporting the Colombian Model
As we noted in our earlier discussion of Central America, Canada is also helping to extend the military reach of Colombia into the isthmus—thus adding to that region’s militarization—through its partnership with the Andean country’s security forces in Honduras. In effect, Canada’s support for the Colombian military is contributing to an increasingly militarized form of democracy throughout large parts of Latin America, where electoralism and the nominal existence of liberal rights intersect with powerful state and non-state security apparatuses and the routinization of violent assaults against political opposition.
Canada has also fostered stronger security ties with Peru, which it counts on as an ally in the uncertain Andean region.1138 Several trips in the 2010s to Peru by Canadian cabinet ministers to advance Canadian investment also witnessed the establishment of security cooperation agreements (one involving the Canadian Commercial Corporation) and commitments by Peru to purchase Canadian security technologies. Canada, the Prime Minister’s Office reported upon concluding one of the MOUs, “aims to deepen defence and security relations between the two countries, and to facilitate and improve cooperation for the purchase of services or military and defence equipment by Canadian companies to the Peruvian Ministry of defense.”1139 One of the Canada-Peru MOUs led to the creation of the Instituto Técnico de las Fuerzas Armadas (Armed Forces Technical Institute) in 2012.1140 In 2013, Canada sold Twin Otter aircraft to Peru, which have dual-purpose capacity for military use.1141 The Peruvian air force, as noted above, has trained with the Canadian Air Force in Canada.
Finally, the securitization of Canadian foreign policy also led the Harper Conservatives to establish a military base in Jamaica. While references are made to terror threats and counternarcotics work by military spokespeople and political leaders—and indeed the Canadian Navy has conducted interdictions in the Caribbean Sea, as well as illegally in Jamaican territorial waters, on ships suspected of drug trafficking—it would be shortsighted to see the establishment of a military base on those grounds alone given Canada’s expanding economic interests and their vulnerability. The base is rather about the desire to project Canadian power and rapidly react to situations of “instability” in a region in which Canadian capital is one of the most powerful economic forces, with extensive interests that require protection.
CONCLUSION
Canada has been laying the groundwork for deeper security ties throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Democracy and human rights promotion has thus far had limited pay off in Ecuador and Venezuela, though such investments, while they may be inspired by short-term ambitions, are also viewed as long-term projects. If openings do present themselves at some point, Canada or Canadian-funded and -trained organizations, are positioned to insert themselves and exploit the opportunities. Strong security links offer an alternative approach to the same goal: instability for progressive forces, stability for Canadian capital. Whatever Canada may claim publicly about these policies, the tell is simple enough to read. The most violent and authoritarian governments in the region, one of which—Colombia—has a track record of violating the sovereignty of its neighbours, are held up as beacons of democracy, while their security forces are targeted for deeper relations with Canada. Meanwhile, social movements and governments that pose a threat to the smooth reproduction of neoliberalism in the region are portrayed as imminent threats to Latin America’s security and democracy.
PART IV
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 10
EXPANSION CONTINUES, RESISTANCE PERSISTS
The Central American and Andean countries covered in this book offer perhaps the most extensive examples of the dialectic of expansion and resistance in recent years. As Canada is one of the largest foreign investor nations in Latin America, this dialectic not surprisingly extends throughout the region. Canadian interests, the interventions in pursuit of them, and the opposition they face are spread far and wide.
GEOGRAPHIES OF CANADIAN CAPITAL
With C$16.6 billion invested in mining, utilities, infrastructure, and banking in Chile, for example, Canada is amongst the largest foreign investors in the southern cone Andean nation. The biggest Canadian project is Barrick Gold’s C$8.5 billion Pascua Lama, an extremely controversial planned open-pit gold mine located on the side of a mountain on the Chilean-Argentine border. If allowed to proceed it would involve the removal of glaciers and thus deprive thousands of small farmers downstream of a major source of fresh water. But widespread opposition, and the arrogance of Barrick displayed in the giant company’s efforts to do an end-run around proper environmental assessment and permission processes, has led to Pascua Lama facing suspensions, major delays, and costly conditions and fines imposed on it by the Chilean government.1142 But the world’s largest gold company never backs away from a fight, particularly given the size of Pascua Lama, and it has had the support of Stephen Harper, who stumped for the company to Chilean political leaders, and met with company representatives during a trip to Chile in 2007.1143
Across the border in Argentina, where Pascua Lama extends, Canadian companies such as Barrick and Goldcorp dominate mining investment and exercise, with the support of the Canadian government, considerable influence. When the Argentine C
ongress passed legislation in 2008 to protect glaciers from large-scale mining, directly threatening Barrick’s present and future operations, President Cristina Fernández vetoed it in response to pressure from Canadian investors, including Barrick. When the Congress passed new legislation to protect and mandate the mapping of glaciers into law, Barrick won an injunction against it in the province of San Juan so that its Veladero mine would be able to continue its operations, arguing that the law was unconstitutional because it interfered with its earnings from sunk investments.1144 In 1997, Barrick was also granted what one writer describes as a “virtual country” by Chilean and Argentine presidents Eduardo Frei and Carlos Menem, consisting of three thousand kilometres in the Cordillera de los Andes, allowing for exploitation with few regulations or conditions. The law outlining this “virtual country” was reportedly written with assistance from Barrick itself.1145 In Catamarca, pickets against Barrick have been violently put down by police, while a violent police assault against people protesting a Yamana Gold mine under construction in 2010, which injured sixty people, “sparked a popular uprising of citizens” against the project.1146
Testifying to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (SCFAID) in Ottawa in 2009, the former Argentine Secretary of the Environment from 2006–2008 reflected on the pernicious power of Barrick in her country: “Barrick Gold is a modern example of a powerful economic giant that unscrupulously manipulates local politics and is skirting environmental and social controls to maximize profit.” It has wielded, she argued, what Argentines have called “the Barrick veto” over their country’s environmental and natural resources policy. More sinister still, she notes that as Secretary of Environment, “My closest staff and I were personally and physically threatened following our mining intervention.…My office was wire-tapped, my staff was bought, and the public officials that once controlled Barrick for me became paid officials of Barrick Gold.”1147 The “Barrick veto” is, in fact, something that has extended to Canadian companies more generally. After Argentina announced, to the anger of Canadian capital, new export taxes in 2008, a cable from the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires reported that “the GoA, led by the Secretary of Mining, has worked quietly with Canadian companies to find ways to work around the new federal regulations.”1148 Given what we have discussed throughout this book, it is extremely unlikely such behind the scenes work was done without the support of the Canadian embassy.
In Mexico, meanwhile, Canadian companies are the fourth largest source of foreign investment. Benefiting from the North American Free Trade Agreement (coming into force in 1994, NAFTA was the cutting edge of international trade agreements) and decades of liberalization in Mexico, they are heavily invested in the country’s banking and maquila sectors, though over half of Canada’s C$12.3 billion of FDI (2013) is in mining. Goldcorp, for instance, was the largest single foreign investor in Mexico in 2010, and over 70 percent of the total foreign mining companies operating in Mexico have been Canadian in recent years. Mining industry organization CAMIMEX forecasts US$13 billion in exploration investment over the next several years, over half of which will be from Canadian companies.1149 Canada has also offered technical assistance as the Mexican government begins the privatization of its oil industry.
As is the case throughout the region, Canadian investment has been met by concerted resistance throughout Mexico, from local communities engaging in road blockades, to mine shutdowns and wildcat strikes over wages and working conditions. But repression and violence are the norm for those that challenge Canadian interests in Mexico. Six opponents of Canadian mining projects were killed between 2009 and 2014. Many others have faced death threats. In May 2008, the Mexican government sent its military and police to crush an occupation against Fortuna Silver’s Trinidad mine, arresting dozens, and entering and searching homes of company opponents.1150 One Canadian company, Gammon Gold, responded to a work stoppage in 2010 by firing four hundred of its workers.1151
Canadian companies operating in Mexico can rely on the steadfast support of the embassy. Faced with blockades, New Gold Mining Co. was ordered to halt its San Xavier operations in late 2009 by the Mexican Environmental Enforcement Agency, a directive which the company ignored. Some of New Gold’s contracts with local communal landowners were found to be fraudulent, and its environmental permit illegal.1152 A flurry of emails circulated through the embassy following the order to stop operations, and the embassy developed its public response—which of course supported New Gold—with help from the company itself.1153
On November 27, 2009, a well-known anti-mining activist, Mariano Abarca, was murdered. Abarca was a leading organizer against a Blackfire Exploration barite mine in Chiapas. His murder led to large demonstrations against the company, forcing the temporary shutdown of the mine by the Mexican government, which cited environmental concerns.1154 Blackfire responded by suing the Mexican government for C$800 million under chapter 11 of NAFTA, claiming damages and lost earnings due to the closure. Blackfire was subsequently investigated by the RCMP for bribery allegations relating to payments made by the company to a local mayor to contain opposition to its mine.1155
According to Jennifer Moore and Gillian Colgrove, whose report on the role of the Canadian Embassy in the Blackfire affair drew on hundreds of pages of embassy documents gleaned from Access to Information requests, the embassy played a central role in supporting the company. “Even after Abarca had been killed, the mine had been suspended, and corruption allegations had surfaced,” they write, “the Embassy continued to defend the company to Mexican state officials and provided it with information on how to sue the State of Chiapas under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for closing the mine.” They conclude that “the Embassy’s active and unquestioning support may have acted as a disincentive for Blackfire to comply with local and international laws.”1156
The embassy’s support for human rights violators in Mexico comes as no surprise of course. It is performing the same role its counterparts perform throughout the region, while the Canadian government, from the pursuit of NAFTA under the Liberals to the Conservative’s quick support for the right-wing Felipe Calderón’s controversial 2006 election victory over Centre-Left candidate Manuel López Obrador, has sent clear signals about where its priorities in Mexico lie. More recently, the Conservatives have embraced the militarization of Mexico, just as they have throughout Central America. In 2009, RCMP officers began training Mexican Federal police—a force with serious corruption problems, which has been implicated in massive human rights abuses. Mexico is also a part of Canada’s Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation, which has had no discernible impact on its military’s human rights record.1157 But as with the security apparatuses in Central America, reform is beside the point. Building deeper formal and informal ties, and gaining some discernible influence with them to ensure the country remains a stable and secure place to do business, is instead what lies behind Canada’s security engagement in Mexico. In 2012, the same Mexican army and federal police broke up a blockade of Excellon Resources’ La Platosa mine by union and community members.1158 Anticipating the possible liberalization of Mexico’s oil and gas industry, Public Safety Canada and the Mexican government have worked on an assessment of security needs for offshore oil and gas projects.1159
Another country worth highlighting here is the Dominican Republic, in which Canada is the largest foreign investor nation with C$548 million in mining, sweatshop manufacturing, and banking capital. The Canadian investment that has attracted the most attention and opposition in recent years is Barrick’s Pueblo Viejo gold mine in Cotuí (Goldcorp has a minority stake in the mine). One of the largest gold mines in the world, it received financing from Export Development Canada worth upwards of C$500 million.1160 Opposition to Pueblo Viejo has involved marches against the project and a campaign calling for a ban on cyanide use in the country. In 2010, while still in the construction stage, an accident
led to the chemical poisoning of over four hundred workers. Although the workers reported hearing a blast before falling ill, Barrick initially blamed the illnesses on food poisoning.1161
In response to criticism from environmental movements, scientists, and landowners who claim Barrick took their land without permission or compensation, the project was defended publically by Canada’s ambassador, who argued that, “It’s not only important what will be obtained there in economic terms but also environmentally.”1162 Exactly what will be “obtained” environmentally is unclear. The Dominican Republic has also received a number of Canadian cabinet ministers on official visits to discuss Canadian investment interests, none of whom has discussed the anti-Pueblo Viejo campaign or chemical poisoning. The Minister of State for the Americas, Diane Ablonczy, visited the Dominican Republic in 2011 and 2012, and two other cabinet ministers visited in August 2012. Shortly after the latter visit, a protest against Pueblo Viejo ended with forty persons injured by police.1163 But not everything has proceeded smoothly for Barrick. In the context of public opposition to the mine and potential super-profits to be earned due to the high international gold prices when production commenced in 2013, the Dominican government halted shipments of gold from the mine, demanding higher tax payments than were originally agreed upon by the company in 2009. The government argued that for every C$100 Barrick exports in gold, the company will get C$97, and successfully forced Barrick to pay a higher tax rate.1164
