Real Peace

by Richard Nixon

  If significant progress is made along these lines before a summit, Presidents Reagan and Andropov when they meet could agree on long-term goals for arms control and establish a step-by-step process for reaching them. New top-level representatives, who would report directly and periodically to the Presidents, should be given the responsibility for negotiating a specific timetable.

  The pieces are in place for an arms control breakthrough. The Soviets dealt themselves a strong hand by relentlessly building up their nuclear weaponry in the 1970s. By modernizing our own we have improved our hand through the draw. But we also have an ace in the hole that gives the Soviets an incentive to strike a fair deal: if there must be a nuclear arms race, we will win it through our superior economic strength and advanced technology.

  After an agreement is signed, the pundits inevitably speculate about who won and who lost. But for an arms control agreement to contribute to real peace, there should be no losers, only winners. If the agreement is not to our mutual advantage, it will become politically impossible for the losing side to implement it. Unless both sides reap benefits, the process will falter.

  Once we conclude arms control agreements, we must do everything they allow us to because we can be sure the Soviet Union will do so. Opponents of arms control claim that SALT I allowed the Soviets to gain nuclear superiority. The facts prove the contrary. In 1972, programs were under way to develop the B-1 bomber, the Trident II submarine, and the MX, cruise, and Minuteman III missiles. It was the Congress, not SALT I, that delayed these programs. Forty billion dollars were lopped off Administration defense budgets between 1968 and 1975. This mistake was compounded by President Carter. In his first years in office, he cancelled the B-1, delayed the MX and cruise missiles, shut down the Minuteman III production line, and cancelled the neutron bomb. The Soviets, not surprisingly, did everything SALT I permitted, stretching some provisions in the process. If we had followed a similar policy, there would be no land-based missile gap today.

  While we must seek arms control agreements, we must not overestimate what they can accomplish. A bad agreement will increase the risk of war. Not even the best agreement imaginable would solve all our problems. If the United States and the Soviet Union cut their nuclear arsenals in half, a goal that is beyond the wildest dreams of even the most optimistic arms control negotiator on either side, we would still have enough weapons to destroy each other many times over. If we were to make such drastic arms reductions, a nuclear war would be just as devastating as it would be today.

  If we are to reduce the risk and danger of war, we must leapfrog the sterile arms control debate and go to the heart of the problem: the political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union and the policies we can initiate that will deter the Soviets from resorting to war to resolve those differences.

  Incentives for Peace. Only when deterrence is assured can detente be effective. If the Soviets realize that aggression will not pay, they will have no choice but to behave with restraint. We can then reinforce the effect of the fear of war by providing them with the rewards of peace. Real peace requires a policy that has incentives for peace as well as disincentives for war.

  Our economic power dwarfs theirs because our economic system works and theirs does not. The NATO allies and Japan outproduce the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies by a ratio of over three to one. Trade between our systems can give them an economic stake in peace and lead to greater Soviet restraint.

  The Soviets need us. We know this, they know it, and we should make use of it. They are more economically dependent on us than we are on them. We largely trade Western technology for Soviet raw materials. The Soviets need access to our know-how if their economy is to grow through the end of the century. If necessary, we can go elsewhere to buy their products, but they have no alternative supplier for ours. This gives us leverage over them. We should use it to further the cause of real peace by stamping our goods with a political price tag as well as an economic one.

  We should have no illusions about what trade can accomplish. Trade by itself will not produce peace or prevent war. Some contend that if we trade more with the Soviet Union, they will be less aggressive. But the Kremlin leaders cannot be bought off by trade. In the late 1970s they showed us that they would both trade and invade. At the other extreme, some contend that the increase in Soviet-American trade in the early years of detente helped fuel Soviet expansionism. This claim is preposterous. The level of trade was minuscule then; it could not possibly have affected Soviet military power. Economic relations can never substitute for deterrence. If properly implemented, they can reinforce it.

  Lenin contemptuously remarked that capitalists were so short-sightedly greedy that they would sell the communists the rope by which they themselves would someday hang. Unfortunately, some Western businessmen fit the bill. They would sell the Soviets not only rope, but also the scaffolding and a how-to book for the hangman. By refusing to look beyond the bottom line, they blithely ignore the military power the Soviets are massing on the front line.

  Trade should be expanded only in ways that serve our interests. This means that we must not sell the Soviets goods and technology that directly contribute to their military capability. It also means that our trade must not be at subsidized prices or on easy credit terms. The rule should be “trade, not aid.”

  Beyond this, we should expand our economic contacts. We should sell them rope, if they want to buy it, but do so in a way that binds their hands and prevents them from reaching out to further their domination. The more we engage the Soviet Union in an intricate network of commercial relations, the more we increase its stake in peace—and also increase its incentive to maintain good relations with us.

  When the Russians marched into Afghanistan, the United States was reduced to boycotting the Olympics in Moscow and imposing a grain embargo that was meaningless because other suppliers were ready to rush in to fill the gap. We would have had more leverage if we had been trading in more things the Russians wanted.

  Our leverage with trade will be minimal unless our allies in Europe and Japan join with us in developing a common policy. Acting together economically, the West is a powerful giant. Acting separately, it is an impotent giant.

  For economic leverage to be effective, it must be substantial. We must have something significant to give and also to take back. We need both the carrot and the stick.

  The Soviet leaders want what the West produces, and they are willing to give up something to get it. The key is to make it very clear to them that there is an iron link between their behavior and the West’s willingness to make the trade deals they hope for.

  Soviet leaders reject explicit linkage, whether to trade or to arms control negotiations. They will not adopt the principle of linkage, but they will adapt to the fact of it. We must make them understand that linkage is a fact of international life. The American people will not support arms control and trade initiatives with the Soviet Union at a time when it is engaging in aggressive actions that threaten our interests.

  For linkage to work, however, it must be done privately. We should not make statements or take actions that will make the Soviets lose face publicly. For example, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union increased from 400 in 1968 to nearly 35,000 in 1973 as a result of the private pressure of our Administration. Congress then passed a law—the Jackson-Vanik amendment—which put the Russians on the spot publicly by tying trade to emigration policy. The number of Jews allowed to emigrate was cut in half the following year.

  Peaceful trade is totally inconsistent with the Soviet Union’s aggressive policies. I once heard President Eisenhower remark, “We should sell the Russians anything that they can’t shoot back.” When they use their economic ties with the West to finance their expansionist policies, the Soviets are in effect shooting back our assistance. The West cannot be so foolish as to subsidize its own destruction.

  During World War II, the United States recognized the importance of economi
c power by setting up a Board of Economic Warfare. Today we need a Foreign Economic Policy Board to concert the use of our economic power. It should answer directly to the President because only he would be able to knock heads together when the bureaucrats in the various agencies involved with foreign economic policy engage in Washington’s favorite sport: fighting for turf. Policies governing trade, foreign aid, loans, and support of international lending agencies must be coordinated to serve American foreign policy interests. A process should also be established for enlisting the cooperation of the private sector in serving those interests. It makes no sense for the government to cut off aid to hostile nations while American banks continue to make huge loans to those same nations.

  Trade is not a panacea. It does not solve all our problems. Nothing can remove the burden of deterrence from our shoulders. Our policies must be designed to take the profit out of war, but we should also put more profit into peace. On these two pillars—deterrence and detente—we can build a structure of real peace.

  Summit Meetings. Summitry between the leaders of the superpowers is indispensable in the pursuit of real peace. It is at the summit that we bring together the various strands of hard-headed detente. This is a delicate exercise that we should undertake only if progress on resolving substantive issues is assured. No American President should go to the summit unless he knows what is on the other side of the mountain.

  Rushing into a quickie summit just so the leaders of the superpowers can get acquainted would be a stupid and devastating mistake. Such a summit might temporarily improve the atmospherics of our relations, but little else. The famous “spirit of Geneva,” as well as the spirits of other Soviet-American summits at Camp David, Vienna, and Glassboro, was illusory. When a summit is all spirit and no substance, the spirit evaporates fast.

  Andropov is understandably reluctant to schedule a summit at a time when it might help President Reagan win reelection. But with the resurgence of the American economy and the President’s rise in the polls, Andropov is caught between a rock and a hard place. If he deliberately delays a summit until after the election, he will find himself facing a President with a new mandate and a stronger bargaining position. Andropov needs a summit before the American election more than President Reagan does. We should not give it to him on the cheap.

  The words coming out of Moscow seem to indicate that they would like a summit. Their deeds would indicate otherwise. Some pundits have seized upon certain “signals” they interpret as being positive. But permitting a half-dozen Pentacostalists to emigrate, making some semantic concessions on human rights at the Madrid conference, allowing progress toward expanded cultural and diplomatic ties, and lifting martial law in Poland while transferring most of its repressive features to the civil code are not actions that deserve serious consideration. Real peace is too important for tokenism. Unless substantial progress is assured on arms control and on reducing Soviet adventurism in Central America, we should not agree to hold a summit.

  If the summit produces too little, there are two dangers. The first is disillusionment. The first Reagan-Andropov meeting will receive enormous worldwide attention. Expectations will be high. If the summit fails to live up to them, the letdown will be catastrophic. The disappointment could lead both sides to give up on the process of peace and increase preparations for war.

  The second danger is euphoria. Sometimes simply the fact of a summit gives many in the West unrealistic hopes for the future. They mistakenly believe that we have reached the end of the journey to peace rather than just made a beginning. This makes it more difficult for Western leaders to gain public support for the decisive actions and strong military forces that are needed to make hard-headed detente work.

  Summits must produce more than tokenism. They cannot make miracles, but they can make progress. As Churchill once said, “It would, I think, be a mistake to assume that nothing can be settled with Soviet Russia unless or until everything is settled.”

  The first Soviet-American summit in Moscow in 1972 was scheduled only after the Soviets agreed to the Berlin settlement in 1971. We believed that if we could reach an agreement on an issue that had plagued East-West relations for 30 years and had at times brought us to the brink of war, we could reasonably expect to make progress on other major issues.

  Similarly, before we schedule the next summit, personal representatives of Presidents Reagan and Andropov should undertake a series of intensive, absolutely confidential negotiations to explore what progress can be made in reaching agreement on major issues. This would be the most promising forum in which to search for some form of accommodation that advances the general interests of both parties by compromising on the specific interests of each. It would allow the two sides to subtly feel out the differing degrees to which various elements of the other party’s positions are negotiable, and to try varying combinations of give-and-take.

  The summit agenda must be broad. It must include arms control, trade, and conduct in areas where our political differences collide, such as the Middle East, Africa, and Central America. In these preparatory talks, links should be forged between these issues. For example, the Russians must be made to understand that there is no way the Congress could or should approve arms control or trade agreements reached at a summit when Soviet surrogates continue to try to build another beachhead in Central America.

  The Soviets will loudly object to such linkage, but they will understand it. After all, their paranoia about having “friendly” buffer states on their borders puts them in a poor position for objecting to our concern about what happens to our neighbors. President Kennedy drew the line when the Soviets tried to put missiles into Cuba in 1962. I drew the line when they tried to put a nuclear submarine base on Cuba in 1970. President Reagan has drawn the line in El Salvador. He is right to do so. We should make it clear to the Soviets that we will do whatever is necessary to prevent the establishment of another Soviet base in the Americas.

  All discussions should proceed on the principle of strict reciprocity. We give them something they want only if they give us something we want. By not capitalizing on our economic power, we have been giving away enormous assets for free. And the Soviets, who are experts at the hoarding and exploiting of power, must certainly view our failure to use our assets as a sign of both stupidity and weakness.

  Our primary goal should be to build a new relationship with the Soviets in which we will be able to prevail upon them to cease their aggression. This can only happen when the bilateral relationship with us becomes more important to them than their adventurism.

  We must develop a process for annual summits between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. These meetings can both reduce the chances of war and help restrain Soviet behavior.

  Regularly scheduled summits allow each leader to take the measure of the other and thus can reduce the possibility of miscalculation during a confrontation. In 1973, on the last night of my second summit with Brezhnev, we had a midnight meeting in San Clemente about the Middle East situation. He tried to push me into agreeing on a settlement that the superpowers would impose on Israel and the other nations of the region. I categorically and firmly resisted this pressure. We went at it toe-to-toe for three hours. After that confrontation, he had to know that we were not bluffing during the Yom Kippur War four months later, when we called an alert of our military forces in response to his threat to send Soviet combat troops into the Middle East.

  If the leaders of the superpowers get to know each other, it does not mean they will like each other. But each controls such enormous power that it is vital that they take every possible step to reduce the possibility that either might underestimate the will of the other to defend his nation’s interests.

  Regular summits will tend to restrain Soviet behavior. As a meeting approaches the Kremlin leaders will be reluctant to do anything that might “poison” the atmosphere and therefore make it more difficult to reach the agreements they want. Brezhnev had an eye on the cale
ndar when he agreed to join us in bringing about a ceasefire in the war between India and Pakistan in 1971. He would have preferred to embarrass the Chinese by allowing his client, India, to gobble up China’s client, Pakistan. But he knew the cost would include the cancellation of a summit meeting he wanted. We had made that risk categorically clear to him.

  Regular summits that produce concrete results will help the United States and our allies mobilize public support for necessary defense programs. While we should not have a summit simply because our allies and friends favor it, the fact that we will go to the summit when it is properly prepared reassures them. Hope for real peace is essential if the people of the United States as well as Europe are to continue to support the military strength necessary to maintain the foundation of deterrence on which detente rests. There may be occasional spurts of spending when the threat of Soviet aggression seems acute, but over the long haul the absence of hope for peace fuels the forces of appeasement.

  Good or bad personal relations at a summit will not have a decisive effect on state relations. But the two cannot be separated. We should not assume that better personal relations will automatically improve bad state relations. Still, poor personal relations will make it more difficult to improve bad state relations, and could even aggravate them.

  In negotiating with the Kremlin leaders, an American President should be cordial in personal matters but unyielding in policy matters. As Franklin Roosevelt learned, with tragic consequences for the people of Poland and the other nations behind the Iron Curtain, any President who believes he can get the men of the Kremlin to change their policies by charming them or simply through personal persuasiveness is due for a rude awakening. But while mushy sentimentality should be avoided, a President achieves nothing—by bluster and belligerence. The Russians are masters of the bluff and can usually detect that tactic when it is used against them. Bluster and bad manners may intimidate the weak but never the strong. Talking softly while carrying a big stick is the most effective way to deal with the Soviets.