The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran

by David Crist

  Nine

  SLEEPY HOLLOW

  On Sunday morning, May 13, 1984, the Kuwaiti oil tanker Umm Casbah, heading south out of the Persian Gulf. Lumbered low in the water, her holds were filled with a load of refined petroleum for the United Kingdom. An Iranian reconnaissance plane relayed the tanker’s location back to an air base near Bushehr. An hour later, an Iranian F-4E painted in a desert-camouflaged scheme of light and dark brown swaths took off with its characteristic deafening roar and trail of black smoke. It took less than fifteen minutes for the two-seat jet to cover the distance across the Gulf. The Iranian electronic warfare officer looked into a small video screen and put the crosshairs squarely on the eighty-thousand-ton tanker; he launched two small Maverick missiles, which had been designed to destroy tanks, not supertankers. The missiles hit the tanker squarely amidships, starting a small fire that the crew quickly extinguished. The next day, Iranian aircraft struck again with another missile, this time inflicting real damage, blowing a five-meter hole in the side of another Kuwaiti tanker, Bahrah. Two days later, Iran added Saudi Arabia to its target list. Iranian missiles hit the Saudi tanker Yanbu Pride while she sat anchored at the oil loading facility of Ras Tannurah. The Iranian pilot then swooped in low, strafing the hapless tanker with its machine gun.1 Over the next seven months, Iran struck fifteen more Gulf Arab ships.

  These attacks marked a major escalation in the Iran-Iraq War. The ensuing tanker war, as it became known, threatened to consume the entire Persian Gulf and curtail the flow of precious oil from the Middle East. Over the next four years, Iran and Iraq attacked more than five hundred ships, with the tonnage lost or damaged equally half that lost in the Atlantic during the Second World War.2 For the United States, the tanker war turned the simmering tensions between Tehran and Washington into a very real shooting war.

  Saddam Hussein started the tanker war. Shortly after the outbreak of war, both sides declared war exclusion zones in which neutral shipping would risk attack. Iran issued a “Notice to Mariners” declaring a wartime exclusion zone running from twelve to sixty nautical miles from the Iranian coastline. Ships not bound for Iranian ports were ordered by Tehran to remain outside this zone. Iran’s stated purpose was to ensure the safety of neutral shipping, but its true motive was to allow Iranian naval and air forces free rein through half the Persian Gulf, providing it the ability to attack shipping bound for Iraq or its supporters. But in effect it provided Iraq with a “free fire zone,” for only ships bound for an Iranian port would sail in the Iranian exclusion zone.3 Any ship in Iran’s exclusion zone was fair game, and Iraqi pilots took full advantage of it. With the land war bogged down in the trenches outside Basra, in February 1984 Iraqi aircraft escalated their attacks against Iranian oil exports, pounding Iranian shipping in the free fire zone near Kharg Island and Bushehr.4

  Iraq made use of recently provided French jets and training. In early October 1983, France leased five Super Étendards to Iraq. Designed to fire the Exocet antiship missile, they served as the Iraqi frontline attack planes against Iranian shipping until France delivered the more advanced F-1 fighters in 1985. While this overt military support from Paris made its peacekeepers targets for suicide bombings in Beirut, it gave Saddam’s air force an unmatched capability to hit oil tankers leaving Iran’s main oil terminal at Kharg Island. Iraqi pilots in their sleek French jets took off from Iraqi airfields and hugged the Kuwaiti and Saudi coastline, frequently flying through both countries’ airspace with their tacit concurrence. When they flew past the small Iranian island of Farsi, just south of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, the Iraqis turned east toward Kharg and the Iranian exclusion zone—a maneuver known as the Farsi hook. Then they unleashed their missiles on the first blip appearing on the radar screens before hightailing it back to Iraq to avoid being attacked by a wayward Iranian jet.

  In a three-month span, from February through April 1984, Iraqi aircraft sank or heavily damaged as many as sixteen ships. This included some friendly fire when an Iraqi Exocet missile struck the Saudi-owned tanker Safina al-Arab, which was carrying 340,000 tons of Iranian crude destined for France. The ship erupted in a massive fireball, rendering it a total loss and killing one of the crew.5

  Iran did not respond immediately to these Iraqi provocations. Despite later accusations by the United States that Iran spread the war throughout the Gulf, Iran never wanted the tanker war. With Iraq exporting most of its oil through pipelines to Turkey, there were only a few Iraqi-bound tankers to attack, and as the chief quarry in the tanker war, Tehran constantly pushed for a cease-fire to the shipping attacks.6

  After weighing its options and making vacuous threats about closing down the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian government decided on a different strategy: to strike at the supporters of the Iraqi war machine, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. And so on Sunday morning, May 13, the Umm Casbah became the first casualty of Iran’s reprisals. Lacking the French connection and under a tight American arms embargo, the aging Iranian fleet of American twin-seat F-4s bombed and strafed ships in the northern Gulf, in much more restrained tit-for-tat strikes responding to the incessant Iraqi attacks on Kharg Island.

  Even though Iraq had started the tanker war, the Gulf Arabs pointed the finger of blame at Iran. On May 21, 1984, they requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to address Iran’s attacks and the issue of freedom of navigation in the Gulf. On June 1, 1984, the UN passed Resolution 552, which called upon all states to respect the right of freedom of navigation and warned Tehran that if it did not comply, the UN would “consider effective measures.”7 Iran responded with indignation at the selective rebuke of the world’s governing body, which ignored Iraq’s role in spreading the war beyond the land.

  Saudi Arabia responded to the Iranian attacks by establishing a no-fly zone in the northern Gulf called the Fahd Line, named after the Saudi king. This line extended well into the Gulf, encompassing all the Saudi offshore oil fields. The Saudi government warned Iran that it would challenge any air incursions across this line and suggested that it would use force should an Iranian jet cross this line to attack Saudi shipping. Behind the scenes, the American air force provided the backbone for the Fahd Line. American AWACS based in Dhahran provided air surveillance, while U.S. air-to-air tankers refueled Saudi F-15 fighters patrolling the Fahd Line.

  On June 5, an American AWACS detected two Iranian F-4 jets crossing the Fahd Line and vectored in two Saudi fighters, one of which had an American flight instructor in the rear seat. The Iranians ignored two warnings to turn back, and instead radioed back to their base asking for instructions. Encouraged by the American in the backseat of the cockpit, the tentative Saudi pilots each “pickled” off a heat-seeking missile. One struck home, turning an Iranian aircraft into a fireball and sending its two occupants down to the ocean below.

  Both sides scrambled nearly sixty aircraft, and it looked as though a major dogfight was about to ensue over the Persian Gulf. However, Iran backed down first. The Iranian wing commander recalled his aircraft, avoiding a major confrontation that neither side particularly desired.8 While the Saudi defense minister was furious over his air force’s aggressive action against Iran, fearing it would lead to an escalation of attacks on Saudi shipping, Iran learned a different lesson.9 Never again would the Iranians send their planes to challenge the Fahd Line or use their scarce aviation resources to attack shipping in the northern Gulf. This unusual display of Saudi fortitude effectively eliminated the Iranian air threat. “Resolution prevailed against the Iranian bully!” remarked the Saudi ambassador, Prince Bandar, to Caspar Weinberger.

  In Washington, the tanker war caused more frantic meetings in the White House Situation Room. All agreed on the need to support Iraq and to strengthen the military capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council, but beyond that, the deep policy rifts exposed during the Lebanon crisis carried over to these new discussions about the tanker war.

  Both Robert McFarlane and George Shultz believed Tehran would use the Iraqi attacks a
s a rationale to expand its terrorist operations to destabilize the Gulf Arab countries, and that it was looking to conduct another spectacular attack against the U.S. military, perhaps by using a suicide plane against a warship in the Persian Gulf. Shultz still chafed about the lack of an American military response to the marine barracks bombing. He stressed to Weinberger during one of their weekly breakfast meetings that the United States could not let terrorism go unpunished; this would only lead to attacks at home and against our allies. McFarlane went beyond the secretary of state, suggesting during one White House meeting that the United States should consider a preemptive strike against Iran.

  Weinberger viewed this saber rattling with incredulity.10 He quarreled with McFarlane in several meetings in June and July, arguing that this would just draw the United States into the larger Iran-Iraq War. The defense secretary could be a tenacious fighter, and he stymied the interagency deliberations with point papers and sheer stubbornness during meetings.11

  Weinberger’s underlings took a different tack to temper McFarlane’s and Shultz’s martial ideas. They raised the continuing concerns about long-term alienation of Iran. The number three man in the Pentagon, deputy for policy Fred Iklé, cautioned that military action against Iran would neither hinder its terrorist operations nor achieve much more than Iraq could do. In his early sixties with graying hair, Iklé came to prominence primarily for his writings on nuclear and strategic warfare. A staunch Cold War hawk, he often proposed covert action against the Soviets in Afghanistan.12 However, when it came to Iran, he took the line of reconciliation. “The most important mid-term issue is the Soviet rule [sic, role] in a post-Khomeini Iran. By maneuvering ourselves into a deeper confrontation with Iran now, we will make it easier for the Soviets to establish themselves.”13

  Other civilians in the Pentagon agreed. The United States needed to plan to eventually “reestablish ties with, hopefully, a moderate Iran in the post-Khomeini period,” wrote Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Sandra Charles, echoing her boss Iklé’s views.14 While Weinberger couldn’t have cared less about reestablishing any rapport with the Islamic Republic, the argument did resonate with William Casey and Bud McFarlane, and eventually with Ronald Reagan.

  President Reagan eventually signed two directives to respond to the tanker war. He reiterated the American goal of preventing an Iranian victory. He rejected any military attack on Iran, but ordered American forces to be ready to respond immediately should Iran attack an American merchant ship or try to halt the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz.15 Additionally, Reagan authorized the transfer of four hundred Stinger missiles as part of a major upgrade for Saudi Arabia’s air defense, and he offered more military aid to the Gulf Arabs.

  Administration officials then fanned out in the region to reassure the Arabs. The president’s envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, made a swing through the Gulf Arab capitals, promoting closer defense ties with Washington and encouraging the Arabs to develop contingency plans with CENTCOM, bringing promises of new arms. As deputy national security adviser, John Poindexter led an interagency team to Saudi Arabia, where they found Saudi officials in a blustering, bellicose mood and unhappy that Reagan had not taken a harder line. “The king would not stand for appeasement with Iran,” one Saudi official told him. “We intend to strike back if Iran escalates their attacks on our tankers!” Yet when Poindexter pressed Saudi Arabia for a public show of support for the United States against Iran, perhaps allowing U.S. forces to use Saudi bases, the king balked. Despite the Iranian attacks, the Gulf states remained reluctant to allow American boots on their ground.16 They encouraged the United States to take action against Iran, but in the event of war, America’s Gulf Arab partners would remain firmly on the side-lines.

  Privately, Reagan harbored reservations about such open-ended aid to these feckless friends. When McFarlane placed the proposal for more helicopters and artillery for Kuwait on the president’s desk, the Gipper read it and looked up. “Bud, the current interests of the Kuwaiti government in working with us are at best transitory,” he said. Incredulous, he added, “The United States is increasingly responsible for the defense of a country that openly criticizes our policy.”

  On November 23, 1985, General Robert Kingston turned over the reins of CENTCOM to Marine General George B. Crist. Slim with dark hair, the son of a naval officer, Crist attended Villanova University, the same school as General P. X. Kelley. Kelley, now the marine commandant, pushed Weinberger and General John Vessey to appoint Crist to be the first marine to ever command a major, theater-unified command. The original agreement for CENTCOM called for alternating marine and army commanders; it was now the corps’ time. Crist’s experience outside of the confines of the smallest service made him a strong candidate. He had unprecedented joint experience: as an aide to the president in the 1950s, as assistant to the chairman during the Vietnam War, as deputy operations officer for Europe during the Iranian hostage crisis, and most recently as vice director of the Joint Staff during Lebanon and Grenada crises. Kelley knew that both the defense secretary and the chairman thought highly of Crist, having seen him in action daily as the vice director.

  In the mid-1980s, CENTCOM was anything but the center of the American military universe. The Middle East remained a backwater, and officers on the fast track avoided going to the Tampa headquarters that many within the military called “Sleepy Hollow.” With the military’s focus on a war with the Soviets in Europe, few wanted to go to a tertiary theater such as the Middle East. CENTCOM had more officers retiring than moving on to other assignments. When Major General Samuel Swart of the air force—the new J-3, or operations officer—came to Tampa in 1986, a good friend of his wrote him a note jokingly saying, “From all work to no work.”17

  General Crist focused on putting together a better staff for his 751-person headquarters. He brought in a new chief of staff from the army, Major General Donald Penzler. Experienced working in large European army headquarters and recently as the deputy chief of staff at the army’s Training and Education Command, he had served with Crist on the Joint Staff from 1981 to 1983, and Crist requested that he come down to be his chief of staff. Penzler was tough, discreet, and loyal. He initiated “Operation Slash,” a program designed to get rid of deadweight and bring new, energetic officers to the staff. His first goal was forcing the retirement of a senior colonel who was running his own side business in town.18

  Crist faced the challenges of two major wars. Shortly after he took over as chief of staff at CENTCOM, the Soviet military began a massive new operation in Afghanistan. Unbeknownst to U.S. intelligence at the time, the newly installed Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, decided to unleash the Soviet military in a last attempt to win the war. Elite special forces, Spetsnaz troops, backed by a hundred frontline attack aircraft, relentlessly pursued the guerrillas. The Soviets dramatically increased their attacks into Pakistan proper. In 1986 alone, the Soviets conducted more than 880 air and ground incursions, attacking guerrilla bases and destroying supply depots.19 The Soviet military formed a new, high-level Southern Theater of Military Operations command, stationing a very experienced general, the former chief of staff of the Soviet forces in East Germany, as its new commander.

  Crist agreed with the prevailing assessment of the Soviet desire to secure warm-water ports and Middle East oil.20 An analysis group inside the intelligence directorate produced a monograph that portrayed two hundred years of gradual, unrelenting Russian expansion south into the Caucasus. The study stated that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one more manifestation of this trend. “In any event,” Crist wrote to the chairman, “it is instructive to recall that the Soviets have occupied Iran four times in the Twentieth Century alone.”21

  But the marine knew that in the event of a general war against the Soviets, CENTCOM would become a backwater theater. CENTCOM would never send any ground troops into Iran. In the event of a major war with Moscow, forces allocated to his command to deploy to Iran, such as the 82nd Airborn
e Division, were also slated to go to the main front in Europe. “The plans were unrealistic,” Crist said later, “but you had to keep them for defense funding as all the resources were tied to Soviet war plans and the reason for CENTCOM’s being.”22

  But it would be the expanding Iran-Iraq War that soon eclipsed Cold War worries as the CENTCOM commander’s chief anxiety. In February 1986, Iran amassed over one hundred thousand men in what both U.S. and Iraqi intelligence officials meeting in Baghdad believed would be another major frontal assault on Basra. Instead, on the night of February 10, amid a pouring rainstorm, Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen loaded up in small boats and rafts and crossed the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab and easily captured the al-Faw Peninsula, a muddy finger of land that served as Iraq’s oil terminus for all its crude exports from the Persian Gulf. The Iranians quickly reinforced their foothold, and some thirty thousand soldiers pushed up the two small roads running north to Iraq’s only port, Umm Qasr, and the city of Basra. A humiliated Saddam Hussein immediately ordered the peninsula recaptured. The Iraqi army threw three of its best divisions into an inept, piecemeal attack that the dogged Iranian defenders easily drove back, inflicting some eight thousand casualties.23 Iran’s lack of trucks or tanks for its foot soldiers, as well as poor logistics, prevented its victory at al-Faw from becoming the southern gateway to Basra, and this front bogged down into another war of the trenches. But the Iranian gains rattled every Arab state in the Middle East, none more so than Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

  The tanker war took another dangerous turn. Iran announced an expanded blockade of Iraq. The Iranian navy would confiscate any military cargo destined for Iraq, including cargo transferred through a third country like Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. The Iranian navy began enforcing this decree by challenging ships entering the Strait of Hormuz, asking for their nationality and last and next ports of call. Any vessel destined for Kuwait was stopped, and a boarding party of Iranian sailors would come aboard to check the ship’s manifest and open any suspicious containers. Any ship found carrying suspicious cargo was diverted to Bandar Abbas, where Iranian authorities would conduct a detailed search of the cargo holds, seizing any military hardware.24 In the first eight months, sixty-six ships were stopped and searched by the Iranian navy—a small fraction of the ships that entered the Gulf, but enough to make everyone, especially those assisting Iraq, very nervous.25