The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran

by David Crist

  At eight thirty in the morning on May 25, 1986, an unmarked Israeli aircraft piloted by the CIA touched down at the airport in Tehran. The U.S. delegation consisted of Bud McFarlane, Oliver North, George Cave, NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Israeli Amiram Nir (pretending to be an American), and a CIA communicator who provided secure communications for the entourage back to Poindexter in Washington. Their plane carried one pallet of Hawk missile parts, with another aircraft filled with twelve more pallets standing by in Israel to be sent the minute the hostages were released. An Iranian airport guard ushered the group into a VIP lounge. Here they waited for someone to appear, content to make polite small talk with the Iranian base commander, who entertained them with an air show using some of his F-4s, having recently received a shipment of spare parts from the West.

  In fact, the U.S. visit caught the Iranians completely by surprise. Despite the agreement and having relayed the day of McFarlane’s arrival, the Iranians did not really think the Americans would come. When the Revolutionary Guard heard of this strange delegation’s appearance in Tehran, they sent men over to the old U.S. embassy to examine the personnel files. They scanned them and could find no one named McFarlane or North, but did see a George Cave. So they agreed to meet with the Americans.38

  More than an hour later, Ghorbanifar appeared with Kangarlou in tow, both men looking harried. Ghorbanifar made an excuse about the Americans arriving early and escorted them to several old cars that would serve as their humble motorcade. They drove to the old Hilton Hotel—now called Independence Hotel—where the Revolutionary Guard had hastily cleared the entire top floor for the unexpected American delegation. A secure message transmitted to the White House regarding their arrival stated, “We have been treated politely, though heavily escorted by Revolutionary Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms.”39

  The first meeting began at five p.m. Three Iranians arrived, none of whom appeared to be either polished or senior officials. The Iranians opened with a litany of grievances and American transgressions. Regardless, McFarlane put that aside and began with rehearsed remarks designed to get the negotiations moving.

  President Reagan had asked him to do what was necessary to find common ground for discussions in the future, to try to find common ground for cooperation, McFarlane told the Iranians. The United States had no desire to reverse the Iranian Revolution and was willing to work with the government.

  Very quickly, however, it became apparent that the two sides were operating from completely different views on what had been agreed to. The United States expected the hostages to be released immediately, and before any more Hawk missile parts arrived. The Iranians thought that the United States intended to provide them a vast array of weapons and spare parts, with the hostages to be released at a later date. It became apparent to Cave that Ghorbanifar had promised the Iranians much more in the way of weapons than the United States would ever agree to. Ghorbanifar had lied to both sides.

  In a message sent to Poindexter, McFarlane relayed his view of the Iranian government: “It might be best for us to try to picture what it would be like if after a nuclear attack, a surviving tailor became vice president; a recent grad student became secretary of state; and a bookie became the interlocutor for all discourse with foreign countries. While the principals are a cut above this level of qualification, the incompetence of the Iranian government to do business requires a rethinking on our part of why there have been so many frustrating failures to deliver on their part.”40

  When McFarlane threatened to leave, the Iranians promised him a meeting with an official of greater stature. A short time later, a member of the parliament and a senior political adviser to Rafsanjani, Hadi Najafabadi, arrived on the fifteenth floor of the old Hilton Hotel to meet with the Americans. A short, bearded man, Najafabadi immediately impressed the delegation. A mullah who had taken off his turban, he was several cuts above the other Iranians: confident, Western educated, cultured, and able to converse in excellent English.

  McFarlane repeated why they were in Iran and his hopes that this would create the beginning of a renewed friendship and a strategic opening between the two nations. He stressed the threat of the Soviet Union to Iran. He told them that the United States knew about a planned Soviet invasion and that the Soviets had already conducted two rehearsals. The United States had a high-level source, a Soviet major general named Vladimir, who confirmed the Soviet intentions. This was pure fabrication, concocted on the plane ride over, but it drove home the theme the United States wanted to leave with the Iranians: that Moscow, not Washington, posed the greater risk to Iranian security.

  McFarlane handed over to Najafabadi a slickly produced packet of intelligence developed by the CIA on Soviet forces arrayed along the Iranian border. He then informed the Iranian that the Soviets had recently told their rival, Saddam Hussein, that they would do everything in their power to keep Iraq from losing the war. McFarlane conveniently left out that American public diplomacy was doing the same thing for Iraq.

  Najafabadi agreed with McFarlane’s assessment of the Soviet threat. He also impressed upon his American counterpart the risk his own government took in meeting with the Americans. It all looked hopeful. McFarlane cabled Poindexter with a slightly optimistic message: “Have finally reached a competent Iranian official…. We are on the way to something that can become a truly strategic gain for us at the expense of the Soviets. But it is going to be painfully slow.”41

  Najafabadi added new conditions set by Hezbollah for the hostages’ release. This included Israeli evacuation of the Golan Heights, monetary compensation, and release of seventeen Shiite prisoners who had been arrested for participation in a massive series of bombings in Kuwait in July 1983. The American delegation convened out on a balcony to avoid the presumed microphones in the hotel rooms. No one could be sure whether the Iranians were simply trying to extract more concessions or had difficulties controlling their surrogates. McFarlane stuck to his instructions from Poindexter. He insisted on the hostages’ release first and no new preconditions.42

  On Tuesday, May 27, talks continued. The two sides wrangled over sending the Hawk spare parts immediately or an immediate release of the hostages. Late in the afternoon, a conciliatory Najafabadi arrived bearing “good news.” The Lebanese captives had dropped all their demands except release of their colleagues in Kuwait. He then pleaded for the United States to immediately send the spare parts to Iran. The Americans could not deliver on this, but drafted a proposed statement they hoped would satisfy the Iranians, saying the United States would “work to achieve a release and fair treatment for Shiites held in confinement.” It did not, but talks continued well into the next morning. They were like two parties haggling in the bazaar. McFarlane threatened to leave if all the hostages were not returned, and Najafabadi and the other Iranians offered two hostages immediately in return for more missile spare parts. After a phone call with Poindexter around one thirty in the morning, McFarlane gave the Iranians until four a.m. to free all the hostages. If they did, an aircraft carrying the remainder of the Hawk spare parts would arrive in Tehran at ten a.m. If not, the U.S. delegation would leave. The Iranians balked, pleading for more time; McFarlane gave them until six thirty. When no hostages emerged, the U.S. delegation ate breakfast and packed up to go to the airport.

  A visibly exhausted Najafabadi again asked for more time. “The hostages are not in our control.”

  “You have our position,” McFarlane replied. “When you can meet it, let me know.”

  Privately, the Americans worried the Iranians might try to hold them hostage, but the real threat came from opponents of the talks within the regime. News spread of the arrival of McFarlane and the Americans. Not everyone liked it. Mehdi Hashemi organized a mob to go and get the Americans. At about eight a.m., his mob of vigilantes formed and began moving toward the hotel. Kangarlou came into the hotel and yelled at Cave, “Get everyone up. You need to leave immediately!” The Iranians
brought three nondescript jalopies and they drove McFarlane’s group by backstreets to the military side of the airport. Had Hashemi succeeded, Reagan would have had his own hostage crisis.

  Just as Cave boarded the aircraft, a senior Revolutionary Guard intelligence officer, Feridoun Mehdi-Nejat, approached Cave and begged him to stay a few more days. The two intelligence officers had warmed to each other during the three days of talks. “Let’s stay in touch,” he told Cave. Cave nodded in agreement.

  As he prepared to board the plane, McFarlane told one of the Iranians that this was the fourth time they had failed to honor an agreement. “Our lack of trust will endure for a long time. An important opportunity has been lost.” With that the cabin door closed and the four-engine 707 taxied down the runway, taking off at 8:55 a.m.

  President Reagan followed the McFarlane mission closely. After being informed of the failure of the mission, President Reagan wrote in his diary, “It seems the rug merchants and the Hisballah [sic] would only agree to 2 hostages. Bud told them to shove it, went to the airport and left for Tel Aviv. This was a heartbreaking disappointment for all of us.”43

  The failure of the meeting in Tehran should have ended the affair. McFarlane recommended as much to Reagan when he back-briefed the president upon his return to Washington. Reagan refused to concede defeat. Ghorbanifar and Nir continued to encourage the policy, and they found a willing accomplice in North, who zealously continued to work the scheme.

  On July 26, Hezbollah released Father Lawrence Jenco, the director of Catholic Relief in Lebanon, after 564 days in harsh captivity. Ghorbanifar had promised the Iranians the remaining twelve pallets of Hawk missile parts when they ordered Jenco’s release. For William Casey, this validated Ghorbanifar. “It is indisputable,” he wrote, “that the Iranian connection actually worked this time.” Casey attributed this success to Nir sitting on Ghorbanifar. Casey, while not pleased with the deal Ghorbanifar had arranged, recommended continuing with the arms deliveries as a means of securing the release of more hostages. Absent from the director’s arguments was any mention of the strategic opening to counter the Soviet Union that he had so firmly advocated since the spring of 1985.44

  Jenco carried with him a videotape from another hostage, David Jacobsen, criticizing Reagan for not doing enough to free the hostages. Reagan took this personally; he anguished over the hostages’ plight and bristled at the accusation that he or his administration was not doing enough to secure their release. On July 29, Reagan called Father Jenco to convey his regards, extending him an invitation to visit the White House, which he did in what Reagan called “an emotional experience” on August 4. Moved by Father Jenco, Reagan approved sending the remaining twelve pallets of Hawk missile parts to Iran. They arrived from Israel on August 4. The entire operation had now degenerated into purely an arms-for-hostages arrangement.

  Poindexter believed the United States needed a new conduit into the Iranian government. Frustrated, he wanted a second channel to cut out Nir, the Israelis, and Ghorbanifar. Poindexter authorized North to seek a new opening shortly after the Tehran meeting. After considerable effort by North’s team, they met with Ali Hashemi Bahramani, a nephew of Hashemi Rafsanjani and a Revolutionary Guard officer with a distinguished combat record against Iraq. Bahramani was smart and well versed in Western politics and Middle Eastern affairs. He advocated better relations with the West and showed his desires by frequently visiting Europe. On August 25, Bahramani met in Brussels with Secord and an Iranian expatriate working with Secord, Albert Hakim. This second channel was not well received in Israel, but the nephew of Rafsanjani promised better access to the Iranian regime, without all the double-talk of Ghorbanifar.

  On September 19, Bahramani and two Revolutionary Guard officers, including Feridoun Mehdi-Nejat, whom Cave had met with McFarlane in Tehran, arrived in Washington for an extraordinary meeting with the Americans. The supreme leader had personally approved Bahramani’s visit, and it required considerable effort on the American side, with North coordinating with both the FBI and the CIA to get the Iranian delegation into the United States. But on that day, the nephew of the Iranian speaker sat in Ollie North’s office in the Old Executive Office Building next to the White House.

  Two days of talks followed. The two sides found common ground on a number of issues. Bahramani echoed American concerns about the Soviet Union and offered a captured Soviet-built T-72 tank to examine. His government wanted strategic cooperation with the United States, he said, and he proposed forming a joint committee between the two nations to resolve their differences.45 The first task set for the joint committee would be to work out establishing commercial arrangements. After this was in effect, perhaps six months later, the two nations would reestablish diplomatic representation. Bahramani proposed ways the two nations could support the mujahideen in Afghanistan. He offered to establish a base inside Iran to facilitate the flow of American weapons to the mujahideen. One of the senior Revolutionary Guard officers stunned Cave. One day he said he was pleased that the Americans had started to provide advanced Stinger missiles to the mujahideen, since Iran had just acquired ten of them from their own sources in the mujahideen, later determined to be Ismail Khan.

  Bahramani brought a laundry list of weapons and parts. This included the ever popular Hawk missile parts and ten thousand rounds of advanced, extended-range artillery ammunition for their U.S.-manufactured howitzers. North reassured Bahramani that they could ship much of this as soon as the hostage issue was resolved. While the Iranian demurred on achieving their release, both sides generally agreed to the premise of a tit-for-tat exchange of hostages and weapons.

  North provided the Iranians with a CIA-prepared annotated map, replete with talking points discussing the general location of Iraqi forces behind the front lines, as well as some additional information on Soviet forces. But rather than give them anything based upon imagery, the units were placed on a commercially available, fifteen-year-old map of Iraq.

  George Cave and the younger Bahramani developed a friendly rapport. During one meeting with Cave, Bahramani laid three letters on the table in front of Cave, each a copy of one of the letters signed by Reagan urging better relations. “Did you really send these letters?”

  “Yes,” Cave answered, surprised that the Iranians apparently did not realize their authenticity.

  Bahramani then asked Cave for American assistance in bringing about a cease-fire with Iraq, before adding that they wanted to launch one last offensive to take Basra.

  “Well, what are you going to do if you take Basra?” Cave asked.

  “Of course we will declare an independent Shia state for Iraq with Basra as the capital!” he answered without hesitation. “He was too young and naive to realize he was saying too much,” Cave later chuckled.

  After the first day of talks, North gave the Iranians a private tour of the West Wing. The group wandered across the street from the Old Executive Office Building and into the side entrance to the White House proper. They walked past the hallway leading down to the White House Situation Room and up to the next floor, past the Cabinet Room and the Roosevelt Room. There Bahramani and his two Revolutionary Guard companions gazed into the Oval Office, prevented from entering this American sanctum only by a felt rope.

  Both North and Cave thought the meetings had gone well. North wrote to Poindexter, “We appear to be in contact with the highest levels of the Iranian government.” North exuberantly compared Reagan with Theodore Roosevelt, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for ending the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. “Anybody for RR [Ronald Reagan] getting the same prize?”46

  When the Iranians left, Cave went to Poindexter’s office. The CIA veteran believed Bahramani to be earnest in his desire for better relations. “I think we will get two or three hostages out,” he reported. Cave thought that this channel might just lead to the diplomatic breakthrough the president craved.

  Talks continued in October. Once again, they broke down into a series of exchanges: five h
undred TOW missiles for one hostage. Then the United States would approach the Kuwaitis about releasing at least some of the seventeen Iranian-backed terrorists held in their jail for the bombings in 1983. Then another five hundred TOWs would be sent to Iran, followed by at least one more hostage. Then the United States would consider sending artillery ammunition and provide more intelligence on Iraq, with Iran promising to do its “utmost to secure the release of the remaining hostages.”47 On October 28, 1986, the first batch of five hundred TOW missiles arrived in Iran. Five days later, the Lebanese released hostage David Jacobsen.48

  In September and October, three more Americans were kidnapped in rapid succession—likely to replace the ones released—off the streets of Beirut: Frank Reed, Joseph Cicippio, and Edward Tracy. More than a year of providing weapons to Iran had yielded three hostages released, and three hostages taken—a net gain of zero with the terrorists in Lebanon.

  The day after Jacobsen’s release, the Lebanese magazine al-Shiraa ran a story about McFarlane’s secret mission to Tehran. While inaccurate in several important details—such as the date of the meeting—it exposed the back-channel meetings between Iran and the United States. Cave suspected Ghorbanifar had leaked it, since he remained friendly with all the political rivals in Tehran. But the clear culprit was Ayatollah Montazeri. In October, authorities had arrested Mehdi Hashemi for kidnapping a Syrian diplomat. In retaliation, his supporters leaked the details of the secret dealings to embarrass Khomeini.

  The next day, Rafsanjani admitted the McFarlane visit during a speech marking the seventh anniversary of the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. He revealed that the Americans brought a “key-shaped cake to be a key to resumed relations,” adding, “but the kids were hungry and ate the cake.”49 As Weinberger had warned over a year earlier, the Iran arms sales had leaked, starting a feeding frenzy in the media.