by David Crist
34. Poole, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Involvement in Lebanon,” p. 27.
35. Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner, 1990), p. 360.
36. Carl Stiner, interview with author, April 2009; McFarlane interview.
37. COMSIXTHFLEET message to CINCUSNAVEUR, “Deployment of FASTAB to Beirut” (0816Z), August 1983, GRC, Lebanon Papers, Disc 23.
38. U.S. Marine Corps, “Mass Casualty Report on Beirut, Lebanon,” September 8, 1983, GRC, Lebanon Papers, Disc 26.
39. CTF Six One message to Commander, Sixth Fleet, “Joint Daily Intelligence Summary 095 for the Period 031800Z-041759Z” (05000Z), September 1983; CTF Six Two message to CTF Six One, “Update” (04117Z), September 1983, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Lebanon Papers, Disc 26.
40. Tom Clancy, Carl Stiner, and Tony Koltz, Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 2002), p. 238.
41. Martin and Walcott, Best Laid Plans, p. 121.
42. Weinberger Diaries, entry for September 11, 1983, Weinberger Papers.
43. Ronald Reagan memorandum addendum to NSDD, “On Lebanon of September 10,” September 11, 1983, Weinberger Papers, Box I:729, Folder Lebanon 7.
44. CTF Six One message to COMSIXTHFLEET, “Employment of ANGLICO Team in Direct Support of the Lebanese Armed Forces” (131630Z), September 1983, GRC, Lebanon Papers, Disc 28; COMSIXTHFLEET message to CTF Six Zero, “Close Air Support for Defense of Suq al-Gharb” (191139Z), September 1983; CTF Six One message to COMSIXTHFLEET, “Concept of Operations in Support of Suq al-Gharb” (160517Z), September 1983, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Lebanon Papers, Disc 29.
45. Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War, p. 65.
46. Ibid., pp. 62–63.
47. Geraghty interview with Frank, November 21, 1983, pp. 11–12. The United States had responded three days earlier. On September 16, several rounds from a Druze artillery battery landed near the U.S. embassy. The American naval gunfire responded by sending sixty 5-inch shells in the general direction of batteries in the Chouf Mountains. The next day, Stiner, who was not in the chain of command, canceled the order by calling in the rickety Lebanese air force instead of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Handwritten notes, “19 September After Action Report,” September 19, 1983, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Disc 29; CINCUSNAVEUR message, “Geopolitical Intelligence Highlights” (191820Z), September 1983; Summary and Conclusions, “Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements,” House Armed Services Committee; Clyde Mark, “Marine Security in Beirut: A Comparison of the House Armed Services Committee and the Long Commission Reports,” Congressional Research Service, January 1984, p. 4.
CHAPTER 7 A SPECTACULAR ACTION
1. Robert Baer, The Devil We Know (New York: Three Rivers, 2008), pp. 53–63; Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle Against the World’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Power (New York: Free Press, 2007), p. 59; David Hirst, Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East (New York: Nation Books, 2010), p. 185.
2. Martin and Walcott, Best Laid Plans, p. 100.
3. Sayeed Ali is a pseudonym for a former Hezbollah fighter. The author interviewed him in a city in the southern United States in March 2010.
4. Naim Qassem, translated by Dalia Khalil, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (Beirut: Saqi, 2010), p. 58.
5. Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War, p. 9.
6. Ammar al-Musawi, head of international relations for Hezbollah, and Hussein Haidar, head of diplomatic and political contacts for Hezbollah, interviews with author, February 19, 2010, Beirut, Lebanon; also Hirst, Beware of Small States, p. 183.
7. Laingen interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
8. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 33.
9. Sayeed Ali interview.
10. Baer, The Devil We Know, pp. 59–63.
11. Martin Kramer, “Hizbullah in Lebanon,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, volume 2 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 130–33.
12. Hani Abdallah, political and media adviser, Office of Religious Authority, Sayed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, interview with author, February 19, 2010, Beirut, Lebanon.
13. Fadlallah embraced modernity. Change, including new technology, is a part of God’s design, he preached. He supported women’s rights, considering women equal to men. He was not in a hurry to establish an Islamic state, believing it would evolve naturally over time. He maintained a large following among youth from all religious sects. In his later years he established his own blog, where he answered all types of questions about life and religion, including such topics as whether it was permissible for a man to have anal intercourse with his wife.
14. Abdallah interview; al-Musawi interview; interview with a retired CIA officer.
15. Bergman, Secret War with Iran, pp. 63–64.
16. James Clarity, “Israelis Killed in Blast in Southern Lebanon,” New York Times, November 12, 1982. Prime Minister Begin, who suffered a concurrent personal tragedy with the death of his wife of forty-three years, declared it a “new outrage perpetrated by the enemies of mankind.”
17. Hirst, Beware of Small States, p. 183.
18. Israeli authorities believed it might have been caused by an accidental gas explosion and not a bomb.
19. Qassem, Hizbullah, pp. 169–70; Bergman, Secret War with Iran, p. 65.
20. “The Islamic Jihad,” September 25, 1984, Weinberger Papers, Box I:779, Folder Lebanon 10.
21. Charles Allen, interview with author, October 7, 2009.
22. Baer, The Devil We Know, pp. 60–64.
23. Allen interview.
24. Osama Hamdan, interview with author.
25. Odom interview.
26. William Odom memorandum for Myers, “Middle East Trip Report, General Observations,” April 4–14, 1983, Odom Papers, Library of Congress, Box 4, Folder 1983, memorandum notes.
27. Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Three Rivers, 2002), pp. 65–67, 120.
28. Eric Haney, Inside Delta Force: The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorism Unit (New York: Delacorte, 2002), pp. 235–36.
29. The U.S. Embassy Bombing in Beirut, hearings, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Internal Operations and on Europe and the Middle East, 98th Congress, 1st Session, June 28, 1983.
30. Persico, Casey, p. 316.
31. CTF Six Two message, “Higher Alert Condition, Setting of” (081308Z), August 1983, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Lebanon Papers, Disc 23.
32. Message, “Lebanon/MNF Iranian Ambassador Advises Attack Against U.S. Forces, Phalanges, and Lebanese Army,” September 27, 1983.
33. The identity of the men who carried out the operation remains unclear. An American intelligence report from 1984, based upon interviews with Lebanese and Syrian intelligence officers, pointed the finger at a young Palestinian who had lost three family members in the Shatila and Sabra massacres. A Hezbollah source testifying in an American court in 2003 said the bomber who aimed at the marines was actually an Iranian, Ismail Ascari, who had been brought in specifically for the mission. Colonel Geraghty believed this man’s story, which he said was confirmed by other sources. If so, it would have been a major deviation from every other Iranian-sponsored suicide attack. Iran preferred to stay in the shadows, using locals, and there was no shortage of willing men in Lebanon, so Iran did not need to export one. Iranians did not mind seeing young men sent to paradise; they were less enthusiastic about doing it themselves. See United States District Court for the District of Columbia, transcript of trial, D. Peterson et al. vs. The Islamic Republic of Iran, March 17–18, 2003.
The CIA later circulated a report that received considerable attention in Washington of a mysterious ce
remony officiated by Sheik Fadlallah, perhaps involving smoking hashish, in which he blessed the bombers. While the grand ayatollah did not oppose suicide bombings against soldiers (civilians, he said, were a different matter), the report proved erroneous and was likely from an unreliable human source.
34. Lyons interview.
35. Lance Corporal Eddie DiFranco, testimony, November 13, 1983, Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon and Plans for Improving That Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 98th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 307–26.
36. Eric Hammel, The Root (Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), p. 293.
37. “Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act,” October 23, 1983, December 20, 1983, p. 99.
38. Peterson vs. Islamic Republic of Iran, p. 55.
39. Michael Petit, Peacekeepers at War: A Marine’s Account of the Beirut Catastrophe (Winchester, MA: Faber and Faber, 1986), p. 172.
40. Geraghty interview with Frank, November 21, 1983, pp. 18–21.
41. Geraghty, Peacekeepers at War, p. 188.
CHAPTER 8 THE AMERICAN HAMLET
1. McFarlane interview; Robert Timberg, The Nightingale’s Song (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 336–37.
2. Weinberger Diary and Appointment Folders, October 23, 1983, Weinberger Papers.
3. General Paul X. Kelley comments on draft manuscript of U.S. Marine Corps official history, Benis Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982–1984, June 23, 1986. Copy provided by Benis Frank.
4. President Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada,” October 27, 1983, www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/83oct.htm, accessed April 22, 2011.
5. National Security Decision Directive 111, October 28, 1983.
6. Weinberger interview.
7. Poindexter interview.
8. Peterson vs. Islamic Republic, p. 146.
9. Gregory Vistica, Fall from Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 116.
10. Selected Works of General John W. Vessey, Jr.: Tenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 June 1982–30 September 1985, U.S. Department of Defense, Joint History Office, 2008, pp. 86–91.
11. Terence Smith, “At Least 39 Die as Truck Bomb Rips Israeli Post in Lebanon,” New York Times, November 5, 1983; Thomas Friedman, “Israeli Jets Bomb Base of Suspects in Marine Attack,” New York Times, November 17, 1983.
12. Notes for November 17, 1983, Weinberger Diary.
13. The phone log for the president revealed only two calls to the president after the NSC meeting: one from McFarlane and the other from the Tunisian ambassador. Phone call with archivist at the Reagan Library.
14. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, pp. 161–62; notes for November 17, 1983, Weinberger Diary.
15. Thomas Friedman, “French Jets Raid Bases of Militia Linked to Attacks,” New York Times, November 18, 1983; John Vinocur, “Questions Arise on French Raid in Lebanon,” New York Times, November 22, 1983.
16. Alessandra Stanley, Bruce van Voorst, and Jack E. White, “An Officer and a Gentleman Comes Home: Lieut. Robert O. Goodman,” Time, January 16, 1984.
17. Robert McFarlane memorandum to Ronald Reagan, “Long Commission Report,” undated, Weinberger Papers.
18. Caspar Weinberger memorandum to Ronald Reagan, “Long Commission Report on October 23 Bombing,” December 23, 1983.
19. Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York: Touchstone, 2001), p. 89.
20. Richard Armitage memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “External Security Force at American Embassy in Beirut,” July 27, 1984.
21. U.S. Intelligence and the September 20, 1984, Beirut Bombing, U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, October 3, 1984.
22. Francis Clines, “Intelligence Cuts by Predecessors Had a Role in Blast, Reagan Says,” New York Times, September 27, 1984.
23. McFarlane interview; Poindexter interview; Allen interiew.
24. McFarlane e-mail to author; Brinkley, Reagan Diaries, pp. 267–68.
25. Bernard Gwertzman, “Shultz’s Address Touches Off Stir in Administration,” New York Times, October 27, 1984; “Shultz Says U.S. Should Use Force Against Terrorism,” New York Times, October 26, 1984.
26. Nearly thirty years later, the Islamic Republic continued to raise the issue of the fate of the men at the United Nations, with Iran accusing the Phalange of selling the four hostages to Israel, where Tehran claimed they still languished in prison. When one of the diplomats, Ahmad Motevaselian’s father, died in 2008, his funeral was attended by no less than President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “Ahmadinejad Attends Funeral of Iranian Kidnapped Diplomat’s Father,” website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, June 6, 2008, www.president.ir/en, accessed November 14, 2009.
27. Baer, See No Evil, p. 74; Ihsan Hijazi, “Iran Ties Help to Hostages to Fate of Its Nationals,” New York Times, December 28, 1988.
28. Baer, See No Evil, p. 100.
29. Norton, Hezbollah, p. 42.
30. Allen interview.
31. Ambassador Robert Oakley, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, July 7, 1992.
32. Ibid.
33. Duane Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner, 1997), p. 341.
34. According to Bob Woodward’s book Veil, Casey met with the Saudi ambassador in his home in Virginia and the two agreed that the Saudi government would fund an assassination plot using Lebanese Phalange under the control of a former British Special Air Services operative. Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman reported that the CIA directly recruited three Phalange and provided them with the explosives, paying the men $100,000 to carry out the attack. The recollection of a retired CIA officer, interviewed in 2008, was something of a hybrid. The Saudis paid for the operation in order for the CIA to maintain deniability, with the operatives coming from a counterterrorist team recruited from Lebanese army intelligence. The officer maintained that the killing of Fadlallah was a rogue operation by Phalange trained by the United States. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 395–97; Bergman, Secret War with Iran, pp. 72–73; Oakley Oral History; interview with retired CIA officer, Arlington Virginia, 2008.
CHAPTER 9 SLEEPY HOLLOW
1. Message for Major General Tixier, “Iranian Air Tactics” (211600Z), May 1984; statement of Colin Eglington, May 8, 1997, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran vs. The United States of America), International Court of Justice, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim Submitted by the United States of America, Exhibit 31, Annex, Volume 2, June 23, 1997.
2. Christen Feyer Puntervold letter, “Re: Attacks Recorded Against Neutral Shipping During Hostilities Between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf,” Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, January 6, 1989; Statement of Captain Christen Feyer Puntervold, Case Concerning Oil Platforms, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, Exhibit 11, Annex, Volume 1, June 23, 1997.
3. While the United States did not accept the legality of the zone, it abided by it and avoided entering the Iranian exclusion zone. General Robert Herres letter to General George Crist, October 28, 1987.
4. Iran and Japan were in negotiations to renew a contract for daily oil shipments to Tokyo. This escalation may have been intended to discourage Japan from buying Iranian oil.
5. Martin Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980–1988 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 74–76; Sreedhar and Kapil Kaul, Tanker War: Aspects of Iran-Iraq War (New Delhi, India: ABC Publishing House, 1989), pp. 89–90. A U.S. warship nearly found itself on the receiving end of an Iraqi missile when an Iraqi pilot failed to make the Farsi hook and turn east before releasing his Exocet. The missile struck a hapless tug only a few miles from an American warship steami
ng in the northern Gulf. The U.S. government warned Iraq to keep its aircraft at least five miles from American warships or risk being shot down, and Weinberger approved a change to the rules of engagement for the U.S. naval flotilla in the Gulf based in Bahrain, Middle East Force, that authorized the use of force against any ship laying mines in international waters or when faced with an approaching jet intent on launching a missile in their direction. At the outbreak of hostilities in September 1980, Defense Secretary Harold Brown had issued rules of engagement that required his approval for U.S. combatants to respond to any attack on neutral ships. If such authorization occurred, the American ships could not enter the territorial waters of either Iran or Iraq. Weinberger reaffirmed this guidance when he came to office. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “ROE for Protecting Third Country Shipping in the Persian Gulf,” September 29, 1980, p. 2; Captain David Grieve, USN (Ret.), interviews with author, May 11, 1995, and August 14, 1995.
6. CIA message, “Iran-Iraq: Lull in the Gulf Anti-Shipping War,” June 17, 1987.
7. Resolution 552, United Nations Security Council, Document S/RES/552, June 1, 1984.
8. Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop, Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980–1988 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2000), p. 172.
9. Charles Horner, interview with the author, July 28, 1995; Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, Lessons of Modern War: Volume III (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), p. 214, footnote 7.
10. Caspar Weinberger memorandum to Robert McFarlane, “Crisis Planning Notice—Persian Gulf Situation,” February 27, 1984.
11. Weinberger did concede that Iran might try to attack one of the five American warships stationed in the Persian Gulf. He ordered handheld Stinger missiles placed on the warships in case of a suicide plane, and the U.S. government issued a notice for planes and boats not to come within five miles of an American warship or risk being fired upon. The legal basis of these keep-out zones was dubious and likely violated international law of the right of freedom of navigation. Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Notice for Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman” (210100Z), January 1984.
