The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran

by David Crist

  Also from John W. Parton, Special Operations Forces in Operation Earnest Will/Prime Chance I, pp. 44–45. In case the Iranians directly challenged them, the barges would be reinforced with metal plating and sandbags while the marines manned a variety of weapons: .50-caliber machine guns, Mk-19 grenade launchers, a TOW missile, 81-mm mortars, and Stinger missiles. There was even discussion of placing a tank on board, but this was rejected as it would make the barge top-heavy. For protection, the barges would be moved randomly every few days among the Saudi islands and oil platforms. To prevent an attack on the barge, a layered defense was envisioned. The helicopters interdicted any target out to fifty nautical miles, while the Mk-IIIs covered the middle distances of ten to twenty miles, with the smaller Seafoxes and PBRs safeguarding the five miles around the barges. If all else failed, the marine security force would provide the final layer, manning the barges’ machine guns, armed with pistols and M-16s to repel boarders if necessary. APP Comment on ComNavSpecWar Group One, Det. 12 (26170Z), September 1987; “Surveys in Support to Arabian Gulf Mobile Sea Bases,” September 30, 1987.

  11. Middle East Force/Joint Task Force Middle East, Command History, 1988, Enclosure 5, p. 7.

  12. Interview with senior military officer.

  13. Evancoe interview; Wikul interview.

  14. Wikul interview.

  15. Lieutenant Colonel Edward B. Cummings, USMC, interview with Mr. Benis Frank, January 4, 1988, and Captain Ernie L. Gillespie, OIC Det. 2d Radio Battalion, interview with Mr. Benis Frank, January 6, 1988, Marine Corps Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Divsion.

  16. Gillespie interview with Frank.

  17. Persian Gulf Operations, Series Title DN-DEE-92-0009, Tape 4.

  18. American Consulate message, “Partition of Iranian Detainees Observe/Interpreters Report” (181215Z), October 1987, Series IIII: JTFME Public Affairs, JTFME Iranian Gunboat Attack, October 1987–April 1988, Box 10, Operational Archives, Navy Historical Center.

  19. It is not known if the Iranians realized the United States had deployed the mobile sea base. Persian Gulf Operations, Series Title DN-DEE-92-0009, Tape 4; American Consul message, “Partition of Iranian Detainees Observe/Interpreters Report.”

  20. Wikul interview.

  21. Evancoe interview.

  22. Captain Jerry O’Donnell, USN (Ret.), e-mails to author, April 27, May 1 and 2, 2001.

  23. Sreedhar and Kaul, p. 61.

  24. See “Archive of Incoming Messages, Rostam Oil Platform,” Case Concerning Oil Platforms, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, Exhibits 118–19, Annex, Volume 4.

  25. CINCCENT message, “Execute Order—Operation Nimble Archer” (180350Z), October 1987.

  26. CJTFME message, “Operation Nimble Archer After Action Report” (260958Z), October 1987; USS Hoel (DDG-13), Command History, 1987, p. 3.

  27. The total number of rounds fired at the platform was 1,065. Chief of Naval Operations, “Arabian Gulf Lessons Learned Report: April–November 1987,” p. 16.

  28. Frédéric Lert, Wings of the CIA (Paris: Histoire and Collections, 1998), pp. 279–84; Wayne Mutza, Loach: The Story of the H-6/Model 500 Helicopter (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2005), pp. 71–75.

  29. Twetten interview.

  30. On October 5, 6, and 13, Admiral Crowe went to the Hill to brief relevant congressional subcommittees on both the Saudi decision to accept the CIA aircraft and the Eager Glacier program, describing how this capability added to the U.S. military. At least on this aspect of Earnest Will, Congress appeared satisfied and raised no objections. Admiral William Crowe, “Opening Statement,” U.S. House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, July 21, 1992, www.fas.org/news/iran/1992/920722-236124.htm, accessed September 1, 2005.

  31. Hart interview.

  32. Horner interview.

  33. Penzler interview; Crist interview.

  34. Lert, Wings of the CIA, pp. 279–80. Lert writes that the surveillance aircraft were Beechcraft King Air 100, very similar to the Merlin.

  35. Grieve interview; CENTCOM, “Lessons Learned,” Draft Script Slides 16L and 16R.

  36. Grieve interview.

  37. Rear Admiral Donald Dyer, USN, interview with author, December 19, 1994, Norfolk, Virginia.

  38. General George Crist letter to Admiral William Crowe, “Eager Glacier,” November 30, 1987.

  39. CIA was adamant about maintaining its own search and rescue capability, in the event one of its aircraft crashed or was shot down. Howard Hart observed: “We have no protections, if we are shot down. It’s not like an air force or navy pilot, which affords you some legal protections. What you are as a CIA pilot is a mercenary black spy who could be shot immediately. If a military pilot gets killed, it’s an act of war; we get killed, nobody gives a shit—you’re a filthy spy, so who cares.”

  40. USS Esteem (MSO-438), Command History, 1988, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center, p. 1. One of the MSOs, the Conquest, ran into the escort ship while conducting a replenishment operation at sea, thereby delaying her arrival until repairs were made.

  41. The navy did not use the term “minefield.” The Iranians laid mine lines and not large dense fields such as Iraq would lay during Desert Storm. Instead the navy called it a “mine danger area,” as mines could be laid anywhere in a large geographical area. CTG 801.4 Message to USS Conquest, “Part II AGM MCM OPMEMO 1-5A (AG Minehunting Procedures)” (210701Z), March 1988, and “Arabian Gulf MCM OPMED 1-5A,” March 21, 1988, JTFME/MEF Operations Files, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 18.

  42. Van Belle interview.

  43. DeMasi interview.

  44. USS Fearless (MSO-442), Command History, 1987, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center, p. 3.

  45. Van Belle interview.

  46. Nerheim interview.

  CHAPTER 17 NO HIGHER HONOR

  1. Bernsen interview. In fact it took a direct order from Crowe to get the Wimbrown deployed near Farsi.

  2. Major General James Record, USAF, interview with author, November 28, 1995, and January 29, 1996.

  3. Bernsen interview.

  4. The chairman ordered his assistant, Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe, to the Gulf for a fact-finding mission. After meeting with both Bernsen and Brooks, he recommended to Crowe that Brooks be relieved and the two commands merged under one hat. As Bernsen was due to rotate out anyway, it made sense to have Less replace both men, a decision with which Crist agreed. Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe, USN (Ret.), interview with author, August 8, 1996.

  5. “Remarks by General George Crist at the Middle East Force Change of Command,” Manama, Bahrain, February 27, 1988.

  6. “JTFME/MEF Ops Officer Lessons Learned—Overarching,” February 1989, JTFME/MEF Operations Files, Operations Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 21, Folder 8. Less made a number of changes to streamline the command and control over the operation. He implemented a more formal composite warfare commander concept structure for navy forces in the Gulf, which was the navy’s standard way of operating a battle group. Under this system, Less delegated to specific commanders the control over certain functions, such as controlling air operations, surface ships (including the convoys), or countermine measures. Dyer interview.

  7. CENTCOM, “Persian Gulf Escort Matrix—As of 13 June 1989,” 1989. A recap of every escort convoy.

  8. Captain Paul Rinn, USN (Ret.), interview with author, February 1, 2004.

  9. Dyer interview.

  10. Bradley Peniston, No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 91.

  11. Quoted in Chuck Mussi, “To See the Dawn: The Night-Long Battle to Save USS Roberts,” All Hands, August 1988, p. 4.

  12. Rather than use the main propellers, Rinn ordered the ship’s auxiliary propulsion units (APUs)—used to maneuver the ship in tight situations such as docking—lowered and set slightly off center and the rudder set hard left.

  13. Oddly, many of the crew including Rinn
initially thought it was the Lamps helicopter that had crashed and caused the explosion; this idea was just as quickly dispelled as it became immediately apparent that it was a mine.

  14. This was the auxiliary machinery room 3 (AMR-3).

  15. Kenneth A. Heine, “This Is No Drill: Saving the ‘Sammy B.,’” Surface Warfare Magazine, July/August 1988.

  16. Michael Tilley, interview with author, June 1, 2005; Rinn interview.

  17. Tilley interview; Rinn interview.

  18. Briefing, “USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) Mining Incident, 14 April 1988 Timeline,” undated [hereafter referred to as Samuel B. Roberts Timeline briefing], provided to author by Captain Paul Rinn.

  19. The original Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) was sunk off Samar in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 25, 1944, with a loss of ninety crew.

  20. Rinn interview.

  21. CENTCOM, Command History, 1988, pp. iii–72; USS Trenton, Command History, 1988, Ships History, Naval Historical Center, Enclosure 1, p. 3; Samuel B. Roberts Timeline briefing.

  22. Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 2-88, “Command Chronology,” November 23, 1987–February 29, 1988, Historical Overview Section, Archives Section, Marine Corps Historical Center, p. 10; Outlaw interview.

  23. Samuel B. Roberts Timeline briefing.

  24. Rinn interview; Mussi, “To See the Dawn,” p. 10.

  25. Rinn interview.

  26. Ibid.

  27. Captain Robert Canepa, USN (Ret.), interview with author, August 15, 2005.

  28. Rear Admiral Guy Zeller, USN (Ret.), interview with author, April 10, 1995.

  29. Zeller expressed some reservations against this action. “It ran too much risk of collateral damage,” he cautioned, especially to a civilian hospital that sat near the naval headquarters building in Bandar Abbas. Zeller added that the complications that would surround the loss of an aircraft and a resulting POW situation outweighed any military benefit. Taking note of Zeller’s concerns, Less nevertheless ordered him to come back with a list of targets for his aircraft. CENTCOM J-3, Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) Number 50343-51944, “Summary, Praying Mantis,” August 23, 1988, p. 2 [hereafter JULLS Report]; Zeller interview; Vice Admiral Anthony Less, USN (Ret.), interviews with author, November 28, 1994, July 6, 2005, November 14, 2006, June 21 2007.

  30. This was one of the first deployments of the senior, or “super,” CAG concept. Conceived by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman as part of a wide range of changes to naval air following the debacle with the air strike in Lebanon in 1983, it elevated the CAG commander to a senior O-6 command on par with the carrier’s captain, who would then serve as the advocate for strike warfare within the battle group command. To assist him, a senior commander/junior captain was assigned as the deputy CAG, whose primary role would be to oversee the execution of an attack mission. Rear Admiral Arthur (Bud) Langston, USN (Ret.), interview with author, July 12, 2005.

  31. Chronology, “Battle Group Foxtrot War at Sea Exercises,” undated [1988], provided to author by Captain James Engler, USN (Ret.); Langston interview.

  32. The second option he proposed was to bomb Abu Musa Island with eight attack aircraft while simultaneously shelling both Farsi Island and the Forouzan oil platform with naval gunfire. CAG-11 Chronology, “Operation Praying Mantis, 18 April 1988,” p. 1, provided to author by Captain Engler.

  33. Less’s own staff developed three courses of action for assaulting the platforms: 1) attack all three with naval gunfire only; 2) bombard all three, but board one with SEALs to look for intelligence while the marines provided support; or 3) attack two platforms simultaneously with marines taking one while the SEALs took another. Hans S. Pawlisch, “Operation Praying Mantis,” VFW, January 1989, p. 35. Dr. Pawlisch was the command historian at CENTCOM.

  34. Less interview.

  35. The other two ships were the USS Merrill and the USS Lynde McCormick.

  36. The frigates were the USS Simpson and USS Bagley.

  37. If the Sabalan could not be found, he would destroy a third Iranian oil platform, Rakhsh. There was no SAG A. The joint task force had a communications circuit called Alpha, which was used to pass administrative traffic. In the planning sessions officers expressed concern about naming one of the surface action groups SAG A, fearing it would cause confusion at the height of combat operations. Vice Admiral James B. Perkins III, USN (Ret.), interview with author, August 9, 2005.

  38. General George Crist, Persian Gulf Ops notebook, entry for April 16, 1988, in author’s possession; letter from General George Crist to Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, May 20, 1988, p. 2; Zeller interview; “Operation Praying Mantis,” Surface Warfare, November/December 1988, p. 17.

  39. Crist interview.

  40. Many have speculated whether the virtually simultaneous attacks by the United States and Iraq was really a coincidence. The July 13, 1992, Newsweek article by John Barry and Roger Charles speculated that the two nations conspired together, in a joint attack against Iran. However, General Crist firmly rejects these accusations, and says that the Iraqi attack caught the United States “by surprise.” The material I have seen supports General Crist’s claim. Thus far there is no evidence that U.S. officials planned Praying Mantis before the Samuel B. Roberts struck the mine on April 14. As mentioned, discussions of a military strike on Iran did not commence in CENTCOM until forty-five minutes after the Roberts incident. By contrast, the Iraqis had planned their attack months in advance, carefully moving Revolutionary Guards and supplies at night so as to conceal their buildup from the Iranians. The United States had no way of knowing a U.S. vessel would strike a mine, thus providing an excuse for American military retaliation. It’s more likely the Iraqis chose the seventeenth to attack because it was the first day of Ramadan, rather than out of any decision taken in conjunction with Washington.

  41. Rick Francona, Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq’s Fall from Grace (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), pp. 23–24.

  CHAPTER 18 GOOD-BYE, CAPTAIN NASTY

  1. Persian Gulf Operations, Series Title T-1, 2, 3 (89-0003), Tape 3.

  2. Case Concerning Oil Platforms, Memorial, Submitted by Islamic Republic of Iran, Volume 1, June 8, 1993, p. 47.

  3. Persian Gulf Operations, Series Title T-1, 2, 3 (89-0003), Tapes 1, 2; James B. Perkins III, “The Surface View: Operation Praying Mantis,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1989, p. 68.

  4. Dunkelberger reported back, “Platform 1 is clear and Platform 2 is burning. Platform 2 is unusable; it is on fire.” Outlaw and Brinkley quickly directed the CH-46 to insert the one assault force to the adjacent southern platform numbered 3. Thomas Hastings, USMC, interview with author, June 22, 1995; Outlaw interview; Persian Gulf Operations, Series Title T-1, 2, 3 (89-0003), Tapes 1, 2.

  5. In all, the Cobras expended 15 TOW missiles, 140 2.75-inch rockets, and over 6,200 20-mm rounds.

  6. As the marine helicopters were on their final approach into Sassan, the Samuel B. Roberts’s Lamps helicopter suddenly detected an unknown patrol boat approaching at twenty-nine knots from the northwest. It was identified as a possible Boghammer, and concern grew as it closed to fourteen thousand yards and appeared to be armed with a Harpoon missile, possibly an Iranian missile boat. Fortunately, Perkins’s force held its fire, for a closer examination revealed it to be a UAE patrol boat apparently unaware of the U.S. military operations under way at Sassan. The emirate boat quickly complied with warnings to stay clear of the area. A short time later, the U.S. ships detected an unidentified aircraft closing from due west. Ignoring repeated warnings to stay clear, two marine Cobras were sent to intercept. They discovered the culprit was a news helicopter from Dubai sent out to cover the action, not realizing how close it came to becoming part of the story.

  7. While his senior Major Clyde Brinkley served as the overall raid force commander and embarked on board the UH-1 Huey command and control helicopter, Hastings would command the forces landing on Sassan. In Brinkley’s helicop
ter sat Captain Vernon Scoggin of 2nd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. It fell to his eyes and wits to control the naval gun predatory fires. Colonel William M. Rakow, “Marines in the Gulf—1988,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1988, p. 66.

  8. Persian Gulf Operations, Series Title T-1, 2, 3 (89-0003), Tapes 1, 2.

  9. Captain David Chandler, USN (Ret.), interview with author, August 12, 2005.

  10. Ibid.

  11. Ibid.

  12. Persian Gulf Operations, Series Title T-1, 2, 3 (89-0003), Tape 3.

  13. Unfortunately, the Wainwright did not transmit “rounds complete,” which was the cue for SEALs to move in. This created a ten-minute delay as the UH-60 and embarked SEALs—already confused by the Simpson’s unexpected participation in the bombardment—remained unsure if the ship’s prep fire was over. CNSWTG, “After Action Report,” p. 2.

  14. Commander Norman Carley, USN (Ret.), interview with author, June 28, 1995; Rear Admiral Thomas Richards, USN, interview with author, August 11, 1995; also Middle East Force Naval Special Warfare Task Unit Atlantic message to CJTFME, “After Action Report at Sirri DTG” (072315), May 1988.

  15. USS Wainwright message to CJTFME, “OPREP-3 Feeder After Action Report, Operation Praying Mantis” (190730Z), April 1988, p. 1. After the action, Richards and other SEALs voiced strong objections in their after-action reports and a series of “Personal For” messages about the “mishandled” operation, venting their irritation at just about every command in the Gulf. The force package for Sirri had been far too light, with at least a full SEAL platoon needed. The lack of an A-6 gunship supporting the insertion seriously risked the assault force. Command and control between the special operations force and the surface group was not “clearly delineated.” Both Richards and May believed that after the first salvo by SAG C, the assault force should have been inserted immediately while the Iranians’ “heads were down.” But the lack of command and control between SAG C and the SEALs delayed their insertion, and the surface warfare officers did not fully comprehend the importance of timing the prep fires with this insertion of the SEALs. Ultimately, this poor coordination led to the “unnecessary” additional salvos that destroyed Sirri. In short, as Commander Richards’s after-action report bluntly stated: “Planning was not done with SOF in mind…. JTFME staff were not fully versed in the use and limitations of Special Warfare assets. They treated the personnel boarding as an add-on requirement, not the primary focus.” CNSWTG MEF message (20044), May 1988, “Praying Mantis After Action,” p. 2; CNSWTG, “After Action Report,” p. 2.