Lion of Jordan

by Avi Shlaim

  The most burning issue for Hussein was military hardware. The first Arab summit in January had called for an Arab military build-up as part of the scheme to counter the Israeli diversion of water from Lake Galilee. The richer Arab states agreed to finance the arms purchases of the poorer ones such as Jordan. Nasser exerted subtle but constant pressure on Hussein to accept cheap Soviet arms (and UAR technicians) to equip half a dozen new brigades and a squadron of MiG-21 supersonic jets. Not wishing to become dependent on Soviet arms or UAR technicians, Hussein replied that he could get what he needed from his Western friends. He then turned to the Americans with a big shopping list, including twenty F-104 supersonic starfighters, promising that the other Arabs would pay for it. He freely admitted that, while related to Jordanian defence along the border with Israel, the arms were urgently needed to help Jordan stand up to pressures from the United Arab Command.

  This request presented a dilemma for the Americans. They understood that Hussein was in a box: that unless he acted as a good Arab, he might endanger his own throne; but also that if he let UAR technicians into Jordan, he would risk growing UAR influence and a possible coup. On the other hand, the pressure applied through the United Arab Command for an arms build-up in Jordan was part of a larger Arab effort to attain military parity with Israel, and it threatened important American interests. The first question was how to meet Hussein’s arms requests without abandoning their traditional policy of restraint on arms sales in the Middle East. The second question was how to obtain Israel’s acquiescence in the sale of US arms to Jordan. Israel shared with America a strong interest in a free Jordan under Hussein as an insurance against another Arab–Israeli flare-up. But the sale of advanced US arms to Jordan was bound to provoke loud protests from Israel and even louder protests from its friends in Washington. The Johnson administration dealt with this dilemma by offering to provide gradually most of the equipment for ground forces that Jordan asked for on a part-credit, part-cash basis and to postpone a decision on supersonic aircraft.11 The gambit was to buy time rather than to confront Hussein head-on regarding the advanced aircraft.

  This offer was sufficient to enable Hussein to resist the pressures on him to go for Soviet MiG-21s during the lead up to the second summit of Arab heads of state that Nasser convened in Alexandria from 5 to 11 September 1964. At the Cairo summit the Arab states had pledged $42 million a year for a number of years to help enlarge and equip the armed forces of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. At Alexandria the pledge was increased to $56 million a year. The more important decision was to proceed immediately with the construction of a storage dam at Mukheiba on the Yarmouk River and to divert water into it from the Banias and Hasbani rivers. Jordan was promised a contribution from the Arab states towards the cost of constructing the dam, which was estimated at $28.7 million. This was the Arab answer to Israel’s extension of the National Water Carrier from the Jordan River Basin to the Negev. But in general the summit took a step back from the brink of actions that might have provoked an immediate Israeli military response. The Mukheiba project was assigned the first priority at the Alexandria summit and this was not particularly provocative. The Lebanese originally maintained that no counter-diversion construction should begin until complete military preparedness had been achieved. In the end, however, they accepted Nasser’s ‘compromise’ proposal that construction should begin without delay but that actual diversion be deferred until the military build-up had been completed.12

  Nasser in fact emerges as the leading conciliator at the summit from a verbal report of the proceedings that Hussein gave to his CIA contact. Nasser was reasonable and moderate throughout the conference, and he succeeded in avoiding open splits and breakdowns. He had apparently concluded that summitry was the best possible vehicle for pursuing his interests. Hussein was expected to be a major antagonist to a number of proposals, such as increasing the authority of the United Arab Command and of the Palestinian entity. Fortuitously, he was relieved of this role by Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia, which took the lead in opposing them. Some of their attacks were so extreme that Hussein ended up defending, rather than opposing, Shuqairi, who had proposed the stationing of several brigades of Palestinian Arabs in the countries bordering Israel. Another proposal related to the composition and authority of the United Arab Command. Hussein felt that the compromise solutions reached on these issues did not jeopardize Jordan’s interests, and indeed that they enabled him to appear more Arab than many of his colleagues. He was therefore confident that summitry would continue and that it enabled the Arabs to follow a moderate and an increasingly realistic course.13 This was at least partly based on wishful thinking. It glossed over the commitment of the members of the Arab League to assist the PLO and to endorse the decision of the organization to set up the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). For Jordan this decision was to have far-reaching consequences.

  Some of the implications of the conference were reviewed together by King Hussein and Dr Herzog at their third meeting in London. The meeting again took place at the home of Dr Emanuel Herbert, on Saturday, 19 December 1964 between 12.10 and 1.20. Dr Herbert was present throughout the meeting. Of the three meetings this was the shortest and the most businesslike, but it still covered a lot of ground. At the beginning, Hussein asked a question about the internal political crisis in Israel, and he received a full answer. Herzog, who as usual had been well briefed by intelligence chiefs, gave his assessment of recent developments in the Middle East. Hussein listened intently throughout the presentation and at its conclusion said that he thought the analysis ‘was correct’.

  The discussion then turned to bilateral issues, starting with the Unified Arab Command. Herzog said that the unified command opened up possibilities for gradual subversion on the part of the Egyptians. The Egyptians were making efforts to impress Jordanian officers with the strength and efficiency of the Egyptian war-machine, and this process could ultimately be dangerous. Israel had intelligence that the Egyptians had also contemplated using more direct methods to influence a Jordanian Air Force officer by the name of Ibrahim Atmah. On hearing this, Hussein’s body stiffened and his face turned serious. Herzog added immediately that they had no information as to whether Atmah had actually been approached and there was certainly no indication that he had agreed to cooperate, at which point Hussein relaxed.

  Herzog pointed out that within the framework of the unified command Jordan had moved a further brigade to the West Bank, bringing up the total to three. While he was sure that no aggressive purpose was behind this, a large concentration of troops on the border inevitably created tension. Smiling broadly, Hussein said, ‘What have you to fear? You know how strong you are.’ Herzog replied that he was not referring to the overall military balance but to the danger that, with heavy concentrations of troops on both sides of the frontier, things might happen unintentionally. He asked Hussein to withdraw at least a token force to the East Bank. Hussein promised to consider the request. Then, assuming a serious mien and looking straight at Herzog, he said, ‘I wish to assure you that only defensive plans have been brought before the Unified Command. No plans for offensive action have even been considered. The troops in the Jordanian plain are stationed within the Jordanian defence plan.’ Thanking him for this assurance, Herzog said that they had heard that the Iraqis had entered Jordan to establish a radar station and ammunition dumps, and that they considered this development to be dangerous to Jordanian security. Hussein reacted with slight emotion to say that ‘no foreign forces will come into Jordan’ and repeated for emphasis ‘none’. He then went on to say, ‘We are fully aware of the danger of foreign troops in our country. We are carefully watching the dangers.’

  On President Nasser the two men did not see eye to eye. Herzog regarded the Unified Arab Command as a framework through which Nasser could lay foundations for a later attempt to undermine Jordan. Hussein replied that he had engaged over the past year in a policy of ‘collective action’ that seemed to be working. He spoke frankly of
the reasons behind this policy. First, he wished to develop his country in peace and to keep it free from subversion. Second, when the Arab leaders were together there was more responsibility and thus more moderation. Third, when the Arab leaders acted separately, Nasser’s influence was far greater than when they acted collectively. Herzog gave his own opinion that Nasser’s aim was to destroy Israel. Hussein, on the basis of his private talks with Nasser, felt that Nasser understood the position and that ultimately he would want a settlement.

  From Nasser the conversation moved to Ahmad Shuqairi. Herzog noted that the PLO had opened offices in Jerusalem, Nablus, Tulkarem, Irbid and elsewhere, and that they were planning to recruit Palestinians for the Liberation Army. In Israel’s assessment, he said, Shuqairi and his movement presented a real danger to Hussein and to the integrity of his country. Hussein replied that there would be no recruiting in his country and that he would not permit any units of Shuqairi’s new force to be stationed there. Contemptuously, he said that a few units might be stationed in Gaza. Nevertheless, Hussein had not thought it wise to try to block Shuqairi entirely. The Palestinians had complained for years that they were denied self-expression. Hussein was sure that they would eventually see that the new course would take them nowhere. ‘I withdraw and let them go their way. They will return,’ he said confidently. Herzog thought the dangers should not be underestimated. Smiling broadly, Hussein commented that Shuqairi talked of having a government and a people, but that they were watching him.

  Another question raised by Herzog was the use of Soviet and Egyptian arms for the expansion of the Jordanian Army. With some emotion Hussein said, ‘They tried in Cairo to push Soviet arms on me but I refused. I will receive arms from the West and prove that one does not have to rely on the Soviets in order to develop an army.’ To Herzog it appeared that there were considerable prospects of increasing economic aid to Jordan and that through economic progress the validity of Hussein’s view, as compared to that of Egypt, would be effectively proved. Herzog reported that, after their previous meetings, Israel had discreetly encouraged US senators and officials to increase economic aid to Jordan. He considered it important that Hussein too should meet US senators for this purpose. On the water question there was the briefest of exchanges. Herzog thanked Hussein for renewing the flow from the Yarmouk. Hussein noted that the water plans were being developed in accordance with the Johnston Plan. Towards the end of the meeting Herzog reminded Hussein that he had promised to appoint a person on his side to maintain regular contact. Hussein replied that at that stage he could not take anyone else into the secret.

  Despite this and other disagreements, Herzog sensed that they were making good progress. At their first meeting in September 1963, Hussein appeared ‘a hunted man in fear of his safety and seeking the assurance of our continued interest in his survival’. At the second meeting ‘he had sat with majestic airs, clearly himself impressed by the new status he had achieved in the meanwhile in the Arab world through the rapproachement with Nasser.’ At that meeting Hussein had sought to defend Nasser, at least pro forma. The atmosphere had been strained at times, and on the water problem Herzog felt obliged to speak with some vigour. At the third meeting the atmosphere was more cordial and balanced. On the personal level, at least, Herzog had the feeling of close communication. Hussein was relaxed and frank. He did not seek to defend Nasser but to explain frankly the nature of their relationship. The third conversation not only indicated that the contact for Hussein was of a substantive nature; it also developed the relationship to a point where Herzog could intuitively sense its character, possibilities and limitations.14

  Israel continued to use its influence in Washington to make the case for American economic and political support for Jordan, although it strongly opposed arms supplies. The White House agreed that support for Hussein was a way of helping Israel. Robert Komer, a senior member of the National Security Council staff, made this point very forcefully in a memo to President Johnson: keeping Soviet arms and UAR trainers out of Jordan served Israel’s security interests more than it served America’s. ‘In fact, we have no other major security interest in Jordan than to keep Israel from being surrounded. Our whole half billion dollar subsidy during 1957–65 has been primarily for this purpose; it has actually been indirect aid to Israel.’15 The key issue, wrote Komer in another memo, was ‘How far to go now in order to keep Hussein on the reservation?’16

  Philip Talbot, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, was sent to Amman to find out. At his meeting with King Hussein, Talbot explained America’s dilemma in relation to Jordan’s arms request. He emphasized that America would not tolerate the introduction of Soviet supersonic aircraft into Jordan; that such action would only undermine the king’s position by enhancing Soviet and Egyptian influence in the Jordanian Air Force; and that it would strengthen Israel’s drive for more sophisticated military equipment, because Jordan’s request would trigger an immediate and much larger request from Israel. Hussein expressed warm appreciation for the trouble that the American government was taking over Jordan’s problems and emphasized the defensive nature of Arab plans. The Palestine problem, he said, had been a serious strain on all of them. His objective was to build a better future for his country and to protect its existence, and in this spirit he had taken part in creating the United Arab Command. Arab leaders had met and reached certain decisions. They decided to build up their air strength and to put a cordon round Israel to prevent it from further expansion. Once Jordan and the Arabs became strong, there would be no threat to his country. Anything short of that would not be good for Jordan. In any case, he could testify that the Arabs had no intention of solving the problem of Israel by force. The Arab military build-up would be wholly defensive. Speaking quietly and slowly, Hussein said that Jordan requested M48A3 Medium Patton tanks with 105-millimetre guns in order to have tanks with the same capacity and gun calibre as those Israel was getting. Talbot made no response.

  Talbot alluded to the power of the Jewish lobby when he said that the domestic pressures in America would become unmanageable if Jordan accepted arms from the Soviet Union. Hussein said it frightened him to hear statements of this kind, to hear that pressures from minority groups could influence the powerful United States to act against its own best interests. In Jordan he had never been fortunate enough to enjoy broad backing, yet he had not hesitated to fight alone against communist influence. If Jordan’s policy had changed, it was not because his views had altered but because of his disappointment with the policies of Jordan’s friends.17 After lunch with the king on the following day, Talbot sent another report that was quite alarming. During lunch the king expressed his foreboding that the end for the Hashemite kingdom was near and his conviction that the West was letting him down. Talbot did not think that threats to cut off aid would make Hussein turn away from the UAR and that the only solution to the crisis lay in persuading the Israelis that limited American sales to Jordan would best serve Israel’s interests as well as those of America. The Israelis had to be made to understand that the consequences to Israel of Hussein buckling under to the United Arab Command would be vastly worse than the arms deal under discussion.18

  In order to keep Jordan ‘on the reservation’ and to calm down Israel’s friends in Congress, Lyndon Johnson decided to link the sale of arms to Jordan with a particularly attractive arms package to Israel. The package reversed long-standing American policy by including offensive as well as defensive weapons. Robert Komer and Averell Harriman, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, were sent to Israel in late February 1965 to sell the proposed linkage to the Israelis. As expected, the Israelis drove a hard bargain. In return for their agreement not to oppose the Jordanian arms deal they were promised Skyhawks and 200–250 advanced tanks with 105-millimetre guns. This was quite a sweetener for swallowing the bitter pill of the arming of Jordan, but there was more to come. The talks concluded with a written protocol in which Harriman proclai
med that the United States had an understanding with King Hussein that the tanks that the Americans would supply would not cross the Jordan River.19

  The eventual American arms package to Jordan included 250 M-48 tanks with 90-millimetre guns, help with modernizing the Jordanian Air Force and permission to buy suitable aircraft in Western Europe. In return Hussein had to agree not to move the tanks into the West Bank and also pledge not to seek jet fighters from the Kremlin. Hussein’s pledge not to deploy the American-made tanks in the West Bank of his kingdom was both secret and highly significant. It accorded with Hussein’s repeated assurances to America that his posture vis-à-vis Israel was purely defensive. But it could not be so easily reconciled with the intentions of the other members of the United Arab Command to build up military strength on all of Israel’s frontiers in order to hem it in, which was why it was kept strictly secret and shared only with the Israelis. What the pledge amounted to was a partial agreement to demilitarize the West Bank. The thinner the forces deployed by Jordan on the West Bank, the better it was for Israel. Hussein was left in no doubt on this score after his last meeting with Dr Yaacov Herzog. The written pledge that Hussein gave to the Johnson administration thus represents another milestone in the evolution of his tacit strategic cooperation with Israel. It complemented Hussein’s firm assurance to Herzog that he would not allow any foreign troops to be stationed on his territory. If the other leaders of the United Arab Command had any offensive action against Israel at the back of their minds, Hussein most definitely did not.