Lion of Jordan

by Avi Shlaim

  Wilson had a back channel to the Israeli Embassy in London that did not go through the Foreign Office. Before leaving London, Dr Herzog asked Wilson’s contact man whether the prime minister would agree to convey to them his impressions from his talks with Hussein. Late on Monday night, the contact man relayed the following message: first, Wilson was impressed by Hussein as a man; second, Israel should not press for bilateral contact with him, as such contact would endanger his life, or, as Wilson phrased it, ‘put an end to the Hashemite kingdom’. This was Wilson’s direct impression, which had been supported by a British Embassy report from Amman. The Israelis also received a report on the meeting through official channels. On the instructions of George Brown, a senior official at the Foreign Office gave details of Hussein’s talks to the Israeli ambassador.18

  On 10 July, Hussein flew to Cairo to report to Nasser on his talks in the West and to coordinate their diplomatic strategy. The Algerian president, Houari Boumedienne, was also there. Boumedienne supported the hard-line Syrian position of continuing the struggle against Israel with the help of the USSR. Nasser told Hussein that he now regretted cutting his links so completely with the West. In the interests of the Arabs as a whole, he agreed that Jordan should maintain its relations with the West. He himself was completely dependent on the USSR. His advice to Hussein was to get in touch with the Americans and to ask for their help in arranging negotiations between Jordan and Israel, advice that he later repeated, at Hussein’s request, in front of the Egyptian, Algerian and Jordanian delegations.19

  On his return from Cairo, Hussein informed both the UK and US ambassadors that, as no overall settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict was in sight, he might very discreetly seek a separate settlement with Israel. Before doing so, however, he wished to elicit the views of the two governments and the extent of their support in facilitating such a settlement. Anglo-American discussions of Hussein’s options revealed significant differences. Britain’s prime interest in the Middle East was to get the Suez Canal reopened. The British were unwilling to encourage Hussein to enter separate negotiations with Israel. They wanted Hussein to continue to rule Jordan, but they were not prepared to invest much in supporting him. They were unwilling to intervene, as they had done in 1958, to save the Hashemite regime. Their advice to Hussein was to wait a while. America’s view, on the other hand, was that, despite the risks involved, it was essential to encourage a settlement between Jordan and Israel. The Americans accordingly advised Hussein to enter into direct negotiations but they declined to lean on Israel to offer him terms that would enable him to survive.20 Hussein’s reaction was one of deep disappointment at what he saw as inadequate American support for the course of action he had hoped to take. He felt unable to move forward in the direction of a bilateral settlement with Israel.21 Instead he took the lead in steering Arab policy towards a political solution to the crisis and in preparing the ground for an Arab summit.

  The fourth Arab summit conference was held in Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, between 28 August and 1 September. It was the first meeting of the Arab leaders since their defeat in the June War. The conference ended with the adoption of the famous three ‘noes’ of Khartoum: no negotiation, no recognition and no peace with Israel. These were a propaganda gift for Israel, and were often cited by critics as proof of the intransigence of the Arabs and of the inability of pan-Arabism to formulate a realistic policy. In fact, surprising as it may sound, the conference was a victory for the Arab moderates. The debates of the heads of state revealed profound disunity within the Arab fold. Algeria, Syria and the PLO wanted to continue the fight against Israel and the West with the support of the Soviet Union. The PLO, in particular, wanted the all-Arab aim to be the liberation of Palestine rather than merely the recovery of the territories captured by Israel in the recent war. The moderates, led by Nasser and Hussein, had a more limited aim and argued in favour of trying to obtain Israel’s withdrawal by political rather than military means and in cooperation with the West. Nasser stated bluntly that the Arabs at that time had no military option and that the only hope of recovering the land lay in political action. He also pointed out that the recovery of the West Bank was a more urgent Arab need than the recovery of the Sinai; that America alone could compel Israel to withdraw; and that Hussein should therefore approach the Americans. Hussein stressed that time was of the essence because the longer the West Bank remained in Jewish hands, the more difficult it would be to regain it.22 The Khartoum summit thus marked a real turning point in Nasser’s attitude to Israel: a departure from the previous approach of military confrontation and the beginning of the quest not simply for dialogue but for a peaceful settlement. His moderate line earned him the support of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the hostility of his erstwhile allies.23 Hussein gave the following account of the realignment of Arab forces at Khartoum:

  At Khartoum I fought very much against the three noes. But the atmosphere there developed into one where all the people who used to support Nasser… turned on him and turned on him in such a vicious way that I found myself morally unable to continue to take any stand but to come closer to him and defend him and accuse them of responsibility for the things that had happened. That was the first collision I had with many of my friends in the Arab world.

  But then we talked about the need for a resolution and the need for a peaceful solution to the problem. And Nasser’s approach was that ‘I feel responsible. We lost the West Bank and Gaza and they come first. I am not going to ask for any withdrawal from the Suez Canal. It can stay closed until such time as the issue of the West Bank and of Gaza is resolved and the issue of the Palestinian people is resolved. So go and speak of that and speak of a comprehensive solution to the problem and a comprehensive peace and go and do anything you can short of signing a separate peace.’ And I said that in any event I was not considering signing a separate peace because we wanted to resolve this problem in a comprehensive fashion.24

  At the close of the summit the following communique was issued: ‘The Arab Monarchs and Heads of State agreed on unifying their efforts in political action on the international and diplomatic level to remove the traces of aggression, and to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories that have been occupied since 5 June. This is within the framework of the basic principles by which the Arab states abide, namely: no peace with Israel, or recognition of her, no negotiation with her, and the upholding of the right of the Palestinian people in their homeland.’25 The first sentence opened the door to diplomatic activity. The last sentence was inserted to reassure the Palestinians that their interests would not be abandoned in the climate of accommodation that followed defeat in the June War. Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace treaty but not a rejection of a state of peace; no direct negotiations but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no de jure recognition of Israel but acceptance of its existence as a fait accompli.26 Israeli propaganda, however, seized on the last sentence to discredit the summit and to portray the Arab position as incorrigibly rejectionist, absolutely uncompromising and threatening.

  Hussein returned from Khartoum well satisfied with the success of the moderates in imposing their views on the extremists and with the support that Jordan obtained, both moral and financial, from the other Arab states. The oil-producing states pledged economic aid to the confrontation states until ‘the traces of aggression’ had been removed, with the sum of £40 million allocated to Jordan. King Faisal had never seen Nasser ‘so frank, humble, sincere or courageous’. Syria was isolated and saddled with most of the responsibility for having provoked hostilities. President Arif agreed to withdraw Iraqi troops from Jordan. President Nasser agreed to withdraw Egyptian troops from Yemen, where they had been since 1962. Hussein was asked to mediate in the Algerian–Moroccan dispute.27 And all the participants agreed to revive the Arab solidarity pact and conduct no hostile propaganda against each other.

  The Khartoum summit effectively a
llowed Hussein to explore the possibility of arriving at an accommodation with Israel. The problem was one of timing, of choosing the optimal moment and the most promising avenue for negotiations. His instinct was that it was too soon to take the initiative on his own. Arab leaders were ahead of their people in appreciating the implications of their recent defeat by Israel. He and his advisers decided to wait for the next meeting of the Security Council in the hope that, with the support of the Great Powers, it would take a step towards imposing a solution. When the Americans suggested to Hussein direct negotiations with Israel, his reaction was that the time was not right. Hussein reminded the American ambassador that he never hesitated in the past to have direct contact whenever he felt it to be useful and assured him that he would not hesitate in the future.28

  During a visit to Cairo on 30 September, Hussein secured Nasser’s agreement to a draft resolution that he hoped the USA and the USSR would submit to the Security Council. In the early days of the following month Hussein made his first official visit to Moscow. According to an Israeli intelligence report, the king was amazed by the honour and special treatment that he was accorded there. He discovered that the Russians were not quite the monsters he had assumed them to be. They made strenuous efforts to sell him arms, but he agreed only to economic aid and cultural relations. The primary reason for the visit was thought to be to form a personal impression of the Russians and to assess their ability to help break the Arab–Israeli impasse.29 According to Hussein’s own report, he had found the Russians very understanding and ready to support an early Security Council resolution along the lines of the draft formulated by Arthur Goldberg, the American permanent representative at the UN, and Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister. Hussein submitted to the Russians a revised version of this draft, which they said they were ready to accept. They warned him, however, that the Americans were becoming increasingly intransigent and that he might have difficulty in securing their acceptance.30

  Hussein wrote a long letter to President Johnson, giving his view of the Middle East situation following the Khartoum Conference and his subsequent trips to Cairo and Moscow. It was a strongly worded but dignified letter. Hussein expressed his deep hurt at America’s pro-Israeli position and lamented the double standard it applied to Arabs and Israelis. This kind of discrimination, he said humbly, was not worthy of a great leader or a great nation. He pointed out that at Khartoum the Arabs reached a reasonable and responsible position. Now it was up to the great powers to act, since they were the ones who had created Israel in the first place. In conclusion, Hussein strongly urged the US government to cooperate with others in convening the Security Council and adopting without delay a resolution along the lines of the draft he had discussed in Moscow.31

  Hussein intensified his efforts to influence American policy during a visit to Washington in the early part of November. In a series of meetings with US officials he succeeded in obtaining a promise that America would exert its influence to preserve the territorial integrity of Jordan. At a meeting in New York on 3 November, Ambassador Goldberg gave Hussein the following summary of US policy: ‘The United States as a matter of policy does not envisage a Jordan which consists only of the East Bank. The United States is prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications. However, the US would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it is required to give up… In short, we are prepared to make a maximum effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of settlement with Israel.’ Secretary of State Dean Rusk formally confirmed these assurances to Hussein and President Johnson was also informed. When Hussein went to the White House on 8 November, Johnson pressed him hard to support the resolution that America was about to submit to the Security Council, despite its lack of precision on the withdrawal of Israeli forces.32 Hussein left Washington with the clear impression that he had reached an understanding with the administration that if he supported the American resolution, they would see to its implementation and that the Israeli forces would be withdrawn from the West Bank within six months.33

  On his way back from the US, Hussein stopped in London and there he renewed his contact with the Israelis after an interval of four months. In the intervening period Israel had received offers to arrange a secret meeting with Hussein from several quarters but it deflected all of them. The most persistent efforts to get the two sides together were made by Julian Amery, now minister of aviation, but the Israelis kept stalling. Amery was valuable to them because of his senior position in the Conservative Party and his close contacts with the intelligence community, but they did not need him as a link man to Hussein and so they kept fobbing him off with various excuses. They also kept him in the dark about Dr Emanuel Herbert, whom they preferred as their link man because he was not a politician and because he did not have his own agenda. Herzog’s account of all the conversations he had with and about Amery fills up twenty pages. The one mildly interesting point to emerge is that Hussein expressed a wish to meet Moshe Dayan and to talk to him as one soldier to another, and that Abba Eban and Levi Eshkol opposed the idea because of their political rivalry with Dayan. But the basic reason for Herzog’s reluctance to meet with Hussein was quite simple – he had nothing to say to him. He believed that it was in Israel’s interest to delay the contact with Hussein for as long as possible.34

  Despite these reservations Herzog had not one but two meetings with Hussein in London. The meeting on 19 November took place in the home of Julian Amery and the one on the following day took place in the home of Dr Emanuel Herbert. Also present at Amery’s home was Sir Erik Bennett, Hussein’s friend and former air adviser. Hussein and Herzog pretended that this was their first meeting, but Hussein gave the game away by asking Herzog whether he had stopped smoking. Herzog opened the meeting with a long review of the Middle East scene designed to destroy any hope that Hussein might have had of help from the Russians or from Nasser. After the survey Herzog said that the prime minister had instructed him to meet the king in order to ask whether he had reached a decision on direct negotiations with Israel that might lead to a peace treaty. Hussein replied that he had always felt that the resources of the countries of the Middle East should be concentrated on constructive efforts, and he still held to this view. In close coordination with Nasser, he had succeeded at Khartoum in getting a decision to seek a political settlement of the problem. After Khartoum he and Nasser remained in regular contact. They both agreed to a settlement comprising the end of belligerency; recognition of Israel in return for its evacuation of the territories it had occupied; freedom of passage for Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba; and a settlement of the refugee problem that was part of the state of war.

  Hussein said that the Middle East was at a turning point. Without a settlement, extremist policies would prevail. ‘I do not think of today but of the distant future,’ he said. ‘After all that has passed over me I do not care what happens today. I hope that history will judge that I was true to my principles. I hope you will understand that we have gone to the utmost limit.’ He and Nasser were in agreement about their approach, and the other Arab States had promised not to interfere. He hoped that Israel would not prove too obstinate and now make the same mistake the Arabs had over many years. If a settlement were not found, the Middle East would be thrown into turmoil and become an arena of conflict between East and West.

  Herzog belittled the significance of Hussein’s achievements and argued that his proposals amounted to no more than the armistice agreements that had not been fulfilled for twenty years. He gave another version of the lecture that Hussein had heard before about the Jewish link with the Land of Israel. At the root of the Arab–Israeli problem, he said, lay the refusal of the Arabs to acknowledge the nature of this link. Israel insisted on direct negotiations as a symbol of recognition. Hussein agreed that direct negotiations should be official and public but he repeated his advice to Israel not to be obstinate. Herzog asked
whether Hussein would enter into negotiations with Israel on his own in the event of his failing to carry his colleagues with him. Hussein replied that he would if the people of the West Bank approached him. But he could not go into negotiations without knowing in advance where he stood. What were the limits to Israel’s claims to the land? This was the question that Herzog had dreaded and to which he could give no answer. He had to confess that he had been sent to listen and not to pronounce. All he could do by way of background was to tell the king that there were differing views in Israel. Some thought that the present position should continue unchanged. Others felt that Hussein had no rights whatsoever on the West Bank and that Israel should seek a settlement with the Palestinians. Yet others considered that in order to achieve peace with Jordan, they should negotiate with him on the West Bank. Even the last school of thought, the minimalists, emphasized security considerations as well as historical associations with the land. In Herzog’s view this was not expansionism, though one is left to wonder what would have constituted expansionism in his view. The meeting, in any case, ended inconclusively. Hussein remarked that the question of Jerusalem was crucial. Herzog did not react because he wished to leave him with the impression that this was not even a matter for discussion.35

  In the evening Hussein went to Dr Herbert’s home on his own initiative and asked to see Herzog again. By the time that Herbert found Herzog it was too late so they met the following morning. It was not clear why Hussein wanted the meeting because he said very little at the beginning, as was his custom. Herzog explained that he had met him at Amery’s home only because Amery claimed that he had requested the meeting. Hussein looked embarrassed and said he hoped that Amery did not know about their secret channel through Dr Herbert. Herzog then referred to the Fatah incursions across the Jordan River in the Beisan area and warned that these guerrilla operations could have serious consequences. Hussein replied that he gave the army orders to put an end to these operations and that they had already arrested 150 Palestinian fighters. Herzog summed up what he thought they had agreed the previous day: the UN mediator would move between the capitals with a view to bringing the two sides to direct negotiations. Hussein confirmed this understanding. They also agreed to avoid Julian Amery and to continue to use Dr Herbert as their link.36