Lion of Jordan

by Avi Shlaim

  22

  Intifada and Disengagement

  The spark that ignited the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, was the seemingly intentional killing, on 9 December 1987, of four residents of Jabaliyah, the largest of the eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, by an Israeli track driver. The accident set off disturbances both in the Jabaliyah camp and in the rest of Gaza that rapidly spread to the West Bank. Within days the occupied territories were engulfed in a wave of street demonstrations and commercial strikes on an unprecedented scale. Equally unprecedented was the extent of mass participation in these disturbances: tens of thousands of ordinary civilians, including women and children. Demonstrators burned tyres, threw stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli cars, brandished iron bars and waved the Palestinian flag. The standard of revolt against Israeli rule had been raised. The security forces used the full panoply of crowd-control measures to quell the disturbances – cudgels, night sticks, tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets and live ammunition – but they only gathered momentum.

  The eruption of the intifada was completely spontaneous. There was no preparation or planning by the local Palestinian elite or the PLO, but the PLO was quick to jump on the bandwagon of popular discontent against Israeli rule and to play a leading role alongside a newly formed body, the Unified National Command (UNC). But, equally, it was not without real underlying causes. In origin it was not a nationalist revolt. It had its roots in poverty, in the miserable living conditions of the refugee camps, in hatred of the occupation and, above all, in the humiliation that the Palestinians had had to endure over the previous twenty years. The aims of the intifada were not stated at the outset; they emerged in the course of the struggle and developed into a statement of major political import. The ultimate aim was self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In this respect the intifada may be seen as the Palestinian war of independence.

  Events in the occupied territories received intense media coverage. The world was assailed by disturbing pictures of Israeli troops firing on stone-throwing demonstrators, or beating with cudgels those they caught, among them women and children. Israel’s image suffered serious damage as a result of this media coverage. The Israelis complained the reporting was biased and that it focused deliberately on scenes of brutality in what was a normal effort to restore order. But no amount of pleading could obscure the message that constantly came across in pictures in the newspapers and on the television screens: a powerful army was being unleashed against a civilian population that was fighting for basic human rights, especially the right to political self-determination. The biblical image of David and Goliath now seemed to be reversed, with Israel looking like an overbearing Goliath and the Palestinians with the stones as a vulnerable David.

  The intifada had far-reaching consequences for Jordan. It had begun as a revolt against Israeli rule, but it turned into a demonstration of support for the PLO and very quickly assumed an anti-Jordanian dimension. Although Jordan’s security was not immediately affected, there was a clear danger that the intifada would spread, with the nationalist sparks lit on the West Bank inflaming the Palestinians on the East Bank and threatening internal stability. Jordan’s influence in the occupied territories had been steadily declining over the previous two decades, and this sudden upsurge of Palestinian nationalism was a further setback. It tilted the balance in the ongoing power struggle between the monarchy and the PLO in favour of the latter. After the Lebanon War the PLO had lost ground to Hussein; the intifada had the opposite effect. Hussein’s claim that the PLO leadership had been imposed by a decision of the Arab League on an unwilling population could no longer be sustained. Indeed, leaflets stated very clearly that the Palestinians saw the PLO as their only representative and that Hussein had no mandate to speak on their behalf. Another consequence of the trouble on the West Bank was to increase support on the Israeli right for the dangerous idea of converting Jordan into an alternative homeland for the Palestinian people. Thus, as a result of the intifada and its ramifications in Israel, Jordan had to reconsider both its position on the West Bank and its role in the Middle East peace process.

  The uprising also brought about a re-evalution of US policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict, culminating by the end of 1988 in recognition of the PLO as a legitimate party in peace negotiations. There was a marked shift at all levels of American public opinion away from its traditional support for Israel and towards sympathy for the Palestinians. For the first time since the war in Lebanon, it even prompted some of the leaders of American Jewry to raise questions about the wisdom of Israel’s policies and the morality of its methods. In government circles there was concern that close American association with Israel could have negative repercussions for American interests throughout the Middle East and the Gulf.1 The Hussein–Peres plan for an international conference had floundered mainly because of Likud opposition but partly because of American passivity. With the intifada gathering momentum, George Shultz became personally involved again. The result was the first major US effort to solve the Arab–Israeli conflict since the Reagan Plan of 1982.

  Shultz put forward publicly, on 4 March 1988, a package that came to be known as the Shultz Initiative. The package followed in the path of the Camp David Accords in calling for Palestinian self-rule but with an accelerated timetable. There was also an important new element: an ‘interlock’, or built-in connection, between the talks on the transitional period of self-rule and the talks on final status. This was intended to give assurances to the Palestinians against Israeli foot-dragging. Events were expected to move forward at a rapid pace. First, the secretary-general of the UN would convene all the parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict and the five permanent members of the Security Council to an international conference. This conference had no power to impose solutions on the participants or to veto any agreements reached by them. Second, negotiations between an Israeli and a Jordanian–Palestinian delegation were to start on 1 May and end by 1 November. Third, the transition period was to start three months later and last three years. Fourth, negotiations on final status were to begin before the start of the transition period and be completed within a year. In other words, negotiations on final status were to start regardless of the outcome of the first phase of negotiations.

  Peres supported the Shultz Initiative and said so publicly. So did President Mubarak of Egypt. The Palestinian response added up to a chorus repeating the old refrain that the one and only address for any proposals was the PLO in Tunis. And the PLO leaders in Tunis had no intention of letting the ‘insiders’ steal the show by meeting with the American secretary of state. But the fiercest opposition to the Shultz Initiative came from Israel’s prime minister. Shamir again blasted the idea of an international conference and rejected the interlock concept as contrary to the Camp David Accords. He said he was ready to negotiate peace with Hussein, and with any Palestinians he might bring along with him, but that he was not ready to relinquish any territory for peace.2 One story has it that when Shamir received a letter outlining the American proposals, he said, ‘I reject the whole initiative, I only accept two words in it, and the two words are the signature – George Shultz – and nothing else!’3 The story may be apocryphal, but Shultz and his aides had a feeling that America’s policy in the Middle East had fallen hostage to Israel’s intransigence or inability to make decisions.4

  Hussein approached the Shultz Initiative with an open mind. He agreed to the general principle, giving rise to hope in the State Department that he could be persuaded to subscribe to the plan.5 The response of the other Jordanian decision-makers to the new initiative was also tepid. They saw it as a thinly disguised version of the principles set out in the Camp David Accords. Although the initiative did not meet their requirements, they were unwilling to reject it out of hand. They welcomed the Reagan administration’s re-engagement in the diplomatic process but felt that its thinking lagged behind events. The Americans recognized that the situation in the terri
tories had been fundamentally altered by the intifada, but they failed to understand the implications. Consequently, the Shultz Initiative continued to promote the Jordanian role in negotiations and to exclude the PLO. Jordanian thinking, however, had changed by this time in two respects. First, they began to stress that any settlement to the conflict with Israel should fulfil the Palestinian right to self-determination. Second, they emphasized the need for PLO participation in an international conference and made it clear that Jordan could not serve as an alternative interlocutor.6 When Shultz visited Amman in late February, the senior officials he met told him that they liked his ideas but that this was basically a PLO matter. Shultz met Hussein, on 1 March, at his house on 7 Palace Green in London and went over his initiative in detail. Hussein raised two issues: the PLO had to play a central role; and direct negotiations had to take place within the setting of an international conference that could weigh in on issues of substance. Hussein would not say yes and would not say no, but only ‘Keep working.’ Shultz could not take any encouragement from the King’s comments.7 Ultimately, he did not understand the changes on the ground that circumscribed Hussein’s freedom of action. Indeed, Shultz’s inadequate grasp of the local forces at play was one of the factors that contributed to the failure of his initiative.

  From the outset the Unified National Command of the uprising declared its support for the PLO. It also attacked the concept of unity between the two banks and accused the Jordanian regime of collaborating with the Israeli government in perpetuating the occupation. From time to time, the UNC issued communiqués with guidance and instructions to its followers. On 11 March 1988 it issued its tenth communiqué, calling on the people to ‘intensify the mass pressure against the occupation army and the settlers and against collaborators and personnel of the Jordanian regime’. It also called on the West Bank representatives in the Jordanian parliament to resign their seats and ‘align with the people. Otherwise, there will be no room for them on our land.’ The king described the communiqué as ‘a horrible sign of ingratitude’ and concluded that his strategy of substituting a partnership with the Palestinians in the occupied territories for one with the PLO had fallen apart. All his efforts to work with the Palestinians towards a peaceful settlement with Israel had come to nothing and only one thing remained – the nightmare of Jordan becoming an alternative homeland for the Palestinians. The Jordanian nationalists had been critical of his attempts. They argued that Jordan would be a safer place without the West Bank and without the Palestinians. Every defeat that Hussein suffered in his quest for a partnership with the Palestinians was a source of satisfaction for them. Now they seemed to have a point. After reading the tenth communiqué, Hussein himself began to consider seriously disengaging from the West Bank.8

  Late in the afternoon on 11 March, Hussein went into the royal court looking grim-faced and angry, and he let off steam about the communiqué to his political adviser, Adnan Abu-Odeh. Abu-Odeh was a Palestinian from Nablus who first came to the attention of the king as a junior officer in the Intelligence Service. For someone so used to command, the king was an exceptionally good listener, and he always encouraged Abu-Odeh to speak his mind. On this occasion, Abu-Odeh argued that the tenth communiqué should not be viewed simply as an act of ingratitude on the part of the West Bankers but as a sign of political maturity. For the first time since 1967 they had risen up to resist the occupation and to assert their independence and dignity. The king did not reject or challenge this analysis but encouraged his adviser to continue. Earlier on in his career, Abu-Odeh had worked as a schoolteacher in Kuwait, and he proceeded in a Socratic mode, by posing questions. Abu-Odeh recalled the conversation that followed:

  I asked the king: ‘Would you make peace with Israel without the recovery of the whole of the West Bank?’ He answered saying no. I then asked him: ‘Would you make peace with Israel without recovering East Jerusalem?’ He said no. I then said to him: ‘Do you think that the Israelis would make peace with you on the basis of the return of the whole of the West Bank and East Jerusalem?’ He thought a little and said no. I said to him: ‘Then let us be frank, by doing this we cannot make peace with Israel.’ He did not comment. I continued by saying: ‘Israel, America and the West believe that you are the one who will make peace with Israel. We have agreed that you cannot make peace with Israel. This situation will only cause more suffering for the Palestinians because those among them who want to make peace cannot do so. This situation will only bring about the continuation of the occupation and more torture for the Palestinians.’ He kept silent. I then said: ‘Don’t you think it is time to consider a disengagement from the West Bank?’ He said: ‘But to leave it to whom?’ I said: ‘You leave it to nobody; you leave it to the PLO. The whole Arab world at Rabat acknowledged the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO has been fighting against us for years to establish that role. By disengaging we would be responding to the Arab world and to the Palestinians. The Palestinians in the West Bank do not challenge the PLO. The only two parties that do not consider the PLO as the Palestinian representative are Israel and the West. By disengaging we would not only be helping the Palestinians, we would also be helping ourselves.’ The king left the office.9

  Abu-Odeh understood that the king wanted to reflect their conversation. He did not claim it was the beginning of the king’s decision to disengage from the West Bank, but he did feel that it accelerated the king’s thinking and made disengagement a more practical option for him to pursue. Two weeks later there was a meeting of the king’s men over lunch at his residence. The lunch was attended by Zaid Rifa’i, the prime minister, Zaid bin Shaker, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Marwan Kasim, the chief of the royal court, Tariq Alaiddin, the director of intelligence, and Adnan Abu-Odeh, the political adviser. The king unexpectedly turned to Abu-Odeh and said, ‘Abu Said, tell our brothers what you told me the other day.’ The political adviser presented to the others the argument he had shared with the king. When he finished, the king asked the rest of the company for their thoughts. The first to respond was Rifa’i. He thought that disengagement from the West Bank was a brilliant idea. Everyone else concurred. All of them were Trans-jordanians except for Abu-Odeh, who was a Palestinian. Most other Palestinians in high office, including Foreign Minister Taher al-Masri, who was not present at this meeting, were opposed to disengagement. Three months later disengagement took place.10 In as much as any one meeting can be said to have made the strategic decision to disengage, this was it. The group of five continued to meet informally and to prepare for the king ideas, proposals and plans for disengagement. At every stage they waited for the green light from the king before proceeding to the next stage.11

  The first stage was to clarify Jordan’s position in relation to the Shultz Initiative. The Jordanians had gone along with Shultz’s plan but stated publicly that they were wary of any move designed to ‘defuse’ or ‘contain’ the intifada. ‘The Jordanians clearly did not want to appear to be pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the sake of Israel and the United States by cooperating in what could be seen by the Palestinians as an exercise to frustrate their national aspirations.’12 In early April, Shultz embarked on another tour of Middle East capitals in an effort to push forward his plan. In Jerusalem he saw no inclination on the part of Shamir to give him anything at all to work with. Shultz offered to take a message from Shamir to Hussein, and the prime minister gave him a paragraph that urged direct Israeli–Jordanian negotiations. This was precisely what the king could not possibly agree to at this juncture. Shultz made the same offer to Peres, who drafted a message urging the king to accept the American initiative. Shultz was frustrated by Shamir’s inflexibility and by the fact that the divided government meant that no one could be held responsible and accountable. ‘When I arrived in Jordan,’ writes Shultz, ‘I found King Hussein candid and gloomy: he again gave me nothing but wanted me to “persevere”.’13

  If Hussein looked gloomy it was because
he had a lot to be gloomy about, not least Shultz’s subservience towards Shamir. Nevertheless, on 6 April, Hussein handed Shultz a paper outlining ‘Jordan’s constants’, or its principles for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. These principles were broadcast on Radio Amman the same day. Some of them were familiar: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war; Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories as the basis for a settlement, one that had to be comprehensive; Security Council Resolution 242 applied to all of the occupied Arab territories; the international conference had to be more than a ceremonial gathering and to ‘reflect the moral and constant weight of the five permanent members of the Security Council in assisting all the parties to the conflict to arrive at a comprehensive, just and lasting peace’. Two additional points, however, were indicative of the shift in Jordanian foreign policy since the outbreak of the intifada. One was the emphasis on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The other point made it clear that Jordan could not represent the Palestinian people at the conference or negotiate the settlement of the Palestinian problem on behalf of the PLO. Jordan was, however, prepared to attend the conference in a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation if this arrangement was acceptable to the parties concerned.14

  At the summit conference of the Arab League in Algiers on 7–9 June, Hussein urged the other members not to reject the Shultz Initiative, but by this time his own influence was rapidly declining. The time and place of the summit were not of his own choosing. It was an emergency summit to consider the intifada and financial support for the uprising was the main item on the agenda. Jordan was thrown on the defensive, as it had been at the Rabat summit fourteen years earlier. The intifada refocused the attention of the Arab world on the Palestinian problem. The courage of the Palestinians in resisting Israeli occupation put the rest of the Arab world to shame. Sympathy translated into material and political support for the Palestinians.