Web Of Deceit: Britain's Real Foreign Policy

by Mark Curtis

  New Labour has continued the British tradition of saying nothing critical of Saudi human rights abuses. The strongest statement I have found – in a report to parliament – is that the government ‘has concerns about the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia’, without outlining what any of these are. It adds, presumably with a straight face, that it ‘believes that a patient and discreet dialogue with the Saudi authorities is the best way to make progress’.13 The rest is complete silence.

  According to Human Rights Watch, there were ‘no discernable improvements’ in Saudi Arabia’s human rights record in 2001 or, we might add, 2002.14 This indicates that London’s policy of private consultations is hardly paying off – even if we accept that there is any effort at all in trying to make it do so.

  Former Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain admitted to a parliamentary committee in November 1999 that he had not ‘publicly said anything’ about human rights abuses since becoming the minister responsible for policy towards Saudi Arabia. When the committee asserted that Britain’s policy was being dictated by trade interests, Hain simply replied: ‘There is always a balance to be struck’ and that the government had to determine ‘how we can best achieve better human rights in any particular country’.15

  Instead of publicly criticising the regime, Hain chose effusive public sycophancy. At a speech in front of Crown Prince Abdullah in June 2000, Hain said he was delighted by the Prince’s presence in London ‘which we like to think is your second home’. He praised Saudi Arabia for having ‘balanced its obligations’ to Islam ‘with the secular pressures of commercial and economic change’ with ‘great dignity and skill’. There was one area in which Hain said Saudi Arabia needed to change: ‘the investment climate in the kingdom is in need of modernisation’. He implored the Saudi regime to ‘please do your best to open up as many sectors as possible to foreign investors’.16

  Tony Blair counts Saudi Arabia as ‘a good friend in the international coalition against terrorism’. The Prime Minister has ‘no doubt at all that in the future those ties and that relationship will become even stronger still’. The Ministry of Defence notes that ‘Saudi Arabia has been our most important ally in the Gulf region, and our largest defence sales markets in the world.’17

  The government’s silence on human rights abuses should be seen in the context of the torture of British citizens arrested by the Saudi authorities. David Mornin was arrested five months after Hain’s speech in connection with a series of bombings in Riyadh and Khobar on what strongly appeared to be trumped-up charges. Held in solitary confinement for eight weeks with the light burning constantly, Mornin said that:

  They flung me off the walls, punched me in the gut, kicked me in the ribcage … they hammered me. They threatened to gang rape my wife, to plant drugs on her, they said they would take me to the desert and cut my throat and leave me there … They kick you awake, make you sit down, then stand up about every 15 minutes … They hung me from bars above the door by my handcuffs so I was just off the balls of my feet for 24 hours at a time. They did that on four occasions.18

  It is simply not the done thing in mainstream political culture to dwell on – or even mention – the repression and human rights abuses of our Saudi ally. This is despite the fact that it is hard not to pay attention to it – there are, after all, 30,000 British citizens living there.

  It doesn’t seem to matter how bad things get. In 1988, for example, a Saudi government-appointed religious body issued a fatwa, sanctioning the execution of members of opposition political parties.19 This fatwa issued by our ally caused a good deal less attention – that is, none – than that issued against Salman Rushdie by our enemy, Iran. In the latter case, the fatwa usefully signalled all kinds of evil things about Islam and fitted nicely the government’s designation of Iran as official enemy.

  But New Labour is also actively contributing to the defence of the Saudi regime. Britain currently has a military mission that is providing ‘internal security training’ to the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). The 75,000-strong SANG is specifically designed to defend the royal family from social unrest and military coups from the regular forces. The military mission is ‘providing advice on such issues as officer training and developing basic military skills, and in more specialised areas such as anti-terrorism’, a parliamentary committee notes. The MoD states that ‘short-term training teams from the UK have been conducting low level internal security training for the SANG at UK expense’. Following the bombing in Khobar, teams were deployed in 1996, Spring 1997, Autumn 1998 and February 2000. ‘All were a success’, the MoD notes. Further teams are to be deployed over the next two years, it stated in March 2000.20

  The British programme runs alongside a much bigger US operation. The most recent five-year US/Saudi contract is worth $831 million and involves 280 US government personnel and 1,400 staff of a private company, the Vinnell corporation. The US programme notes that the SANG ‘is responsible for defending vital internal resources (oil fields and refineries), internal security, and supporting the Ministry of Defence and Aviation’. US personnel ‘are directly involved in all aspects of SANG’s force expansion and in helping to develop a total army’.21

  This training makes Britain and the US direct allies of the Saudi royal family’s retention of power against all-comers, a practical means of support for the regime championed by Peter de la Billiere, mentioned above. I can find almost no mention of this fact anywhere in the mainstream media. Neither is there any apparent concern in Westminster.

  British training of the SANG is long-standing, going back decades. But almost nothing is known about it, partly because the British elite’s relations with the Saudi elite are shrouded in secrecy, and subject to hardly any scrutiny.

  A sign of the closeness between London and Riyadh is that during the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, MI6 helped organise the Kuwait resistance in liaison with the Saudis. A training camp for volunteers was set up in eastern Saudi Arabia, involving members of the SAS, while Britain also provided machine guns. As with the aid given to the Afghan mojahidin, MI6’s activities were a smaller vision of a similar CIA programme. Journalist Mark Urban quotes one person involved in this programme as saying that the guerilla training ‘always had limited objectives, and its real value may have been as a long-term political gesture’ – presumably, a gesture of support for the existing regimes.22

  Selling arms is a further important aspect of the special relationship with Riyadh. This is not just about profits and supporting British military industry; arms exports also help to ‘keep the goodwill of the king and other important Saudi Arabs’, it was recognised by the US State Department in 1947.23

  Britain’s Al Yamamah arms contracts, signed in 1985 and 1988 and worth up to £50 billion, are not so much arms deals as a re-equipment of Saudi Arabia’s military forces. These contracts involve dozens of Tornado and Hawk fighter and trainer aircraft, minehunters, associated infrastructure and arms, and support equipment including spares. One official linked to the deals admitted that Britain had beaten France’s rival bid by gaining intelligence about which Saudi officials they intended to bribe and by outbidding them. A former MI6 station chief told BBC’s Panorama that MI6 informed British businessmen about what the foreign competition might be.24

  An investigation into the Al Yamamah deals by the National Audit Office is likely to show massive bribery and corruption. But the British administration that is committed to ‘open government’ has maintained its predecessor’s refusal to make the report’s findings public. This would likely embarrass our Saudi friends and no doubt a few British officials too.25 The reluctance of British governments to publicise details of the deals may have been another reason why the Saudis chose to buy from Britain in the first place.

  It is thought that about 15 per cent of the costs of the Al Yamamah deal went into the private bank accounts of Saudi princes and their associates.26 Indeed, given that the weapons acquired by Saudi Arabia are far in excess of its defensive ne
eds, it is plausible that the princes signed the deals precisely to receive massive bribes.

  There is a further important aspect to the Al Yamamah deals: all the arms are exempt from export licensing by the British government. This means that there are no restrictions on the use or deployment of the arms under the deal.27 Britain has simply washed its hands of any use the Saudi regime may want to put its weapons to. As noted in chapter 8, the bulk of this British arms trade with Saudi Arabia only arose from the then reluctance of the US to supply the regime.

  When Jonathan Aitken, a former government minister, was imprisoned for perjury, the media were happy to dub him a liar and a con-man. This was due to his lying about a hotel bill paid by a Saudi prince, with whom Aitken had built up close business relations over many years. But, as the Campaign Against the Arms Trade has pointed out, the real scandal is that a man who for many years was in effect a servant of Saudi royalty was appointed to ministerial office. Moreover, Aitken was made minister for British ‘defence procurement’ (that is, the arms trade), the most important customer of which was the family of his former business connections. It is likely that these connections were instrumental in ensuring that Al Yamamah contracts continued in the 1990s.28

  Bahrain – siding with the rulers

  Bahrain has provided a good test case for how seriously New Labour would address human rights abuses committed by traditional British allies, and for whether it would be prepared to support opposition groups calling for greater political participation in the political system. Would New Labour be any different or continue business as usual?

  A month after Labour came to power – in June 1997 – Human Rights Watch published a report on Bahrain entitled Routine abuse, routine denial. It noted that human rights abuses in Bahrain were wide-ranging, especially in the denial of fundamental political rights and civil liberties such as freedom of expression and association. The group said that there was a particular responsibility on Britain to take a lead since ‘many abusive practices derive from the policies pursued by Great Britain prior to independence in 1971.’

  Under the Conservative government, Britain’s approach to these abuses had been similar to that of the US, Human Rights Watch noted: London only expressed concern ‘in very general terms’ about human rights practices and raised the issue only on a confidential basis. But this approach ‘can no longer be regarded as adequate or sufficient’. It called on the newly elected British government to:

  make clear to the government of Bahrain, both publicly and privately, that persistent and recurrent human rights violations will affect negatively the depth and quality of relations with the United Kingdom, including military and security relations.29

  The Blair government’s reaction was immediately clear. A month following the report, Foreign Office Minister Derek Fatchett expressed support for the Bahraini regime’s ‘shura’ system of consultative councils appointed by the Emir. Fatchett described this system as a ‘respected and accepted’ form of constitution and that the ‘Bahraini shura council is not perfect but we should not write it off’.30

  Britain rejected Human Rights Watch’s suggestion to make clear that military relations would suffer as a result of human rights violations. Instead, London conducted another round of military talks with Bahrain in November 1997, addressing ‘issues of mutual defence interest and bilateral defence relations’.31

  When asked in a parliamentary question the extent to which the government believed that human rights were violated in Bahrain, Fatchett simply replied: ‘we take seriously any abuse of human rights wherever it might occur’ and said he regularly raised human rights with Bahraini ministers.32 This signalled a continuing policy of supposed private diplomacy that Human Rights Watch had labelled not ‘adequate or sufficient’.

  The British government’s support for the shura system has been in direct defiance of liberal and Islamic groups in Bahrain demanding greater political liberalisation. Since 1994, there has been a growing popular movement to press the regime to become more open, to allow greater political participation and to restore the constitution suspended in 1975. The constitution had been established in 1973 and consisted of a national assembly with thirty elected members and fifteen nominated government ministers. Major demonstrations have occurred together with mass petitions. By October 1994, 25,000 prominent people had signed a petition to the Emir calling for political liberalisation, including the greater involvement of women in the political process and the need to address the country’s economic problems, like unemployment and inflation. The Bahraini people were not asking for the Earth, calling neither for the overthrow of the Emir nor even for full democracy.

  The response of the Bahraini regime after 1994 was to crack down hard on all demonstrations by indiscriminate arrests and arbitrary detention of several thousand people, by abuse and torture of prisoners, deporting leaders and tightening restrictions on all forms of meetings and public expression.33 Reserve Bahraini military forces were called up and even columns of special Saudi National Guards – as noted, also trained by Britain – crossed into Bahrain in support of the authorities.34

  In May 1998, the Financial Times reported that the Bahraini government ‘continues to crack down on the slightest sign of dissent’. It noted that five women had been given a three-month suspended jail sentence for nothing more than ‘chanting slogans against the existing political system’. Thousands of people had been jailed.35

  Major changes occurred in 2001 and 2002, however, under the new Emir – Hamad Al Khalifa – who had taken over on his father’s death in 1999. In February 2001, all political prisoners were pardoned and the state security law and state security court, which severely suppressed basic freedoms, were abolished. The following February, the kingdom of Bahrain was proclaimed, with the Emir declaring himself king. Municipal elections were held in May 2002 and parliamentary elections in October 2002. Most importantly, the king announced the restoration of parliament, with the creation of a lower house – consisting of forty elected members – and an upper house – a shura or consultative council, of forty members appointed by the king.

  These are significant improvements for Bahrainis, but major brakes on democratic freedoms remain. Most important is the fact that the new parliament is less powerful than the old one suspended in 1975. The appointed upper house is far more powerful than the elected chamber, meaning the King retains overall control. According to the Bahrain Freedom Movement (BFM), a major opposition group based in London:

  Many Bahrainis thought they were going back to the 1973 constitution, with a single legislative chamber boasting wide powers. Instead the king promulgated a new constitution creating an appointed upper house that can effectively block anything the elected parliament does.

  The BFM also notes that ‘the government is aiming for a namesake parliament with the occasional ritual of elections’ and that ‘real and effective state power is vested in the traditional monarchy’. Public rallies have also been prohibited while access to opposition internet sites have been blocked.36

  Britain has chosen to side very firmly with the rulers, both before and after the (limited) political opening of the last two years. It has rejected Human Rights Watch’s call to use its close military and political ties with the Bahrain regime publicly to press it to end abuses, and also failed to express any (that I can find) public support for the calls of the popular protest movement. Rather, it appears simply to have seized on the king’s recent initiatives. Foreign Office Minister Mike O’Brien has expressed Britain’s welcome for ‘progress towards constitutional monarchy and a democratic state’, even saying: ‘Bahrain is in many ways providing a lead to show that it is possible to create a more democratic state in the Middle East that can participate in the international community with its head held high’.37

  Britain continues to arm and train the regime and exports arms to ‘all units of the Bahraini security forces, including the Bahrain Defence Force and the Bahrain National Guard, whose forces have
received some training from the Ministry of Defence’. That training is ‘tailored to Bahrain’s requirements’, a parliamentary committee notes, while the MoD describes Bahrain as ‘a key regional ally of the UK’.38

  ‘The relationship between Britain and Bahrain is special’, Trade minister Baroness Symons told a ‘Doing business in Bahrain’ seminar, before praising the regime for the ‘wise way in which Bahrain has used its oil wealth’.39

  Policy has changed hardly a jot since 1965 and 1966, when Britain put down demonstrations against the regime, then a colony in all but name. The Economist correctly noted at the time that ‘the British have no sympathy with the notion of political organisations in Bahrain’.40 London’s priorities clearly change little.

  Whitehall bears even greater responsibility for repression in Bahrain, however. Bahrain’s internal security services are riddled with Britons, with around a dozen in mainly senior roles. It is only the most prominent, Ian Henderson, who has received some (minimal) media coverage. Henderson, a British national and a former colonial official in Kenya, had been Director General of the Public Security Directorate, the Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID) and the State Security Directorate (SSD), from 1966 until 1998, before taking up the role as adviser to the interior ministry until July 2000.