Russia Against Napoleon

by Lieven, Dominic

  Armies on campaign usually leave behind some sort of cadre in depots or along the lines of communication, from which their regiments can if necessary be reconstituted. For example, Napoleon’s Guards in theory numbered 56,000 men on the eve of the 1812 campaign. The Guards units which entered Russia nominally comprised 38,000 men and had 27,000 actually present in the ranks when they crossed the Neman. The Young Guard regiments which invaded Russia were almost wiped out but two Young Guard battalions had remained in Paris in 1812, and two more in Germany. Around them and the four full Young Guard regiments in Spain a formidable new force could be created.41

  Within France there were the reserve battalions of the regiments serving in Spain and in the farther-flung areas of the empire. In his study of the Grande Armée in 1813, Camille Rousset mentions them but gives no figure for the men they sent to it. The Prussian general staff history of the campaign reckons perhaps 10,000. French and Prussian sources also differ as to how many men were withdrawn from Spain. The smallest figure is 20,000 but all sources agree that the men from Spain were the elite of the troops deployed there. On top of this there were 12,000 good soldiers of the naval artillery stationed in France’s ports and now incorporated into the new Grande Armée. Even the first wave of recruits, the 75,000 so-called cohorts, had already been under arms for nine months by the beginning of 1813. It was around this relatively large cadre that the true ‘Marie Louises’ were formed. These young men usually lacked neither courage nor loyalty: their great problem was endurance when faced by the gruelling demands of Napoleonic campaigning. Nevertheless, as it concentrated near the river Main Napoleon’s new army was an impressive force. Initially, its more than 200,000 men faced barely 110,000 allied soldiers. If the Russians and Prussians had considerably more veterans, the French had Napoleon to even this balance.42

  While Napoleon was mobilizing and concentrating his new armies Kutuzov was at headquarters in Kalicz, contemplating competing strategic options. Immediately after the signing of the Russo-Prussian alliance on 28 February Lieutenant-General Gerhard von Scharnhorst arrived at Russian headquarters in Kalicz to coordinate planning for the forthcoming campaign. There was no doubt, however, either that Russia was the senior partner in the alliance or that Kutuzov, field-marshal and commander-in-chief, would have the decisive say in strategy. Both at the time and subsequently Kutuzov was criticized from two diametrically opposed points of view.

  One school of thought argued that the allied forces ought to have advanced decisively across Germany in March and early April 1813. Some of the Prussian generals and some later German historians took the lead here but Wittgenstein was also anxious to pursue Viceroy Eugène over the Elbe. Both those like Wittgenstein, who wished to attack Eugène at Magdeburg, and those who wanted to strike further south to disrupt Napoleon’s planned offensive, believed this would allow the allies to mobilize powerful support from the German peoples and perhaps German princes. The opposite school of thought, almost exclusively Russian, sometimes blamed Kutuzov for having advanced so far from his base in Russia, and opposed any plan to cross the Elbe into the Saxon heartland until Russian reinforcements arrived.43

  In an important letter written to his cousin, Admiral Login Golenishchev-Kutuzov, the commander-in-chief explained why the Russians had been forced to advance so deep into Germany.

  Our movement away from our borders and so from our resources may seem ill-considered, particularly if you reckon the distance from the Neman to the Elbe and then the distance from the Elbe to the Rhine. Large enemy forces can reach us before we can be strengthened by reserves coming from Russia…But if you go into the circumstances of our activities in more detail, then you will see that we are operating beyond the Elbe only with light forces, of which (given the quality of our light forces) none will be lost. It was necessary to occupy Berlin and having taken Berlin how can you abandon Saxony, both because of its abundant resources and because it interdicts the enemy’s communications with Poland. Mecklenburg and the Hanseatic towns add to our resources. I agree that our removal far from our borders also distances us from our reinforcements but if we had remained behind the Vistula then we would have had to wage a war like in 1807. There would have been no alliance with Prussia and all of Germany, including Austria, with its people and all its resources, would have served Napoleon.44

  Kutuzov’s response to those who urged a rapid advance across Germany is contained in the many letters he wrote to his subordinate generals, Winzengerode and Wittgenstein. The commander-in-chief admitted the advantages in occupying as much as possible of Germany in order to mobilize its resources, raise German morale and pre-empt Napoleon’s plans. But the further the allies advanced the weaker their forces would become and the more vulnerable to a devastating counter-strike from the far larger army that Napoleon was building up in southwestern Germany. Defeat would have more than merely military consequences: ‘You must understand that any reverse will be a big blow to Russia’s prestige in Germany.’45

  Aleksandr Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, who was serving at the time on Kutuzov’s staff, recalled that there was constant tension between headquarters and Wittgenstein in March and April 1813, as Kutuzov tried to draw his subordinate’s attention southwards to where Napoleon’s main army was concentrating, and in particular to the line from Erfurt through Leipzig to Dresden along which the enemy was expected to advance. On the contrary, Wittgenstein was above all concerned to protect Berlin and the Prussian heartland which his corps had liberated and on whose borders it was mostly deployed in March 1813. Kutuzov and his chief of staff, Petr Volkonsky, were extremely concerned that unless Wittgenstein advanced to the south-west into Saxony there was every chance that Napoleon’s advance would drive a wedge between him and the main allied forces and thereby enable the enemy to isolate and overwhelm first one allied army and then the other.46

  In the circumstances Kutuzov and Volkonsky were basically correct. Given their acute shortage of troops, the allies had to concentrate their forces in the Dresden–Leipzig area in order to stop Napoleon driving eastwards along the Austrian border towards Poland. But the worries of Wittgenstein and his chief of staff d’Auvray about defending Berlin and Brandenburg were also legitimate and were shared by most senior Prussian commanders. If Napoleon reconquered these areas, Prussian mobilization of men and matériel would suffer a big setback. The basic problem of the allies in the spring of 1813 was that they needed to defend both the Prussian heartland around Berlin and southern Saxony. Unfortunately they lacked the resources to do this. The tension caused by conflicting strategic priorities and inadequate manpower to defend them continued throughout the spring campaign.

  Clausewitz provides a realistic view on the allied situation which goes a long way towards justifying the strategy ultimately agreed by Kutuzov and Scharnhorst, and ratified by the Russian and Prussian monarchs. In his view Wittgenstein’s wish to attack Eugène at Magdeburg made no sense: the viceroy would merely retreat if faced by superior numbers and would draw the allies away from the crucial Leipzig–Dresden operational line on which their links to Austria and to the Russian supplies and reinforcements in Poland depended. Mounting a pre-emptive strike into Thuringia, as some Prussian generals were urging, also made no sense. The advancing allied troops would face far superior numbers close to Napoleon’s bases by April.

  Unfortunately, however, the purely defensive strategy based on defence of the Elbe which some Russians advocated was also unlikely to work, given Napoleon’s superiority in numbers and the fact that he held almost all the fortified crossing points over the river. By standing on the Elbe rather than further west, the allies would merely gift Napoleon extra time which they dearly needed to win over the Austrians and bring up Russian reinforcements. Though Clausewitz therefore approved of the allied strategy of advancing over the Elbe and seeking to delay Napoleon by offering battle near Leipzig, he was clear-eyed about the allied chances in this battle, given the French advantage in numbers. Surprise, added to the superiority of the
allied veteran troops and of their cavalry, gave them some hope of victory but no more than that.47

  On 16 March 1813 Blücher’s Prussian corps crossed the Silesian border into Saxony. The next day Prussia declared war on France. Blücher was followed by the advance guard of Kutuzov’s army, commanded by Winzengerode, who was subordinated to the Prussian general’s command. Dresden, the Saxon capital, fell to Winzengerode on 27 March, after which the Russian and Prussian troops fanned out across Saxony towards Leipzig. Apart from the strategic reasons for occupying western Saxony, logistics also came into play. Silesia and the Lausitz (i.e. eastern Saxony) were largely manufacturing areas which depended even in normal circumstances on imported Polish grain. These provinces could sustain troops crossing them but the long-term deployment of the allied armies east of the Elbe was bound to be difficult and to impede efforts to mobilize resources in Silesia for the Prussian war effort.

  The ever-aggressive Blücher dreamed of heading into Thuringia and Franconia to attack Napoleon’s main army before it was ready. He knew that he could not do this on his own but his attempts to persuade Wittgenstein to join the offensive were unavailing. In fact even Blücher began to have his doubts about the wisdom of such a move. Like all the allied leaders, Blücher had his eyes on Austria, and in particular on Francis II. Like them too, memories of 1805 were burned into his consciousness: in that year probable Prussian intervention in the war had been wrecked by the premature allied attack at Austerlitz. He commented to Wittgenstein that everyone was warning him of the possible present-day parallels and that maybe on this occasion it was better to postpone the decision for as long as possible.48

  Meanwhile Kutuzov and his army’s main body remained in Kalicz, much to the Prussians’ annoyance. The field-marshal saw no reason to disturb his men’s rest. Having occupied Saxony he had no wish to advance further and his intelligence reports in March rightly concluded that Napoleon was not yet ready to attack him. On 2 April Frederick William arrived in Kalicz and inspected the Russian troops. The Guards, all in new uniforms, looked splendid but the king was dismayed by the small size of the Russian forces. The Prussians were beginning to realize how much the past year’s campaigning had cost the Russians and how very great an effort Prussia would need to make for victory. Five days after the parade Alexander, Kutuzov and the Guards at last set off for Saxony.

  En route, Captain Zhirkevich’s battery of the Russian Guards artillery experienced another rather different inspection by Frederick William while passing through Liegnitz. The news that the king was in the city and wished to greet the Russian troops only reached Zhirkevich at very short notice. The Russian commander’s preparations were then thrown into total confusion when the modest Frederick William suddenly emerged onto the insignificant steps of the first small house they passed on entering the city. A volley of commands more or less got the column into some variant of parade order in the narrow street but the excitement also stirred up the menagerie of ducks, geese and hens stacked on top of the gun caissons, who added their own cacophony to the military music. Behind the gun carriages and caissons followed a herd of sheep, calves and cows. They added to the confusion not just by their cries but also by attempting to array themselves into their own version of parade order too. Zhirkevich’s embarrassment was increased by the fact that these animals had all been ‘acquired’ from the king’s own province of Silesia, but Frederick William just smiled and told the Russian commander that it was good to see the troops looking so well and cheerful. The king could be morose, cold and ungracious but at heart he was a decent and well-meaning man. He also spoke and read Russian, albeit imperfectly, and he liked the Russians. It was lucky for Zhirkevich that his men’s antics had been performed before Frederick William rather than Alexander or the Grand Duke Constantine. The latter would have taken a very dim view of the Guards’ informality when on parade before an allied sovereign.49

  For the Russian troops the march across Silesia and Saxony was something of a picnic. The weather was superb and, especially in Silesia, the Russian soldiers were greeted everywhere as allies and liberators. Though usually treated correctly by the Poles, the latter were seldom fully trusted by Russian officers. Much of Poland was poor at the best of times, and not improved by the passage of armies in 1812–13. By contrast, Silesia was rich and Saxony even richer. The Russian officers marvelled at the wealth, houses and lifestyles of Saxon peasant farmers. The blonde and buxom German young women were a joy to behold, though German ‘vodka’ seemed miserably thin and weak. Meanwhile, as they approached the Elbe, they could see on their left the romantic wooded slopes of the mountains dividing Saxony from Habsburg Bohemia.50

  On 24 April Alexander and the Russian Guards entered Dresden, where they were to spend the Russian Easter. For the overwhelming majority of the Russian soldiers, both in Dresden and elsewhere in Saxony, the Easter services were a moving and uplifting experience. Serge Volkonsky, Prince Repnin-Volkonsky’s brother and Petr Mikhailovich Volkonsky’s brother-in-law, was an excellently educated, French-speaking officer of the Chevaliers Gardes. Nevertheless he recalls how the priests emerged from the church to greet the massed regiments with the Easter cry, ‘Christ is risen’, ‘the prayer…dear to the heart of all Christians and for us Russians all the more strongly felt because our prayers are both religious and national. On account of both sentiments, for all the Russians present this was a moment of exaltation.’ The time for prayers and picnics was drawing to a close, however. The same day that Alexander entered Dresden, Napoleon moved his headquarters forward from Mainz to Erfurt in preparation for his advance into Saxony.51

  Meanwhile illness had forced Kutuzov to drop out en route to Dresden. The old field-marshal died in Bunzlau on 28 April. Kutuzov’s death had no impact on allied strategy, which remained committed to stopping Napoleon’s advance through Saxony. Alexander appointed Wittgenstein to be the new commander-in-chief. In many ways he was the most suitable candidate. No other general had won so many victories in 1812 and his reputation had been enhanced by the victorious campaign to liberate Prussia in 1813. Wittgenstein spoke German and French and could therefore communicate easily with Russia’s allies. In addition, his concern for the defence of Berlin and the Prussian heartland endeared him to the Prussians and enabled him to empathize with their worries. One problem with Wittgenstein’s appointment was that he was junior to Miloradovich, Tormasov and Barclay. The latter was still absent from the main army at the siege of Thorn but the other two full generals were deeply insulted. Tormasov departed for Russia and was no great loss. Miloradovich remained and was assuaged by daily messages of support and benevolence from Alexander.

  None of this would have mattered too much had Wittgenstein chalked up a victory over Napoleon. Failure at the battle of Lutzen brought out the knives. Already prone to intervene in military operations, Alexander became even more inclined to do so as criticisms mounted of the new commander-in-chief. Unfortunately, these criticisms were often justified. Wittgenstein was out of his depth as commander-in-chief. Brave, bold, generous and even chivalrous, Wittgenstein was an inspirational corps commander but he could not master the much more complex requirements of army headquarters where authority could not always be exercised in face-to-face manner and painstaking administration and staff work were required to keep a large force operational. According to Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Wittgenstein’s headquarters was chaotic, with little discipline or even elementary military security being exercised over the many hangers-on who came to infest it.52

  In the last days of April, as Napoleon advanced from Erfurt towards Leipzig, the allies deployed just to the south of his line of march near the town of Lutzen. Either they must try to ambush Napoleon or they must retreat rapidly so that he could not reach Dresden before them and cut off their retreat over the Elbe. The choice was not difficult since to retreat without a battle when first encountering Napoleon would damage the troops’ morale and the allies’ prestige in Germany and Austria. A surprise attack which caugh
t the enemy on the march might defeat him, or at the very least slow down his advance.

  The allied plan was devised by Diebitsch. He aimed to catch part of the enemy army while it was strung out on the march and to destroy it before the rest of Napoleon’s corps could come to its aid. The consensus is that the plan was good but its execution very flawed. This is not surprising. Wittgenstein brought with him his own staff. Almost all top positions at headquarters changed on the eve of the battle. To take but one example: Ermolov was replaced as chief of artillery by Prince Iashvili, who had previously headed the artillery of Wittgenstein’s corps. Ermolov was already in some disfavour because of his failure to bring up the artillery parks with ammunition supplies at sufficient speed, but the sudden transfer of responsibility to Iashvili resulted in the new artillery chief not knowing the whereabouts even of all the ammunition that was to hand. Further confusion occurred because this was the first time that large Russian and Prussian forces had fought side-by-side.

  Diebitsch’s plan included columns moving at night to take up positions for attack by 6 a.m. on 2 May. Predictably, confusion occurred, columns bumped into each other and even the first allied line was not deployed until five hours later. Matters were not helped by the fact that the plans often arrived very late and were detailed but not always precise. To some extent the delay may even have worked in the allies’ favour, however. During the five hours that elapsed, Napoleon and the bulk of his army was marching away from the battlefield and towards Leipzig, convinced that no battle would occur that day. In addition, had the battle of Lutzen commenced at dawn, Napoleon would have had a full summer’s day to concentrate all his forces on the battlefield, with possibly dire results for the outnumbered allies.