The 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks

by Edward Mickolus

  Meanwhile, also on September 8, 2003, a Bali court sentenced three militants to 15–16 years for a robbery that funded the bombing.

  On September 10, 2003, a court in Bali sentenced Imam Samudra to death by firing squad for his masterminding of the bombing. Prosecutors said he chose the recruits and financed the attack. Samudra said the bombing was revenge for U.S. tyranny.

  On September 18, 2003, a court sentenced to life in prison Ali Imron, finding that he had participated in making the bomb and driving the minivan to the area.

  In 2003, one of the 17 Indonesians who took terrorist training in the Philippines in April 2000 was arrested for hiding a Bali bomber.

  On November 8, 2008, the Indonesian government executed Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and Mukhlas.

  On March 9, 2010, police raided an Internet cafe and killed Dulmatin (alias Joko Pitoyo), a senior member of JI who they believed was behind the Bali bombings. His group claimed to be the Aceh branch of al Qaeda for Southeast Asia.

  On January 25, 2011, Pakistani security officials arrested al Qaeda operative Umar Patek in connection with the Bali bombings. His trial began in February 2012. He was convicted on six terrorism charges and sentenced on June 21, 2012, to 20 years in prison for murder and bomb-making.

  On June 9, 2011, Indonesian authorities in central Java arrested Heru Kuncoro, who was suspected of buying electronic equipment used in the bombings. He was among 16 people arrested in early June 2011 on suspicion of plotting cyanide attacks against police, according to Fox News. He was charged in late October 2011. His case remains open.

  October 23, 2002

  Moscow Theater Takeover

  Overview: Chechen terrorists became more brazen during the late 1990s and early 2000s, refusing to buckle in the wake of massive crackdowns against them by the Moscow regime. Attacking planes, subways, apartment complexes, and government officials, the Chechen rebels posed the greatest terrorist threat to the Russian regime since the breakup of the Soviet Union. An especially daring attack took place in the heart of Moscow in October 2002, when Chechens resurrected an attack type rarely seen in the 2000s—a large-scale barricade-and-hostage operation with a laundry list of demands posed to the authorities. Exceptionally long and fanciful names designed to sow confusion and fear were trotted out by various self-appointed terrorist spokesmen. A bungled Russian rescue attempt left 170 people dead, sparking a firestorm of internal and international protests regarding the government’s handling of the incident and of the rebellion in general. Russian attempts to equate the Chechens to al Qaeda’s depredations, despite evidence of links between the two groups, fell on deaf ears.

  Incident: On October 23, 2002, at 9:00 P.M., scores of masked Chechen gunmen and women armed with automatic weapons took over a Moscow theater on the corner of Dobrovskaya and Melnikova, holding nearly 900 people hostage. About 100 people escaped in the initial attack; another 46 were freed in stages. The House of Culture for the State Ball-Bearing Factory theater was showing a popular musical, NordOst (Northeast). The terrorists demanded that Russian troops leave Chechnya within a week and end the war in the separatist region. They threatened to kill all the hostages if their demands were not met. At least one and perhaps two hostages were killed and two wounded in the initial assault by the gunmen, who had grenades strapped to their bodies. The Chechens said they were holding 650 people after having released 150. They claimed to have placed land mines around the theater’s perimeter.

  Tatyana Solnishkina, an orchestra member, used her cell phone to say that the rebels were threatening to kill 10 hostages if one of them was harmed. The news media quoted her as saying that the terrorists had explosives.

  Alevtina Popva, an actress, escaped from backstage, and told the news media that the terrorists were chanting like kamikazes. She and some colleagues used curtains and scarves to climb out windows. Terrorists later fired rocket-propelled grenades at two teen girls who were attempting to run to safety, injuring a Russian soldier.

  Rebel Abu Said claimed that the rebels were all shahids (Arabic for martyr). An Interfax reporter called from his cell phone to say that the rebels claimed membership in the Suicide Commandos of the 29th Division.

  The rebels separated the men and women, and later separated out the foreign citizens into a third group. Some Muslim audience members were permitted to leave.

  Several children were freed by the rebels. One boy said that his mother and sister were still being held, as were dozens of other children.

  The hostages included citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Australia, France, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Israel, and the Netherlands. At least 3 Americans, a Russian with a U.S. green card, and 70 other foreigners were being held.

  President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin said that the attack was planned by foreign forces and was connected with the attacks in Bali and the Philippines. A police source said that the rebels were contacting accomplices in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

  Aslan Maskhadov, former president of Chechnya, denied involvement with the hostage-takers, blaming a splinter faction with links to Muslim terrorists. Al Jazeera played a tape that showed the hostage-takers in front of an Arabic-language banner. A Chechen website said the attackers were led by Movsar Barayev, 25, nephew of Arbi Barayev, a Chechen rebel leader who died in 2001. The younger Barayev said he headed a group of Islamic radicals he called the Islamic Special Purpose Regiment of the Chechen State Defense Committee (Majlis al-Shura) with 400 active fighters and as many in reserve. His second-in-command was Abu Bakr. Al Jazeera later said the group was the Sabotage and Military Surveillance Group of the Riyadh al-Salikhin Martyrs (aka the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of the Chechen Martyrs). A group member said in a recorded statement, “Our demands are stopping the war and withdrawal of Russian forces. We are implementing the operation by order of the military commander of the Chechen Republic.”

  The State Department said that the attack was by three groups:

  The Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade: It was established in 1998 by Shamil Basayev, who led the group with Saudi-born Ibn al-Khattab until the latter’s death in March 2002. Arab mujahideen leader Abu al-Walid had since taken over al-Khattab’s position.

  The Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (Requirements for Getting into Paradise), also led by Shamil Basayev.

  The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, led by Movzar Barayev, who died in the attack. Leadership was picked up by a Chechen who used the alias Khamzat.

  Singer and politician Yosif Kobzon, the Duma member from Chechnya, claimed he had established communications with the hostage-takers, and was going to negotiate with the gunmen. Kobzon, accompanied by a Red Cross representative, was permitted into the theater and obtained the release of five hostages after 1:30 P.M. on October 24, 2002. They included a sick Briton in his fifties or sixties, a woman, and three children. During Kobzon’s second visit, he was accompanied by parliamentarian Irina Khakamada. The terrorists refused to free anyone else, saying that they did not want to deal with intermediaries, only with decisionmakers. Parliamentarian Grigory Yavlinsky was permitted inside the theater later that day, as was another group of negotiators. Other negotiators included Sergei Govorukhin, a film director; U.S. ambassador Alexander Vershbow; Duma member for Chechnya Aslanbek Aslakhanov; journalist Anna Politkovskaya; and former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov. Another two hostages fled at 6:30 P.M.

  During one visit, Kobzon was accompanied by Mark Franchetti of the Sunday Times of London, who interviewed the rebel leader.

  On October 26, 2002, the Chechens freed seven more hostages at 6:00 A.M. At noon, eight children were freed.

  A male hostage threw a bottle at a Chechen woman and charged her. She shot him dead, along with a nearby woman.

  On October 25, 2002, the Chechens called for antiwar demonstrations in Red Square. That day, the rebels released 19 hostages, inclu
ding some children.

  The terrorists refused to improve the conditions of the hostages, who were starving and who had to use the orchestra pit as a toilet.

  On October 26, 2002, in the early morning, the terrorists reportedly killed two male hostages and wounded a man and a woman. The hostages had attempted to escape, but only two made it. The sound of gunfire and explosions was heard at 3:30 A.M., when Russian Special Forces raided the theater in a battle that led to the deaths of 42 rebels, including rebel leader Movsar Barayev and 18 female suicide bombers with explosives strapped to their stomachs, and 117 hostages who were killed by the incapacitating gas used by the rescue force. Some of the women were shot. A man with head wounds and a woman with stomach injuries were taken away by ambulance. Several rebels were captured. Most of the freed hostages were hospitalized due to the effects of the gas that was pumped into the ventilation system. Russian soldiers refused to identify the gas, even to the attending physicians. At least 600 hostages were treated for bullet wounds and gas inhalation. The gas came in so quickly that the terrorists did not have time to put on their gas masks. Pentagon sources suggested that the gas was opium-based. Other U.S. doctors suggested it was fentanyl, an opiate derivative. Still others said it was an aerosol form of carfentanil, a potent narcotic used to sedate big game animals, or halothane, an inhalational anesthetic used in surgery for 50 years.

  Among the dead hostages were 115 Russians, an American, an Azerbaijani, a Dutch citizen, 2 Ukrainians, an Armenian, an Austrian, a Kazakh, and a Belarussian.

  On October 28, 2002, the Russians arrested a pair of Chechens in connection with the attack.

  On October 29, 2002, Denmark arrested Akhmed Zakayev, an aide to Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, for possible involvement in the attack. He was held until November 12, 2002, pending investigation. He had been attending the final session of the World Chechen Congress in Copenhagen. Russian officials detained dozens of possible accomplices.

  On January 25, 2003, the theater officially reopened after $2.5 million in renovations, including a new security system with metal detectors, a new audio system, and new orchestra pit. Elsewhere, Russian police detained three Chechens in Penza, 310 miles southeast of Moscow, on suspicion of involvement in the attack.

  Nord-Ost reopened on February 8, 2003.

  In June 2003, Zaurbek Talkhigov was sentenced to eight and one half years for tipping off terrorists about police attempts to rescue the hostages.

  By July 17, 2003, 793 former hostages and families of the 129 dead hostages were having a difficult time seeking redress in Russian courts. The 135 former hostages or family members who had agreed to sue were represented by Attorney Igor Trunov. As of that date, Russian courts had rejected 35 of the 65 lawsuits filed against the state. On July 28, 2003, a Moscow court rejected appeals in 21 compensation cases; attorneys argued that the law applies only to material damages for loss of income.

  May 12, 2003

  Riyadh Western Compound Bombings

  Overview: Because fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, many observers suggested that the Saudis were supportive of al Qaeda, at least passively, and that not enough had been done to combat the group. Views of the Saudi regime’s stance on terrorism changed dramatically when a wing of al Qaeda began attacking Saudi interests at home. A significant slap at the House of Saud occurred when al Qaeda conducted a major suicide bombing against a residential complex. The Saudi government engaged in a two-pronged attack on domestic terrorists, establishing an extensive Most Wanted Terrorist List, while also creating a terrorist rehabilitation program. Western leaders praised Saudi efforts.

  Incident: On May 12, 2003, at 11:25 a.m., suicide bombers set of f three truck bombs in a residential complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 34 people, including 8 Americans, 2 Britons, 7 Saudis, 2 Jordanians, 2 Filipinos, 1 Lebanese, 1 Swiss, and 9 terrorists. Another 190 people were injured. The facilities were identified as the Cordoval, Gedawal, and Hamra residences. The terrorists first fired at the sentries before pushing a button that opened the gates and permitted them to drive deep into the compounds. A member of the Saudi National Guard was killed in a gun battle. Two Filipino employees of Vinnell Corporation were also killed, and several employees were injured, two critically. Jordanian children Zeina Abassi, 10, and her brother Yazan, 5, were killed. A ninth American died on June 1, 2003. The 2-week-old niece of Jim Young, 41, an entrepreneur from Dalton, Georgia, was badly injured in the face. Also injured was British citizen Erika Warrington, 15.

  In an initial attack, the terrorists fired at guards, detonated the bomb, and then escaped. The compound houses several Britons; a British school is on the grounds. The terrorists worked their way through three levels of security, including Saudi National Guards. The Dodge Ram truck contained 400 pounds of plastic explosives and damaged every building in the compound. The terrorists also drove a white Ford Crown Victoria, which they left outside; it was impaled on the gate in the explosion. Two attackers died; three escaped on foot.

  At Al Hamra, two cars, including a car bomb, drove up to the main entrance at 11:30 P.M. The terrorists shot the security guards. As one car drove toward the recreation area, the terrorists continued firing, wounding or killing several people on the street. The car bomb went off outside a pool area where a barbecue party was under way. The car landed in the pool. At least 10 people died and dozens were wounded. Saudi officials worried that some of the attackers were still on the grounds hours later. The press reported that gunfire could be heard in the early morning in Riyadh. Injured were Saudis Berkel, husband Jelal, and their 3-year-old son; two little girls from Jordan—their father was in a coma—and a Lebanese man. Al Hamra and Gedawal are home to workers from Turkey, Lebanon, the United States, and United Kingdom. Two attackers died; three escaped on foot. Mohammed Atef al Kayyaly was killed.

  Gedawal facility housed Americans working for a local subsidiary of the Fairfax, Virginia-based Vinnell Corporation, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman Corporation. The firm is jointly owned by U.S. and Saudi interests, and trains the Saudi National Guard. U.S. ambassador Robert W. Jordan had asked the Saudi interior ministry for more security on April 29 and May 7, 2003, and on May 10, 2003, specifically requested more security for Gedawal. (The house raided on May 6, 2003, is just across the street from Gedewal.) The compound’s elaborate security system minimized the effect of the bombing of the 408 six-bedroom, two-story villas in the complex. At 11:25 P.M., a guard posted at one of the four towers at the corners of the facility went to a small room below to have tea with other guards. Shortly thereafter, a GMC pickup and a Ford sedan drove up to that gate. The terrorists shot to death two guards and wounded two other guards and another employee. They raised a gate by hand. Guards at a nearby interior gate heard shooting and keyed in a security code that prevented the metal gate from opening. The car and truck stopped outside the second gate. The three men in the Ford left the car, while the duo in the truck set off the truck bomb, killing them and the other three terrorists, who had grenades strapped to their waists. No residents died. The blast destroyed the gates, sewage tanks, and the terrorists’ vehicles.

  At least some of the attackers wore Saudi Arabian National Guard uniforms and drove vehicles commonly used by residents and guards. When the sentries requested ID, the terrorists opened fire.

  Ali al-Khudair and two other new-generation radicals called on Saudis not to cooperate in the investigation. They were rebuffed and forced to retract their statements.

  President Bush vowed “American justice” would be given the terrorists.

  The Saudis said the 50- to 60-member al Qaeda cell that attacked on May 6, 2003, was responsible. It was led by Khaled Jehani, 29, who had left the country at age 18, and fought in Bosnia and Chechnya. He served in Afghan camps.

  The bombings came hours before U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell was due to arrive in Riyadh.

  Only three dead terrorists were positively identified via DNA. Possibly among the dead w
as Abdul Kareem Yazijy, 35, who was suspected of membership in the terrorist cell. His younger brother, Abdullah, called on him to turn himself in and noted that he had disappeared 18 months earlier. He had a long history of “emotional instability,” according to Abdullah. His brother went to Afghanistan for a few months in 1990 and later worked for two years in Sarajevo for the Saudi charity Supreme Committee for the Collection of Donations for Bosnia–Herzegovnia, which was raided in 2002 for al Qaeda ties.

  Saudi officials said three al Qaeda cells with 50 active members were operating in the country before the bombings. The cells were set up by Abd-al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the former head of operations for al Qaeda in the Persian Gulf. He was captured in November 2002 and is in U.S. custody. He was involved in the USS Cole attack in October 2000 and planned other attacks on U.S. and Western ships. He was succeeded by Khaled Jehani, 29, a Saudi Afghan war veteran, who was in charge of planning the attack. The bombing team leader was Turki Mishal Dandani, another Saudi Afghan veteran who remained at large.

  Saudi officials suggested that all of the dead terrorists came from the list of 19 who were sought in the May 6, 2003 case.

  On May 14, 2003, the Saudis said they were holding a suspect who turned himself in to authorities the day of the bombings.

  On May 18, 2003, Saudi interior minister Prince Nayef said that four al Qaeda suspects detained in the last three days knew in advance of the attacks.