The 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks

by Edward Mickolus

  Earlier this year, I directed that a task force of seasoned Agency professionals conduct a review of the Khost attack. The purpose was to examine what happened, what lessons were learned, and what steps should be taken to prevent such incidents in the future. In addition, I asked Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Charlie Allen, a highly accomplished former Agency officer, to conduct an independent study of the Khost attack and to review the work of the task force. They concurred with its findings. One of CIA’s greatest strengths is our ability to learn from experience, refine our methods, and adapt to the shifting tactics of America’s enemies.

  The review is now complete, and I would like to thank those who participated. They did our Agency a great service. It was, to be sure, a difficult task—especially since key insights perished with those we lost. Perfect visibility into all that contributed to the attack is therefore impossible. But based on an exhaustive examination of the available information, we have a firm understanding of what our Agency could have done better. In keeping with past practice, we will provide the Khost report to the Office of Inspector General.

  In highly sensitive, complex counterterrorism operations, our officers must often deal with dangerous people in situations involving a high degree of ambiguity and risk. The task force noted that the Khost assailant fit the description of someone who could offer us access to some of our most vicious enemies. He had already provided information that was independently verified. The decision to meet him at the Khost base—with the objective of gaining additional intelligence on high priority terrorist targets—was the product of consultations between Headquarters and the field. He had confirmed access within extremist circles, making a covert relationship with him—if he was acting in good faith—potentially very productive. But he had not rejected his terrorist roots. He was, in fact, a brutal murderer.

  Mitigating the risk inherent in intelligence operations, especially the most sensitive ones, is essential to success. In this case, the task force determined that the Khost assailant was not fully vetted and that sufficient security precautions were not taken. These missteps occurred because of shortcomings across several Agency components in areas including communications, documentation, and management oversight. Coupled with a powerful drive to disrupt al-Qa’ida, these factors contributed to the tragedy at Khost. Each played an important role; none was more important than the others. Based on the findings of the task force and the independent review, responsibility cannot be assigned to any particular individual or group. Rather, it was the intense determination to accomplish the mission that influenced the judgments that were made.

  There are no guarantees in the dangerous work of counterterrorism, but the task force identified six key areas that deserve greater focus as we carry out that vital mission. We will:

  Enforce greater discipline in communications, ensuring that key guidance, operational facts, and judgments are conveyed and clearly flagged in formal channels.

  Strengthen our attention to counterintelligence concerns while maintaining a wartime footing.

  Apply the skills and experience of senior officers more effectively in sensitive cases.

  Require greater standardization of security procedures.

  More carefully manage information sharing with other intelligence services.

  Maintain our high operational tempo against terrorist targets, even as we make adjustments to how we conduct our essential mission.

  I have approved 23 specific actions recommended by the task force, some of which I ordered implemented months ago. They provide for organizational and resource changes, communications improvements, tightened security procedures, more focused training, and reinforced counterintelligence practices. These include:

  Establishing a War Zone Board made up of senior officers from several components and chaired by the Director of the National Clandestine Service. It will conduct a baseline review of our staffing, training, security, and resources in the most dangerous areas where we operate.

  Assembling a select surge cadre of veteran officers who will lend their expertise to our most critical counterterrorism operations.

  Creating an NCS Deputy within the Counterterrorism Center, who will report to the Director of the Counterterrorism Center and ensure a more integrated effort across Agency offices.

  Conducting a thorough review of our security measures and applying even more rigorous standards at all our facilities.

  Expanding our training effort for both managers and officers on hostile environments and counterintelligence challenges.

  Creating an integrated counterintelligence vetting cell within our Counterterrorism Center that focuses on high-risk/high-gain assets, evaluates potential threats, assesses “lessons learned,” and applies the latest technology and best practices to counterterrorism operations.

  Designating a senior officer to ensure that all the recommendations are indeed implemented.

  We’ve now taken a hard look at what happened and what needed to be done after the tragedy at Khost. While we cannot eliminate all of the risks involved in fighting a war, we can and will do a better job of protecting our officers. Drawing on the work of the task force and its insights, it’s time to move forward. Nothing in the report can relieve the pain of losing our seven fallen colleagues. By putting their lives on the line to pursue our nation’s terrorist enemies, they taught us what bravery is all about. It is that legacy that we will always remember in our hearts.

  October 31, 2010

  Iraq Our Lady of Salvation Church Takeover

  Overview: Terrorist attacks following the coalition incursion into Iraq in 2003 became commonplace, with some months logging hundreds of incidents by numerous terrorist groups, bitter-enders, and other insurgents. While most of the attacks were against coalition forces and civilians who happened to be in the wrong place, by the end of the first decade of the new millennium, some attacks against the minority Christian population began to worry government officials and others regarding a potential trend of confessional violence.

  Incident: One especially grievous attack was the October 31, 2010, takeover of Baghdad’s Our Lady of Salvation Church (Sayidat al-Nejat). In the late afternoon, terrorists parked their Dodge SUV in the back of the church and threw several bags over the compound wall. Guards at the neighboring Baghdad Stock Market in the Karada neighborhood engaged in a gun battle with terrorists, during which two guards died and four were injured. The terrorists set off their truck bomb, then set off explosives at the rear door of the church. They ran inside and took 120 hostages.

  The terrorists phoned two employees of al-Baghdadiya television to demand the release of female prisoners in Egypt and Iraqi prisoners in Iraq. The Iraqi-owned, Egypt-based station later broadcast the demand. The Iraqi government later shut down the station. The Islamic State of Iraq (another name for al Qaeda in Iraq) posted on a website:

  The Mujahideens raided a filthy nest of the nests of polytheism, which has been long taken by the Christians of Iraq as a headquarters for a war against the religion of Islam and they were able by the grace of God and His glory to capture those were gathered in and to take full control of all its entrances.

  Following a four-hour siege, the Golden Force antiterrorist unit stormed the Assyrian rite Catholic church. A terrorist threw a grenade into a room where the congregants were assembled. Thirteen hostages escaped.

  During the gun battle, two terrorists set off their explosives belts containing ball bearings. Thirty hostages and seven security officers died. Forty-one hostages and 15 rescuers were wounded. Police arrested eight suspects. They found three Yemeni and two Egyptian passports, possibly belonging to the suicide bombers.

  The Islamic State of Iraq reiterated its demand following the conclusion of the incident. On November 3, 2010, the group announced the passage of its deadline for Egypt’s Copts to release women who had converted to Islam. It warned that it would attack Christians anywhere. “We will open upon them the doors of destruction and rivers of blood.”<
br />
  By the end of November 2010, Iraqi authorities had arrested a dozen al Qaeda in Iraq suspects, including its Baghdad leader, Huthaifa al-Batawi, in connection with the case.

  Ishtar Television reported that three individuals were sentenced to death and a fourth to 20 years in prison on August 2, 2011. An Iraqi appeals court upheld the death sentences and the three were executed on February 2, 2012.

  July 22, 2011

  Oslo Shooting and Bombing Spree

  Overview: Although the West had seen numerous would-be “lone wolf” Islamic terrorists, inspired by the calls to jihad of Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Aulaqi, and others, the most successful lone wolf terrorist of the early part of the millennium was a right-wing racist Norwegian who set off a massive car bomb and conducted a major shooting spree before being apprehended. The actions of Anders Behring Breivik, 32, resurrected the issue of what constitutes a terrorist attack versus the actions of a deranged psychopath cloaked in a political veneer. The answer raises questions about the legal status and ultimate resolution in the courts, prisons, and psychiatric facilities of such individuals.

  Incident: On July 22, 2011, Breivik set off a car bomb at 3:26 p.m. near the 17-story building that houses the prime minister’s office in Oslo, starting a fire at the neighboring Oil Ministry in Oslo. Eight people died and 30 were injured.

  Two hours later, wearing a police uniform, Breivik arrived at a Youth Labor Party political conference on Utoya Island, 25 miles to the northwest. He told the students to bunch together, then opened fire, killing at least 68 people and injuring another 66. At least 60 victims were teens. He shot several of them in the water, as they were trying to swim away from the island. It took a police patrol 25 minutes to respond to emergency calls. An emergency team from Oslo had to borrow motorboats from local residents, getting to the island an hour after the first call. The patrol found Breivik within two minutes. He surrendered without a fight and apparently had no plans for a getaway. Police seized his Glock pistol and automatic weapon.

  Breivik quickly told police that he was responsible, deeming the attacks “atrocious but necessary.” He faced 21 years in prison. He claimed he acted alone and pleaded not guilty.

  Police noted that he had shown right-wing tendencies in his Internet postings. His lawyer, Geir Lippestad, said his fundamentalist Christian client was insane. Breivik had joined an anti-immigrant party. He opposed Islam, multiculturalism, and “cultural Marxists.” Authorities noted his recent purchase of tons of fertilizer, a possible bomb component. He had written a 1,500-page English-language manifesto, entitled 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, which called for a civil war. It also explained how he made the Oslo bomb. The document was illustrated with symbols of Knights Templar. The screed was reminiscent of Unabomber Ted Kaczynski’s manifesto, which it quoted. Breivik also videotaped himself wearing quasi-military uniforms.

  On August 24 2012, Oslo District Court found him sane and guilty, and sentenced him to 21 years of preventive detention, which could be renewed and keep him imprisoned for life.

  * * *

  Unsuccessful Attempts

  Several attacks were foiled, or did not reach the level of destruction, death, or political and economic consequences initially planned by their perpetrators. If the terrorists had been successful, their incidents would have been included in the 50 Worst.

  Many of the plots involved innovative tactics designed to circumvent security procedures, such as bombs in airplane passengers’ underwear, shoes, and carry-on drinks; computer printer toner cartridges hidden in airline cargo; simple binary chemical agents; and multiple simultaneous bombings of aircraft pre- and postdating 9/11. They also involved attacks on high-profile targets, both persons and facilities. Terrorists dreamed of attacks on the Pope, the White House, U.S. Capitol, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Headquarters, Times Square, the Space Needle, and other major monuments. Of particular concern to authorities was that many of the plots were attributed to “lone wolves”—individuals perhaps inspired by larger terrorist organizations but acting on their own.

  May 13, 1981

  Attempted Papal Assassination

  On May 13, 1981, in Vatican City, Mehmet Ali Agca, 24, an escaped rightist Turkish terrorist, fired five shots from a Browning 9-mm pistol at Pope John Paul II as the pontiff was being driven in Saint Peter’s Square in front of 10,000 worshippers. The attacker hit the Pope three times and wounded two tourists: Ann Odre, 58, of Buffalo, New York, and Rose Hall, 21, of Jamaica. Agca was charged on May 14, 1981, with the attempted assassination of the Pope, who recovered from his wounds. The terrorist had previously threatened the Pope during his visit to Turkey in November 1979. He claimed he wanted to assassinate the “king of England,” but gave up that plan when he discovered that the king is a woman. He also planned to murder UN secretary general Kurt Waldheim and Simone Veil, president of the European Parliament. He claimed friendship with George Habash, but the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine denied any contact with him. He was also affiliated with the Gray Wolves, a rightist organization associated with the Nationalist Action Party.

  Agca had escaped from Turkey after being imprisoned for the murder of prominent journalist Abdi Ipekci.

  On July 19, 1981, Turkey asked for Agca’s extradition. On July 22, 1981, after a three-day trial and a one-day hunger strike, Agca was sentenced to life imprisonment in Rome.

  Suspicion that the Communist Bloc was behind the assassination attempt roiled Western press and intelligence observers for years. According to the Italian press, the publicity-conscious Agca soon began to talk about his suspected sources of support and tied Bulgarian intelligence to the case. On December 8, 1982, Italian newspapers claimed that Agca had confessed that Bulgarian intelligence had ordered him to kill the Pope. He claimed that he escaped into Bulgaria with the help of Oral Celik, a Turkish terrorist with ties to the Bulgarians. In Sofia, he was aided by another Turk, Bekir Celenk, whom Italian police have linked to arms and drug smuggling. Celenk introduced Agca to Sergei Ivanov Antonov, a Rome station chief for Balkan Airlines; Teodorov Ayvazov, a cashier for the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome; and Jelio Kolev Vassiliev, former secretary to Bulgaria’s military attaché in Rome. Celenk and the Bulgarians allegedly offered Agca DM 3 million ($1.25 million) to kill the Pope. Agca was captured with a paper bearing the phone numbers of the Bulgarian embassy and consulate, Balkan Airlines, and Ayvazov’s residence.

  On March 29, 1986, having heard from over 100 witnesses, Judge Severino Santiapichi announced that the Rome jury of two judges and six lay jurors acquitted the three Bulgarians of charges of plotting to assassinate the Pope because of insufficient evidence.

  During the “Trial of the Century,” which began on May 27, 1985, Agca often strained his credibility by contradicting his testimony, admitting lying, and at the start of proceedings, announcing that he was Jesus Christ. Agca claimed that the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB; Committee for State Security) was involved in the assassination attempt. Agca, already serving a life sentence for firing the shots, was sentenced to a year in prison for illegal possession of the automatic pistol. He was extradited to Turkey in 2000 after serving nearly 20 years in Italy. On January 18, 2010, Turkey released Agca from Sincan’s prison after he served time for the Ipekci murder.

  January 1995

  Bojinka Planned Bombing of 10 U.S.-Bound Planes

  On April 13, 1995, U.S. prosecutors indicted Ramzi Yousef with the bombing of an airliner on December 11, 1994, that killed Japanese passenger Haruki Ikegami and injured 10 people, and of planning to bomb other U.S. airliners in the Bojinka plot. The bombing charge carried the death penalty. He was believed to have boarded the plane in Manila, placed a bomb under a seat in a life-vest holder, and then deplaned at Cebu before it left for Tokyo. He was sentenced on January 8, 1998, to life plus 240 years for the World Trade Center bombing of February 26, 1993. He had also plotted with Wali Khan to bomb a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific in the Boj
inka plot and to assassinate Pope John Paul II and U.S. president Bill Clinton in Manila. Authorities believed the Manila bombing was a test run for the attacks on the dozen planes. He also planned to crash a hijacked plane into the Langley Virginia, headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Authorities said he had developed the plan with his relative, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who would go on to become the key planner of the 9/11 attacks. Mohammed also claimed credit for numerous other al Qaeda attacks. He was placed on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Ten Most Wanted List on April 21, 1993, and captured on February 7, 1995, in Pakistan. As of late 2013, he was awaiting trial in Guantanamo Bay military prison.

  December 15, 1999

  Planned Millennium Bombing of Space Needle and Airport

  Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian attempting to enter Port Angeles, Washington, was arrested on December 15, 1999, by Washington State Police and customs officials as he arrived by ferry from Canada. He was transporting two 22-ounce bottles of nitroglycerin, more than 100 pounds of urea, and homemade timers in his rental car. The detonating device consisted of circuit boards linked to a Casio watch and a 9-volt battery, similar to one used early by Osama bin Laden associates. He was earlier arrested and jailed for 15 months for arms trafficking with terrorists. He and his associates in Canada were members of Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group and were believed to be working for Osama bin Laden. In March 1998, he had attended an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan.