Seven Decades of Independent India

by Vinod Rai

  Confronting the Cold War’s End

  The abrupt end of the Cold War and the simultaneous collapse of the Soviet Union amounted to a dramatic exogenous shock to both India’s economy and polity. From an economic standpoint, India’s model of a mixed economy reliant on massive state intervention suffered a body blow with the Soviet collapse. The strategy of economic growth that the Soviet Union had pursued and that India had emulated to some degree was effectively discredited. The Soviet collapse also meant the loss of India’s most invaluable strategic partner. To compound matters, other factors, including the loss of substantial remittances from the Persian Gulf as well as a series of debt payments that became due, converged to create an unprecedented fiscal crisis for the country. These twin shocks, strategic and economic, induced India’s policymakers to undertake a fundamental reappraisal of the country’s economic and foreign policy.

  In the realm of economic policymaking, the country abandoned its commitment to substantial state intervention, opened its markets and drastically reduced regulations. Within a year thereof, the economy not only recovered but began posting unprecedented rates of economic growth. Within the decade, the country had not only embarked upon a pathway of steady economic growth but had also made a significant dent on poverty. It also overcame its residual reservations about the utility of force in international politics. To that end it carried out a series of five nuclear tests in May 1998 ending a long span of strategic ambiguity.4 Despite widespread international diplomatic disapprobation and a raft of bilateral and multilateral sanctions, the country was able to cope with the fallout from the tests. Its economy was robust enough to withstand the sanctions and its diplomatic corps sufficiently dexterous to cope with the political condemnation.

  Ironically, the crossing of the nuclear Rubicon, combined with significant economic growth, actually catapulted the country into an altogether new realm in the global arena. With two key elements of material power harnessed, India could now assert itself in a hitherto unprecedented fashion in the global sphere. Not surprisingly, it increasingly started to lay claim to a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It also became an active member of the G-20, helped create the India–Brazil–South Africa forum (IBSA) and embraced the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) organization. All of these developments, both at home and abroad, boded well for India’s hopes of achieving a great power status.

  Institutional Challenges and Limits

  Despite these obvious achievements, there are a number of factors, mostly domestic, that can hobble its quest. These need to be discussed in some detail. The first impediment can stem from what was one of India’s greatest strengths: the quality and efficacy of its political institutions. Indeed as early as the late sixties, the noted American political scientist Samuel Huntington had highlighted the significance of its institutions as an indicator of the country’s political development.5 Unfortunately, as Huntington had warned, political development cannot be assumed to be a linear process. Institutions can both develop and decay. Owing to a complex array of factors, virtually every political institution has witnessed a decline both in its probity and efficacy.

  India now faces an interesting paradox. A host of countries in the global South are poorly institutionalized. A great deal of decision-making is simply based upon the personal vagaries and proclivities of leaders. Such a problem does not plague India. It has an extraordinary range of institutions that run the gamut from a working Parliament to a mostly independent judiciary. However, over the past several decades all of them have witnessed varying levels of decay. Their internal norms have frayed, their efficacy is at question and their autonomy increasingly at risk. Unless this process of deterioration is arrested, it is far from clear how the existing institutions can address the plethora of problems that currently besiege the country.

  Just one or two examples should help illuminate the problem. There is little or no question that the higher echelons of the Indian judiciary have contributed to important developments in modern jurisprudence. For example, through the creation of the system of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) it has extended the reach of the law to many who had hitherto lacked the resources to approach the bench. However, there are widespread concerns about delays in disposing cases by the judiciary, particularly at the lower level. The large number of pending cases6 delays delivery of justice and adds to the woes of the aggrieved by imposing financial stress. Judicial delays also affect commercial transactions and investment decisions with investors apprehending possibilities of protracted litigations in case of disputes.

  Another related area also demonstrates the limits of India’s existing institutions. This is the realm of policing. Admittedly, in the country’s federal system, the efficacy of the police does vary considerably across the country. That said, some aggregate statistics underscore the dimensions of a nationwide problem of under-policing. According to a Human Rights Watch report of 2009, India had one civil policeman for 1037 residents against an Asia-wide average of one per 558 residents and a global average of one per 333.7 Another recent article revealed that in India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, as many as 50 per cent of police posts remained vacant. The same story indicated that on a nationwide basis as many as 24 per cent of police posts remained vacant.8

  These statistics, of course, only underscore one facet of the myriad problems of policing in India. Beyond this issue of under-policing, the police in the vast majority of states are under-resourced, overworked and frequently venal. Worse still, a disproportionate number of them are assigned to the task of protecting India’s administrative and especially political elites.9 Though there have been no end of calls for police reform and various commissions have been formed to that end, they have had little or no effect on the actual conduct of policing in the country.

  To compound matters, the police, with marked exceptions, have proven wholly inadequate to the task of quelling the resurgence of a neo-Maoist insurgency, the Naxalites, across vast swaths of the country. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while in office, had publicly stated that the renewal of the Naxalite insurgency was the single greatest threat to the country’s internal security. The statement was hardly hyperbolic as Maoist violence has wracked as many as seven states across the country.10 Worse still, despite state strategies of both repression and co-opting, they have been able to inflict spectacular strikes on police and paramilitary forces. If a state cannot perform one of the most fundamental Weberian tasks—maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force—it is hard to see how it can emerge as a great power.

  The institutional deficits that the Indian state confronts are not confined to entities dealing with domestic issues. They also afflict areas of foreign and defence policymaking. For example, there is little or no question that India has a highly professional and thoroughly dedicated foreign service. However, as a number of commentators have argued, its size is quite inapt for a country of India’s size. With a sanctioned strength of 912 in 2016, it had a mere 770 full-fledged officers.11 This made it comparable to that of the Singaporean Foreign Service that handles the foreign affairs of a country of five million.12 Despite multiple plans to expand the foreign service, the results of such efforts have been most uninspiring. It is indeed a testament to the service, that despite its small size, it has been able to cope with the growing complexity of India’s foreign relations. Of course, a counterfactual thought experiment might raise an uncomfortable question: what opportunities have been lost or squandered owing to the limited size of the service?

  Despite the structural limits that plague the service, it is widely believed that it is mostly an efficacious institution. This judgement, however, cannot be proffered about various other governmental bureaucracies charged with safeguarding particular aspects of India’s national security. Few major defence projects in India have been completed on time. The ones completed have also often been noted to have design flaws. As a result, the armed forces have had to
bear with poor-quality weapons and equipment. Indigenization of defence manufacturing has fallen short of its objectives with dependence on foreign prototypes and components continuing, as in the case of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which is reliant on an imported engine.13 Serious efforts to improve the situation in the foreseeable future are yet to be noted.

  Conclusions

  This overview has made clear that India’s quest for a great power status is long standing. For decades the effort was mostly chimerical as the country simply lacked the material wherewithal to achieve that standing. Seventy years later, it has some of the capabilities that might enable it to pursue that goal. It has one of the fastest growing economies in the world; it has managed to make a significant dent on endemic poverty; it is a de facto nuclear weapons state with a growing arsenal; and it has a military with increasing reach. All of these attributes should boost its search for great power standing.

  Yet, as this analysis has demonstrated, it also suffers from a number of chronic institutional shortcomings that can hobble its efforts. These inadequacies are not subject to quick or easy redress. They have evolved over extended time spans and will require major reform efforts. Given the resistance of most institutions to drastic changes it is hard to see such reforms emanating from within. Significant exogenous shocks may induce these institutions to undertake the drastic changes that are necessary to enhance their capabilities and efficacy.

  There is indeed reason to believe, based upon the country’s post-Independence trajectory, that major institutional reforms or policy shifts have been carried out only in the wake of significant endogenous or exogenous shocks. For example, the much-needed modernization of the Indian armed forces only took place in the aftermath of the 1962 military debacle. Similarly, the market-friendly reforms that were undertaken in the early nineties stemmed from an acute and unprecedented fiscal crisis. Unfortunately, after the initial impetus to pursue reforms the country has often witnessed a renewal of institutional inertia or policy stagnation. Consequently, while shocks have certainly played a vital role in boosting institutional and policy changes, their effects seem to wear off over time. India’s political culture of incremental change seems to prevail over attempts to induce drastic alternations. Given this uneven record, it is hard to envisage a future where the Indian state might harness the requisite motivation to propel itself to tackle various endemic problems that stand in the path towards a great power status. Indeed, it is tempting to conclude that the likelihood that India will achieve that status remains quite uncertain.14

  X

  Non-Governmental Organizations in India: Contribution, Challenges and Future Prospects

  Poonam Muttreja

  India has a long and rich tradition of social action by civil society organizations rooted in the principles of dāan (charity) and seva (help).1 Both these principles have shaped India’s development across various dimensions, ranging from food security, environmental sustainability, education and healthcare to advocating transparency in governance, promoting communal harmony and representing the rights of minorities, women and children. Much of private voluntary activism to start with was driven by India’s dominant religions. A significant shift occurred when Mahatma Gandhi gave it a new orientation by linking activism with political change and social transformation. The seventies witnessed another major change in India’s voluntary action movement when young sociopolitical activists re-conceptualized the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).2 From ‘do-gooding’ by offering relief to poor ‘beneficiaries’, the new NGOs started underscoring the rights and entitlements of citizens as enshrined in the Constitution, and holding the state and political establishment accountable for delivering on the promise of development.

  NGOs engaged in private and voluntary social action have a very visible and active presence in India. The reach of these organizations extends from metropolitan cities to rural and remote tribal areas, rivalling and often exceeding the reach of the state. The contributions and significance of civil society organizations are perhaps best captured through the sustained trust that Indians place in them. According to the 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer (2017), Indians’ trust in NGOs was 71 per cent—up from 64 per cent in 2016.3 India comes out as an outlier given the global trend of declining trust in institutions.

  Private social action in India today presents a rich tapestry of diverse ideologies and approaches. Civil society organizations differ from one another in their missions, goals, structures and modalities of working. This heterogeneity makes it conceptually difficult to define precisely, classify and categorize civil society organizations. As a result, even the estimates of the number of NGOs in India differ considerably. According to a study conducted by PRIA, there were close to 1.5 million civil society organizations in India in 2001. In 2016, the Government of India, in a submission to the Supreme Court, placed the figure at 3.1 million NGOs.4 While it is likely that the number of registered NGOs has gone up over the fifteen-year period, the phenomenal increase can also be attributed to the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework that defines, registers and monitors NGOs.

  This essay briefly reviews the experience and contribution of Indian NGOs, and identifies the challenges they are likely to face in the years to come. It argues that collaboration between the State and NGOs is critical to ensuring large-scale sustainable social development. This is possible only if a well-defined regulatory framework is put in place, the adversarial relations between NGOs and the state are smoothened, and the trust deficit is bridged.

  The Space for NGOs

  Seventy years since Independence, the Indian state has not been able to substantially deliver on its promises of alleviating poverty, relieving inequalities, ending discrimination, providing access to quality services and ensuring equal opportunities to all. With the advent of economic liberalization, the market was believed to be the great equalizer whereby benefits of development would trickle down to the last person. However, this has not happened. Economic inequalities persist and in some instances, casualization and feminization of labour have made earnings even more insecure and precarious.

  The rise of NGOs, to a large extent, reflects the failure of the Indian state and markets to usher in equitable development and economic redistribution. The rapid expansion of NGOs, since the eighties, overlaps with the ushering in of neoliberal policies and the retreat of the state from social welfare.5 NGOs have grown and helped people living in the most marginal and backward regions. They have sought to address the everyday problems in the lives of ordinary people, lent a sympathetic ear, and carried their voices, demands and complaints to decision-makers in the government. By representing minorities, challenging discrimination, and demanding state action for equitable access to economic and social benefits, NGOs have consistently worked towards advancing India’s social development.

  In doing so, disagreements with the political establishment are unavoidable as NGOs hold the state accountable to the people, especially the poor. NGOs act as a watchdog, checking totalitarian tendencies and upholding India’s democratic principles. For instance, during the political emergency declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi between 1975 and 1977, NGOs were at the forefront of protests, defying the curtailment of freedom of speech and expression, and criticizing government’s overreach and authoritarianism. Various scholars have traced the origins of NGOs’ adversarial relations with the state to this political phase.6 They argued that the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA) introduced in 1976 ostensibly to check threats of the ‘foreign hand’ was primarily meant to delegitimize protests and intimidate those critical of the government. While the Emergency is now many decades behind us, state–NGO relations continue to face threats from the state, and FCRA regulations have become even more draconian and controlling of civil society actions.7

  Contribution of Indian NGOs

  NGOs in India have been at the forefront of drawing public attention to socioeconomic and environmental problems, and he
lping formulate policies to address them. Some have fought for human rights, others have worked to preserve arts, crafts, livelihoods, and cultural heritage, and yet others have developed alternative models for delivering basic services, including health and education to the poor and marginalized communities. For instance, the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), a non-profit organization founded in 1980, has devoted its attention to the fight for environmental protection. CSE, for example, worked alongside the Chipko Movement8 to highlight how environmental degradation impacted the health, lives and livelihood of India’s poor and rural residents.9 It was also instrumental in identifying strategies that could prevent pollution and redress environmental degradation, like the implementation of CNG-run public vehicles in Delhi.

  Indian NGOs have been forging issue-based movements that have gained political significance and yielded new regulations. Engagement of governments with NGOs and similar movements have been very positive in this regard. For example, the genesis of the Right to Information Act of 2005 and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 can be traced to effective advocacy for the rights to information and employment by the Rajasthan-based NGO Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS). At the same time, there are several issues such as finding solutions to Delhi’s air pollution and the failure to check corruption through the ‘jan lokpal’,10 where progress has been slow.