In Search of the Lost Testament of Alexander the Great

by David Grant

  In traditional interpretations, Leonnatus and Antigonus were tasked by Perdiccas with assisting Eumenes in his pacification of the geographically vast and important unconquered Cappadocia, when Leonnatus’ own authority was restricted to the relatively diminutive (in size) Hellespont-bordering province once governed by a ‘son of Harpalus’, possibly a relative of the controversial treasurer; the region’s principal importance lay in its bordering the narrow sea-crossing to Europe, though its boundaries are less than clinically outlined by our sources.86 Once again we need to question whether Alexander would have really carved up the empire so disproportionately when considering the accepted territorial grants of Ptolemy, Peithon, Peucestas, Lysimachus, Antigonus and Eumenes. Again we need to similarly challenge the notion that Perdiccas could have attempted the same, for he and Leonnatus were in action together as far back as Philip II’s death in Aegae some thirteen years before.87

  Alexander would surely have bestowed a grander role on Leonnatus that recognised his true importance: logically this was authority over northwest Asia Minor governed from Hellespontine Phrygia, just as Antigonus had initially operated in a wider role from his own early ‘capital’ at Celaenae in Phrygia. Asia Minor had never been governed under a single mandate; with Alexander campaigning east, Antigonus was supplemented by Balacrus in Cilicia, Nearchus south of the Taurus (to the west of Cilicia), with Calas and Asander in the Hellespontine region and Lydia.88 If the bulk of Asia Minor was to be divided between them now, then Leonnatus’ authority could have spanned the still nominally independent Bithynia (alongside Mysia and the Troad region), Lesser Phrygia, Lydia and Caria, with lesser governors under him.89

  Antigonus would have then received the adjoining hinterland and much of the south: Greater Phrygia, Lycia, Pamphylia and Lycaonia.90 Pisidia and Cilicia as far as the Cilician or Amanian Gate bordering Syria (so south-eastern Asia Minor) appear to have fallen outside his mandate, as they had before. This division of power explains why both Leonnatus and Antigonus were charged with helping Eumenes pacify Cappadocia and presumably Paphlagonia (separated from Bithynia by the Parthenius, the modern Bartin River); quite credibly Eumenes was also a pan-satrapal strategos whose own region would have stretched eastwards through Armenia.91

  Armenia may have been bestowed upon Neoptolemus on similar conditions to Eumenes’ region: the territory first needed subduing, and a similar reciprocal arrangement for assistance might have been demanded. Perdiccas ‘… sent Eumenes back from Cilicia, ostensibly to his own satrapy [Cappadocia], but really to reduce to obedience the adjacent country of Armenia, which had been thrown into confusion by Neoptolemus.’ And so it is tempting to join Armenia to Eumenes’ wider mandate, as this would explain Neoptolemus’ resentment of the ‘man who followed Alexander with a pen’. Peucestas’ friend, Orontes, had either claimed the region, or later been reinstated as satrap.92 If Armenia was part of Eumenes’ genuine inheritance, or even if it was a more-duplicitous Pamphlet-Will grant, it would better explain why Eumenes’ ruse involving the unwitting Orontes worked so convincingly at Persepolis, helping him wrest regional control from the equally unwitting Peucestas.93 Eumenes’ governance of Armenia would have then logically extended his authority towards the Caspian whence Peithon’s own governance commenced from Media and stretching eastward, and it would have been neatly bordered by Mesopotamia in the south.

  In the aftermath of the Second Diadokhoi War ending 315 BCE, Lysimachus demanded Hellespontine Phrygia when he, Cassander and Ptolemy sent envoys to Antigonus. The satrapy was vacant following the defeat of Arrhidaeus, and the same delegation of envoys demanded Lycia for Cassander along with Eumenes’ Cappadocia.94 ‘Lycia’ should surely read ‘Lydia’, the satrapy left ungoverned since the death of White Cleitus, for with Leonnatus dead, the region had been become divisible at Triparadeisus.

  At this point, 315 BCE, Cassander was the de facto ruler of Macedonia, for he had King Alexander IV and his mother under lock and key at Amphipolis. His role in the defeat of Eumenes had been restricted to distracting Polyperchon in Greece, and yet he seems to have already sent advanced forces into Cappadocia, besieging the city of Amisus (modern Samsun in northern Turkey), possibly to distract Antigonus from invading Macedonia.95 But why here specifically? As Cassander had no experience in Asia and no previous Asian claims, we might conclude it was the publication of the Pamphlet, with its obvious authorship, that incited him to occupy Eumenes’ inherited region. Whether this led to the rift between him and Antigonus, who realigned with Polyperchon, or whether it followed it, is unclear, but Antigonus had no intention of letting Cassander stay on Asian soil.

  PERDICCAS: HOLLOW PROMISES FOR A GREATER SYRIA

  With Craterus appointed to govern the Macedonian kingdom as the principle resident guardian of the kings, and with Alexander’s Somatophylakes spread through the vast provinces of the former Persian Empire they would now govern, tax and harvest, we should pose a huge but as yet unarticulated question: where Perdiccas, the supposedly itinerant overseer of the empire, was supposed to base himself? The one hugely important region, greater in significance than those assigned to govern it and less than satisfactorily accounted for in the divisions listed at Babylon, is a ‘Greater Syria’ that would link Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia-Babylonia and Asia Minor (through Cilicia and Pisidia) together. The only reference to Syria in the Babylonian settlement, or at Triparadeisus, was a governorship linked to Laomedon, and that was more convincingly Coele-Syria, as Diodorus and other satrapy-citing texts later clarified; Arrian was clear that his territory bordered Egypt and Justin additionally stated: ‘Laomedon of Mytilene was allotted Syria, which bordered on Ptolemy’s province’ (T17, T20).96

  Coele-Syria was itself ambiguously referenced throughout history though it was more specifically delineated in the Pamphlet-originating Wills. In koine Greek, Coele (koile) meant ‘hollow’, and this referred to the fertile Bequaa Valley in modern eastern Lebanon, or, as some scholars interpret it, broadly modern Israel.97 Diodorus’ Hieronymus-inspired digression on the geography of the empire was clearer on the constituent Syrian parts:

  Next to Mesopotamia are Upper Syria, as it is called, and the countries adjacent thereto along the sea: Cilicia, Pamphylia, and Coele-Syria, which encloses Phoenicia. Along the frontiers of Coele-Syria and along the desert that lies next to it, through which the Nile makes its way and divides Syria and Egypt…98

  Diodorus often referred to the region bordering Egypt as ‘lower’ Syria. A ‘Greater Syrian’ governorship might then have encompassed lower Syria, Coele-Syria (encompassing Phoenicia) and Upper Syria (in total, broadly modern Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria) to the Mesopotamian Line (thus including ‘Mesopotamian Syria’) which we assume was the River Euphrates, and it would have been a strategically sound base of operations, linking as it did the major Asian regions.99 On this basis the division of what we might term the ‘Levant’ today is clear-cut. The extended domain, as far north as Cilicia and eastern Pisidia, operated as a buffer zone through which any army would need to pass if it were to invade another. Certainly Cilicia was carved out of Asia Minor in texts: following battle at Gaugamela, Alexander appointed Menes in a role that was to govern from Babylon (probably again though Syria and Phoenicia) to the Taurus.100 So the Taurus Mountain range was the natural cut-off of a cohesive region that was still in existence when Mark Antony and Cleopatra allocated it to their son, Ptolemy II Philadelphos under the Donation of Alexandria in 34 BCE.101

  It is generally supposed that Eumenes returned to Babylon to report to Perdiccas once Leonnatus and Antigonus refused to assist his pacification of Cappadocia.102 Yet his and Perdiccas’ whereabouts are not actually stated; the urgency of Antigonus’ flight, and the speed with which a new campaign against Ariarathes was initiated – ‘moreover, a little while after he [Eumenes] was conducted into Cappadocia with an army which Perdiccas commanded in person’ – suggest the chiliarch might have been rather closer, and northern Syria is a strategically sound option. It does
appear that Perdiccas was based just to the north of Syria, in Cilicia, when he ordered Eumenes to take control of Armenia with plenipotentiary powers, and this further explains Perdiccas’ own hostile campaign in the region, and why his brother, Alcetas, was cited at Cretopolis and Termessus.103

  Perdiccas’ tasking Arrhidaeus with the construction of the dead king’s funeral bier indicates that he was not based at Babylon, otherwise he could have overseen it himself, and Arrhidaeus had no technical or engineering background that we know of; if its destination was Syria (it was hijacked near Damascus) then, as we previously posed, Arrhidaeus did not ‘redirect’ its path at all. As Atkinson points out, the wording Diodorus used – ‘return journey’ and ‘home’ – clearly indicates that Perdiccas eventually planned to send the body to Aegae.104

  Perdiccan-Syria, it appears, was to be the temporary home of Alexander while the dust from the recent tensions settled and until Perdiccas could launch his own ‘invasion’ of Pella. Routing the cortège though Damascus conforms to no practical route to Macedonia; the more direct journey to the Hellespont from Babylon, and the one best served by established roads, would have been to follow the Euphrates north, or better, the western bank of the Tigris, to connect with the Royal Road network in upper Mesopotamia and then northwest through Asia Minor. It is possible that Alexander’s throne, weapons and panoply (a ‘set’ of which later resurfaced with Eumenes) had originally travelled with it.105 But loading an enormously weighty sarcophagus – housed in an ornate ‘ionic temple’ – on a ship would have been a tricky business for even the best of engineers in the most peaceful of times, and this suggests the funeral hearse was never constructed with a maritime voyage in mind. Then again, the Macedonians had witnessed Alexander in action and they were now hardly deterred by such challenges: elephants were just as much of a transportation headache, and Antipater managed to take some seventy of them back with him across the Hellespont.106

  Further clues to Perdiccas’ extended presence in a Greater Syria exist. He is recorded as having founded (or refounded) the city of Samaria (now northern Israel), probably during this period, and he launched his campaign against Ptolemy from Damascus. It was here that the ancient network of roads converged: the Old Testament ‘way of the Philistines’ (or the ‘way of the sea’), ‘way of the kings’ which had an offshoot – the ‘way of the wilderness’ from Babylonia to Egypt and across the Sinai and Negev.107 Damascus, Alexandria ad Issus (Roman Alexandretta, modern Iskenderun) and Beroia (today’s Aleppo) to the north were similarly connected and therefore strategically sound choices as bases for empire administration. Diodorus described the location as ‘… naturally well adapted for watching over Babylon and the upper satrapies, and again for keeping an eye upon lower Syria and the satrapies near Egypt.’108 Antigonus would later learn the strategic value of Syria when founding Antigonea-on-the-Orontes near Antioch, his residence from 306-302 BCE.109 Seleucus later positioned the city of Apamea in calculated fashion on the right bank of the Orontes as part of a Syrian tetrapolis.110

  Following Perdiccas’ death in Egypt, and as further evidence of his regional governance, Archelaus, the garrison captain at Tyre, handed over the 800 talents to Attalus that Perdiccas had there for safekeeping. As one scholar noted, this was a transaction that appeared to take place independently of the local authority of Laomedon, suggesting an overarching authority at work.111 We know Ptolemy offered to buy Laomedon out of Coele-Syria (in previous times annexed, along with Phoenicia, by the Egyptian pharaohs) to better secure his border and gain the Phoenician ports.112 Diodorus’ account of the episode is brief; either a lacuna exists or Hieronymus’ oversimplified the rationale behind Ptolemy’s move.113

  If we are correct in identifying these wider roles for the Somatophylakes, a financial offer would have only been acceptable to the remaining Diadokhoi if it did not infringe upon a living strategos. That implies a new absence of that overarching authority in the Syrian region following Perdiccas’ death. For unless we introduce a missing mechanism, Ptolemy’s annexation would have appeared controversial and indeed expansionist, and yet no challenge emerged. The region was not contested until Eumenes ‘thought to recover for the kings Phoenicia’ in early 317 BCE.114 In 315 BCE, after war with Eumenes was concluded, Ptolemy’s envoy to Antigonus demanded ‘all Syria’ be granted for the part he played in the victory; once again this suggests there was no de jure governor of the Greater Syrian region.115

  Perdiccas may well have initially succeeded in surrounding himself with trusted governors and potentially with Alexander’s approval in the name of stability: Aristonus could have governed a northern part of Syria ‘to the Mesopotamian Line’ (therefore close to Cilicia from where he set off on the failed Cypriot invasion), Arcesilaus in Mesopotamia itself, Laomedon in Coele-Syria, Philoxenus in Cilicia, and his brother Alcetas in Pisidia; no doubt Docimus in Babylonia, Cleomenes in Egypt and Eumenes in eastern Asia Minor were supposed to report on developments across the immediate borders.116

  Why then was Hieronymus not more lucid on Perdiccas’ Syrian mandate? Diodorus could have misunderstood the role of the roving chiliarch, as he did that of Seleucus, or, quite simply, it did not benefit Hieronymus to broadcast it, for once he had made it clear Perdiccas enjoyed foremost authority at Babylon he had achieved all he needed to legitimise Eumenes’ early career. Syria was after all raped and torn apart by Hieronymus’ own patrons in their bid to secure Phoenician ports and a path south to Egypt.

  Could the other still-debated coffin, the so-called ‘Alexander Sarcophagus’ that was discovered in Sidon, and which is still widely linked to Abdalonymus (or as Heckel suggests, Mazaeus), have actually been crafted for Perdiccas, perhaps after the conference at Triparadeisus, itself in Upper Syria? His brother-in-law, Attalus, was close by gathering up any soldiers who made it out of Egypt, and Eumenes could have even commissioned the ‘highly conflicted’ coffin when he passed through the region in early 317 BCE with his pockets full from Cyinda. It is noteworthy that carved on one pediment (the top of short side ‘A’) is a relief reckoned by some scholars to depict Perdiccas’ murder; an unarmed man is being attacked by what appear to be three armed Macedonians (Antigenes, Peithon, Seleucus, or even a bearded Philip III?). A second victim (perhaps his sister, Atalante) looks to be holding a shield for protection, and one attacker has fallen implying a spirited defence. If that theory is correct, this would hardly be a fitting commemorative for anyone else but Perdiccas.117

  A scene from the so-called Alexander Sarcophagus (short side ‘A’) which may depict the murder of the unarmed Perdiccas. Istanbul Archaeology Museum.

  A TESTAMENTAL MIRROR: THE IMPORTANCE OF TRIPARADEISUS

  At the reconvening of generals at Triparadeisus in late summer of 320 BCE, the discord from Babylon re-emerged, incited by Eurydice and stirred by ‘accusations’ delivered in her speech, though the unexpected presence of Attalus and his fleet (perhaps moored nearby, but surely not at the convocation where he would have been seized and executed), may have added to the tension. Eurydice was fanning a fire lit by grievances related to pay and promised bonuses (and probably more besides), a crisis finally defrayed by Antigonus and Seleucus.118 With Perdiccas, Craterus and Leonnatus now dead, and with Eumenes along with the remaining Perdiccans scattered under sentence of death, and with Peithon, Antigenes, and possibly Seleucus having recently shown their deadly dissatisfaction with the state of Perdiccan affairs, the empire could have been completely redistributed.119

  This was also the perfect opportunity to take a second and perhaps more legitimate vote on the accession of the princes; Antipater, we should recall, arrived with a Macedonian army not tainted by Babylonian Assembly politics or by years of service under the Somatophylakes. Moreover, the principal backers of Arrhidaeus – Meleager and his supporters – were dead or firmly outnumbered.120 A completely new order could have emerged, and yet it did not.

  The most significant of the territorial grants made by Antipater at Triparadeisus mat
ched the original satrapal appointments supposedly orchestrated by Perdiccas at Babylon. The few changes that were made simply plugged the gaps left by the dead or by the clearly untrustworthy. Ptolemy, Laomedon, Lysimachus, Antigonus (though now with wider powers), Asander, Peithon, Peucestas, and we propose Seleucus too, all retained control of their original regions, as did the majority of the eastern satraps.121 If Alexander had made no effort to formalise the governance of the empire, this would be a vexing status quo, and it is far better explained as adherence to his Will that no one dared challenge at that stage. Besides, the Somatophylakes did not wish to challenge their inheritances, for they had surely been discussed, shaped, and agreed upon well before Alexander’s death.

  ‘WHERE THERE IS GAIN, ‘GAINST NATURE’S DICTATES MUST ONE WED’: MACEDONIAN WOMEN, ROYAL-BORN AND REGENT-BRED122

  … once the father is dead, heirs are for practical purposes (assuming they are well below the age of maturity) no man’s sons, and can do no would-be-dynast any more than short-term good, whereas the king’s sisters can be married and thus, legitimise the seizure of royal or quasi-royal power. Better yet, a king’s sister may produce children of the blood of the royal house, as well as the new.123

  This extract from a study of Argead women by Elizabeth Carney has particular relevance to the situation Alexander was faced with on his deathbed in Babylon, and to the struggles of ascendancy his successors were faced with after. The contribution of women in Macedonian dynasties is well-documented, and the Hellenistic Age was ‘strewn with’ Stratonices, Berenices, Laodices, Arsinoes, and of course, Cleopatras, all of whom played significant political roles at the royal courts of their day.124