The Last Great Senate

by Ira Shapiro

  Nevertheless, in April and May 1977, after meeting the leaders of Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, Carter concluded that the Arab nations could be convinced to recognize Israel. Any peace agreement could occur only if there was a Palestinian state, linked to Jordan, and Israel was prepared to relinquish occupied territories as part of the peace agreement. His optimism about certain leaders, notably President Hafez Assad of Syria, would soon be proven misplaced, but at the time, it was enough to begin renewed efforts toward peace.

  Carter’s aggressive outreach to Arab leaders was beginning to disconcert many leaders in the American Jewish community. He realized he would need to seek support from well-known friends of Israel in the Senate. On June 16, 1977, flanked by Vice President Walter Mondale and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter met with Senators Abe Ribicoff, Hubert Humphrey, Ed Muskie, and Scoop Jackson. Regarding the meeting as “constructive,” Carter continued meeting with key Senate and House members. Only Javits remained unpersuaded by Carter’s approach to peace. Yet everyone would soon have to reexamine their assumptions, as one of the most electrifying reversals in modern history was about to take place.

  On November 19, 1977, Anwar Sadat travelled to Israel in pursuit of peace. Sadat stated to the Knesset, in direct, forthright terms, the Arab requirements for peace. As Carter would note, “he was standing there alone, before his ancient enemies, holding out an olive branch. The Israeli welcome to him was truly remarkable. The Israelis were also facing their ancient enemy.”

  This being the Middle East, Sadat’s extraordinary and courageous bid to overcome the region’s hatreds thrilled many people but enraged many others. Assad promptly broke off relations with Egypt, while high officials of the Syrian, Iraqi, and Libyan governments openly called for Sadat’s assassination. In the wake of such furor, the prospects for serious peace talks in the region seemed as distant as ever.

  To keep the hope of peace from withering on the vine, support from other powerful forces in the region would be necessary. No nation held more sway than Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading oil producer and the location of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest places.

  On January 3, 1978, Carter met with Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Fahd told Carter that Saudi Arabia privately supported everything Sadat was doing, but was not willing to make that known through public statements, for fear of antagonizing more militant Arabs who might threaten his rule. Fahd expressed a strong view in support of an independent Palestinian state, which Carter termed a dangerous idea. But despite his disappointment that the Saudi leaders would not be more publicly supportive, Carter came away convinced, again, of Saudi Arabia’s central importance in the region and the need to bolster the U.S.-Saudi relationship. He chose to make a bold move.

  ON FEBRUARY 14, 1978, the Carter administration announced that it would seek congressional authorization to sell fighter planes to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Though Israel had been the recipient of U.S. fighter planes for years, this was the first time that an American administration was offering to sell advanced arms to Arab nations. The administration requested approval to sell sixty F-15s, the most advanced U.S. fighter, to Saudi Arabia, while selling only fifteen F-15s, along with seventy-five F-16s, to Israel. Israel already had twenty-five F-15s. The administration’s request for Egypt was for fifty F-5Es, a plane considerably less advanced than the F-15 or F-16.

  Such a decision could not be made without congressional support or at least acquiescence. In 1974, as a major step to reasserting its role in foreign policy, Congress had enacted the Nelson-Bingham Amendment giving itself the authority to block any arms sale by passing a concurrent resolution of disapproval within thirty days of formal notification. The congressional leadership and the White House had agreed that formal notification of this proposed sale would be given right after the Panama Canal treaties were resolved.

  In the Senate, the prevailing reactions to the proposed arms sales package were marked by dismay, mystification, and anger. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a stalwart champion of Israel while serving as U.N. Ambassador, blasted the proposal as “an ill-timed intrusion into the Middle East peace process.” Frank Church, who had long deplored the emergence of the United States as the world’s leading arms merchant, pointed out that we were yet again potentially arming both sides of a conflict.

  The American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) announced its vehement opposition to Carter’s proposal. AIPAC argued that selling advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia and Egypt was a mortal threat to Israel, justifiably increasing Israel’s insecurity and making it less willing to compromise. Since its inception in 1953, AIPAC had never lost a vote in Congress, and at the outset, it seemed that AIPAC’s winning record would stay intact. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which would consider the arms sale package, appeared overwhelmingly opposed to it.

  Javits would play a central role in the coming battle. He had been deeply involved with Israel since 1946, when, as a newly elected member of the House, he had made a ten-day trip to Palestine. Javits saw British tanks rolling through the streets as the British searched for the Irgun, Jewish freedom fighters, whom the British regarded as terrorists. He walked through refugee camps in Europe and returned home to sponsor legislation calling for the United States to press Britain to lift its limitations on Jewish refugees coming to Palestine. In years since, he had personally known every leader of Israel starting with its founder, David Ben-Gurion.

  Javits was one of the first members of Congress to articulate the view that supporting Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East, was not just a moral imperative; it was in the security interests of the United States. Further solidifying his beliefs on the subject was the fact that one of his foreign policy advisers, Hal Rosenthal, had been killed by a terrorist bomb in Istanbul airport in 1971.

  Although elated by Israel’s victory in the Six Day War in 1967, Javits was sobered as the Soviet Union openly sold arms to Egypt and Syria to rebuild and strengthen their military capabilities. With Scoop Jackson’s help, Javits led the fight to convince the Nixon administration to sell more planes to Israel, eventually overcoming the reluctance of Nixon and Kissinger.

  Javits was no blind advocate of Israel’s policies—he expressed early frustration about Israel’s expanding settlements. But he firmly believed that Israel needed advanced weaponry from the United States, particularly aircraft, to maintain its qualitative edge, deter its Arab enemies, and provide the security needed to negotiate with its enemies.

  Javits watched dynamics change in the region following the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Israel had been stunned by the surprise attack by Egypt and Syria and the courage and new capabilities demonstrated by their adversaries. After a period of days in which serious defeat seemed likely, Israel had rallied, with the support of American arms, and was on its way to victory, having encircled 20,000 troops of the Egyptian army. Israel then made the hard choice to release the Egyptian forces, prodded by Nixon and Kissinger, enabling the war to end. The Yom Kippur War allowed Anwar Sadat to erase the humiliation of Egypt’s defeat six years earlier. It gave him the stature, confidence, and impetus to make his historic trip to Jerusalem in November 1977.

  Now, just a few months after Sadat’s trip, the Senate would consider President Carter’s request for advanced weapons for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. Javits was impressed by Carter’s sincere commitment to seeking Middle East peace but worried that Carter’s approach may be naïve. The aircraft for Egypt did not trouble him much—the F-5Es were not very advanced and posed little threat. It was Saudi Arabia that bothered him, in large part because Saudi Arabia’s blanket embargo of Israel extended to even American Jews who worked for U.S. companies doing business in Saudi Arabia. But he had made his first trip to Saudi Arabia in early 1977 and came away impressed with the unexpected openness of the Saudi royal family. They seemed much more concerned with external threats such as Iraq, rather than Israel or the danger of internal dissent.

  With t
he sands seemingly shifting in the Middle East, Javits decided that he could support selling airplanes to Egypt and even Saudi Arabia. But he opposed Carter’s decision to package the arm sales to the three countries together. To Javits, as well as to other senators, the decision undermined the special relationship between the United States and Israel, which could only weaken Israel’s security and confidence. Javits couldn’t help but wonder if Carter was attempting to send a message not to the Arab nations but to Menachem Begin that the United States was moving to a more evenhanded policy in the Middle East that would no longer favor Israel. Until Carter could convince him otherwise, Javits remained opposed.

  Another key player in the legislative battle would be Scoop Jackson, who supported Israel as fervently as he opposed the Soviet Union. He had great stature in Israel because of his untiring efforts to help Russian Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union. He was dead set against Carter’s proposal. Meanwhile AIPAC was gearing up very effectively to lobby against the package, using both direct lobbying and grassroots efforts to generate communications from concerned Jews all over the country. The battle promised to be a fierce and uphill struggle for Carter and the supporters of the proposed arms sales.

  IT WAS DIFFICULT TO see how the Carter administration could possibly convince the Senate to give the green light to the arms sale package in view of the combined opposition of Javits, Jackson, and AIPAC. Carter remained adamantly opposed to separating the arms sales into three separate deals, and with his characteristic doggedness, certitude, and aversion to compromise, he also opposed changing the package to make it more salable. However, the Panama Canal battle had given at least some members of the Carter White House team valuable lessons on how to deal with the Senate. Despite the president’s reluctance, his administration began communicating with the three senators who had been most decisive in the Panama Canal fight: Byrd, Baker, and Church.

  Baker again played a critical role. His former Senate colleague from Tennessee, Bill Brock, now chairman of the Republican National Committee, believed that opposing the arms sale was best for the security of Israel, as well as good politics, because Jewish voters, thinking that Carter had endangered Israel, might start voting Republican. Bob Packwood, who chaired the Republican Senate Campaign Committee, felt the same way. Baker, however, feared the Saudis would abandon their presently moderate position, and that America would be breaching a trust with Sadat, who had repeatedly shown his commitment to peace. Baker made it known to the White House that he would support the arms sale, but only if it contained some concessions to Israel.

  Baker was also talking with Ribicoff. Not only were they close friends, they had also traveled to the Middle East together in November 1976. At the request of the White House, Ribicoff had made a quick trip to Saudi Arabia to assess the importance of the arms sale, its impact on U.S.-Saudi relations, and the prospects for Middle East peace. Upon his return, based on his trip, Ribicoff found himself in agreement with Baker’s approach. Once they had agreed upon principles, they approached Church and Javits, asking them to reconsider the matter.

  Baker took soundings in the Republican caucus, and found that the majority would support the arms sales package if changes were made. He informed President Carter that the sale would not be approved in its original form but told the president: “If you want to work this out, I’m willing to try.” While reaching out to the White House and his Senate colleagues, Baker also enlisted Henry Kissinger, to gain his support for a modified package. Although out of power, Kissinger maintained great credibility with respect to the Middle East because his shuttle diplomacy had helped conclude the Yom Kippur War in a way that allowed all combatants some modicum of face-saving success.

  On May 9, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sent a seven-page letter to the Foreign Relations Committee, setting forth important changes in, and clarifications to, the arms sales package negotiated with Baker. Brown stated that Saudi Arabia had agreed that it would not add special auxiliary fuel tanks to expand the range of its planes; would not transfer the planes to any other nation or permit any foreign national to be trained to fly the planes; and would use the planes only for defensive purposes. The Saudis also specifically committed that the F-15s would not be kept at Tabuk, the airfield in northwestern Saudi Arabia only 250 miles from Jerusalem, from which the F-15s could carry large bomb loads over most Israeli territory, including the port of Eilat on which Israel depended for oil imports. Brown also pledged that Israel would receive twenty additional F-15s. The changes Brown outlined addressed most of core concerns of Senate opponents to the arms sales package.

  Church, who had agreed to see if a consensus could be found on the committee, began lobbying his colleagues vigorously on behalf of the package with Brown’s amendments. He convinced McGovern, who had started out strongly opposed, that if Carter’s proposal was rejected, Saudi Arabia would simply buy advanced aircraft from France, without any limitations on their use. Israel would be less safe, and the U.S. relationship to Saudi Arabia would be greatly damaged.

  On May 11, the Foreign Relations Committee met in its hearing room on the fourth floor of the Dirksen Building. There is always excitement and anticipation when a committee meets on an important issue. Reporters buttonhole senators as they arrive, while staffers confer with one another, waiting for their principals to come to the table. Church and Javits whispered to each other about the recent developments. The atmosphere surrounding this markup was particularly electric because most of the committee had been so strongly opposed to Carter’s proposal; Brown’s letter was so recent that the outcome was still uncertain. Baker believed that there were eleven votes in the committee for the modified proposal, and Moshe Dayan, the legendary war hero who was Israel’s Foreign Minister, conceded the restraints offered by Secretary Brown furthered Israel’s interests. Experienced Senate hands expected that the package would win.

  They were wrong. After a passionate debate, the committee stunned the Senate and the president by deadlocking 8–8, offering no recommendation to the full Senate. Three votes that Baker had counted on had disappeared. Church’s reversal of position was most shocking. One senator described himself as “flabbergasted by that switch. One day he was lobbying people hard to go with the Administration. The next day he waltzes in and does a 180 degree turn.” Baker ruefully smiled after the surprising vote and commented: “I have a chilling feeling that this may be the start of my troubles.”

  It would be up to the full Senate to resolve the issue. White House Press Secretary Jody Powell grimly commented: “We had hoped to spare [the Senate] this ordeal.” Certainly the senators would have strongly preferred not to choose between a vote for Israel or the moderate Arab countries, which was how the vote would be portrayed by AIPAC even if the White House sought to frame it differently. But the arms sales package presented the most important Middle East vote in many years and could stand as a new beginning for the United States’ relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It was fitting that the Senate, which had fought so long to reestablish its role in major foreign policy decisions, would not duck the issue.

  EMOTIONS RAN HIGH AS the Senate met four days later. Debate began over a resolution disapproving the arms sales package, offered by Joe Biden, ordinarily one of Carter’s strongest supporters. The foreign policy issues posed by the Middle East arms sales package were serious enough, but the debate would also carry with it an ugly overtone about the role of Jewish lobbying. Gravel criticized AIPAC for turning the vote into a “litmus test” by which members would no longer receive support from Jews even if their previous voting record had been impeccable: “This vote, if it is not done properly, kisses away in the future all kinds of financial support that would inure to a candidate for office.”

  Packwood defended AIPAC’s lobbying with considerable heat, noting that Jews had the same understandable interest in the homeland of their forefathers as do “Poles, Greeks and blacks.” Packwood went on to say, “It is with sorrow and disgust, therefore, that
I hear the State Department time and again refer to the Jewish lobby or the Israeli lobby in a tone suggestive of a group which puts the interests of another country ahead of the United States.”

  But the Senate focused mainly on the difficult questions about what substantive U.S. policy was best suited to advancing American interests in the security of Israel and peace in the troubled region. Javits, who had signaled a willingness to consider a compromise if the number of planes sold to Israel was dramatically increased, came out strongly against the package. Calling it “the wrong issue, at the wrong time, for the wrong reason,” he added emotionally, “What do we want to do with the Israelis? Sap their vitality? Sap their morale? Cut their legs out from under them? Is that what this is all about?”

  Only a senator with both stature and a proven commitment to Israel could debate Javits and the other opponents of the arms sale. This senator was Abe Ribicoff. In an extraordinary two-hour closed session, Ribicoff took on the opponents’ arguments forcefully. “We must have the courage, we must have the guts to face a changing world,” Ribicoff intoned. “The fact is that without a stable, predictable supply of oil from Saudi Arabia . . . the West would face the worst depression of the industrial era.” Ribicoff also pointedly defined the standard that senators should use in casting their vote: the national interest of the United States, not the national interest of another country, even if it was Israel, one of our closest friends and strongest allies.